¿Se ha perdido la confianza en la economía de mercado en los países avanzados? Desigualdad y falta de oportunidades (página 7)

"Lo que podemos hacer, lo que deberíamos hacer, es reconocer que limitar los intereses en la inversión de capital propio de los bancos comerciales es en el interés de la competencia abierta y justa, así como de la protección de la provisión de servicios financieros esenciales"…

"Deberíamos imponer límites a las negociaciones de valores con capital propio por parte de los bancos y los holding bancarios, así como restricciones a la propiedad o auspicio de fondos de cobertura o fondos de capital privado de inversión"…

"Cuando un banco es de hecho un cliente al negociar su propia cuenta, "inevitablemente se encontrarán a sí mismos consciente o inadvertidamente, actuando en fines cruzados para los intereses de cliente comercial no relacionado de un banco"…

"Los bancos no deben ser hedge funds"… "La red de seguridad que el Gobierno ofrece a los bancos a través del Fondo de Garantía de Depósitos (FDIC) y de los rescates de emergencia de 2008, no debe amparar las actividades de alto riesgo que han provocado la crisis. Es decir, esta protección debe aplicarse a los depositantes, no a los especuladores"…

"La primera regla de esta reforma sea que los bancos no pueden poseer ni operar hedge funds… Aunque no pretende prohibir estos vehículos, como tampoco el capital riesgo; lo que no se quiere es que ni ellos ni los bancos que actúan como ellos operen con una red pagada con dinero público"… "Estos vehículos son, y deben ser, libres para operar, innovar, invertir… y quebrar"…

Se trata, de imponer los métodos para minimizar estas quiebras en "las fábricas básicas de los mercados financieros". "La necesidad esencial es protegernos contra el exceso de apalancamiento, e insistir en los niveles de capital y liquidez adecuados"…

(Paul Volcker (82 años) ex presidente de la Reserva Federal en los años 80 y antecesor de Alan Greenspan representa a la mano de hierro de la política monetaria, más cercano a las tesis ortodoxas y restrictivas del Bundesbank, que a la fiesta de tipos bajos y dinero gratis desencadenada por sus sucesores en la última década)

La Volcker "rule" (como Gary Cooper: "sólo ante al peligro")

– ¿Se puede reformar el sistema financiero global? (Project Syndicate – 4/6/12)

(Por Paul Volcker) Lectura recomendada

Hong Kong.- En la actualidad hay abundantes pruebas de que los sistemas financieros pueden dejar de funcionar correctamente, de lo que sirven como ejemplo Asia en los noventa y Estados Unidos y Europa una década después. Cuando ello ocurre, se paga un costo intolerable en la forma de interrupción del crecimiento y desempleo.

Pero una reforma del sistema no será posible, o resultará muy endeble, a menos que se alcance un consenso internacional en torno a ciertos temas clave. La libertad del dinero, de los mercados financieros y de las personas para trasladarse de un lugar a otro (y, de ese modo, eludir reglamentaciones e impuestos) puede ser un freno aceptable e incluso constructivo al exceso de intervención oficial, pero no cuando eso da pie a una competencia desregulatoria entre países que impide la adopción de normas éticas y prudenciales necesarias.

Tal vez lo primero en lo que habría que pensar sea adoptar un enfoque coherente y uniforme para enfrentar las situaciones de quiebra inminente de instituciones de "importancia sistémica". Tanto los contribuyentes como los gobiernos están cansados de salvar instituciones financieras por temor a una sucesión de quiebras en cadena con efecto destructivo, sabiendo que la posibilidad de rescate alienta a los acreedores a asumir riesgos desmesurados.

En Estados Unidos, la legislación ha instaurado nuevos métodos que sustituyen a los procedimientos de quiebra vigentes y exigen la disolución (y no el rescate) de las empresas en bancarrota, sea por venta, fusión o liquidación. Pero para que esta iniciativa tenga éxito será necesario que la acompañen medidas complementarias en otras partes del mundo, especialmente en el Reino Unido y otros centros financieros clave.

Esto no implica necesariamente una estricta uniformidad regulatoria. Por ejemplo, respecto de la protección de la banca comercial contra los riesgos de la inversión con fondos propios, de carácter más especulativo, puede ser que los tipos de políticas que emplean el Reino Unido y Estados Unidos sean diferentes, pero el temor que las inspira es bastante similar; a su vez, este problema tal vez no sea tan acuciante en otros países que siguen otras tradiciones y donde las operaciones de inversión están más limitadas. Pero aun así, una jurisdicción no debería tomar medidas que con el fin de competir menoscaben las restricciones impuestas por otra.

Hay otra reforma estrechamente relacionada, que es la del sistema monetario internacional. Incluso podríamos preguntarnos si lo que hay en la actualidad es realmente un "sistema", al menos en comparación con los acuerdos de Bretton Woods y, más allá en el tiempo, con la aparente simplicidad del patrón oro. Hasta ahora nadie ha sido capaz de ejercer autoridad en forma sistemática y coherente, y no existe una moneda internacional que cuente con aprobación y control internacional.

Es de suponer que el ideal de tener un régimen monetario internacional bien definido y eficaz se ha vuelto más difícil de llevar a la práctica, ahora que los mercados y los flujos de capitales son muchísimo más grandes e impredecibles que antes. También se dice que la economía mundial creció (y los países emergentes prosperaron) a pesar de no haber un sistema más organizado.

Pero a menudo se pasa por alto que la falta de un orden monetario internacional estuvo en el origen de las sucesivas crisis financieras de los noventa, y que su papel fue incluso más evidente en la crisis que estalló en 2008. En esto se destacan los desequilibrios sostenidos y, en cierto modo, complementarios, de Estados Unidos y Asia.

Entre 2000 y 2007, Estados Unidos acumuló un déficit de cuenta corriente por valor aproximado de 5,5 billones de dólares, acompañado por aumentos compensatorios casi simétricos en las reservas de China y Japón. A China le convenía mantener un gran superávit comercial y usar la elevada tasa de ahorro interno y el ingreso de inversión extranjera para sostener su industrialización y su veloz crecimiento.

