La era de la desigualdad (¿consecuencia directa del "imperialismo monetario"?) – Parte III (página 5)
The United States, where out-of-work transfers were
relatively modest before the crisis, has done much more to
strengthen income support in a counter-cyclical manner. The
country"s transfer system directs a large share of working-age
cash payments towards low-earning working families. To address
the social risks of such a policy configuration when more and
more people were finding themselves jobless for long periods, the
United States combined a number of swift discretionary policy
measures with "automatic" policy changes that extended
unemployment insurance and safety-net benefits during the
downturn, albeit from a comparatively low level (Immervoll and
Richardson, 2013). Canada also combined discretionary and
automatic policy adjustments. Although discretionary measures
accounted for the majority of additional spending in both
countries, the automatic benefit extensions described in Section
2 made support significantly more counter-cyclical, and it
directed extra support to economically more fragile regions.
Importantly, such automatic provisions also strengthen the
credibility of expenditure reductions in line with the recovery.
These experiences are relevant to countries considering how to
adapt social support systems more readily to variations in
economic circumstances and household needs.
Striking the right balance between benefit recipients"
rights and responsibilities is one way to make transfers more
responsive to labour-market conditions. Job-search requirements
and activation measures help ensure that benefit expenditures
decline when labour demand picks up. They also allow benefit
administrations some room for manoeuvre to make benefits more
accessible (e.g. by tailoring eligibility criteria to
labour-market conditions) when job prospects are poor or when
increasing numbers of jobseekers have no recent work experience.
Moreover, activation policies contribute to better targeting by
making support conditional on job-search efforts (Immervoll,
2012; OECD, 2013g). If well designed, such targeting can, in
turn, create the fiscal space, and possibly the political
support, that is needed to ensure support for individuals and
families who require it.
Yet, a credible commitment to counter-cyclical
redistribution rests on consistency between social spending and
the revenues that finance them. In the United States, the
pre-crisis boom years saw a budgetary and arguably a political
marginalization of first-tier transfers (unemployment insurance)
and second-tier benefits (e.g. Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF)) for workless individuals and households.20 At a
time when the recovery is still weak and poverty high, the
pre-crisis erosion of revenue sources produced by pro-cyclical
tax reductions (notably in the case of unemployment insurance
funds) has now created strong pressures for across-the-board
budget cuts and specific benefit cuts at state and federal
levels.
Unemployment benefit, general social assistance, and
active labour market programmes together account for an average
of less than 10% of public social spending in the OECD. However,
the downturn placed heavy additional demands on them. Even in the
current economic context, margins for savings are still narrow
and, ideally, reductions in benefit duration and recipient
numbers should be paced to match recovery. Governments can
improve both fiscal and social sustainability by committing to
funding with a long view in order to balance finances across the
economic cycle and maintain effective income support during
extended downturns.
Structural policy reforms need to continue and be
fiscally and socially sustainable
Key structural reforms of pensions and health care
systems begun before the crisis should continue. Pensions and
health care each account for 30% of total public spending in the
OECD on average, and successful reforms in these areas create the
fiscal space that enables governments to provide disadvantaged
groups with adequate support, notably in the context of often
rapid population ageing. Structural health care reforms should
focus on identifying and reducing unnecessary supply of services
and on savings through efficiency gains. Untargeted cuts, for
example in the form of higher co-payments, should be avoided as
they restrict access to health services for the most
vulnerable.
As for pensions, short-term and temporary reforms -like
freezing benefit levels- have an immediate impact on public
finances. But they may also heighten the risk of poverty among
the low-income elderly unless supplementary measures are taken in
parallel. Structural reforms that seek to restore the long-term
sustainability of pension systems -e.g. raising retirement ages
and lengthening contribution periods- can achieve greater
savings, albeit with a longer time lag. While short-term fiscal
pressures may cast the spotlight on certain elements of public
pension provision, it is important to consider retirement income
more broadly. The economic crisis has already had a serious
effect on households. And it will not end there. It will also
affect the retirement situation of the current working-age
population. Across all spending areas, an overarching challenge
is to identify reforms that are effective in alleviating the
impact of economic crises on both households and government
budgets, not only now, but for later years as
well…
3. General Context Indicators (Reproducción
parcial)
Household income
In 2010 half of the people in Mexico had incomes of less
than USD 4 500. Half of the people in Luxembourg had incomes
about eight times higher (Figure 3.1, Panel A). Countries with
low household income included countries in Southern Europe,
Turkey and much of Eastern Europe, as well as two Latin American
countries -Chile and Mexico. Those with higher household incomes
included Norway and Switzerland.
In most OECD countries incomes from work and capital
(i.e. market income) fell considerably between 2007 and 2010
(Figure 3.1, Panel B). Higher unemployment and lower real wages
brought down household market income, particularly in Estonia,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain (5% or
more per year). By contrast, market income increased
significantly in Chile and Poland as well as to a lower extent in
Austria, Germany and the Slovak Republic. On average, between
2007 and 2010, real household disposable income declined by much
less than the market income (-0.5%), thanks to the effect of
public cash transfers and personal income taxes. At the same
time, incomes from work and capital fell by 2% per
year.
Figure 3.2 focuses on the top and bottom 10% of the
population. While on average across OECD countries real average
household disposable income and the average income of the top 10%
remained almost stable, the income of the bottom 10% fell by 2%
per year over the period 2007 to 2010.
Out of the 33 countries where data are available, the
top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% in 21 countries.
This pattern was particularly strong in some of the countries
where household income decreased the most. In Italy and Spain,
while the income of the top 10% remained broadly stable, the
average income of the poorest 10% in 2010 was much lower than in
2007. Incomes of poorer households also fell by more than 5%
annually in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Mexico. Among
these countries, Iceland was the only one where the decrease in
average annual income at the top (-13%) exceeded that of the
bottom (-8%).
Figure notes: Figures 3.1, Panel B and 3.2: 2007 refers
to 2006 for Chile and Japan. 2008 for Australia, Finland, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and
the United States. 2010 refers to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New
Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey. 2011 for Chile.
4. Self-sufficiency indicators -ELF-
(Reproducción parcial)
Employment
Access to paid work is crucial for people"s ability to
support themselves. On average, two out of three working age
adults in the OECD area are employed (Figure 4.1, Panel A). In
Iceland and Switzerland about eight out of ten are employed,
compared to about one out of two in Greece and Turkey. Gender
differences in employment rates are small in the Nordic
countries, but such differences tend to be largest in Chile,
Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
The economic crisis has had a large impact on the
employment rates in many countries (Figure 4.1, Panel B). On
average, the employment rate declined by 1 percentage point in
the OECD area from mid-2007 to mid-2013, but the variation across
countries is large. While the rates dropped by 10 or more
percentage points in Greece and Spain; Chile, Israel and Turkey
experienced an increase of 5 or more percentage points over the
same period.
Women have improved their relative position in the
labour market compared to men (Figure 4.1, Panel B). Only in
Estonia, Korea and Poland, was the change in the employment rate
the same for both sexes. In spite of this relatively more
favourable development for women, the long-term increasing trend
in female employment rates came to a halt in OECD countries after
the onset of the crisis.
While employment has dropped, part-time work has
increased in many countries. Even if these people avoid
unemployment, the consequence for many of them is
under-employment and reduced incomes. Involuntary part time as a
share of total employment has increased substantially in Ireland,
Italy and Spain following the onset of the crisis (Figure 4.2).
