The financial upheaval of 2007-08 created not just an economic and fiscal crisis but also a social crisis. Countries that experienced the deepest and longest downturns are seeing profound knock-on effects on people"s job prospects, incomes and living arrangements.
Some 48 million people in OECD countries are looking for a job -15 million more than in September 2007- and millions more are in financial distress. The numbers living in households without any income from work have doubled in Greece, Ireland and Spain.
Low-income groups have been hit hardest as have young people and families with children.
Social consequences could linger for years
With households under pressure and budgets for social support under scrutiny, more and more people report dissatisfaction with their lives, and trust in governments has tumbled. There are also signs that the crisis will cast long shadows on people"s future well-being. Indeed, some of the social consequences of the crisis, in areas like family formation, fertility and health, will be felt only in the long term. Fertility rates have dropped further since the start of the crisis, deepening the demographic and fiscal challenges of ageing. Families have also cut back on essential spending, including on food, compromising their current and future well-being. It is still too early to quantify the longer-term effects on people"s health, but unemployment and economic difficulties are known to contribute to a range of health problems, including mental illness.
Invest today to avoid rising costs tomorrow
Short-term savings may translate into much higher costs in the future, and governments should make funding of investment-type programmes a priority. Today"s cuts in health spending need to avoid triggering rising health care needs tomorrow. Especially hard-hit countries should ensure access to quality services for children and prevent labour market exclusion of school leavers.
Vulnerable groups need support now
To be effective, however, social investments need to be embedded in adequate support for the poorest. Maintaining and strengthening support for the most vulnerable groups must remain a crucial part of any strategy for an economic and social recovery. Governments need to time and design any fiscal consolidation measures accordingly, as the distributional impact of such measures can vary greatly: for example, the poor may suffer more from spending cuts than from tax increases.
Room for cuts in unemployment spending is limited
Weak job markets provide little room for cuts in spending on unemployment benefits, social assistance and active labour market programmes. Where savings can be made, they should be achieved in line with the pace of recovery. Targeted safety-net benefits, in particular, are a priority in countries where such support does not exist, is difficult to access, or where the long-term unemployed are exhausting their unemployment support.
Across-the-board cuts in social transfers, such as housing and child/family benefits, should be avoided, as these transfers frequently provide vital support to poor working families and lone parents.
Targeting can deliver savings while protecting the vulnerable
More effective targeting can generate substantial savings while protecting vulnerable groups. Health care reforms, in particular, should prioritize protecting the most vulnerable. However, fine-tuning of targeting is necessary, in order to avoid creating perverse incentives that deter people from finding work. For instance, unemployed people who are about to start a job may suffer losses or may gain very little as they switch from benefits to earning a salary.
Support families" efforts to cope with adversity
There is a strong case for designing government support in ways that harness and complement -rather than replace- households" own capacities to cope with adversity. In this light, it is especially important to provide effective employment support, even if this means higher spending on active social policies in the short term. Labour market activation and in-work support should be maintained at reasonable levels. Where there are large numbers of households without work, policy efforts need to focus on ensuring they benefit quickly once labour market conditions improve. For instance, to be as effective as possible, work-related support and incentives should not be restricted to individual job seekers but should be made available to non-working partners as well.
Governments need to plan for the next crisis
To "crisis-proof" social policies and to maintain effective support throughout the economic cycle, governments must look beyond the recent downturn. First, they need to find ways to build up savings during upswings to ensure they can meet rising costs during downturns. On the spending side, they should link support more to labour market conditions – for example, by credibly reducing benefit spending during the recovery, and by shifting resources from benefits to active labour market policies. On the revenue side, they should work to broaden tax bases, reduce their reliance on labour taxes and adjust tax systems to account for rising income inequality. Second, governments need to continue the structural reforms of social protection systems begun before the crisis. Indeed, the crisis has accelerated the need for these. In the area of pensions, for example, some future retirees risk greater income insecurity as a result of long periods of joblessness during working age. In health care, structural measures that strip out unnecessary services and score efficiency gains are preferable to untargeted cuts that limit health care access for the most vulnerable.
Chapter 1 – The crisis and its aftermath: A "stress test" for societies and for social policies
Introduction
Social issues lie at the heart of governments" policy agendas. Before the onset of the financial and economic crisis in 2007-08, social spending across the OECD area accounted for about half of all government outlay. But while there is great demand for social protection and support in all phases of the economic cycle, the need is especially acute during and after deep and extended economic downturns. The recent global economic crisis is no exception, as it quickly translated into hardships for households, who suffered unprecedented losses of jobs, earnings, and wealth.
A primary purpose of social policies is precisely to help individuals and families cope with the consequences of economic shocks like the Great Recession and to prevent temporary economic problems from turning into long-term disadvantage. They should enable individuals and families to manage risks more effectively and take better advantage of opportunities. Economic shocks have multiple causes which social policies cannot prevent. They can, however, strengthen families" ability to adapt and respond to economic difficulties when they do occur. Income transfers, health care, and other public services make major shocks both less likely and less damaging. For society as a whole, social policies can prevent cyclical or temporary downturns from turning into protracted social crises…
The financial crisis in 2007-08 saw a fast, far-reaching deterioration in economic output for the OECD area as a whole and GDP fell steeply from its pre-recession peaks. But while in some countries, the Great Recession was followed by a moderate but continuous recovery, others avoided outright recession. A number of hard-hit countries, notably in Europe, faced a second recession in 2011-12 and output only began to stabilize in late 2013 (Figure 1.1). More than five years after the Great Recession started, economic output in the OECD is still not back to pre-crisis levels.
Of all the economic losses, however, the income drops suffered by workers have turned out to be the most difficult to reverse. In most countries, the recovery has not yet translated into significant improvements in labour market conditions. Employment and wages have continued to fall until recently (Figure 1.1).
In the worst-affected countries, labour income -households" most important income source- keeps on falling, in some instances at a gathering pace, even as GDP stabilizes. Most countries have experienced "jobless" recoveries and/or falling wages and it will take several more years for labour incomes to regain their pre-crisis levels. Where the erosion of earnings persists, consumers are unlikely to play much of a role in supporting an economic recovery.
The Great Recession thus continues to cast a particularly long shadow on workers and their families. To policy makers, the negative trends it has generated point to continuing economic hardship, a high risk of growing poverty, and a persistently strong demand for effective support.
The demand for social support has persisted despite a public awareness that something needs to be done about often-unprecedented debt levels and structural fiscal deficits. Figure 1.2 for instance, illustrates the findings from a 2013 survey which shows how, in some countries, attitudes have shifted markedly against government debt and in favour of spending cuts.
Most respondents in France, Italy, Portugal, and the United States supported lowering government expenditure, while in other countries -like the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom- people appear much less convinced that spending cuts should be a priority. Strikingly, though, large majorities support protecting or extending social spending, even in those countries where most people consider overall spending too high. That sentiment highlights the essential role of social support measures during and after deep economic downturns. However, concerns about the fiscal situation in some countries also underline the need for cost-efficient social protection and for the difficult task of "doing more with less".
Social risks are higher when hardship is concentrated in specific groups
Effective, efficient social support measures should be properly targeted and tailored to individual circumstances. To that end, understanding the distributional aspects of recessions is essential. The worsening of aggregate income and employment trends is striking and highlights the scale of the crisis. But aggregate numbers hide wide disparities across population groups and regions within countries. By averaging across diverse populations, they understate the difficulties faced by the worst-off.
Deep recessions do not strike symmetrically. Jobs in sectors that bore the brunt of the initial economic slump in the Great Recession, such as financial services, construction, and manufacturing, were particularly exposed. As reduced incomes and depressed product demand permeated the economy, more and more families were affected, even though the extent and duration of difficulties varied dramatically from one group to another.
Men, youth, and low-skilled workers in labour-market plight
Since 2007, non-employment rates have increased much more markedly among young people, men, and low-skilled workers than among women and older workers (Figure 1.3). The surge in non-employment, especially among youth and men, reflects a combination of increasing numbers of unemployed (those looking for jobs) and so-called labour-market inactive (including discouraged jobseekers who are no longer available for work or not actively looking).