En cambio Estados Unidos, enfrentado al problema del crecimiento lento, se limitó a sostener niveles de consumo excepcionalmente altos en perjuicio del ahorro personal. Esto permitió que se formara una enorme burbuja inmobiliaria que al estallar hizo muchísimo ruido (y dejó a todo el mundo muy alterado).

La lección práctica insoslayable es que cuando se deja a los países aplicar a su arbitrio sus propias herramientas políticas, puede ocurrir que las preferencias de cada uno conduzcan a la aparición de desequilibrios prolongados y a la larga, insostenibles. Antes o después, será necesario un ajuste: si no es a través de una política interna cuidadosa o del buen funcionamiento del sistema monetario internacional, será a través de una crisis financiera.

No hace mucho tiempo, hallábamos tranquilidad en la teoría de que para mediar los ajustes internacionales en forma oportuna y ordenada era suficiente permitir la flotación de los tipos de cambio. Pero en el mundo real, hay muchos países (sobre todo las pequeñas economías abiertas, pero también otras) para los que sencillamente resulta inviable o indeseable permitir la flotación de sus monedas.

La conclusión inevitable, por desagradable que sea, es que para formar parte activa de una economía mundial abierta es preciso ceder cierto grado de soberanía económica. O, para expresarlo en términos más positivos, estar dispuestos a una coordinación de políticas más efectiva. Esto admite diversas posibilidades, por ejemplo:

· Una mayor vigilancia por parte del Fondo Monetario Internacional y un compromiso más firme de los países a respetar las "buenas prácticas" y las normas acordadas.

· Un mecanismo de consultas obligatorias, seguidas por la formulación pública y directa de recomendaciones por parte del FMI, el G20 u otros organismos.

· Un sistema de calificación o descalificación para el uso de fondos del FMI u otras fuentes de financiación (por ejemplo, los acuerdos de intercambio monetario entre bancos centrales [swaps]).

· Cobro de intereses u otras multas financieras (en sintonía con las propuestas que se estudian en Europa).

Pero si adoptar soluciones que aprovechen las lecciones de los fracasos del pasado no fuera suficientemente efectivo, podría ser más promisorio repensar la idea de la flotación cambiaria. Esto exigiría llegar a algún acuerdo respecto de cuáles son los tipos de cambio de "equilibrio" adecuados, dejando una franja de valores bastante amplia que dé cuenta de la incertidumbre y permita al mercado ejercer su propia disciplina. Pero cada país por separado debería orientar sus intervenciones y sus políticas económicas hacia el objetivo de defender el tipo de cambio de equilibrio; o se podría emplear una modalidad más radical, en la que una autoridad internacional autorizara a los socios comerciales de un país a aplicar medidas contundentes para fomentar la coherencia del sistema.

Otro tema muy importante es que haya una moneda de reserva apropiada y liquidez internacional suficiente. Por muchos años, la respuesta práctica fue usar para ello el dólar (y hasta cierto punto, otras monedas nacionales), pero esto provocó quejas por el "privilegio excesivo" que se le confería a los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, a Estados Unidos no lo beneficia acentuar y ampliar su déficit de balanza de pagos en detrimento de una economía con competitividad internacional, fortaleza industrial y restricción del consumo. Y al resto del mundo le conviene la flexibilidad que ofrece la moneda de la economía más grande, más fuerte y más estable del mundo.

Para que una moneda sirva como medio de reserva, su oferta debe ser limitada, pero también debe tener elasticidad suficiente para satisfacer las necesidades, grandes e impredecibles, que pueden surgir en un mundo financiero turbulento. Y sobre todo, debe ofrecer garantías de estabilidad y disponibilidad, lo cual es un argumento más a favor de la practicidad que supone usar una moneda nacional, o tal vez una canasta de ellas.

(Paul Volcker is a former chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board)

Cuentas y cuentos: no están todos los que son… pero sí, son todos los que están

Después de este listado de "agravantes" (políticamente incorrecto, tal vez desordenado, y seguramente incompleto), podemos volver a la pregunta original:

¿Se ha perdido de confianza en la "economía de mercado", en los países avanzados?

El escepticismo de las clases medias es, probablemente, la consecuencia política más palmaria de la crisis económica. La cohesión social que ha permitido mantener a las clases medias dentro del "sistema de economía de mercado" ha saltado por los aires.

Está acreditado que a medida que se produce un ensanchamiento de las desigualdades salariales o un deterioro creciente de las condiciones laborales (empleo de usar y tirar), la polarización social tiende a aumentar. La identificación con el sistema económico se evapora. No hay interés para permanecer dentro.

Si el modelo económico y social no es capaz de proteger a los hogares, parece evidente que no hay ninguna razón para creer en él. Sobre todo cuando en paralelo el sistema fiscal se ha apoyado fundamentalmente en los asalariados al tiempo que privilegiaba a quienes obtienen sus rentas de fuentes no salariales.

Hasta hace muy poco tiempo se entendía que la erradicación de la pobreza dependía fundamentalmente de la creación de empleo, pero el nuevo orden económico internacional lo que ha provocado es, en realidad, un deterioro sin parangón de las condiciones salariales en los países occidentales, lo que explica que ya no basta con tener una ocupación para escapar de la pobreza. De ahí que muchos gobiernos se vean obligados a echar mano de los impuestos para asegurar un mínimo de supervivencia.

El problema es que esos recursos salen, precisamente, de otros asalariados con ingresos insuficientes, lo que provoca un círculo vicioso. Una especie de socialización de la pobreza. Se ha quebrado la creencia de que la historia es una progresión continúa -con altibajos en determinados procesos históricos- en pos de mayores cotas de libertad y educación.

Millones de hogares que antes tenían sentido de pertenencia a las clases medias se ven hoy muy cerca de la pobreza relativa. Sin duda, por la eclosión de eso que se ha venido en denominar "trabajadores pobres", y que afecta no sólo a los empleados de baja cualificación, sino también a ciudadanos bien formados atrapados por una frustración creciente.

Anteriormente, el sistema se basaba en que los empresarios pagaban a los trabajadores lo suficiente para que éstos pudieran comprar lo que sus empresas vendían. Ese pacto social es el que se ha quebrado, y de ahí la radicalización de las clases medias, que progresivamente se han visto amenazadas y han ido abandonando su papel de ciudadanos para convertirse en espectadores de una realidad que se cuenta en la televisión como un producto de entretenimiento.