The increase has been strongest for women, where involuntary
part-time reached about 14% of total employment in Italy and
Spain in 2012. But also in Australia and Ireland, about 10% of
women worked involuntarily in part-time jobs. For men, the share
of involuntary part-time was about 5% in Ireland and Spain in
2012.
Immigrants" employment thus seems to be more sensitive
to economic conditions than that of the natives. On average, the
change in employment rates for the foreign-born between 2007 and
2012 was approximately the same as for the native-born (Figure
4.3).This, however, hides large differences across countries. In
those countries which experienced the sharpest drop in employment
rates of the native-born (Greece, Ireland and Spain),
foreign-born fared even worse than the natives. In contrast, in
countries with increasing employment rates, such as Germany,
there was a larger increase in the employment rates of the
foreign-born than among the natives.
Figure notes: Figure 4.1: Panel A: Data for the Russian
Federation are annual and refer to 2012. Data for Mexico refer to
Q1 2013. Panel B: Data for South Africa refer to Q1 2007. Figure
4.2: Data for Switzerland refer to 2010 instead of 2012.
Countries are ranked in increasing order of the percentage point
change of the total population. Figure 4.3: Data refer to 2008
instead of 2007 for Canada, Germany and Ireland; and to Q2 2007
for Switzerland.
Unemployment
Record high unemployment rates in a number of countries
have put stress on the benefit systems (see "Recipients of
out-of-work benefits" indicator). Unemployment, and particularly
long-term unemployment, may also harm career chances in the
future, reduce life satisfaction and increase social costs.
Establishment in the labour market for youth has become more
difficult, while older unemployed often have problems re-entering
the workforce.
During the second quarter of 2013, the highest
unemployment rates in the OECD were in Greece and Spain – eight
times higher than the lowest unemployment rate, in
Korea
(Figure 4.4, Panel A). The average unemployment rate of
9.1% in the OECD covers a wide diversity. Austria, Japan, Korea,
Norway and Switzerland had an unemployment rate below 5%. As many
as ten countries had an unemployment rate above 10%.
The economic crisis has had a strong, but varied impact
on unemployment rates (Figure 4.4, Panel B). The average OECD
unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points between
mid-2007 and mid-2013. Greece and Spain were hit particularly
hard, seeing an increase of above 18 percentage points. Increases
of more than 5 percentage points were also observed in Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. Countries which succeeded in
reducing their unemployment rates included Chile, Germany,
Israel, Korea and Turkey.
In most countries, male unemployment has been more
affected by the crisis than female unemployment. The gender
difference is particularly strong in countries such as Ireland,
Portugal and Spain, where the contraction of the construction
industry is a major factor driving the increased unemployment.
High representation of women in the public sector can also be one
explanation why women have fared better than men during the
crisis in many countries. However, women in Estonia, Luxembourg
and Turkey had a stronger increase in the unemployment rates than
men.
Long-term unemployment has increased in many countries.
The share of people unemployed for one year or more as a
percentage of the total unemployment has increased the most in
Ireland, Spain and the United States (Figure 4.5), and by as much
as 30 percentage points in Ireland. Mid-2013, six out of ten
unemployed were out of work for one year or more in Greece,
Ireland and the Slovak Republic. The share of long-term
unemployed decreased by 10 percentage points or more in Germany
and Poland. In spite of the positive achievements, long-term
unemployment still accounts for more than 40% of total
unemployment in Germany and Poland.
Youth have been hit particularly hard by the
deteriorated labour market situation (see also the "NEETs""
indicator). The unemployment rate for young people aged 15-24
increased by 20 percentage points or more from mid-2007 to
mid-2013 in Greece, Portugal and Spain (Figure 4.6). At the OECD
level, the rate increased by 7 percentage points during the same
period. Mid-2013, more than 50% of the age group was out of work
in Greece and Spain. At the other end of the scale, youth
unemployment rates dropped in Austria, Chile, Germany, Israel and
Turkey. Germany, Japan and Switzerland had mid-2013 the lowest
unemployment rate for this age group, at about 7%.
Figure note: Figure 4.4, Panel A: Data for the Russian
Federation are annual and refer to 2012.
Youth neither in employment, education nor training
(NEETs)
Participation in employment, education or training is
important for youth to become established in the labour market
and achieve self-sufficiency. Record high unemployment rates in a
number of countries have hit youth especially hard. In addition,
inactivity rates of youth are substantial in many countries,
meaning that they are neither employed, nor registered as
unemployed, in education or in training.
More than 20% of all youth aged 15/16-24 were unemployed
or inactive, and neither in education nor in training (NEET) in
Greece, Italy, Mexico and Turkey in the fourth quarter of 2012
(Figure 4.7, Panel A). The lowest rates were observed in Denmark,
Iceland, the Netherlands and Switzerland, with rates of 6% or
lower. The average NEET rate in the OECD area was about
13%.
The NEET rate has increased in most OECD countries since
the onset of the economic crisis (Figure 4.7, Panel B). From the
fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2012, the
increase was strongest in Greece, Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy and
Spain. On the other hand, there were also some countries where
the NEET rates dropped. The decrease was particularly strong in
the Czech Republic and Turkey. The higher NEET rates in many
counties can mainly be explained by increased unemployment. At
the average OECD level, the inactivity rate declined by 1
percentage point, and in most countries the rate declined or
increased moderately.
On average across OECD countries, the NEET rates for the
broader 15-29 age group are higher for people with low education
levels than for those with high education (Figure 4.8). The gap
is highest in Belgium, Mexico and the United Kingdom. The share
of 15-24 year-olds who are unemployed or inactive and neither in
education nor in training is higher for foreign-born than for
natives (Figure 4.9). Exceptions are Hungary, Ireland and the
United Kingdom. The impact of the crises on the NEET rates is
relatively similar for foreign-born and natives in most
countries. In the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg,
Norway and Slovenia, were the relative change in the rates for
foreign-born larger than for natives.
The NEET rates in emerging economies are generally high
(Figure 4.7, Panel A). In India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa,
more than 20% of the population aged 15/16-24 were unemployed or
inactive and neither in education nor in training in the fourth
quarter of 2012.
Figure notes: Figure 4.7: Detailed data are not
available for South Africa. Argentina and Brazil: Selected urban
areas only. Saudi Arabia and China: May include some unemployed
people who are students. Figure 4.8: For Japan, data refer to
15-24 year-olds. Figure 4.9: The results for NEET in Europe are
overestimated because they are based on three quarters, including
summertime, when under declaration of school enrolment of
students is commonly observed. Data are sorted by increasing rate
of unemployment for the foreign-born population.
Education spending
On average, OECD countries spent USD 9 300 per child per
year from primary through tertiary education in 2010 (Figure
4.12, Panel A). Spending was highest in the United States with
just over USD 15 000 per child, followed closely by Switzerland.
On the opposite end, spending was USD 5 000 or less in Chile and
Mexico. Spending was also relatively low (around USD 6 000) in
several Eastern European countries.
The crisis has halted the long-term trend of increasing
spending in education. While public spending as a percentage of
GDP for all levels of education increased by 8% between 2008 and
2009 on average across OECD countries, it fell by 1.5% between
2009 and 2010 (Figure 4.12, Panel B). Public expenditures on
educational institutions as a percentage of GDP decreased in
two-thirds of those OECD countries for which data are available,
most likely as a consequence of fiscal consolidation policies.
Drops of more than 4% were seen in Estonia, Hungary, Iceland,
Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.