Most affected by rising unemployment are low-skilled prime-age workers, while the doubling of the number of long-term unemployed in the OECD area to 17 million- one in every three jobless people- by the second quarter of 2013 is particularly worrying.
Growing numbers of people without recent work experience, depreciating skills, and employers" reluctance to hire them, swell the ranks of discouraged job seekers, i.e. those who want to work but no longer actively look for a job. Lengthening jobless spells make turning a hesitant recovery into a job-rich economic upswing much more difficult, and can lead to rising structural unemployment.
Women and older workers have fared somewhat better: their labour market participation had risen prior to the crisis and has mostly continued to do so. They were also less affected by unemployment. Women, for example, are typically overrepresented in the services and public sector that initially suffered less than male-dominated industries like manufacturing and construction. In addition, many inactive women resumed or entered work in an attempt to offset other household members" loss of earnings. Although the crisis had a less adverse effect on the employment situation of women, it spelled the end of the long-term upward trend in employment rates in OECD countries.
The collapse in young people"s employment opportunities is of particular concern because it leads to "scarring" -a term commonly used to describe how early working life difficulties can jeopardize long-term career paths and future earnings prospects. The share of youth not in employment, education or training (the so-called "NEETs") has gone up significantly in the OECD area since the onset of the crisis. By late 2012, it stood at 20% or more in Greece, Italy, Mexico, Spain and Turkey. The sharpest increases were recorded in countries hardest hit by the crisis (Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) and in Italy, Luxembourg, and Slovenia. In the OECD area as a whole, the number of unemployed youth increased by some two million, with young men accounting for the bulk of the rise…
Individual employment losses leave rising numbers of households with no labour income
The most commonly used statistics of labour-market difficulties refer to individuals rather than households. They therefore do not show how these individual labour-market problems translate into predicaments at the family level. Since 2007 the proportion of people living in households with no income from work has gone up in most countries, approximately doubling in Greece, Ireland and Spain and increasing by 20% or more in
Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, the United States (Figure 1.5). In debates on fiscal consolidation and other policy reforms, such households deserve special attention as they are particularly vulnerable and highly dependent on government support. With more than one in eight working-age individuals in most countries now living in workless households, the success of redistribution measures and active social policies is gauged to a large extent on whether they can improve economic security for families without any income from work…
Economic hardship felt most acutely among low income earners and youth
What do these recent trends mean for longer-term inequality trends? Information from earlier downturns provides pointers as to the distributional mechanics which tend to be at work well into the recovery phase. Figure 1.6 offers just such a historical perspective on the income trends among low-, middle- and high-income households across earlier economic cycles. These trends are for market incomes, that is, before adding social transfers or subtracting taxes. By focusing on market income, Figure 1.6 indicates the space that redistribution policies have to bridge if they are to stem widening gaps between household incomes after taxes and government transfers…
Health outcomes may deteriorate
Difficult economic conditions, people"s behavioural responses to them, and health policy changes may all have impacted on people"s health. There remains, nevertheless, considerable uncertainty as to the net effects of the crisis in the short- and the longer term. At the aggregate country-wide level, studies that consider such broad measures as mortality often find that recessions exert positive short-run effects on health (i.e. mortality is lower). At the same time, there is strong evidence of negative effects on individuals most affected by downturns (unemployed working-age people), especially over the long term (Vangool, 2014)…
While federal food assistance programmes in the United States now support roughly twice as many households as in 2007, the number with inadequate access to food at some time in the year has nonetheless climbed from 13 million (11% of all households) in 2007 to 17.6 million (15%) in 2012. Rates of food insecurity were substantially higher among households with children (20% in 2012) and lone-parent families were particularly affected (35%). Forty-one percent of all food-insecure households received no support through federal food assistance programmes.
While there are no internationally comparable statistics on food insecurity that are as detailed as those of the United States, some unofficial estimates indicate that growing numbers of families and children suffer from hunger or food insecurity in economically distressed countries. Some 10% of students in Greece fall into that category according to Alderman (2013). The Gallup World Poll includes a question on whether respondents feel that they have "enough money to afford food". Responses confirm that rising numbers of families in OECD countries may have less money to spend on food and a healthy diet. By contrast, while large shares of people in the large emerging economies feel that they cannot afford adequate nutrition, their numbers have mostly declined since 2007 (Figure 1.7)…
Symptoms of a social crisis – and the right policy responses
In summary, the evidence considered in this first section of the chapter suggests that the financial upheaval of 2007-08 led not only to an economic and fiscal crisis in many countries, but to social crises, too. Figure 1.8 presents selected outcome measures for which a "crisis link" is already clearly visible. Life satisfaction has declined much more steeply in countries where household incomes have fallen most (Figure 1.8, Panel A).
The same is true for fertility rates (Panel D). Crisis-related effects on other outcomes, including health, take longer to materialize. The indicators presented in Chapters 3 to 7 provide a fuller picture of the social situation across the OECD and how it has changed since the crisis began.
The precise patterns differ from one indicator to another and the associations shown in Figure 1.8 are not prove of a causal relationships (for instance a third factor, such as unemployment, is plausibly causing the drops in both household incomes and life satisfaction). But whatever the mechanism behind them, the patterns underline that social outcomes have tended to deteriorate more in countries where households were particularly exposed to economic hardship during the downturn.
In addition to crisis exposure, the policy responses matter as well. Fiscal pressures make it more difficult to provide adequate public support in countries where it is most urgently needed. The social and political burden of fiscal pressures is highlighted by the fact that the countries which made the greatest efforts to limit increases in social spending (the "low spending growth" countries in Figure 1.8) or reduce fiscal deficits (the "high recent effort" countries) did so against a background of declining incomes among the poor and increasing unemployment (Figure 1.8, Panels B and C). Importantly, the extent of economic hardship and the deterioration in broad life-satisfaction measures are also more sizable in countries with the greatest future fiscal consolidation needs ("high future effort" countries in Figure 1.8, Panels A, B, and C). Efforts to reduce public debt will therefore continue to come up against the tough task of implementing reform programmes that address immediate social concerns and priorities now, while remaining fiscally, socially and politically sustainable in the future…
3. General Context Indicators (Reproducción parcial)
Household income
In 2010 half of the people in Mexico had incomes of less than USD 4 500. Half of the people in Luxembourg had incomes about eight times higher (Figure 3.1, Panel A). Countries with low household income included countries in Southern Europe, Turkey and much of Eastern Europe, as well as two Latin American countries -Chile and Mexico. Those with higher household incomes included Norway and Switzerland.
In most OECD countries incomes from work and capital (i.e. market income) fell considerably between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 3.1, Panel B). Higher unemployment and lower real wages brought down household market income, particularly in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain (5% or more per year). By contrast, market income increased significantly in Chile and Poland as well as to a lower extent in Austria, Germany and the Slovak Republic. On average, between 2007 and 2010, real household disposable income declined by much less than the market income (-0.5%), thanks to the effect of public cash transfers and personal income taxes. At the same time, incomes from work and capital fell by 2% per year.
Figure 3.2 focuses on the top and bottom 10% of the population. While on average across OECD countries real average household disposable income and the average income of the top 10% remained almost stable, the income of the bottom 10% fell by 2% per year over the period 2007 to 2010.
Out of the 33 countries where data are available, the top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% in 21 countries. This pattern was particularly strong in some of the countries where household income decreased the most. In Italy and Spain, while the income of the top 10% remained broadly stable, the average income of the poorest 10% in 2010 was much lower than in 2007. Incomes of poorer households also fell by more than 5% annually in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Mexico. Among these countries, Iceland was the only one where the decrease in average annual income at the top (-13%) exceeded that of the bottom (-8%).
Figure notes: Figures 3.1, Panel B and 3.2: 2007 refers to 2006 for Chile and Japan. 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States. 2010 refers to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey. 2011 for Chile.
4. Self-sufficiency indicators -ELF- (Reproducción parcial)
Employment
Access to paid work is crucial for people"s ability to support themselves. On average, two out of three working age adults in the OECD area are employed (Figure 4.1, Panel A). In Iceland and Switzerland about eight out of ten are employed, compared to about one out of two in Greece and Turkey. Gender differences in employment rates are small in the Nordic countries, but such differences tend to be largest in Chile, Korea, Mexico and Turkey.