El costo de la desigualdad y la falta de oportunidades, han acabado por demostrar a las clases medias de los países avanzados, que esa "realidad" que se cuenta por televisión es pura propaganda, y como lo resumió muy bien George Orwell: "Toda propaganda es mentira, incluso cuando dice la verdad".

La crisis de las clases medias en los países avanzados es anterior al estallido de la burbuja del crédito. Su origen hay que encontrarlo en la insuficiencia de puestos de trabajo (los altos niveles de desempleo estructural en muchos países) y el deterioro de algunos servicios públicos esenciales (deficiencias de los sistemas educativos y sanitarios) que antes servían de pararrayos social, Como consecuencia de ello, un número cada vez más relevante de ciudadanos se siente extraño al sistema económico.

Lo que se ha roto son las certezas y el mundo previsible. El mundo de la seguridad, del que hablaba Stefan Zweig. Hasta hace bien poco, se pensaba que los avances técnicos -y su corolario en términos de productividad– serían suficientes para lograr el progreso social. Hoy ya no es así.

Mientras que en la sociedad industrial o de clases la cuestión social giraba en torno a cómo repartir la riqueza producida de forma colectiva (y la historia del siglo XX refleja hasta qué punto la lucha entre los diferentes agentes económicos fue encarnizada), en la nueva sociedad del riesgo se seguirá produciendo de una manera desigual, pero su volumen ya no estará garantizado. Y es aquí cuando surge lo que ha venido a definirse como los "nuevos pobres". O la nueva pobreza, como se prefiera. Un fenómeno en el que se ven envueltos nuevos colectivos que antes se consideraban protegidos contra las inclemencias económicas: profesionales, empleados públicos, pensionistas, parados de larga duración o estudiantes con dificultades para su inserción laboral.

Antes el trabajador era necesario para que algunos ganaran, ahora hay gente que gana sin necesidad de que nadie trabaje para ellos. El resultado de esta situación es una profunda desigualdad. Que no solo alcanza a los parados, sino también a una gran parte de los trabajadores asalariados.

Vamos, total, al fin "nada" es cierto (aria di bravura)

No es cierto que los pobres sean los culpables de la crisis (créditos subprime).

No es cierto que las reformas estructurales se deben limitar al sector trabajo.

No es cierto que para mejorar la competitividad los trabajadores deban aceptar contratos basura y despido libre.

No es cierto que para resolver el problema del déficit público haya que limitar el gasto en sanidad, educación, pensiones y otros gastos sociales.

No es cierto que el problema de la deuda en la eurozona sea más grave que en los Estados Unidos o en el Reino Unido.

No es cierto que no se puedan restablecer el crecimiento en el corto plazo y, al mismo tiempo, abordar los problemas de la deuda en el mediano y largo plazo, como respuesta válida a la crisis.

No es cierto que los países que manejan su política monetaria necesiten del mercado para financiar su deuda.

No es cierto que el poder lo tenga el "mercado". En los países soberanos el poder lo tiene el Estado a través de su banco central y Ministerio de Hacienda. Nunca el "mercado".

No es cierto que (únicamente) con "rigor fiscal" se sale de la crisis. Es mucho lo que está en juego. Sin una acción audaz, Europa (me animaría a decir que EEUU también) podría verse arrastrada a una espiral bajista de deterioro de la confianza, de estancamiento del crecimiento y de menor empleo. Y ninguna región quedaría inmune ante semejante catástrofe.

Es aritméticamente imposible que todos los países en la eurozona se escapen simultáneamente de la crisis de la deuda a base de deflación. ¿Vamos a morir juntos?

Coda: puede pasar lo peor o lo mejor (viejas y queridas causas perdidas)

Estos "relatos" (de cabotaje), intentan de una manera "sencilla" responder la pregunta sobre ¿por qué se ha perdido de confianza en la "economía de mercado", en los países avanzados? Se trata de resaltar el poder del dinero frente a la fuerza de la verdad. Denunciar que reinan los principales por encima de los principios. Afirmar que la economía (y la justicia) queda(n) huérfana(s) de esperanza.

Las mías son "advertencias", no "predicciones". Puedo estar equivocado (probablemente), pero no soy "interesado" (cómplice), ni "pluma mercenaria" (lacayo), con absoluta seguridad. A partir de esta confesión, ustedes mismos.

Luego, en el Anexo III, se reproducen partes del Informe: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom – The Heritage Foundation – WSJ

Anexos

Anexo I: El escepticismo de las clases medias en los países avanzados

Emerging and developing economies much more optimistic than rich countries about the future (Global views on opportunity and inequality) – PEW RESEARCH CENTER – October 2014

This report examines public opinion about opportunity and inequality around the world, including financial prospects for the next generation, the biggest factors to getting ahead in life and the causes of inequality. It is based on 48,643 interviews in 44 countries with adults 18 and older, conducted from March 17 to June 5, 2014.

(Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world. It does not take policy positions. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. The center studies U.S. politics and policy views; media and journalism; internet and technology; religion and public life; Hispanic trends; global attitudes and U.S. social and demographic trends. All of the center"s reports are available at www.pewresearch.org. Pew Research Center is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts).

As they continue to struggle with the effects of the Great Recession, publics in advanced economies are pessimistic about the financial prospects for the next generation. Most of those surveyed in richer nations think children in their country will be worse off financially than their parents. In contrast, emerging and developing nations are more optimistic that the next generation will have a higher standard of living.

Overall, optimism is linked with recent national economic performance. Countries that have enjoyed relatively high levels of growth in recent years also register some of the highest levels of confidence in their children"s economic futures.

Looking ahead, people in the emerging and developing world see better opportunities at home than abroad. Majorities or pluralities in 30 of the 34 emerging and developing nations surveyed say they would tell young people in their country to stay at home in order to lead a good life, instead of moving to another country.

A good education and hard work are most often seen as the keys to getting ahead in life. This view is especially prevalent in emerging and developing nations, where most see economic opportunity expanding. Still, many also believe success can be determined by things outside a person"s control, such as luck or having a wealthy family.