On average across the OECD countries, less investment
was put into early education as compared to later years, with
spending per child amounting to USD 6 800 at the preprimary
level, USD 8 000 at the primary level, USD 9 000 at the secondary
level and USD 13 500 at the tertiary level (Figure 4.13). These
averages mask a broad range of expenditure per student by
educational institutions across the OECD countries, varying by a
factor of 9 at the pre-primary level, 11 at the primary level, 7
at the secondary level and 4 at the tertiary level.
In 2010, public funding accounted for 84% of all funds
for educational institutions, on average across the OECD
countries (Figure 4.14). It varied from around 60% in Chile and
Korea to over 95% in Finland and Sweden. The share of public
funding decreased from 2000 to 2010. The decline was remarkable
for tertiary institutions, from 76% in 2000 to 68% in 2010. This
trend is mainly influenced by non- European countries, where
tuition fees are generally higher and enterprises participate
more actively in providing grants to finance tertiary
education.
Argentina, Brazil and Russian Federation (emerging
economies for which data are available) all had education
spending comparable to the low-spending OECD countries (Figure
4.12, Panel A).
Figure notes: Figure 4.12: Level of spending not
available for Canada, Germany, Greece and Turkey.
Figure 4.13: 2009-10 change not available for Canada,
Germany, Greece, Turkey, Argentina and Brazil; Figure 4.14:
Pre-primary data not available in 2010.
Equity indicators
(Reproducción parcial)
Income inequality
Income inequality is an indicator of how material
resources are distributed across society. Some people consider
that high levels of income inequality are morally undesirable.
Others regard income inequality as harmful for instrumental
reasons – seeing it as causing conflict, limiting co-operation or
creating psychological and physical health stresses (Wilkinson
and Pickett, 2009). Often the policy concern is focused more on
the direction of change of inequality, rather than its
level.
Income inequality varied considerably across the OECD
countries in 2010 (Figure 5.1, Panel A). The Gini coefficient
ranges from 0.24 in Iceland to approximately twice that value in
Chile and Mexico. The Nordic and central European countries have
the lowest inequality in disposable income while inequality is
high in Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey and the United States.
Alternative indicators of income inequality suggest similar
rankings. The gap between the average income of the richest and
the poorest 10% of the population was almost 10 to 1 on average
across OECD countries in 2010, ranging from 5 to 1 in Denmark,
Iceland and Slovenia to almost six times larger (29 to 1) in
Mexico.
Keeping measurement-related differences in mind,
emerging countries have higher levels of income inequality than
OECD countries, particularly in Brazil and South Africa.
Comparable data from the early 1990s suggest that inequality
increased in Asia, decreased in Latin America and remained very
high in South Africa.
The distribution of income from work and capital (market
income, pre-taxes and transfers) widened considerably during the
first phase of the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, market income
inequality rose by 1 percentage point or more in 18 OECD
countries (markers in Figure 5.1, Panel B). The increase was
particularly large in Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Japan and Spain,
but also in France and Slovenia. On the other hand, market income
inequality fell in Poland and, to a smaller extent, in the
Netherlands.
The distribution of income that households "take home"
(disposable income, post-taxes and transfers) remained unchanged
on average, due to the effect of cash public transfers and
personal taxes. Between 2007 and 2010, the Gini coefficient for
disposable income remained broadly stable in most OECD countries
(bars in Figure 5.1, Panel B). It fell the most in Iceland, New
Zealand, Poland and Portugal, and increased the most in France,
the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. Overall, the welfare state
prevented inequality from going from bad to worse during the
first phase of the crisis.
Income inequality increased especially at the top of the
distribution: the share of pre-tax income of the top 1% earners
more than doubled their share from 1985 to 2010 in the United
Kingdom and the United States (Figure 5.2). In Spain and Sweden,
the data show a clear upward trend albeit less marked than in
English-speaking countries. The upward tendency is also less
marked in France, Japan and most continental European countries.
Overall, the economic 2007/08 crisis has brought about a fall in
top income shares in many countries, but this fall appears to be
of a temporary nature.
Figure notes: Figure 5.1: Gini coefficients refer to
2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for
Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for
Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for
Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key
partners are for 2008/09. Gini coefficients are based on
equivalized incomes for OECD countries and the Russian Federation
and per capita incomes for all key partners except India and
Indonesia for which per capita consumption was used.
Poverty
Poverty rates measure the share of people at the bottom
end of the income distribution. Often a society"s equity concerns
are greater for the relatively disadvantaged. Thus poverty
measures generally receive more attention than income inequality
measures, with greater concerns for certain groups like older
people and children, since they have no or limited options for
working their way out of poverty.
The average OECD relative poverty rate in 2010 was 11%
for the OECD (Figure 5.3, Panel A). Poverty rates were highest at
above 20% in Israel and Mexico, while poverty in the Czech
Republic and Denmark affected only about one in 20 people.
Anglophone and Mediterranean countries and Chile, Japan and Korea
have relatively high poverty rates.
The initial phase of the crisis had a limited impact on
relative income poverty (i.e. the share of people living with
less than half the median income in their country
annually).
Between 2007 and 2010, poverty increased by more than 1
percentage point only in Italy, the Slovak Republic, Spain and
Turkey (bars in Figure 5.3, Panel B). Over the same period, it
fell in Chile, Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom, while
changes were below 1 percentage point in the other OECD
countries.
By using an indicator which measures poverty against a
benchmark "anchored" to half the median real incomes observed in
2005 (i.e. keeping constant the value of the 2005 poverty line),
recent increases in income poverty are much higher than suggested
by "relative" income poverty. This is particularly the case in
Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico and Spain
("diamond" symbols in Figure 5.3, Panel B). While relative
poverty did not increase much or even fell in these countries,
"anchored" poverty increased by 2 percentage points or more
between 2007 and 2010, reflecting disposable income losses of
poorer households in those countries. Only in Belgium, Germany,
Israel and Poland did "anchored" poverty fall at the same time as
relative poverty stagnated or increased.
Households with children and youth were hit particularly
hard during the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, average relative
income poverty in OECD countries rose from
12.8 to 13.4% among children (0-18) and from 12.2 to
13.8% among youth (18-25). Meanwhile, relative income poverty
fell from 15.1 to 12.5% among the elderly. This pattern confirms
the trends described in previous OECD studies, with youth and
children replacing the elderly as the group at greater risk of
income poverty across the OECD countries.
Since 2007, child poverty increased considerably in 16
OECD countries, with increases exceeding 2 percentage points in
Belgium, Hungary, Italy Slovenia, Spain and Turkey (Figure 5.4).
On the other hand, child poverty fell by more than 2 percentage
points in Portugal and the United Kingdom. At the same time,
youth poverty increased considerably in 19 OECD
countries.
In contrast to other age groups, the elderly have been
relatively immune to rises in relative income poverty during the
crisis. In the three years prior to 2010, poverty among the
elderly fell in 20 out of 32 countries, and increased by 2
percentage points or more only in Canada, Korea, Poland and
Turkey. This partly reflects the fact that old age pensions were
less affected by the recession. In many countries (at least until
2010), pensions were largely exempted from the cuts implemented
as part of fiscal consolidation.
Figure notes: Figures 5.3 and 5.4: Data refer to 2009
for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile
instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for
Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for
Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key
partners are for 2008/09, changes are not available.
Living on benefits
Most OECD countries operate transfer programmes that aim
at preventing extreme hardship and employ a low income criterion
as the central entitlement condition. These guaranteed
minimum-income benefits (GMI) provide financial support for
low-income families and aim to ensure an acceptable standard of
living. As such, they play a crucial role as last-resort safety
nets, especially during prolonged economic downturns when
long-term unemployment rises and increasing numbers of people
exhaust their entitlements for unemployment benefits.