The economic crisis has had a large impact on the employment rates in many countries (Figure 4.1, Panel B). On average, the employment rate declined by 1 percentage point in the OECD area from mid-2007 to mid-2013, but the variation across countries is large. While the rates dropped by 10 or more percentage points in Greece and Spain; Chile, Israel and Turkey experienced an increase of 5 or more percentage points over the same period.
Women have improved their relative position in the labour market compared to men (Figure 4.1, Panel B). Only in Estonia, Korea and Poland, was the change in the employment rate the same for both sexes. In spite of this relatively more favourable development for women, the long-term increasing trend in female employment rates came to a halt in OECD countries after the onset of the crisis.
While employment has dropped, part-time work has increased in many countries. Even if these people avoid unemployment, the consequence for many of them is under-employment and reduced incomes. Involuntary part time as a share of total employment has increased substantially in Ireland, Italy and Spain following the onset of the crisis (Figure 4.2). The increase has been strongest for women, where involuntary part-time reached about 14% of total employment in Italy and Spain in 2012. But also in Australia and Ireland, about 10% of women worked involuntarily in part-time jobs. For men, the share of involuntary part-time was about 5% in Ireland and Spain in 2012.
Immigrants" employment thus seems to be more sensitive to economic conditions than that of the natives. On average, the change in employment rates for the foreign-born between 2007 and 2012 was approximately the same as for the native-born (Figure 4.3).This, however, hides large differences across countries. In those countries which experienced the sharpest drop in employment rates of the native-born (Greece, Ireland and Spain), foreign-born fared even worse than the natives. In contrast, in countries with increasing employment rates, such as Germany, there was a larger increase in the employment rates of the foreign-born than among the natives.
Figure notes: Figure 4.1: Panel A: Data for the Russian Federation are annual and refer to 2012. Data for Mexico refer to Q1 2013. Panel B: Data for South Africa refer to Q1 2007. Figure 4.2: Data for Switzerland refer to 2010 instead of 2012. Countries are ranked in increasing order of the percentage point change of the total population. Figure 4.3: Data refer to 2008 instead of 2007 for Canada, Germany and Ireland; and to Q2 2007 for Switzerland.
Unemployment
Record high unemployment rates in a number of countries have put stress on the benefit systems (see "Recipients of out-of-work benefits" indicator). Unemployment, and particularly long-term unemployment, may also harm career chances in the future, reduce life satisfaction and increase social costs. Establishment in the labour market for youth has become more difficult, while older unemployed often have problems re-entering the workforce.
During the second quarter of 2013, the highest unemployment rates in the OECD were in Greece and Spain – eight times higher than the lowest unemployment rate, in Korea
(Figure 4.4, Panel A). The average unemployment rate of 9.1% in the OECD covers a wide diversity. Austria, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland had an unemployment rate below 5%. As many as ten countries had an unemployment rate above 10%.
The economic crisis has had a strong, but varied impact on unemployment rates (Figure 4.4, Panel B). The average OECD unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points between mid-2007 and mid-2013. Greece and Spain were hit particularly hard, seeing an increase of above 18 percentage points. Increases of more than 5 percentage points were also observed in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. Countries which succeeded in reducing their unemployment rates included Chile, Germany, Israel, Korea and Turkey.
In most countries, male unemployment has been more affected by the crisis than female unemployment. The gender difference is particularly strong in countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where the contraction of the construction industry is a major factor driving the increased unemployment. High representation of women in the public sector can also be one explanation why women have fared better than men during the crisis in many countries. However, women in Estonia, Luxembourg and Turkey had a stronger increase in the unemployment rates than men.
Long-term unemployment has increased in many countries. The share of people unemployed for one year or more as a percentage of the total unemployment has increased the most in Ireland, Spain and the United States (Figure 4.5), and by as much as 30 percentage points in Ireland. Mid-2013, six out of ten unemployed were out of work for one year or more in Greece, Ireland and the Slovak Republic. The share of long-term unemployed decreased by 10 percentage points or more in Germany and Poland. In spite of the positive achievements, long-term unemployment still accounts for more than 40% of total unemployment in Germany and Poland.
Youth have been hit particularly hard by the deteriorated labour market situation (see also the "NEETs"" indicator). The unemployment rate for young people aged 15-24 increased by 20 percentage points or more from mid-2007 to mid-2013 in Greece, Portugal and Spain (Figure 4.6). At the OECD level, the rate increased by 7 percentage points during the same period. Mid-2013, more than 50% of the age group was out of work in Greece and Spain. At the other end of the scale, youth unemployment rates dropped in Austria, Chile, Germany, Israel and Turkey. Germany, Japan and Switzerland had mid-2013 the lowest unemployment rate for this age group, at about 7%…
5. Equity indicators (Reproducción parcial)
Income inequality
Income inequality is an indicator of how material resources are distributed across society. Some people consider that high levels of income inequality are morally undesirable. Others regard income inequality as harmful for instrumental reasons – seeing it as causing conflict, limiting co-operation or creating psychological and physical health stresses (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Often the policy concern is focused more on the direction of change of inequality, rather than its level.
Income inequality varied considerably across the OECD countries in 2010 (Figure 5.1, Panel A). The Gini coefficient ranges from 0.24 in Iceland to approximately twice that value in Chile and Mexico. The Nordic and central European countries have the lowest inequality in disposable income while inequality is high in Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey and the United States. Alternative indicators of income inequality suggest similar rankings. The gap between the average income of the richest and the poorest 10% of the population was almost 10 to 1 on average across OECD countries in 2010, ranging from 5 to 1 in Denmark, Iceland and Slovenia to almost six times larger (29 to 1) in Mexico.
Keeping measurement-related differences in mind, emerging countries have higher levels of income inequality than OECD countries, particularly in Brazil and South Africa. Comparable data from the early 1990s suggest that inequality increased in Asia, decreased in Latin America and remained very high in South Africa.
The distribution of income from work and capital (market income, pre-taxes and transfers) widened considerably during the first phase of the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, market income inequality rose by 1 percentage point or more in 18 OECD countries (markers in Figure 5.1, Panel B). The increase was particularly large in Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Japan and Spain, but also in France and Slovenia. On the other hand, market income inequality fell in Poland and, to a smaller extent, in the Netherlands.
The distribution of income that households "take home" (disposable income, post-taxes and transfers) remained unchanged on average, due to the effect of cash public transfers and personal taxes. Between 2007 and 2010, the Gini coefficient for disposable income remained broadly stable in most OECD countries (bars in Figure 5.1, Panel B). It fell the most in Iceland, New Zealand, Poland and Portugal, and increased the most in France, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. Overall, the welfare state prevented inequality from going from bad to worse during the first phase of the crisis.
Income inequality increased especially at the top of the distribution: the share of pre-tax income of the top 1% earners more than doubled their share from 1985 to 2010 in the United Kingdom and the United States (Figure 5.2). In Spain and Sweden, the data show a clear upward trend albeit less marked than in English-speaking countries. The upward tendency is also less marked in France, Japan and most continental European countries. Overall, the economic 2007/08 crisis has brought about a fall in top income shares in many countries, but this fall appears to be of a temporary nature.
Figure notes: Figure 5.1: Gini coefficients refer to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key partners are for 2008/09. Gini coefficients are based on equivalized incomes for OECD countries and the Russian Federation and per capita incomes for all key partners except India and Indonesia for which per capita consumption was used.
Poverty
Poverty rates measure the share of people at the bottom end of the income distribution. Often a society"s equity concerns are greater for the relatively disadvantaged. Thus poverty measures generally receive more attention than income inequality measures, with greater concerns for certain groups like older people and children, since they have no or limited options for working their way out of poverty.
The average OECD relative poverty rate in 2010 was 11% for the OECD (Figure 5.3, Panel A). Poverty rates were highest at above 20% in Israel and Mexico, while poverty in the Czech Republic and Denmark affected only about one in 20 people. Anglophone and Mediterranean countries and Chile, Japan and Korea have relatively high poverty rates.