Despite the long-term optimism that exists in many countries, there are widespread concerns about inequality. Majorities in all of the 44 nations polled say the gap between rich and poor is a big problem facing their countries, and majorities in 28 nations identify this as a very big problem. More than seven-in-ten hold this view in Greece, Spain and Italy – countries that faced significant economic challenges during the last several years. But even in the emerging and developing nations that have enjoyed tremendous growth over the last couple of decades, there is a consensus that those at the top are reaping the gains while others are being left behind.

People blame inequality on a variety of causes, but they see their government"s economic policies as the top culprit. A global median of 29% say those policies are most to blame for the gap between rich and poor. Fewer people blame the amount of workers" wages, the educational system, the fact that some work harder than others, trade, or the tax system.

The survey also asked what would do more to reduce inequality: low taxes on the wealthy and corporations to encourage investment and growth, or high taxes on the wealthy and corporations to fund programs that help the poor. The balance of opinion in emerging and developing nations is that low taxes are most effective while people in advanced economies tend to favor high taxes.

While inequality is considered a major challenge by a median of 60% across the 44 nations polled, higher numbers say rising prices and a lack of job opportunities (medians of 77%) are very big problems. And people in advanced, emerging and developing markets alike are clearly willing to live with some degree of inequality as part of a free market system. Majorities or pluralities in 38 of 44 countries say that most people are better off in a free market economy, even though some people are rich while others are poor.

These are among the key findings of a survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted in 44 countries among 48,643 respondents from March 17 to June 5, 2014. While this report focuses largely on differences and similarities between economically advanced, emerging and developing nations, the survey also finds significant differences by region…

People in emerging and developing nations are more optimistic for the next generation than publics in advanced economies. Still, there is a wide range of attitudes within each group…

Publics in advanced economies are the most pessimistic. In most of the high income countries surveyed, three-in-ten or fewer say the nation"s children will surpass their parents financially. Majorities in eight of the 10 countries believe the younger generation will be worse off. The French, Japanese and British are particularly downbeat about the future. Nearly two-thirds of Americans say the same…

In general, countries that have experienced higher economic growth since 2008 are more optimistic for next generation than publics that have had less growth. For example, in China, which has experienced an average GDP growth of 9% between 2008 and 2013, 85% of the public says young people will be better off financially than their parents. Meanwhile, Italians, who have seen their economy contract by an average of 2% per year over the course of the global recession, are much less optimistic (15%)…

(Advanced economies include France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Spain, UK & the U.S. Emerging economies include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela & Vietnam. Developing economies include Bangladesh, El Salvador, Ghana, Kenya, Nicaragua, Palestinian territories, Senegal, Tanzania & Uganda).

In some countries, optimism for the next generation has changed significantly in just the past year and these shifts in attitudes appear to be related in part to changing views about the country"s economy.

Today, 51% of Ugandans say children will be better off financially than their parents, compared with 39% last year. Over the same time period, Ugandans also became significantly more positive about the current economy (+18 percentage points). Optimism for young people improved since 2013 as well in Senegal (+12), South Africa (+11), Germany (+10), Pakistan (+8), Egypt (+7) and the UK (+6). At the opposite end, hope for the nation"s youth in Venezuela declined by 18 points in the past year as positive ratings of the economy also fell by 15 points. Optimism about the children"s future also decreased over the past 12 months in Kenya (-19), Malaysia (-14), the Philippines (-11), El Salvador (-8) and Brazil (-7).

Perhaps because most publics see a bright future for their nation"s youth, people in emerging and developing nations generally believe that it is better for young people who want to have a good life to stay in their home country, rather than move to another country…

In some countries, young people, those ages 18-29, are more optimistic than people 50 and older about prospects for the next generation. The age gap is particularly large in Uganda (+22 percentage points children will be better off financially), the UK (+21), Nicaragua (+20), Spain (+19) and Thailand (+15). At the same time, in many countries, young people are also more likely to say there are more opportunities to have a good life abroad than at home. On this question, the biggest age gaps are in Tunisia (+25 percentage points recommend young people move to another country), Brazil (+19), the Palestinian territories (+16) and Chile (+15)…

Majorities or pluralities in 28 of the 44 countries surveyed agree that success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control. People in developing and emerging markets (medians of 56%) are somewhat more likely to believe their fate is out of their hands than those in advanced economies (51%)…

Meanwhile, in advanced economies, roughly half or fewer in six of the 10 countries surveyed agree that success is out of our control. Americans are the least likely to say they are not the masters of their fate (40%), one of the lowest percentages among the 44 countries surveyed…

When asked to rate on a scale of 0 to 10 how important a range of characteristics are to getting ahead in life, most global publics say having a good education (global median of 60% rating this "10 – very important") and working hard (50%) are very important. Knowing the right people (37%), being lucky (33%), coming from a wealthy family (20%), being born a male (17%) and giving bribes (5%) are seen as less essential to doing well…

Advanced economies are a bit more divided between education and hard work as the keys to success. Education is the top response among five of the 10 countries – Spain (71% rate as 10), Germany (61%), Israel (41%), Italy (39%) and Greece (31%) – and work ethic is the top in four – the U.S. (73%), UK (60%), Japan (42%) and France (25%). The percentage of Americans who say hard work is very important to getting ahead in life is among the highest across all 44 countries. South Koreans are the only public where knowing the right people is the most commonly cited key to success (rated at the top of the scale by 39%)…

Inequality a major problem

A global median of 60% say that the gap between rich and poor is a very big problem in their country. Concern is somewhat higher among developing economies and emerging markets (median of 60% in each), but is also shared by people in advanced economies (56%).

Nonetheless, despite this high level of worry about inequality, the issue only ties or tops the list of economic problems in four of the 44 countries surveyed. In general, people in advanced economies tend to worry more about public debt and unemployment than inequality, while those in emerging markets and developing economies are more concerned about inflation and jobs…

Publics fault government policies

The top culprit for income inequality cited by publics around the world is their national government"s economic policies. A global median of 29% say their government"s policies are to blame for the gap between the rich and the poor, while the amount workers are paid is a close second at 23%. Globally, people place less blame on the educational system (11%), a lack of individual hard work (10%), trade between countries (8%) and the structure of the tax system (8%).