In a large majority of OECD countries, incomes for the
long-term unemployed are much lower than for the recently
unemployed (Figure 5.6). Making GMI benefits more accessible is
key to maintaining a degree of income security for the long-term
unemployed. In addition, rising numbers of people who have
neither a job nor an unemployment benefit means that the
generosity of GMI benefits is likely to receive more public
attention.
Benefits of last resort are sometimes significantly
lower than commonly used poverty thresholds (Figure 5.5). Poverty
avoidance or alleviation is primary objectives of GMI programmes.
When comparing benefit generosity across countries, a useful
starting point is to look at benefit levels relative to commonly
used poverty thresholds.
The gap between benefit levels and poverty thresholds is
very large in some countries. In a few countries there is no
generally applicable GMI benefit (Greece, Italy and Turkey). For
GMI recipients living in rented accommodation, housing-related
cash benefits can provide significant further income assistance,
bringing overall family incomes close to or somewhat above the
poverty line (Denmark, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom).
However, family incomes in these cases depend strongly on the
type of housing, the rent paid and also on the family situation.
In all countries, income from sources other than public transfers
is needed to avoid substantial poverty risks.
On average across OECD countries, GMI benefit levels
have changed little since the onset of the economic and financial
crisis. The real value of these benefits was largely the same in
2011 as in 2007. Most countries, including those with significant
fiscal consolidation programmes, have so far not reduced benefit
levels for the poorest. However, at the same time, countries that
were especially hard-hit by the crisis and where GMI were
non-existent or very low, have not taken major measures to
strengthen benefit adequacy (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and
the United States).
Social spending
In 2012-13, public social spending averaged an estimated
21.9% of GDP across the 34 OECD countries (Figure 5.7, Panel A).
In general, public spending is high in continental and northern
European countries, while it is below the OECD average in most
countries in Eastern Europe and outside Europe. Belgium, Denmark,
Finland and France spent more than 30% of GDP on social
expenditures. By contrast, Korea and Mexico spent less than 10%
of GDP. Social spending in the emerging economies in the late
2000s was lower than the OECD average, ranging from around 2% in
Indonesia to about 15-16% in Brazil and the Russian Federation
(Figure 5.7, Panel A).
Public social spending in per cent of GDP increased in
all OECD countries with the exception of Hungary from 2007-08 to
2012-13 (Figure 5.7, Panel B). The growth fully took place during
the period 2007-08, as a response to increased unemployment and
other consequences of the economic crisis. In this initial phase,
Estonia and Ireland had the strongest increase in expenditure
shares. From 2009-10 to 2012-13, fiscal consolidation reduced
public social spending. Nearly two-thirds of the OECD countries
reduced social spending in this period. The real drop in public
social spending in some countries is larger than indicated by
change in the shares of GDP, since the level of GDP also fell.
Indeed in some countries, the rise of the ratio of public social
spending in GDP is explained largely by the fact that GDP
declined.
On average in the OECD, pensions, health services and
income support to the working-age population and other social
services each amount to roughly one-third of the total
expenditures. In a majority of OECD countries, pensions are the
largest expenditure area (Figure 5.8). In Anglophone countries
and most other countries outside of Europe, health dominates
public social expenditure. In a few countries, such as Denmark,
Ireland and Norway, the largest share is devoted to income
support of the working age population.
Accounting for the impact of taxation and private social
benefits (Figure 5.8) leads to a convergence of spending to- GDP
ratios across countries. Net total social spending is 22-28% of
GDP in many countries. It is even higher for the United States at
29% of GDP, where the amount of private social spending and tax
incentives is much larger than in other countries.
In Europe, people seem to be most satisfied with the
health care provisions and less satisfied with the pension
provisions, unemployment benefits and the way inequality and
poverty are addressed (Figure 5.9). Satisfaction with health care
provisions is highest in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with pension
provisions is highest in Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with how inequality
and poverty are addressed is in general quite low.
Figure notes: Figure 5.7, Panel A: Data refer to 2009
for Turkey, 2010 for Japan, 2012 for Chile, Korea, and Mexico and
to the last years available for key partners. Figure 5.8: Income
support to the working-age population refers to cash benefits
towards incapacity, family, unemployment and other social policy
areas. Data for Israel concern public social spending only. Total
net social expenditure data are not available for Hungary,
Greece, Switzerland and Turkey. Data for Switzerland refer to
2008.
Recipients of out-of-work benefits
Cash transfers for working-age people provide a major
income safety net in periods of high unemployment. In most
countries two different layers of support can be distinguished: a
primary out-of-work benefit (generally unemployment insurance
benefits); and a secondary benefit (unemployment assistance or
minimum-income benefits such as social assistance) for those who
are not or no longer entitled to insurance benefits.
In 2010, the shares of working-age individuals receiving
primary out-of-work benefits were highest in Iceland, France,
Finland, Spain and the United States, with rates of around 5% or
more (Figure 5.10, Panel A). At the other end of the spectrum,
only about 1% in Japan, Korea, Slovak Republic and Chile received
unemployment insurance benefits. There is no nation-wide
unemployment insurance programme in Mexico and recipient data are
not available for Greece and Turkey.
The large variation in the numbers in part reflects
labour market conditions and partly the design of social benefit
systems. Low participation in unemployment insurance programmes
reduces coverage among the unemployed. An example is Chile, where
unemployment insurance is organized as an individual saving
scheme. In Sweden, where unemployment insurance membership is
voluntary, recipient numbers dropped despite rising unemployment.
Benefit receipt increased most in Iceland, Estonia, United
States, Ireland and Spain, all countries where unemployment
soared during the economic crisis.
Receipt of secondary out-of-work benefits generally
increased by much less between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 5.11, Panel
B). Rising long-term unemployment and increasing joblessness
among people without access to insurance benefits led, however,
to a substantial rise in Ireland and Spain (unemployment
assistance), and in the United States (Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program, SNAP). Receipt rates dropped somewhat in the
Czech Republic and in France, as well as in some countries with
more favourable labour-market developments (Australia, Germany,
Poland).
By 2010, receipt of secondary benefits was highest in
Ireland, Mexico and the United States (Figure 5.11, Panel A) and
lowest in Belgium, Israel and Japan. The composition of these
safety nets differs across countries. Social assistance dominates
in Mexico (Oportunidades) and the United States (SNAP and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF). Unemployment
assistance is important in Ireland, Germany, Spain, Finland and
the United Kingdom. Australia, Iceland and New Zealand also
provide targeted income support to a large number of lone
parents. In Germany, the largely unchanged number of recipients
during a period of falling unemployment suggests that reducing
safety-net beneficiary numbers can be difficult.
Figure notes: Secondary out-of-work benefits for a
number of countries are not shown due to missing information. In
the United Kingdom, insured jobseekers can receive a flat-rate
benefit during the first six months of unemployment, which
becomes means-tested afterwards. The split between these two
categories was not available and total beneficiary numbers are
indicated both as primary and secondary benefits.
Social cohesion
indicators (Reproducción parcial)
Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction is determined not only by economic
development, but also by people"s diverse experiences and living
conditions. People in Norway and Switzerland are most satisfied
with their lives (Figure 7.1, Panel A). The measured level in
these countries was 3 steps higher than in Hungary, the country
at the bottom of the 11-step ladder in 2012.
There are broad regional or cultural country groupings
of life satisfaction. Four of the top five countries are Nordic.