The initial phase of the crisis had a limited impact on relative income poverty (i.e. the share of people living with less than half the median income in their country annually).
Between 2007 and 2010, poverty increased by more than 1 percentage point only in Italy, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Turkey (bars in Figure 5.3, Panel B). Over the same period, it fell in Chile, Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom, while changes were below 1 percentage point in the other OECD countries.
By using an indicator which measures poverty against a benchmark "anchored" to half the median real incomes observed in 2005 (i.e. keeping constant the value of the 2005 poverty line), recent increases in income poverty are much higher than suggested by "relative" income poverty. This is particularly the case in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico and Spain ("diamond" symbols in Figure 5.3, Panel B). While relative poverty did not increase much or even fell in these countries, "anchored" poverty increased by 2 percentage points or more between 2007 and 2010, reflecting disposable income losses of poorer households in those countries. Only in Belgium, Germany, Israel and Poland did "anchored" poverty fall at the same time as relative poverty stagnated or increased.
Households with children and youth were hit particularly hard during the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, average relative income poverty in OECD countries rose from
12.8 to 13.4% among children (0-18) and from 12.2 to 13.8% among youth (18-25). Meanwhile, relative income poverty fell from 15.1 to 12.5% among the elderly. This pattern confirms the trends described in previous OECD studies, with youth and children replacing the elderly as the group at greater risk of income poverty across the OECD countries.
Since 2007, child poverty increased considerably in 16 OECD countries, with increases exceeding 2 percentage points in Belgium, Hungary, Italy Slovenia, Spain and Turkey (Figure 5.4). On the other hand, child poverty fell by more than 2 percentage points in Portugal and the United Kingdom. At the same time, youth poverty increased considerably in 19 OECD countries.
In contrast to other age groups, the elderly have been relatively immune to rises in relative income poverty during the crisis. In the three years prior to 2010, poverty among the elderly fell in 20 out of 32 countries, and increased by 2 percentage points or more only in Canada, Korea, Poland and Turkey. This partly reflects the fact that old age pensions were less affected by the recession. In many countries (at least until 2010), pensions were largely exempted from the cuts implemented as part of fiscal consolidation.
Figure notes: Figures 5.3 and 5.4: Data refer to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key partners are for 2008/09, changes are not available.
Living on benefits
Most OECD countries operate transfer programmes that aim at preventing extreme hardship and employ a low income criterion as the central entitlement condition. These guaranteed minimum-income benefits (GMI) provide financial support for low-income families and aim to ensure an acceptable standard of living. As such, they play a crucial role as last-resort safety nets, especially during prolonged economic downturns when long-term unemployment rises and increasing numbers of people exhaust their entitlements for unemployment benefits.
In a large majority of OECD countries, incomes for the long-term unemployed are much lower than for the recently unemployed (Figure 5.6). Making GMI benefits more accessible is key to maintaining a degree of income security for the long-term unemployed. In addition, rising numbers of people who have neither a job nor an unemployment benefit means that the generosity of GMI benefits is likely to receive more public attention.
Benefits of last resort are sometimes significantly lower than commonly used poverty thresholds (Figure 5.5). Poverty avoidance or alleviation is primary objectives of GMI programmes. When comparing benefit generosity across countries, a useful starting point is to look at benefit levels relative to commonly used poverty thresholds.
The gap between benefit levels and poverty thresholds is very large in some countries. In a few countries there is no generally applicable GMI benefit (Greece, Italy and Turkey). For GMI recipients living in rented accommodation, housing-related cash benefits can provide significant further income assistance, bringing overall family incomes close to or somewhat above the poverty line (Denmark, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom). However, family incomes in these cases depend strongly on the type of housing, the rent paid and also on the family situation. In all countries, income from sources other than public transfers is needed to avoid substantial poverty risks.
On average across OECD countries, GMI benefit levels have changed little since the onset of the economic and financial crisis. The real value of these benefits was largely the same in 2011 as in 2007. Most countries, including those with significant fiscal consolidation programmes, have so far not reduced benefit levels for the poorest. However, at the same time, countries that were especially hard-hit by the crisis and where GMI were non-existent or very low, have not taken major measures to strengthen benefit adequacy (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United States).
Social spending
In 2012-13, public social spending averaged an estimated 21.9% of GDP across the 34 OECD countries (Figure 5.7, Panel A). In general, public spending is high in continental and northern European countries, while it is below the OECD average in most countries in Eastern Europe and outside Europe. Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France spent more than 30% of GDP on social expenditures. By contrast, Korea and Mexico spent less than 10% of GDP. Social spending in the emerging economies in the late 2000s was lower than the OECD average, ranging from around 2% in Indonesia to about 15-16% in Brazil and the Russian Federation (Figure 5.7, Panel A).
Public social spending in per cent of GDP increased in all OECD countries with the exception of Hungary from 2007-08 to 2012-13 (Figure 5.7, Panel B). The growth fully took place during the period 2007-08, as a response to increased unemployment and other consequences of the economic crisis. In this initial phase, Estonia and Ireland had the strongest increase in expenditure shares. From 2009-10 to 2012-13, fiscal consolidation reduced public social spending. Nearly two-thirds of the OECD countries reduced social spending in this period. The real drop in public social spending in some countries is larger than indicated by change in the shares of GDP, since the level of GDP also fell. Indeed in some countries, the rise of the ratio of public social spending in GDP is explained largely by the fact that GDP declined.
On average in the OECD, pensions, health services and income support to the working-age population and other social services each amount to roughly one-third of the total expenditures. In a majority of OECD countries, pensions are the largest expenditure area (Figure 5.8). In Anglophone countries and most other countries outside of Europe, health dominates public social expenditure. In a few countries, such as Denmark, Ireland and Norway, the largest share is devoted to income support of the working age population.
Accounting for the impact of taxation and private social benefits (Figure 5.8) leads to a convergence of spending to- GDP ratios across countries. Net total social spending is 22-28% of GDP in many countries. It is even higher for the United States at 29% of GDP, where the amount of private social spending and tax incentives is much larger than in other countries.
In Europe, people seem to be most satisfied with the health care provisions and less satisfied with the pension provisions, unemployment benefits and the way inequality and poverty are addressed (Figure 5.9). Satisfaction with health care provisions is highest in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with pension provisions is highest in Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with how inequality and poverty are addressed is in general quite low…
Figure notes: Figure 5.7, Panel A: Data refer to 2009 for Turkey, 2010 for Japan, 2012 for Chile, Korea, and Mexico and to the last years available for key partners. Figure 5.8: Income support to the working-age population refers to cash benefits towards incapacity, family, unemployment and other social policy areas. Data for Israel concern public social spending only. Total net social expenditure data are not available for Hungary, Greece, Switzerland and Turkey. Data for Switzerland refer to 2008
7. Social cohesion indicators (Reproducción parcial)
Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction is determined not only by economic development, but also by people"s diverse experiences and living conditions. People in Norway and Switzerland are most satisfied with their lives (Figure 7.1, Panel A). The measured level in these countries was 3 steps higher than in Hungary, the country at the bottom of the 11-step ladder in 2012.
There are broad regional or cultural country groupings of life satisfaction. Four of the top five countries are Nordic. Continental Western and Eastern European OECD members are not particularly satisfied with their lives, with the notable exceptions of Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and the Netherlands. Predominantly Anglophone OECD countries are all in the top half of the list when measuring life satisfaction, and follow in a tight group after the predominately Nordic top cluster.
Life satisfaction deteriorated during the first years of the crisis between 2007 and 2012, particularly in European Mediterranean countries. Indeed life satisfaction dropped mostly in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, followed by the United States (Figure 7.1, Panel B). On the other hand, life satisfaction improved most in non-European countries, in Chile and Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Nordic and Eastern European countries.
Life satisfaction levels for men and women across OECD countries are highly correlated (Figure 7.2). In countries where life satisfaction is high, both men and women tend to have higher life satisfaction than in countries where the levels are lower.
On average across OECD countries, women report slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than men do.