Advanced economies in particular lean toward the notion that their governments are to blame for inequality (median of 32%). The Greeks (54%), Spanish (52%) and South Koreans (46%) are government"s harshest critics. Significant percentages among advanced economies also fault workers" wages for the gap between the rich and the poor, including 29% in Japan and 26% each in France and Germany. The Americans and British are two of the few publics to blame individuals" lack of hard work (24%) about as much as they do their government"s policies (24% in U.S., 23% in UK)…

Many say low taxes are the answer

Pluralities or majorities in 22 of the 44 countries surveyed say to reduce inequality it is more effective to have low taxes on the wealthy and corporations to encourage investment and economic growth rather than high taxes on the wealthy and corporations to fund programs that help the poor. Publics in 13 countries prefer the high tax option.

Overall, advanced economies (median of 48%) are somewhat more supportive than either developing (40%) or emerging (31%) countries of using high taxes on the wealthy and corporations to address income inequality. The broadest support comes from Germany, where 61% favor using high taxes to fund poverty programs. Roughly half or more in Spain (54%), South Korea (53%), the UK (50%) and the U.S. (49%) agree. In Italy (68%), France (61%) and Greece (50%), opinion leans toward low taxes to encourage investment.

In most advanced economies, people who say they are very concerned about inequality are particularly supportive of income redistribution to reduce the gap between the rich and poor. There is also a large ideological divide over taxes in Europe and the U.S. In general, individuals on the left are much more likely than those on the right to prefer high taxes on the wealthy and corporations. For example, 71% of those on the left in Spain support redistribution, compared with 45% of people on the right. In the U.S., 70% of liberals say high taxes are more effective to combat inequality while just 33% of conservatives agree…

Free market seen as best, despite inequality

Despite the fact that most people are very concerned about the gap between the rich and the poor in their country, majorities across the globe are willing to accept some inequality to have a free market system. A global median of 66% say most people are better off under capitalism, even if some people are rich and some are poor.

Belief in the free market tends to be highest in developing countries (median of 71%). Nearly two-thirds or more in all nine of the developing economies surveyed agree that most people benefit from capitalism, including 80% of Bangladeshis, 75% of Ghanaians and 74% of Kenyans.

Publics in emerging markets also generally support the free market. More than half in 21 of the 25 countries surveyed agree that most people are better off in a free market system even if there is some inequality, including roughly three-quarters or more in Vietnam, China, Nigeria, Turkey, Malaysia and the Philippines. Support is much lower in Colombia, Jordan, Mexico and Argentina. Argentines are the least likely to see the benefits of capitalism among all 44 countries surveyed.

Advanced economies are somewhat more divided over the free market. At least seven-in-ten in South Korea, Germany and the U.S. say most people are better off under capitalism, but fewer than half in Greece, Japan and Spain agree. In most advanced economies, people who say the gap between the rich and poor is a very big problem are much less supportive of the free market than those who worry less about inequality.

In general, there has been moderate change in support for the free market between 2007 and 2014 among the countries surveyed in both years. The Spanish (-22 percentage points) and Italians (-16) stand out for their declining belief in capitalism over the course of the global recession. At the other end of the spectrum, the Turks (+14) and Indonesians (+13) are more likely today to say the free market is better for everyone than they were seven years ago.

In some countries, lower income and less educated individuals are less likely to express support for capitalism than higher income and more highly educated people. The gap between lower and higher income people on this question is particularly large in Peru (-23 percentage points), Greece (-20) and France (-17). And the education differences are especially wide in Peru (-20), Pakistan (-18) and Nigeria (-16).

Anexo II: La "montaña mágica" de la deuda

Debt and (not much) deleveraging – MACKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE – February 2015

In brief

After the 2008 financial crisis and the longest and deepest global recession since World War II, it was widely expected that the world"s economies would deleverage. It has not happened. Instead, debt continues to grow in nearly all countries, in both absolute terms and relative to GDP. This creates fresh risks in some countries and limits growth prospects in many.

Debt continues to grow. Since 2007, global debt has grown by $ 57 trillion, or 17 percentage points of GDP. Developing economies account for roughly half of the growth, and in many cases this reflects healthy financial deepening. In advanced economies, government debt has soared and private-sector deleveraging has been limited.

Reducing government debt will require a wider range of solutions. Government debt has grown by $ 25 trillion since 2007, and will continue to rise in many countries, given current economic fundamentals. For the most highly indebted countries, implausibly large increases in real GDP growth or extremely deep reductions in fiscal deficits would be required to start deleveraging. A broader range of solutions for reducing government debt will need to be considered, including larger asset sales, one-time taxes, and more efficient debt restructuring programs.

Shadow banking has retreated, but non-bank credit remains important. One piece of good news: the financial sector has deleveraged, and the most damaging elements of shadow banking in the crisis are declining. However, other forms of non-bank credit, such as corporate bonds and lending by non-bank intermediaries, remain important. For corporations, non-bank sources account for nearly all new credit growth since 2008. These intermediaries can help fill the gap as bank lending remains constrained in the new regulatory environment.

ƒHouseholds borrow more. In the four "core" crisis countries that were hit hard -the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Ireland- households have deleveraged. But in many other countries, household debt-to-income ratios have continued to grow, and in some cases far exceed the peak levels in the crisis countries. To safely manage high levels of household debt, more flexible mortgage contracts, clearer personal bankruptcy rules, and stricter lending standards are needed.

China"s debt is rising rapidly. Fueled by real estate and shadow banking, China"s total debt has quadrupled, rising from $ 7 trillion in 2007 to $ 28 trillion by mid-2014. At 282 percent of GDP, China"s debt as a share of GDP, while manageable, is larger than that of the United States or Germany. Several factors are worrisome: half of loans are linked directly or indirectly to China"s real estate market, unregulated shadow banking accounts for nearly half of new lending, and the debt of many local governments is likely unsustainable.