Continental Western and Eastern European OECD members are not
particularly satisfied with their lives, with the notable
exceptions of Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and
the Netherlands. Predominantly Anglophone OECD countries are all
in the top half of the list when measuring life satisfaction, and
follow in a tight group after the predominately Nordic top
cluster.
Life satisfaction deteriorated during the first years of
the crisis between 2007 and 2012, particularly in European
Mediterranean countries. Indeed life satisfaction dropped mostly
in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, followed by the United
States (Figure 7.1, Panel B). On the other hand, life
satisfaction improved most in non-European countries, in Chile
and Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Nordic and Eastern European
countries.
Life satisfaction levels for men and women across OECD
countries are highly correlated (Figure 7.2). In countries where
life satisfaction is high, both men and women tend to have higher
life satisfaction than in countries where the levels are
lower.
On average across OECD countries, women report slightly
higher levels of life satisfaction than men do.
On average, the level of life satisfaction decreases
with age (Figure 7.3). Beyond the OECD average, life satisfaction
is "u-shaped" in some countries, increasing from about the age of
55. It is not surprising to see that on average 25-34 year-olds
(entering the labour market) and 50+ (leaving the labour market)
reported lower levels of life satisfaction in 2012 than in 2007.
According to related data for Europe, groups who tended to see
the greatest deterioration in incomes and labour-market prospects
are more likely to have low levels of subjective
well-being.
As for emerging economies, life satisfaction also varies
between them, from above 6 in Argentina, Brazil and Saudi Arabia,
to below 5 in India and South Africa. Between 2007 and 2012, it
increased in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia
and the Russian Federation), and it decreased in three countries
(India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa).
Figure notes: Figure 7.1: Data refer to 2011 for Chile
instead of 2012; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic
and Slovenia, average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria, Finland,
Ireland, Norway and Portugal, and 2008 for Iceland and
Luxembourg.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3: Data refer to 2011 for Brazil and
Chile and 2009 for Switzerland; and instead of 2007: 2006 for
Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland; average between 2006
and 2008 for Austria,
Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal; 2008 for
Iceland and Portugal; and 2009 for Luxembourg.
Confidence in institutions
A cohesive society is one where citizens have confidence
in national-level institutions and believe that social and
economic institutions are not prey to corruption. Confidence and
corruption issues are dimensions which are strongly related to
societal trust.
Confidence in the national government is generally high
in Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, while it is low in
the Czech Republic, Greece and Japan. Large differences can be
observed across countries (Figure 7.7, Panel A).
In a majority of OECD countries, trust in national
governments declined from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.7, Panel B). The
decline was particularly large in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and
Slovenia, all countries hit hard by the crisis. However, other
countries experienced a substantial increase in trust, notably
Israel, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.
Youth tended to have more trust in national governments
than the total population, and their confidence declined less
from 2007 to 2012. This could be the consequence of less
political involvement, but also that youth are more optimistic
about the future.
The economic crisis from 2008 was closely related to the
crisis in the financial sector. In most OECD countries,
confidence in financial institutions fell from 2007 to 2012
(Figure 7.8). Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain
and the United States experienced the most substantial drops in
confidence. Only in Iceland, Japan and Norway can a positive
change be observed.
Corruption can be a sign of the degree of informality
and distrust in the economy. Countries which suffered the biggest
declines in GDP from 2007 to 2012 were also among those where
corruption had increased (Figure 7.9). Increase in corruption was
particularly high in countries such as Estonia, Greece, Ireland
and Portugal. These countries also saw a stronger decline in
confidence in the national government. Lower levels of corruption
could be seen particularly in Australia, Germany, Japan and
Mexico.
Among the emerging economies, confidence in national
governments increased in Brazil, Indonesia and the Russian
Federation, while it declined in India and South Africa. While
confidence in financial institutions in general declined in the
OECD countries, it increased in Argentina, Indonesia, the Russian
Federation and Saudi Arabia.
Figure notes: Figure 7.7: No data available for change
in China.
Figure 7.9: No data available for change in Slovenia and
Switzerland.
(Información de Hemeroteca)
– El saldo de la recesión en España: los
pobres pierden un 33% de su renta; los ricos, un 3%
(Vozpópuli – 19/3/14)
Según la OCDE, la crisis ha costado 2.600 euros
por persona a las clases más bajas mientras que apenas ha
afectado al 10% de la población más rica. El
retroceso de las rentas bajas no ha sido tan notable en
ningún otro país desarrollado. La OCDE advierte:
los recortes de desigualdad en el futuro normalmente no duran lo
suficiente para atenuar lo ya pasado.
La crisis no es igual para todos. Es lo
que denuncia la OCDE que revela que en España, la crisis
sólo existe para los pobres. Para el 10% de los
españoles más ricos, la recesión ni siquiera
ha comenzado. Según los datos de la OCDE, la
depresión económica ha costado a los
españoles más pobres unos 2.600 euros por persona
al año desde 2007, un 33% de su renta disponible. Por
el contrario, los estratos más ricos apenas han perdido
un 1% al año desde 2007 hasta sumar un 3% de
caída de renta total.
Los datos de la OCDE -agrupados en un
estudio titulado "2014: sociedad de un vistazo"- revelan que
España es uno de los países más golpeados
por la crisis (superado por Estonia, Irlanda, Grecia,
México e Islandia) pero, al mismo tiempo, desvela que ese
golpe lo han encajado unas rentas bajas que han caído como
en ningún otro país desarrollado: a ritmos del 14%
anual en algunos ejercicios.
Lo grave no es sólo la creciente desigualdad
derivada de la crisis, que ha aumentado un 3%. Lo peor es que
las ayudas públicas no sólo no están
corrigiendo sino que están agravando esa
situación. Según el análisis de la
organización internacional, el 30% de la población
más rica recibe más ayudas que el 30% de los
más pobres. Ante esa situación, la OCDE concluye:
"las prestaciones asistenciales para los desempleados de larga
duración y para las familias de trabajadores pobres deben
ser fortalecidas urgentemente".
De hecho, dado que el desempleo es la primera causa de
pobreza, el organismo internacional considera especialmente
graves los recortes de gasto en las llamadas "políticas
activas", las encaminadas a la formación y
búsqueda de empleo de los parados, que han perdido un 66%
de sus fondos entre 2007 y 2011 para caer de los 390 euros por
persona a menos de 160 euros por parado.
Por sectores de población, los
jóvenes y las familias con hijos son las que
más han sufrido el impacto de la crisis. Entre esos dos
grupos, el riesgo de pobreza ha subido de manera "particularmente
prolongada" hasta un 5% colocando a España a niveles de
Turquía o Estonia. La tasa de ni-nis,
jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan, es la quinta
más alta de toda la OCDE y, como consecuencia de ello,
España es el segundo país con mayor
número de emigrantes. Sólo los ciudadanos de
Grecia dejan más su país que los
españoles.
La OCDE adivina la reforma fiscal
Curiosamente, la OCDE -que redactó su informe
antes de que los sabios presentaran sus conclusiones al
Gobierno-adivina cuál iba a ser la propuesta de la
"comisión Lagares" y apuesta por la misma
fórmula de subida del IVA: "una posible forma de
financiar estas prestaciones asistenciales podría ser la
reducción en el número de productos o servicios que
se benefician de un IVA preferencial o que están
enteramente exentos de él". El organismo internacional -al
que los expertos del Gobierno atribuyen en su informe sus
"contribuciones clave"- asegura que "los grupos de bajos ingresos
consumen menos que los grupos de altos ingresos y, en
consecuencia, las rebanas del IVA les benefician
menos".