On average, the level of life satisfaction decreases with age (Figure 7.3). Beyond the OECD average, life satisfaction is "u-shaped" in some countries, increasing from about the age of 55. It is not surprising to see that on average 25-34 year-olds (entering the labour market) and 50+ (leaving the labour market) reported lower levels of life satisfaction in 2012 than in 2007. According to related data for Europe, groups who tended to see the greatest deterioration in incomes and labour-market prospects are more likely to have low levels of subjective well-being.
As for emerging economies, life satisfaction also varies between them, from above 6 in Argentina, Brazil and Saudi Arabia, to below 5 in India and South Africa. Between 2007 and 2012, it increased in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia and the Russian Federation), and it decreased in three countries (India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa).
Figure notes: Figure 7.1: Data refer to 2011 for Chile instead of 2012; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic and Slovenia, average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Portugal, and 2008 for Iceland and Luxembourg.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3: Data refer to 2011 for Brazil and Chile and 2009 for Switzerland; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland; average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria,
Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal; 2008 for Iceland and Portugal; and 2009 for Luxembourg.
Confidence in institutions
A cohesive society is one where citizens have confidence in national-level institutions and believe that social and economic institutions are not prey to corruption. Confidence and corruption issues are dimensions which are strongly related to societal trust.
Confidence in the national government is generally high in Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, while it is low in the Czech Republic, Greece and Japan. Large differences can be observed across countries (Figure 7.7, Panel A).
In a majority of OECD countries, trust in national governments declined from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.7, Panel B). The decline was particularly large in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, all countries hit hard by the crisis. However, other countries experienced a substantial increase in trust, notably Israel, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.
Youth tended to have more trust in national governments than the total population, and their confidence declined less from 2007 to 2012. This could be the consequence of less political involvement, but also that youth are more optimistic about the future.
The economic crisis from 2008 was closely related to the crisis in the financial sector. In most OECD countries, confidence in financial institutions fell from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.8). Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United States experienced the most substantial drops in confidence. Only in Iceland, Japan and Norway can a positive change be observed.
Corruption can be a sign of the degree of informality and distrust in the economy. Countries which suffered the biggest declines in GDP from 2007 to 2012 were also among those where corruption had increased (Figure 7.9). Increase in corruption was particularly high in countries such as Estonia, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. These countries also saw a stronger decline in confidence in the national government. Lower levels of corruption could be seen particularly in Australia, Germany, Japan and Mexico.
Among the emerging economies, confidence in national governments increased in Brazil, Indonesia and the Russian Federation, while it declined in India and South Africa. While confidence in financial institutions in general declined in the OECD countries, it increased in Argentina, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.
Figure notes: Figure 7.7: No data available for change in China.
Figure 7.9: No data available for change in Slovenia and Switzerland.
Información de Hemeroteca
– El saldo de la recesión en España: los pobres pierden un 33% de su renta; los ricos, un 3% (Vozpópuli – 19/3/14)
Según la OCDE, la crisis ha costado 2.600 euros por persona a las clases más bajas mientras que apenas ha afectado al 10% de la población más rica. El retroceso de las rentas bajas no ha sido tan notable en ningún otro país desarrollado. La OCDE advierte: los recortes de desigualdad en el futuro normalmente no duran lo suficiente para atenuar lo ya pasado.
La crisis no es igual para todos. Es lo que denuncia la OCDE que revela que en España, la crisis sólo existe para los pobres. Para el 10% de los españoles más ricos, la recesión ni siquiera ha comenzado. Según los datos de la OCDE, la depresión económica ha costado a los españoles más pobres unos 2.600 euros por persona al año desde 2007, un 33% de su renta disponible. Por el contrario, los estratos más ricos apenas han perdido un 1% al año desde 2007 hasta sumar un 3% de caída de renta total.
Los datos de la OCDE -agrupados en un estudio titulado "2014: sociedad de un vistazo"- revelan que España es uno de los países más golpeados por la crisis (superado por Estonia, Irlanda, Grecia, México e Islandia) pero, al mismo tiempo, desvela que ese golpe lo han encajado unas rentas bajas que han caído como en ningún otro país desarrollado: a ritmos del 14% anual en algunos ejercicios.
Lo grave no es sólo la creciente desigualdad derivada de la crisis, que ha aumentado un 3%. Lo peor es que las ayudas públicas no sólo no están corrigiendo sino que están agravando esa situación. Según el análisis de la organización internacional, el 30% de la población más rica recibe más ayudas que el 30% de los más pobres. Ante esa situación, la OCDE concluye: "las prestaciones asistenciales para los desempleados de larga duración y para las familias de trabajadores pobres deben ser fortalecidas urgentemente".
De hecho, dado que el desempleo es la primera causa de pobreza, el organismo internacional considera especialmente graves los recortes de gasto en las llamadas "políticas activas", las encaminadas a la formación y búsqueda de empleo de los parados, que han perdido un 66% de sus fondos entre 2007 y 2011 para caer de los 390 euros por persona a menos de 160 euros por parado.
Por sectores de población, los jóvenes y las familias con hijos son las que más han sufrido el impacto de la crisis. Entre esos dos grupos, el riesgo de pobreza ha subido de manera "particularmente prolongada" hasta un 5% colocando a España a niveles de Turquía o Estonia. La tasa de ni-nis, jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan, es la quinta más alta de toda la OCDE y, como consecuencia de ello, España es el segundo país con mayor número de emigrantes. Sólo los ciudadanos de Grecia dejan más su país que los españoles.
La OCDE adivina la reforma fiscal
Curiosamente, la OCDE -que redactó su informe antes de que los sabios presentaran sus conclusiones al Gobierno-adivina cuál iba a ser la propuesta de la "comisión Lagares" y apuesta por la misma fórmula de subida del IVA: "una posible forma de financiar estas prestaciones asistenciales podría ser la reducción en el número de productos o servicios que se benefician de un IVA preferencial o que están enteramente exentos de él". El organismo internacional -al que los expertos del Gobierno atribuyen en su informe sus "contribuciones clave"- asegura que "los grupos de bajos ingresos consumen menos que los grupos de altos ingresos y, en consecuencia, las rebanas del IVA les benefician menos".