It is clear that deleveraging is rare and that solutions are in short supply. Given the scale of debt in the most highly indebted countries, the current solutions for sparking growth or cutting fiscal deficits alone will not be sufficient. New approaches are needed to start deleveraging and to manage and monitor debt. This includes innovations in mortgages and other debt contracts to better share risk; clearer rules for restructuring debt; eliminating tax incentives for debt; and using macroprudential measures to dampen credit booms. Debt remains an essential tool for funding economic growth. But how debt is created, used, monitored, and when needed discharged, must be improved.

Executive summary

Seven years after the global financial crisis, global debt and leverage have continued to grow. From 2007 through the second quarter of 2014, global debt grew by $ 57 trillion, raising the ratio of global debt to GDP by 17 percentage points (Exhibit E1). This is not as much as the 23-point increase in the seven years before the crisis, but it is enough to raise fresh concerns. Governments in advanced economies have borrowed heavily to fund bailouts in the crisis and offset falling demand in the recession, while corporate and household debt in a range of countries continues to grow rapidly.

There are few indicators that the current trajectory of rising leverage will change, especially in light of diminishing expectations for economic growth. This calls into question basic assumptions about debt and deleveraging and the adequacy of the tools available to manage debt and avoid future crises. We find it unlikely that economies with total non-financial debt that is equivalent to three to four times GDP will grow their way out of excessive debt. And the adjustments to government budgets required to start deleveraging of the most indebted governments are on a scale that makes success politically challenging.

This situation demands a broader set of approaches. Debt will remain an essential tool for the global economy, funding needed investments in infrastructure, business expansion, and urbanization. But high debt levels, whether in the public or private sector, have historically placed a drag on growth and raised the risk of financial crises that spark deep economic recessions. A broader range of tools to avoid excessive borrowing and efficiently restructure debt when needed should be considered.

This research builds on our previous work on global debt and deleveraging, which examined debt in the private and public sectors across countries. In this report, we examine the evolution of debt and prospects for deleveraging in 22 advanced economies and 25 developing economies. Our research focuses on debt of the "real economy" –of households, non-financial corporations, and governments- and treats financial-sector debt separately. One bit of good news in our research is the reduced leverage and increased safety of the financial sector in advanced economies.

In our analysis we examine several important developments in global debt since the crisis: the continuing rise of leverage around the world; growing government debt and how it might be managed; continued rapid growth in household debt in some countries that raises the risk of future crises; the potential risks of China"s rising debt, which accounts for about a third of the increase in global debt since 2007; and the decline of the riskiest forms of shadow banking and continued growth of other forms of non-bank lending. We conclude that, absent additional steps and new approaches, business leaders should expect that debt will be a drag on GDP growth and continue to create volatility and fragility in financial markets. Policy makers will need to consider a full range of responses to reduce debt as well as innovations to make debt less risky and make the impact of future crises less catastrophic.

Since the crisis, most countries have added debt, rather than deleveraging

A large body of academic research shows that high debt is associated with slower GDP growth and higher risk of financial crises. Given the magnitude of the 2008 financial crisis, it is a surprise, then, that no major economies and only five developing economies have reduced the ratio of debt to GDP in the "real economy" (households, non-financial corporations, and governments, and excluding financial-sector debt). In contrast, 14 countries have increased their total debt-to-GDP ratios by more than 50 percentage points (Exhibit E2). Exhibit E3 shows the change in the ratio of debt to GDP in countries by sector since 2007 and ranks countries by the size of their total debt-to-GDP ratio.

Some of the growth in global debt is benign and even desirable. Developing economies have accounted for 47 percent of all the growth in global debt since 2007-and threequarters of new debt in the household and corporate sectors. To some extent, this reflects healthy financial system deepening, as more households and companies gain access to financial services. Moreover, debt in developing countries remains relatively modest, averaging 121 percent of GDP, compared with 280 percent for advanced economies. There are exceptions, notably China, Malaysia, and Thailand, whose debt levels are now at the level of some advanced economies.

More concerning is the continuing rise of debt levels in advanced economies. Despite the tightening of lending standards, household debt relative to income has declined significantly in only five advanced economies -the United States, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Germany. The United States and Ireland have achieved the most household deleveraging, using very different mechanisms (default in the United States, and loan modification programs in Ireland). Meanwhile, a number of countries in northern Europe, as well as Canada and Australia, now have larger household debt ratios than existed in the United States or the United Kingdom at the peak of the credit bubble. Corporations were not highly leveraged at the start of the 2008 crisis and their debt has risen only slightly since then. For small businesses, particularly in parts of Europe, new lending has dried up.

Government debt: A wider range of solutions is needed

Government debt in advanced economies increased by $ 19 trillion between 2007 and the second quarter of 2014 and by $ 6 trillion in developing countries. In the depths of the recession, the rise in government spending was a welcome counterbalance to the sharp decline in private-sector demand. Indeed, at the first G20 meeting in Washington, DC, policymakers urged governments to use fiscal stimulus to combat the recession.

But government debt has now reached high levels in a range of countries and is projected to continue to grow. Given current primary fiscal balances, interest rates, inflation, and consensus real GDP growth projections, we find that government debt-to-GDP ratios will continue to rise over the next five years in Japan (where government debt is already 234 percent of GDP), the United States, and most European countries, with the exceptions of Germany, Ireland, and Greece.

It is unclear how the most highly indebted of these advanced economies can reduce government debt. We calculate that the fiscal adjustment (or improvement in government budget balances) required to start government deleveraging is close to 2 percent of GDP or more in six countries: Spain, Japan, Portugal, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (Exhibit E4). Attaining and then sustaining such dramatic changes in fiscal balances would be challenging. Furthermore, efforts to reduce fiscal deficits could be self-defeating -inhibiting the growth that is needed to reduce leverage.

Nor are these economies likely to grow their way out of high government debt -which was essential to some previous successful deleveraging episodes, such as Sweden"s and

Finland"s in the 1990s. In these countries, too, government debt rose in the recessions that followed their crises. But their private sectors deleveraged rapidly, and both nations benefited from an export boom, fueled in large part by a 30 percent currency depreciation and strong global demand. Today, many of the world"s largest economies are trying to deleverage at the same time and in an environment of limited global growth and persistently low inflation. Our analysis shows that real GDP growth would need to be twice the current projected rates or more to start reducing government debt-to-GDP ratios in six countries: Spain, Japan, Portugal, France, Italy, and Finland.