Ese mismo argumento ha sido plasmado en idénticos
términos por los miembros de la Comisión Lagares y
ha sido elevado al Gobierno. Tal y como publicó
Vozpópuli, la OCDE, junto al FMI y a la UE se ha
reunido hasta en seis ocasiones con los sabios para tutelar la
presentación de las reformas.
Anexo: Historias del
presente (las caras del dolor)
Informe Save the Children – 2.826.549 razones – La
protección de la infancia frente a la pobreza: un derecho,
una obligación y una inversión – 30 de enero de
2014
1. Introducción
La situación de pobreza en la que se encuentran
más de dos millones y medio de niños y niñas
en España es una situación sobre la que alertan
casi a diario las organizaciones sociales y los medios de
comunicación.
En los últimos años, la coyuntura
económica de crisis ha expuesto a muchas familias a una
disminución de sus ingresos, algo que ha disparado todos
los indicadores de pobreza y exclusión social a niveles
alarmantes. Particularmente grave es el hecho de que más
de un 30% de la población menor de 18 años se
encuentre en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión social, lo que
convierte a los niños y las niñas en el grupo de
edad más vulnerable frente a la pobreza
actualmente.
En este informe, Save the Children analiza cómo
esta situación de pobreza o exclusión social que
cuantifican los datos estadísticos se materializa en la
vida cotidiana de los niños y las niñas.
Señala el modo en que la situación de pobreza se
erige en un serio obstáculo, en ocasiones insalvable, para
el disfrute y ejercicio de derechos esenciales reconocidos en la
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. Plantea, en
definitiva, observar la situación de pobreza infantil en
España desde una perspectiva de derechos de
infancia.
Para ello resulta fundamental entender lo que nos dicen
los datos y estadísticas oficiales, así como las
diferentes organizaciones sociales que intervienen ante la
pobreza y exclusión social sobre la situación de
pobreza infantil. Pero, sobre todo, atender a cómo nos
describen su situación las familias, los niños y
las niñas, así como los profesionales que trabajan
con ellos.
La pobreza infantil no es simplemente un índice
alarmante de insuficiencia o falta de recursos económicos.
Es el contexto en el que Lucas, Eva, Javier, María, Ana,
Andrea, Hugo, Lara, Carlos, Cristina, Miguel y Manolo viven su
infancia, crecen y se preparan para su vida adulta.
Lucas, Eva, Javier, María, Ana, Andrea, Hugo,
Lara, Carlos, Cristina, Miguel y Manolo son ciudadanos del
presente y actores clave del futuro de este país, cuya
sociedad debe tomar conciencia a todos los niveles
(gubernamental, legislativo, judicial, empresarial, asociativo e
individual) de la gravedad de que vean limitada la
realización de sus derechos.
La sociedad en su conjunto debe ser consciente de la
necesidad de adoptar medidas efectivas para paliar la actual
situación garantizando el respeto, promoción y
protección de los derechos reconocidos a todos los
niños y las niñas en la Convención sobre los
Derechos del Niño.
El Estado -los poderes y administraciones
públicas- tiene la obligación de actuar como
garantes de la plena realización de estos derechos de los
que son titulares los niños y las niñas, una
obligación adquirida a nivel internacional, definida en
los tratados de Derechos Humanos. Sin embargo, su
actuación ante la actual coyuntura económica
antepone a esta obligación el cumplimiento con las
exigencias de las instituciones financieras nacionales e
internacionales. Las políticas "de austeridad"
están agravando considerablemente la situación al
restringir, aún más, la ya limitada capacidad del
modelo de protección social para dar una respuesta
adecuada a las necesidades de niños, niñas y
familias en una situación económica desfavorable.
Además, en este mismo sentido se están llevando a
cabo una serie de reformas estructurales de las políticas
y servicios sociales que resultan preocupantes porque anteponen
la eficiencia económica del modelo a la mayor
garantía posible de los derechos de la población en
general, y de los niños y las niñas en
particular.
Abordar la situación en la que viven actualmente
Lucas, Eva, Javier, María, Ana, Andrea, Hugo, Lara,
Carlos, Cristina, Miguel y Manolo, entre los más de dos
millones y medio de niños y niñas que se encuentran
en riesgo de pobreza y exclusión social en España,
requiere la adopción de medidas urgentes que garanticen el
disfrute de todos los derechos reconocidos en la
Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño.
(Nombres ficticios para proteger la identidad de los
niños, las niñas y sus familias)
"¿De verdad las cosas funcionan así?
¿Yo calculo mal al tomar una decisión, entonces
todo cambia y empieza a torcerse… y son mis hijos de 11 y
4 años quienes pagan por ello?"
Carmen, madre de Lucas y Eva
"Mamá, cuando tengas trabajo, si te queda
dinero, si puedes, me gustaría que me
compraras…"
María, 7 años
"Lo ideal sería que mi madre encontrase
trabajo, y que mejorara, estuviese más feliz… que
no se matase tanto en buscarse la vida"
Ana, 16 años
"Toma mamá, estos 30 euros del premio son
para que pagues la factura del agua"
Lara, 11 años
"La crisis, claro que afecta a las personas, y a
mí, y a todos, hay mucha gente que no trabaja y que no
tienen qué comer ni ropa para vestirse"
Cristina, 12 años
"Dado que la mayoría de los que viven en la
pobreza son niños, y que la pobreza en la infancia es una
causa básica de pobreza en la vida adulta, los derechos de
los niños deben tener prioridad. […] A fin de
erradicar la pobreza, los Estados deben adoptar medidas
inmediatas para combatir la pobreza en la
infancia"
Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona, Relatora Especial
sobre Pobreza Extrema y Derechos Humanos
"(No) proteger a los niños de la pobreza es
uno de los errores más costosos que puede cometer una
sociedad. Son los propios niños quienes asumen el mayor de
todos los costos, pero también sus países deben
pagar un muy alto precio por su error: menor nivel de
competencias y productividad, menor nivel de logros en materia de
salud y educación, mayor probabilidad de desempleo y
dependencia de la seguridad social, mayor costo de los sistemas
de protección judicial y social, y pérdida de
cohesión social. Por tanto, salvo en un enfoque de muy
corto plazo, los argumentos económicos sustentan la
protección de los niños contra la
pobreza".
Centro de Investigaciones Innocenti. UNICEF.
"El Comité de Derechos del Niño
recomendó expresamente a España "que redoble sus
esfuerzos por prestar la asistencia adecuada a los padres y
tutores legales en el ejercicio de sus responsabilidades
relacionadas con la crianza, en particular a los de familias en
situaciones de crisis debido a la pobreza, la falta de vivienda
adecuada o la separación. También le recomienda que
vele por que se satisfagan las necesidades de todos los
niños y que adopte todas las medidas necesarias para
asegurar que ningún grupo de niños viva por debajo
del umbral de la pobreza. El Comité recomienda igualmente
al Estado parte que refuerce el sistema de prestaciones
familiares y por hijo para apoyar a los padres y los niños
en general y que preste apoyo adicional a las familias
monoparentales, las que tienen muchos hijos y aquellas cuyos
padres están desempleados"
En el caso de España la tasa de riesgo de pobreza
o exclusión social de menores de 18 años se situaba
en 2012 en el 33.8%, lo que en números absolutos supone
2.826.549 niños y niñas viviendo en riesgo de
pobreza y exclusión social.