Ese mismo argumento ha sido plasmado en idénticos términos por los miembros de la Comisión Lagares y ha sido elevado al Gobierno. Tal y como publicó Vozpópuli, la OCDE, junto al FMI y a la UE se ha reunido hasta en seis ocasiones con los sabios para tutelar la presentación de las reformas…
– (Septiembre 2014) Actualización del "marcador" (dentro del marasmo de la "sobreinformación" disponible en Internet, algunos "sospechosos" cambios de metodología y ciertas "intoxicaciones" políticamente correctas)
Fuentes consultadas:
– Ingresos de los hogares publicados por el U.S. Department of Commerce y Eurostat: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/IE-1.pdf
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introduction
– Desigualdad Global: La distribución del ingreso en 141 países – Documento de trabajo sobre política social – UNICEF – Agosto 2012
– National Income and Its Distribution – IMF Working Paper – June 2014
– Income Inequality Update – Rising inequality: youth and poor fall further behind – OECD – June 2014
– Income inequality: nearly 40 per cent of total income goes to people belonging to highest (fifth) quintile – Income inequality statistics – Eurostat – June 2014
– Europe 2020 indicators – poverty and social exclusion – Eurostat – September 2014
– Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage: 2013 – U.S. Department of Commerce – U.S. Census Bureau – September 2014
– Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013 Current Population Reports – U.S. Department of Commerce – U.S. Census Bureau – September 2014
Table N. Earnings dispersion and incidence of high and low pay
"Crecimiento vs. Desigualdad": un falso debate
Un "calentamiento" previo, en la hemeroteca
"Los balances -de los bancos, el sector público, las empresas y los hogares- siguen siendo una fuente de dificultades. Aunque la respuesta inmediata a la crisis evitó que se cumplieran los peores pronósticos y creó un margen de maniobra crucial para llevar a cabo el ajuste, no abordó activamente la combinación inusual de problemas relacionados con los balances, provocados por la crisis. En muchos países europeos, los ya elevados coeficientes de endeudamiento de los hogares y las empresas empeoraron como resultado de la caída de precios de los activos y el crecimiento débil o negativo del ingreso, y la deuda del sector público aumentó significativamente. Dado el lento crecimiento de la demanda mundial, hay pocas esperanzas de que cualquiera de estos sectores pueda salir de su situación de deuda con facilidad. En cambio, la consiguiente presión para llevar a cabo un desapalancamiento -la necesidad de reducir la deuda disminuyendo el consumo, la inversión y el gasto público neto- pone en peligro la recuperación…
La historia confirma que unas condiciones económicas adversas no son un obstáculo para reducir la deuda, pero tienen un precio. Como muestran Abbas, muchos episodios anteriores de reducción sostenida y a gran escala de la deuda soberana se iniciaron en medio de una coyuntura desfavorable, pero en muchos casos posteriormente se vieron respaldados por una aceleración de la demanda externa. Cuando el producto crece rápidamente, los coeficientes de endeudamiento pueden reducirse aunque no se produzca una disminución sustancial del déficit. Sin embargo, si el crecimiento subyacente se mantiene débil, la carga del ajuste recae más directamente sobre la política fiscal. En una muestra de economías avanzadas entre 1980 y 2011, el porcentaje de procesos de consolidación fiscal que resultaron eficaces se redujo de alrededor del 40% a aproximadamente el 25% cuando el crecimiento cayó por debajo de la mediana de los países. En tales circunstancias, la reducción de la deuda soberana requiere que las autoridades económicas se comprometan de manera duradera a respaldar la consolidación fiscal y realicen grandes esfuerzos para limitar el impacto de los ajustes presupuestarios sobre el crecimiento. El mecanismo para la reducción de la deuda del sector privado es similar. Bakker y Zeng señalan que las consolidaciones de los balances del sector privado ocurridas en el pasado se vieron favorecidas en muchos casos por un aumento de la inflación y medidas de apoyo fiscal. En la coyuntura actual no es probable que ocurra ninguna de ambas cosas. Advierten que, como consecuencia, esta vez el desapalancamiento del sector empresarial podría dar lugar a una reducción significativa de la mano de obra, especialmente si las instituciones del mercado de trabajo impiden el ajuste de los salarios. La aplicación de buenas políticas puede mitigar los costos a corto plazo del desapalancamiento. Aunque no hay otra alternativa que reducir los niveles de deuda, las autoridades económicas aún pueden contribuir a proteger el crecimiento…
Es esencial mejorar el potencial de crecimiento de Europa. Aunque la crisis ha hecho que la búsqueda del crecimiento sea cada vez más urgente, muchos observadores han señalado que desde los años ochenta el crecimiento en la zona del euro y en otras economías avanzadas de Europa ha sido inferior al de otros países comparables. Tras alcanzar aproximadamente el 90% del PIB per cápita de Estados Unidos en 1980, el producto de la zona del euro se mantiene actualmente en alrededor del 70% de ese nivel, y el de algunas economías como España, Grecia, Irlanda, Italia y Portugal representa menos del 60%. Gran parte de este deterioro relativo puede explicarse por el débil crecimiento de la productividad total de los factores. Deberán adoptarse medidas en muchos frentes para subsanar esta deficiencia.
La reforma del mercado de trabajo desempeñará un papel importante, y en el contexto actual es especialmente importante aplicar las reformas adecuadas. Millones de jóvenes no tienen trabajo, y comenzar su vida laboral sin un empleo no solo les afecta directamente sino que también frena el potencial de crecimiento futuro de Europa. El desempleo juvenil implica una falta de capacitación en el trabajo, un deterioro de los conocimientos técnicos y una fuerza laboral menos productiva en el futuro. También significa una reducción del ahorro y las pensiones, lo que implica una vida laboral más larga, una jubilación menos próspera, o ambas cosas"… Empleo y crecimiento: Respaldando la recuperación europea – Martin Schindler y Helge Berger – FMI – 28/1/13)
"P. ¿Final del túnel para… 2023?
R. Sí, algo así, porque las primeras medidas acaban de aprobarse. Cuando Alemania entró en crisis, allá por 1995, no empezó a levantar cabeza hasta 2002, siete años después. España necesita un lapso de tiempo equivalente hasta que la sociedad y los políticos entiendan la gravedad de la crisis, hasta generar el entorno que permita hacer reformas. Eso está llegando. A partir de ahí hay que esperar otra década más para que los esfuerzos den resultado"… "España tendrá 10 años más de crisis y una devaluación interna del 30%" – Hans-Werner Sinn – Presidente del IFO – El País – 2/3/13)
"La desigual recuperación económica y las sucesivas revisiones a la baja de las previsiones de crecimiento económico han incidido en la situación del empleo en el mundo. Se calcula que en 2013 el número de personas desempleadas se situó cerca de los 202 millones, un aumento de casi 5 millones respecto del año anterior, lo que significa que el empleo está creciendo a un ritmo más lento que la fuerza de trabajo…
En conjunto, el déficit mundial de empleo generado relacionado con la crisis desde el inicio de ésta en 2008, agregando a un numero de por sí considerable de buscadores de empleo, sigue aumentando. En 2013, el déficit ascendió a 62 millones de empleos, incluidos 32 millones de personas más que buscaban trabajo, 23 millones que se desalentaron y habían dejado de buscar y 7 millones de personas económicamente inactivas que optaron por no participar en el mercado de trabajo.
Si la tendencia actual se mantiene, el desempleo mundial seguirá empeorando, aunque de forma gradual, para situarse en más de 215 millones de personas en 2018. Durante este período, se crearán alrededor de 40 millones de empleos nuevos netos al año, un número menor que el de personas que se prevé entren en el mercado de trabajo, unos 42,6 millones cada año. En líneas generales, la tasa mundial de desempleo se mantendrá constante durante los próximos cinco años, es decir, medio punto porcentual por encima del valor registrado antes de la crisis…
En las circunstancias actuales de recuperación tímida, la duración media de los períodos de desempleo ha aumentado considerablemente, un signo más de la debilidad que reviste la creación de empleo. En muchas economías avanzadas, la duración del desempleo se ha multiplicado por dos desde el inicio de la crisis. En países en crisis de la zona del euro, como Grecia o España, la duración media del desempleo es de 9 y 8 meses respectivamente, e incluso en países de otras regiones que están empezando a vislumbrar signos de recuperación económica alentadores, como los Estados Unidos, el desempleo de larga duración afecta a más del 40 por ciento de todas las personas que buscan empleo.
Estos períodos de desempleo tan largos impiden una recuperación más rápida del mercado de trabajo, incluso cuando las previsiones apuntan a una aceleración de la actividad económica. En primer lugar, suponen una considerable carga para el erario público, obligando a los gobiernos a subir los impuestos o a aplicar recortes para no aumentar el déficit fiscal. Y lo que es más importante, las personas que llevan largos períodos de tiempo buscando trabajo empiezan a perder sus competencias a un ritmo acelerado, haciendo más difícil encontrar un empleo en una ocupación similar o que requiera competencias parecidas.
El déficit de demanda global impide una recuperación más rápida de los mercados de trabajo mundiales. A este respecto, la consolidación fiscal adoptada en muchas economías avanzadas, al igual que la debilidad del consumo privado, suponen un freno al crecimiento de la producción.
El presente informe muestra que un restablecimiento del equilibrio entre las políticas macroeconómicas y un aumento de los ingresos del trabajo mejorarían considerablemente el panorama del empleo. Según las simulaciones, en los países del G20 de ingresos altos, un restablecimiento del equilibrio tal podría reducir el desempleo en 1,8 puntos porcentuales para 2020, lo que significa la creación de 6,1 millones de puestos de trabajo. De este modo también se favorecería el logro de los objetivos fiscales. De hecho, los resultados de la simulación sugieren que tal enfoque de políticas resultaría en mejoramiento significativo del escenario status quo de base"… Tendencias Mundiales de Empleo ¿Hacia una recuperación sin creación de empleos? – 2014 OIT – 21/1/14)
"Las fluctuaciones financieras (los "ciclos financieros") que pueden acabar en crisis bancarias como la más reciente duran muchos más años que los ciclos económicos. Por irregulares que sean, suelen desarrollarse en promedio a lo largo de entre 15 y 20 años. Al fin y al cabo, para encender una gran hoguera hace falta mucha yesca. Aun así, los ciclos financieros pueden pasar en gran medida inadvertidos: su dinámica es simplemente demasiado lenta para las autoridades económicas y para los analistas cuya atención se centra en fluctuaciones a más corto plazo del producto.