A wider range of solutions to enable government deleveraging is therefore needed. The specifics will depend on the circumstances of each country. But these may include, for instance, more widespread public asset sales, higher or one-time taxes on wealth, higher inflation targets, and more efficient programs for debt restructuring.

Household debt continues to grow rapidly, and deleveraging is rare

Unsustainable levels of household debt in the United States and a handful of other advanced economies were at the core of the 2008 financial crisis. Between 2000 and 2007, the ratio of household debt relative to income rose by one-third or more in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. This was accompanied by, and contributed to, rising housing prices. When housing prices started to decline and the financial crisis occurred, the struggle to keep up with this debt led to a sharp contraction in consumption and a deep recession.

Since then, households in those countries have begun deleveraging, with the most progress in Ireland and the United States (Exhibit E5). In many other countries, however, household debt has continued to rise rapidly. In the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway, household debt now exceeds 200 percent of income -far above US or UK household debt at the peak.

In other advanced economies, such as Canada, South Korea, and Australia, household debt also continues to grow. Household debt has risen rapidly in some developing countries, too -quadrupling in China, for instance- but remains at much lower levels relative to income than in advanced economies (Malaysia and Thailand are exceptions).

Why is household deleveraging so rare? Mortgages are the main form of household debt in all advanced economies, and rising housing prices contribute to more borrowing. And, when buyers can obtain larger mortgages, they bid up house prices even more. We find a strong correlation between increases in real estate prices and household debt both across countries and between US states. Housing prices, in turn, reflect land costs, which are influenced by physical limitations, regulatory policies, and urban concentration. We show that urbanization patterns matter: countries in which a large share of the population crowds into a small number of cities have higher real estate prices -and household debt- than countries with more dispersed urban development. Policy makers will therefore need to be particularly vigilant in monitoring debt growth and sustainability in global cities with high real estate prices.

The question now is whether high household debt in some countries will spark a crisis.

We assess the level and growth of debt-to-income ratios, debt service ratios, and house price changes. Using these metrics, we find that seven economies today have potential vulnerabilities in household debt: the Netherlands, South Korea, Canada, Sweden, Australia, Malaysia, and Thailand. More than ever, effective tools are needed for issuing, monitoring, and managing household debt.

The riskiest forms of shadow banking have retreated, but non-bank credit remains important

One bright spot in our research is progress in financial-sector deleveraging. In the years prior to the crisis, the global financial system became ever more complex and interconnected. Credit intermediation chains become very long, involving multiple layers of securitization, high levels of leverage, and opaque distribution of risk. This was reflected in growing debt issued by financial institutions to fund their activities. Financial-sector debt grew from $ 20 trillion in 2000 to $ 37 trillion in 2007, or from 56 percent of global GDP to 71 percent. Much of this debt was in the so-called shadow banking system, whose vulnerability was starkly exposed by the financial crisis.

It is a welcome sign, then, that financial-sector debt relative to GDP has declined in the

United States and a few other crisis countries, and has stabilized in other advanced economies. At the same time, banks have raised capital and reduced leverage. Moreover, the riskiest elements of shadow banking are in decline. For example, the assets of off balance sheet special-purpose vehicles formed to securitize mortgages and other loans have fallen by $ 3 trillion in the United States. Repurchase agreements (repos), collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps have declined by 19 percent, 43 percent, and 67 percent, respectively, since 2007.

However, if we consider the broader context of non-bank credit, including corporate bonds, simple securitizations, and lending by various non-bank institutions, we see that non-bank credit is an important source of financing for the private sector. Since 2007, corporate bonds and lending by non-bank institutions -including insurers, pension funds, leasing programs, and government programs- has accounted for nearly all net new credit for companies, while corporate bank lending has shrunk (Exhibit E6). The value of corporate bonds outstanding globally has grown by $ 4.3 trillion since 2007, compared with $ 1.2 trillion from 2000 to 2007. Most of these forms of non-bank credit have fewer of the risks of the shadow banking seen before the crisis, in terms of leverage, maturity mismatch, and opacity.

Some specific types of non-bank credit are growing very rapidly, such as credit funds operated by hedge funds and other alternative asset managers. Assets in credit funds for a sample of eight alternative asset managers have more than doubled since 2009 and now exceed $ 400 billion. Another small, but rapidly growing, source of non-bank debt is peer-topeer lending. These online lending platforms have originated only about $30 billion in loans so far, but private equity funds, other asset managers, and even banks have begun investing in peer-to-peer platforms, suggesting that these lenders could build greater scale. Currently, the risks associated with these new credit intermediaries appear low, although they should be monitored closely, as that could change.

With bank lending likely to remain constrained in the future due to new regulations, non-bank credit could fill a growing need. If appropriate restrictions on leverage and use of complex, opaque financial instruments are in place, loans from non-bank intermediaries, corporate bonds, and simple forms of securitization can play an important role in funding growth.

China"s debt is rising rapidly, with several potential risks ahead

Since 2007, China"s total debt (including debt of the financial sector) has nearly quadrupled, rising from $ 7.4 trillion to $ 28.2 trillion by the second quarter of 2014, or from 158 percent of GDP to 282 percent (Exhibit E7). China"s overall debt ratio today appears manageable, although it is now higher in proportion to GDP than that of the United States, Germany, or Canada. Continuing the current pace of growth would put China at Spain"s current level of debt -400 percent of GDP- by 2018. We find three particular areas of potential concern: the concentration of debt in real estate, the rapid growth and complexity of shadow banking in China, and the off-balance sheet borrowing by local governments.