El porcentaje de niños y niñas en riesgo
de pobreza o exclusión social sólo es superior en:
Bulgaria 52.3%, Rumanía 52.2%, Hungría 40.9%,
Letonia 40.5%, Grecia 35.4%, Italia 34.3%, Irlanda 44 37.6%. El
octavo mayor de los 28 países miembro de la Unión
Europea.
Es importante recordar de nuevo que en Eurostat las
cifras de riesgo de pobreza y exclusión social identifican
a los menores de 18 años como grupo de edad, mientras el
Instituto Nacional de Estadística ofrece datos sobre
menores de 16 años. En este sentido, los datos
correspondientes a 2011 de menores de 16 años en riesgo de
pobreza o exclusión social es del 29.9%.
De acuerdo con el Padrón continuo del Instituto
Nacional de Estadística, el número de niños
y niñas en España a 1 de enero de 2012 era de
8.362.305.
2 Datos
En España hay 8.362.305 niños y
niñas.*
El 29.9%, es decir, 2.500.329 niños y
niñas viven en hogares con ingresos bajo el umbral de
pobreza relativa, y el 33.8%, es decir, 2.826.549 niños y
niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión
social.
Entre las familias monoparentales, el 45.6% de los
niños y las niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza o
exclusión social.
Entre las familias cuyos padres no alcanzaron la
educación secundaria, el 57.6% de los niños y las
niñas viven en riesgo de pobreza o exclusión
social.
Entre las familias en las que al menos uno de los
progenitores es de origen extranjero,
el 49.2% de los niños y las niñas viven en
riesgo de pobreza relativa.
(*) Datos a 1 de enero de 2012 según el
padrón continuo del Instituto Nacional de
Estadística. El resto de datos que aparecen en esta
sección han sido obtenidos de Eurostat, Encuesta sobre
Ingresos y Condiciones de Vida. (Datos actualizados el 8 de
noviembre de 2013, extraídos el 13 de noviembre de
2013)
La siguiente tabla refleja la tasa de niños y
niñas bajo el umbral de pobreza relativa en la
Unión Europea, la Zona Euro, España y Francia antes
y después de las prestaciones o transferencias
sociales:
Esta diferencia en la efectividad de las transferencias
sociales para la reducción de la pobreza puede explicarse
a partir del siguiente gráfico:
Recomendaciones
El Gobierno Central en colaboración con los
Gobiernos Autonómicos deben poner en marcha de manera
coordinada y con urgencia una serie de medidas destinadas
a:
1. Promover un mejor conocimiento de la
situación de pobreza infantil en
España2. Acordar un marco común para
garantizar plenamente la realización de los derechos
de los niños y las niñas en todo el territorio
nacional3. Aumentar la transparencia de la
información relativa a los recursos públicos
destinados por cada administración4. Elaborar y aprobar un Plan Nacional de
Acción para la Inclusión Social
2013-20165. Elaborar y aprobar un Plan de Apoyo a las
Familias que tomando como referencia las medidas de la
recomendación de la Comisión Europea "Invertir
en la Infancia: romper el ciclo de las
desventajas"6. Aprobar una Ley marco de Servicios Sociales
que garantice la realización y prestación de
los servicios recogidos en el Catálogo de Referencia
de Servicios Sociales7. Reforzar el sistema de prestaciones de la
Seguridad Social destinadas a la protección de las
familias8. Reforzar la protección a los deudores
hipotecarios, reestructuración de deuda y alquiler
social9. Medidas urgentes para garantizar la
sostenibilidad del Sistema Nacional de Salud y mejorar la
calidad y seguridad de sus prestaciones10. Medidas urgentes de racionalización
del gasto público en el ámbito
educativo11. Establecer una salvedad que garantice que
la concesión de las becas escolares12. Garantizar la plena disponibilidad y acceso
a todos los materiales y actividades educativas
necesarias13. Garantizar el derecho de todos los
niños y todas las niñas a crecer en su entorno
familiar sin que los motivos económicos puedan motivar
la separación del núcleo familiar.
Oxfam Media Briefing – A Tale of Two Britains
– 17 de marzo de 2014
The gap between rich and poor is growing- income and
wealth are concentrated at the top while those at the bottom face
increasingly hard times
Inequality is a growing problem in the UK. Whilst
austerity measures in Britain continue to hit the poorest
families hardest, a wealthy elite have seen their incomes spiral
upwards, exacerbating income inequality which has grown under
successive governments over the last quarter of a
century.
Since the mid-1990s the incomes of the top 0.1 percent
have grown almost 4 times faster than the incomes of the bottom
90 percent of the population. In real terms, that means the
richest 0.1 percent have seen their income grow by more than
£ 461 a week, the equivalent of over £ 24,000 a year.
That"s enough to buy a small yacht or a sports car. By contrast
the bottom 90 per cent have experienced a real terms increase of
only £ 147 a year -insufficient to insure a family car.
That equates to £ 2.82 a week- the average cost of a large
cappuccino.
Today, the five richest families in the UK are wealthier
than the bottom 20 per cent of the entire population. That"s just
five households with more money than 12.6 million people -almost
the same as the number of people living below the poverty line in
the UK. The extreme levels of wealth inequality occurring in
Britain today threaten to exclude the poorest, whose standards of
living are being squeezed as they are hit by increasing costs for
basics like food and energy bills and cuts to services and
support when they are most needed.
Starting with this week"s Budget, the Government needs
to re-balance the books by raising revenues from those who can
afford it -by clamping down on companies and individuals who
avoid paying their fair share of tax and starting to explore
greater taxation of extreme wealth- rather than relying on cuts
to services that disproportionately impact on the poorest in
society, some 13 million people who are currently classed as
living below the poverty line.
Britain in the 21st Century is a deeply divided nation.
Whilst a handful of people at the top have never had it so good,
millions of families are struggling to make ends meet. Growing
numbers of Britons are turning to charity-run food-banks, yet at
the same time the highest earners in the UK have had the biggest
tax cuts of any country in the world. And whilst low-paid workers
are seeing their wages stagnate, the super-rich are seeing their
pay and bonuses spiral up.
Oxfam"s new figures show just how stark the divide
between Britain"s richest and the rest is.
• The most affluent family in the UK (Gerald
Cavendish Grosvenor and family), have more wealth than the
poorest 10 percent of the population, 6.3 million people (£
7.9 and £ 7 billion respectively).
• The richest 5 families in Britain are wealthier
than the bottom 20 percent of the population in the UK (with a
wealth of £ 28.2 billion and £ 28.1 billion
respectively).
• Incomes for the bottom 90 percent increased by 27
percent between 1993 and 2011. Incomes for the richest 0.1
percent increased by 101 percent over the same time period. In
other words, the incomes of the top 0.1 percent have grown almost
4 times faster than for the bottom 90 percent of the
population.
• Once you factor in increases in the cost of
living over the last ten years, then the real squeeze for the
majority of Britons becomes apparent as does the divide between
those at the top and the rest. Since 2003 the majority of the
British public (95 percent) have seen a 12 percent real terms
drop in their disposable income (after housing costs), whilst the
richest 5 percent of the population have seen their disposable
income increase.
Oxfam"s analysis: numbers and
methodology
Oxfam used the latest list of billionaires from Forbes
released on March 4, 2014 to calculate the accumulated wealth of
the richest families in Britain and data from Credit Suisse
Global Wealth Databook to calculate the wealth of the bottom 10
and 20 percent of the population.