Las consecuencias del ciclo financiero pueden ser devastadoras. Cuando los auges financieros se tornan en contracciones, las pérdidas de producto y empleo pueden ser enormes y extraordinariamente perdurables. En resumidas cuentas, las recesiones de balance pasan una factura mucho más onerosa que las recesiones normales. Las contracciones revelan la mala asignación de recursos y las deficiencias estructurales que los auges ocultaron temporalmente. Por ello, las respuestas de política que no adoptan una perspectiva de largo plazo corren el riesgo de atacar el problema inmediato a costa de generar uno mayor en el futuro. La acumulación de deuda a lo largo de sucesivos ciclos económicos y financieros se convierte en el factor decisivo"… (Banco de Pagos Internacionales – 84º Informe Anual – 1 de abril de 2013 – 31/3/14)
Las mentiras más grandes jamás contadas: el fin de la historia, la Tierra es plana…
Hace más de un cuarto de siglo, cuando era un "rico" sudamericano, y viajaba (con toda mi familia) durante 60 días por Europa o EEUU (en visita anual, a uno u otro destino), mientras admiraba los museos y catedrales (europeas), o visitaba los centros comerciales y parques Disney (americanos), me sorprendía de los altos precios de las mercancías y servicios (desde mi óptica de consumidor subdesarrollado). Luego comparaba los ingresos de los trabajadores (europeos o americanos) y "entendía" todo. El alto costo de la vida estaba compensado con el alto nivel de los ingresos. Ellos se lo guisaban y ellos se lo comían. Productos de calidad, altos precios, buenos empleos y mejores salarios. La Europa Social Demócrata. The american way of life. ¡Magnífico!
Ese equilibrio se desbarató cuando se abrieron los mercados y se facilitó el libre movimiento de mercancías y servicios. En realidad el librecambio fue el pretexto para la financierización de la economía. Lo que se buscaba era el libre movimiento de capitales. Lo demás (mercancías), eran "efectos colaterales" que, como luego se comprobó, acarrearían "graves daños colaterales". El libre movimiento de trabajadores nunca se puso en práctica (ni como ficción). Sobre el perjuicio devenido por la financierización, creo que la crisis más grave vivida desde el año 1930, me exime de todo comentario.
Con la globalización (el imperio de la mediocridad) llegaron las tres "des": desregulación, deslocalización y desigualdad. O como dicen Hans-Peter Martin y Harald Schumann en su libro La Trampa de la Globalización (Editorial Taurus – 1998): "Desregulación, liberación y privatización: estas tres "ciones" se convirtieron en los instrumentos estratégicos de la política económica europea y americana, que el programa neoliberal (Reagan/Friedman y Thatcher/Hayek) elevó a ideología decretada por el estado (años 1979-1980).
La "Tierra se aplanó" en base a empleos más precarios, menores ingresos, desempleo, escasas oportunidades y así, hasta llegar al fin del sueño americano. El de los europeos, apenas fue una "ilusión" acunada por un Estado del Bienestar, producto de la guerra fría y el temor político a que el comunismo se extendiera por una vía electoral. La "caída del muro" de Berlín terminó "aplastando" a los trabajadores, sus empleos, sus ingresos y sus conquistas sociales. Comenzó la era de las "manos libres". Eso que Fukuyama denominó "el fin de la historia". El inicio de la "histeria"… La "era de los excesos"…
Ahora son los chinos los que se pasean por el museo vacío de Europa o les prestan su dinero a los norteamericanos para que les puedan seguir comprando las mercancías que antes se fabricaban en USA. Ahora son los oligarcas rusos quienes compran las mejores casas de Londres. ¿Humillación…connivencia… prostitución táctica? ¿"Greed is good"? (¿la avaricia es buena?). La estulticia no tiene límite.
La furia de la globalización se llevó por delante la clase media, averió el ascensor social, envió el primer mundo al subdesarrollo, puso a la democracia en una trampa y ha hecho del lema "sálvese quien pueda", un estilo de vida. Solo que: ¿quién puede?
El comercio internacional no alcanza: ¿se exportan "bienes" o "males" (bajos salarios)?
Las grandes potencias exportadoras del mundo muestran señales de agotamiento, lo que reanuda las presiones para que muchos países devalúen sus monedas como una forma de reactivar sus economías.
El crecimiento de las exportaciones en numerosos países que dependen de las ventas de sus productos al exterior para impulsar su crecimiento ha vuelto a quedar corto frente a las expectativas de un repunte. Las exportaciones de Alemania, que tiene el mayor superávit comercial del mundo, registraron un alza de 0,9% en 2013, después de promediar incrementos de 8% durante los años previos a la crisis de 2008. Las exportaciones de China, la segunda economía del mundo, crecieron 8,6% en 2013 tras promediar aumentos de 20% al año durante una década.
El problema es generalizado y va más allá de los países que tienen un superávit comercial. La Organización Mundial del Comercio redujo su pronóstico para el crecimiento del intercambio comercial mundial y advirtió que era más probable que lo revise a la baja que al alza en el futuro. La OMC prevé una expansión de 4% del comercio internacional en 2015, en lugar del 5,3% estimado con anterioridad.
El letargo del comercio es un síntoma de una recuperación global decepcionante. "La economía global es más débil de lo que habíamos esperado", reconoció a fines de la semana pasada Christine Lagarde, directora gerente del Fondo Monetario Internacional. Se prevé que el FMI reduzca el martes su pronóstico del crecimiento global de 2015 desde el actual 4%, un recorte que se suma a lo que la entidad califica como años de "decepciones en serie". "El riesgo es que el mundo quede estancado en (un crecimiento) mediocre", aseveró.
La desaceleración afecta a las principales economías emergentes de Asia y a los países desarrollados de Europa, cuyas perspectivas son tan sombrías que el FMI ha advertido sobre el riesgo de que sufra una "década perdida", como la de Japón, caracterizada por una inflación excesivamente baja y un crecimiento anémico.
Un fuerte repunte del comercio después de la crisis financiera ayudó a propulsar las primeras etapas de la recuperación global hasta 2010. Desde entonces, sin embargo, el crecimiento se ha debilitado y no ha cumplido las expectativas. Los problemas están reduciendo las oportunidades para las industrias exportadoras en las grandes economías desarrolladas.
La fragilidad de la economía aumenta la tentación de que los países devalúen sus divisas para aumentar la competitividad del sector exportador. Algunos ministros de Hacienda han vuelto a hablar de una guerra global de divisas, en alusión a una serie de devaluaciones que propician el crecimiento a corto plazo a expensas del resto de los países.
Mario Draghi, presidente del Banco Central Europeo, ha elogiado la depreciación del euro, con lo que sugiere a los inversionistas que el debilitamiento de la moneda es uno de los grandes objetivos de la entidad. El gobernador del Banco de Japón, Haruhiko Kuroda, realizó comentarios semejantes en torno a la caída del yen. Corea del Sur y China han sido atacados por mantener la cotización de sus divisas más baja de lo que muchos economistas consideran un valor justo.
Devaluar la moneda es una estrategia más fácil que emprender reformas estructurales que deben sortear obstáculos políticos, en particular en el caso de los países que tienen un creciente endeudamiento y un alto desempleo.
En momentos en que la política monetaria ya ha desplegado sus herramientas y hay poco margen para el estímulo fiscal, buena parte del mundo se ha volcado hacia el comercio como una forma de incentivar el crecimiento. Europa, por ejemplo, busca una liberalización de su intercambio comercial con Estados Unidos mediante la firma de la Asociación Transatlántica para el Comercio y la Inversión. Su posible impacto en el crecimiento es una de las principales motivaciones de los europeos, dice Michael Froman, representante comercial de EEUU.
Otros países podrían estar haciendo cálculos parecidos, indicó. La negociación de pactos de libre comercio permite a los gobiernos mejorar la eficiencia y competitividad de sus sectores, lo que nutre el crecimiento. "Eso le ha brindado más apoyo y nuevos bríos a la agenda comercial en el mundo", asevera Froman"… A falta de crecimiento global, vuelve a escena el temor a una "guerra de divisas" (The Wall Street Journal – 6/10/14)
Y el crédito no llega: el fin de la "sopa boba" financiera
Para suplir los menores ingresos de los trabajadores de los países avanzados (que cambiaron sus empleos manufactureros (de altos salarios) por trabajos en el sector servicios (de usar y tirar, precarios, temporales, de bajos salarios) y mantener "anestesiada" a la población (sumados a la droga, el alcohol, el fútbol, la super bowl, los reality shows y los cotilleos de ricos y famosos), utilizaron el "crédito fácil" para permitir que la rueda del consumo siguiera en movimiento.
Con empleos inestables y salarios miserables, el crédito pasó a ser imprescindible para que los trabajadores pudieran comprar a los chinos a menor precio, los mismos productos que antes producían ellos, teniendo empleos y salarios más dignos. Eso es lo que se dice "hacer un pan como unas tortas". ¿Cuánto tiempo podía durar la ficción de sustituir empleos por créditos? ¿Ningún gurú hizo la crónica de un fracaso anunciado?
Así, poquito a poco, se fue llegando a la crisis de las hipotecas subprime. Luego se produjo el "efecto mariposa": el aleteo de una mariposa, puede causar un tifón en algún lugar del mundo… Una derrota sin mariscales. Lo demás, es la historia de una histeria.
Una demostración por el absurdo: para aquellos que aún esperan un crédito bancario
– Banco "niega" refinanciación de hipoteca al exjefe de la Reserva Federal de EEUU (BBCMundo – 3/10/14)
Un banco de Estados Unidos denegó la refinanciación de su hipoteca al expresidente de la Reserva Federal Ben Bernanke, según reveló este viernes él mismo.
"Traté de renegociar mi hipoteca y no pude", dijo Bernanke ante un auditorio en Chicago, según Bloomberg News.
"No me lo estoy inventando", añadió al ver que el público se reía.
Bernanke, que presidió la Reserva Federal entre 2006 y 2014, trajo a colación el ejemplo para mostrar que los bancos se están excediendo en sus cautelas para ofrecer hipotecas.
Los bancos de EEUU fueron culpados de la burbuja inmobiliaria que estalló en 2007 debido a la facilidad con que concedieron crédito inmobiliario.
Algunos economistas creen que la recuperación del mercado inmobiliario está siendo contenida a causa de nuevos estándares mucho más exigentes.
¿El cielo puede esperar?: si todo sigue igual, muchos morirán a las puertas del paraíso
(Tomando el caso español como ejemplo) Acumular 56 trimestres consecutivos de crecimiento, nada menos que catorce años, como hizo la economía española entre 1994 y 2007, y que no se rompa nada, hubiera sido un providencial milagro. La fuerte bajada de los costes de financiación que aportó la entrada en el euro desató una avalancha de inversión en un país que había estado años y años con una financiación insoportablemente cara y con ella se generó un sobreendeudamiento descomunal que aún hoy es el primer problema para el despegue de un nuevo ciclo de crecimiento.
Los altos niveles de apalancamiento privado y la creciente deuda pública generada en la crisis (ha pasado del 36% del PIB al 100%) convierten a la española en una de las economías más vulnerables, no solo a una subida tendencial de tipos cuando llegue la recuperación o surjan tensiones inflacionistas, sino incluso a cualquier desconfianza súbita de los mercados financieros ante cualquier evento externo (o interno) de gravedad. De ahí que sea urgente, a pesar de la dificultad que comporta, reducir los volúmenes y niveles relativos de deuda. Algo que solo se puede hacer de forma ortodoxa desinvirtiendo, ahorrando y creciendo.
El crecimiento actual de la economía, y el estimado para los próximos ejercicios se antoja muy modesto para devolver las ratios de apalancamiento a los valores gobernables. El último informe del think tank EuropeG, elaborado por Oliver Alonso, recoge algunas hipótesis. Veamos.
"Para llevar la deuda de los hogares desde el 85% del PIB en el que se encuentra ahora hasta el valor que la eurozona tiene como media y se considera razonable, que sería un 61%, se precisaría un crecimiento del 6% nominal del PIB durante los próximos once años (hasta 2025 incluido), siempre y cuando el aumento nominal de la deuda avanzase en paralelo menos del 4%"… Crecer un 6% hasta 2025 para recomponer el equilibrio (Cinco Días – 6/10/14)
Para la deuda empresarial, siempre según el mismo ensayo de proyecciones, pasar del 95% del PIB actual hasta el 81% de media de la Unión Europea exigiría también once años con crecimiento nominal del PIB del 6%, y con incrementos de la deuda inferiores el 3%. Si la deuda creciese un 6% anual, no se lograría descender de la ratio actual (94%) ni creciendo la economía un 6%.
En el caso de las Administraciones Públicas, variable en la que España, con excepción de Grecia, Portugal e Irlanda, es el país comunitario con mayor crecimiento durante la crisis, el tránsito sería muy similar. Descender desde el 100% actual (será alcanzado en 2015) hasta el 60% del PIB que la Comisión Europea estima que no se debe superar para converger con los socios de moneda, exigiría también que la economía creciese un 6% nominal hasta 2025 de forma ininterrumpida, y que el déficit fiscal anual fuere del 2% o inferior; algo que, por cierto, solo sería posible desde 2017, a juzgar por las estimaciones que el Gobierno recoge en el Programa de Estabilidad.
Las proyecciones para corregir la debilitada posición neta de inversión internacional (NIIP, la necesidad de financiación neta agregada), que ahora es de un 103% del PIB, no son mejores. La Comisión Europea considera razonable disponer de una posición deficitaria acumulada del 35% del PIB, lo que supone que España debería reducirla en unos 65 puntos porcentuales.
Tal ejercicio solo sería posible con avances nominales de la economía del 5% de manera continuada hasta el año 2026, y siempre que la composición del crecimiento fuera de tal manera que arrojase, de forma ininterrumpida, un superávit del sector exterior del 1% del PIB cada año.
Demasiadas condiciones, ciertamente. En 2013, un año extraordinariamente positivo por el comportamiento del sector exterior, España registró superávit por cuenta corriente de un 1,5%, una circunstancia que difícilmente podrá repetirse en el año 2014. Ha contribuido de manera importante la caída de la demanda interna en los años pasados en el reequilibrio del saldo exterior; pero en el primer semestre del año 2014, con una significativa recuperación de la demanda interna, el saldo comercial ha entrado de nuevo en déficit, y es complicado que cierre el año en equilibrio. Únicamente una mejora muy fuerte del saldo de rentas o de servicios podría repetir el superávit.
Por tanto, una de las variables manejadas en la proyección del think tank EuropeG es de muy difícil manejo. Pero la proyección ensaya también qué ocurriría con la posición internacional de inversión si el saldo exterior fuese anualmente deficitario en un 2%. En tal caso, el desequilibrio financiero externo, pese a crecer la economía un 6%, se reduciría hasta 2026 únicamente en 30 puntos: la mitad de lo necesario. Si el saldo exterior fuese cero, el desequilibrio se reduciría hasta muy cerca del 40%.
Otra demostración por el absurdo: la economía de servicios no resuelve el desempleo
(Tomando el caso español como ejemplo) El boom de turistas extranjeros del que se beneficia el país hace que cuatro comunidades españolas entren el ranking de regiones europeas más turísticas, según Eurostat.
España tuvo en 2013 su mejor año en la historia del turismo patrio. El mejor… de momento. El año 2013 se rebasó por primera vez la cota de los 60 millones de turistas extranjeros, todo un hito, pero para el año 2014, el Gobierno y el sector ya augura que se rozarán los 64 millones de viajeros al cierre del ejercicio. Otro récord"… Canarias, a la cabeza de las regiones con más turismo de toda Europa (Expansión – 6/10/14)
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