To calculate changes in income since 1993 (the earliest
year with comparable data on income), Oxfam used the Top Income
Database. For the changes in income for 95 percent of the
population after housing costs, Oxfam used data from the Family
Resources Survey 2002-2003 to 2011-2012 (data for which the
survey has comparable methodology) as reported by the Institute
For Fiscal Studies" "Living Standards, Poverty and Inequality in
the UK: 2013".
The richest and the rest – a global
perspective
Economic inequality is far from being a UK only problem
– a similar picture of a rapidly increasing gap between rich and
poor can be seen in most countries across the globe. The entire
wealth of the world is divided in two: almost half going to the
richest 1 percent; the other half to the remaining 99 percent.
Working For the Few, an Oxfam report published ahead of
this year"s World Economic Forum in Davos, revealed that the
richest 85 people on the planet own the same amount between them
as half the world"s population -that"s 3.5 billion
people.
This widening inequality is creating a vicious circle
where wealth and power are increasingly concentrated in the hands
of a few, leaving the rest behind. Our report showed that
increasing inequality is allowing the wealthy to capture
government policymaking. This means the rules are constantly
rewritten in favour of the rich, for example through policies
such as like lower taxes for high earners.
Seven out of 10 people in the world live in countries
where economic inequality has increased in the last 30
years.
Inequality has shot up the global agenda recently, with
leaders and influential figures from President Obama to the Pope
making the issue a key priority for 2014.
Taxing times
Tax evasion, by companies and individuals, costs the UK
economy billions of pounds every year. The "tax gap"- the total
amount of missing tax money the Treasury is owed – is estimated
to be around £ 35 billion a year.
Of that tax gap, Oxfam estimates that at least £
5.2 billion a year is being evaded by wealthy individuals who use
tax havens. That"s the equivalent of £ 200 a year for every
single household in the UK.
The Government has made a good start on cracking down on
tax evasion, including at the 2013 G8, but needs to continue to
increase transparency and accountability -for instance with
effective legislation on Beneficial Ownership- and ensure that
HMRC are well resourced for the task.
Surviving on a shoestring
One in five people in the UK are living in poverty –
cuts to social security and public services are combining with
falling incomes and rising costs for basics like food and fuel
bills to create a deeply damaging situation in which millions are
struggling to get by. Although unemployment numbers are falling,
the number of people in insecure jobs is on the rise and many are
on wages that don"t pay enough to make ends meet. For the first
time, more working households are living in poverty in the UK
than non-working ones. In 2012 just over half of the 13 million
people in poverty were from working families.
Austerity policies are massively increasing poverty and
inequality in the UK – damage that could take two decades or more
to reverse. Our research suggests 800,000 children and an extra
1.9 million adults in the UK could be pushed into poverty by
2020. The unprecedented rise of over 500,000 Britons needing
emergency aid from food banks is just one example among many of
what poverty looks like in the UK. There is significant public
concern about the lack of say ordinary people have in the changes
that affect their lives. According to a recent Oxfam poll, more
than two thirds of the British population thinks the rich have
too much influence over where the country is headed.
Case Study: "The bills are going up but the money
isn"t"
Anna, 35, lives in Devon, with her partner Mike and
their children. Mike works full time at an electronics company,
whilst Anna is a stay at home mum.
"They"ve been laying off people at Mike"s work at
the minute, so he"s constantly terrified that he"s going to lose
his job. He brings home between £ 1000 and £1100 a
month. It"s alright, but not great when you consider that our
rent is £ 800 per month, it doesn"t go very far at all. We
get help with tax credits but it"s getting harder and harder to
pay the bills every month and not charge things on the credit
cards. The bills are going up and the money
isn"t.
"Personally, I feel so strongly about how there is
so much inequality in our society and it's getting worse. There
are all these people looking down their noses at the "undeserving
poor" and it really makes me cross. We"re being kept poor. We"re
being kept in a position where we aren"t able to improve our
lives.
"I mean who"s the real scrounger? Someone who might
get seventy pound per week because they haven"t got a job, or
someone who gets a ridiculous amount of money in bonuses after
they bankrupted the country? I"d like to be able to earn a wage
myself… there is no way for us to get out of this position
until somebody does something about the cost of housing and other
stuff. The people who can afford to pay for it are getting away
scot free."
Why does Oxfam care about inequality?
Extreme economic inequality is damaging because of the
negative impact it has on poverty reduction and overall
prosperity. It multiplies social problems and compounds other
inequalities such as those between men and women. In many cases
extreme economic inequality causes unequal political
representation: those with the most money are able to rig the
rules, and influence government policy in their favour, often at
the expense of everyone else.
For many workers across the globe, doing a day"s work
doesn"t necessarily mean they earn enough to live on, and
companies are making profits whilst workers" wages and conditions
are not enough to live decent lives.
Whilst the opportunity to prosper is an important
incentive that helps drive the economy and implies some level of
inequality, even the International Monetary Fund"s recent study
finds that extreme income inequality undermines both the pace and
sustainability of economic growth. The IMF also made the case
that redistribution efforts -including progressive taxation and
spending on health and education- are pro-growth.
In developed and developing countries alike we are
increasingly living in a world where the lowest tax rates, the
best health and education and the opportunity to influence are
being given not just to the rich but also to their
children.
For decades, Oxfam has worked to increase access to
high-quality health care and education. Despite great progress,
millions of families in the poorest countries are not able to
send their children to school or pay for healthcare should anyone
fall sick. Governments don"t have the money to pay for these
basic essential services – not because the money isn"t there, but
because the richest and most powerful aren"t paying their fair
share.
While many rich people use a portion of their wealth to
support individual good causes, this should not be used as an
excuse for governments failing to tackle the problem of growing
inequality.
Oxfam"s call to action
All parties need to focus on reducing inequality and
consider how they will:
Tackle unfair tax rules to combat inequality and
ensure those who can afford it are paying their fair share:
Clamp down on tax dodgers by improving transparency and
accountability standards in global and UK tax rules and
increasing government capacity to tackle tax evasion.
Look at ways of raising revenue through progressive
taxation and balancing the books on the shoulders of those who
can afford it: In particular, the Government should implement
a financial transactions tax to ensure the financial sector
contributes its fair share, and focus on the greater taxation of
wealth, by exploring things like a land value tax.
Ensure that the strategy to reduce the deficit does
not hitting the poorest hardest: Use the revenue from more
progressive taxation to prevent long-term damage caused by cuts
to social security and public services. Support women and parents
to be part of the country"s return to growth through the
provision of universal affordable childcare.
Ensure that work really pays for the poorest:
Outline a long-term strategy for raising the minimum wage to a
living wage, using tools such as government procurement to
promote a living wage. Ensure that increasing the tax allowance
really works for the poorest by also increasing the earnings
disregard by £ 200 per year.
Audit policy to ensure it is being designed to
improve equality: We would like to see party manifestos
include an analysis of the impact of their pledges on economic
inequality in the UK.
As a first step, we are calling on the Government to
continue taking tough action to tackle tax dodging as part of
this week"s Budget.
Save the Children denuncia que actualmente hay casi 27
millones de niños en riesgo de pobreza en Europa
(Vozpópuli – 15/4/14)
"La pobreza es muy dura porque te roba tus
sueños y tus esperanzas"… "La pobreza no tiene
pasaporte y nadie está a salvo"… Ante una
situación de urgencia, pedimos medidas de urgencia:
"Esta situación no puede esperar a que mejore la
economía. Lo que perdamos ahora con niños,
no se puede recuperar más tarde", sostiene la ONG
Save the Children.
Autor:
Ricardo Lomoro
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