We estimate that nearly half of the debt of Chinese households, corporations, and governments is directly or indirectly related to real estate, collectively worth as much as $ 9 trillion. This includes mortgages to homeowners; debt of property developers; lending to related industries, such as steel and cement; and debt raised by local governments for property development. This concentration in the property sector poses a significant risk. Property prices have risen by 60 percent since 2008 in 40 Chinese cities, and even more in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Residential real estate prices in prime locations in Shanghai are now only about 10 percent below those in Paris and New York. Over the past year, a correction has begun. Transaction volumes are down by around 10 percent across China, and unsold inventories are building up: smaller inland cities now have 48 to 77 months of inventory. A slowdown in the property market would be felt mostly in construction and related industries, rather than by households, which are not highly indebted. However, housing construction is an enormous sector, accounting for 15 percent of GDP. Thousands of small players in the industry, many of which rely on high-cost shadow banking loans, would have trouble keeping up with debt service payments in a prolonged slowdown.

The rapid growth of shadow banking in China is a second area of concern: loans by shadow banking entities total $ 6.5 trillion and account for 30 percent of China"s outstanding debt (excluding the financial sector) and half of new lending. Most of the loans are for the property sector. The main vehicles in shadow banking include trust accounts, which promise wealthy investors high returns; wealth management products marketed to retail customers; entrusted loans made by companies to one another; and an array of financing companies, microcredit institutions, and informal lenders. Both trust accounts and wealth management products are often marketed by banks, creating a false impression that they are guaranteed. The underwriting standards and risk management employed by managers of these funds are also unclear. Entrusted loans involve lending between companies, creating the potential for a ripple of defaults in the event that one company fails. The level of risk of shadow banking in China could soon be tested by the slowdown in the property sector.

The third potential risk in China is the growing debt accumulated in off-balance sheet local government financing vehicles, which are used to fund infrastructure (airports, bridges, subways, and industrial parks), social housing, and other projects. Local governments rely on these off-balance sheet entities because they have limited taxing authority, must share revenue with the central government, and until recently have not been permitted to issue municipal bonds. Since China"s 2009 stimulus program, lending to local governments has surged, reaching $ 2.9 trillion. The central government has recognized the growing risk and in 2014 conducted an audit of local government finances, finding that 40 percent rely on land sales to make loan payments and that 20 percent of new borrowing is to repay older loans. The slowing of property markets puts these entities at risk of default. China"s central government has the financial capacity to handle a financial crisis if one materializes -government debt is only 55 percent of GDP. Even if half of property-related loans defaulted and lost 80 percent of their value, we calculate that China"s government debt would rise to 79 percent of GDP to fund the financial-sector bailout. However, the larger question is whether China could manage this without a significant slowdown in GDP growth (which then would put additional pressure on government finances). China"s challenge today is to enact reforms to deflate the growing credit and property bubbles, increase transparency and risk management throughout the financial system, and create efficient bankruptcy courts and other mechanisms to resolve bad debt without provoking instability or financial crises.

The path forward: Learning to live with debt

The growing debt of the global economy is an unwelcome development seven years after the financial crisis began. It slows the recovery, raises the risk of new crises, and it limits the ability to respond to them. While significant deleveraging may prove elusive for many countries, effectively managing the growth of debt -and reducing it where necessary- is an imperative. We offer several ideas that warrant further discussion:

Encourage innovations in mortgage contracts. More flexible mortgage contracts can avoid foreclosure and the associated social and economic costs. One proposal is a "shared responsibility mortgage," in which loan payments are reduced when home prices decline below the purchase price and revert when prices improve; in return, when the home is sold, the lender receives a portion of the capital gain. A "continuous workout mortgage" would adjust payments automatically in response to triggers such as recession or job loss to enable borrowers to continue making payments and avoid default. Or homeowners could be given incentives (or required) to purchase insurance to cover mortgage payments in case of job loss or other developments that inhibit their ability to pay. The benefits of these schemes should be weighed carefully against the costs and risks, but could improve financial system stability.

Improve processes for private-sector debt resolution. Loan defaults, when they occur, can be made less disruptive. Non-recourse mortgages, which allow creditors to seize only the collateral when a loan is in default, are widely used in the United States. These facilitate relatively swift resolution of bad debts and enable households to extinguish debt through default and resume normal consumption. Recourse loans, which are common in most of the rest of the world, permit the lender to pursue a borrower"s other assets and future income. As a result, borrowers try to make loan repayments under all circumstances, and they have a strong incentive to limit debt. The downside is that to keep up with loan payments, households may cut other spending dramatically, which can deepen and extend a recession. Non-recourse loans must be combined with strong macroprudential rules that limit excessive borrowing, but could facilitate more efficient resolution of bad debts when they occur.

?Use macroprudential tools to dampen credit cycles. The 2008 financial crisis was a reminder that, given the opportunity, some borrowers will take on too much debt. Macroprudential measures are intended to reduce those opportunities. For example, these measures may place limitations on loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) or restrict certain types of mortgages, such as interest-only loans. In addition, they may include countercyclical measures to dampen lending during periods of strong credit growth, for instance by raising capital requirements for banks. Most advanced economies today have adopted some macroprudential regulations, and these should be strengthened and expanded to consider the total leverage in the economy.

Reduce tax incentives for debt. Given the role of housing debt and real estate bubbles in financial crises, it may be time to reconsider deductibility of mortgage interest and other tax preferences for housing debt. Interest deductibility benefits high-income households most and creates incentives for households to take out larger mortgages to maximize deductions. Reducing or phasing out the deductibility of interest on corporate debt would be more challenging, but policy makers should consider measures that would put debt and equity on a more equal footing. This could improve capital allocation in firms and also would reduce the incentives to invest in capital goods rather than labor. Such reforms may need to be accompanied by other adjustments to corporate tax codes, including perhaps reductions in marginal rates. While changes in tax policy are always difficult, they deserve attention.

Consider a broader range of tools for resolving sovereign debt. Unilateral default is the most extreme option for countries struggling with unsustainable public debt. But today a broader range of options for restructuring debt may be available. Greece, for example, negotiated a partial debt restructuring in 2012 by modifying only the debt held by private investors. Stronger collective-action clauses would facilitate such restructuring by compelling bondholders to accept a majority vote to modify loans. In addition, when assessing the sustainability of government debt, more attention should be paid to net debt, which can be defined as excluding debt owned by other government agencies and central banks, rather than gross debt. In a sense, such debt is merely an accounting entry, representing a claim by one arm of government on another. Moreover, debt owned by central banks could be replaced upon maturity indefinitely, eliminating the future need to raise taxes or reduce government spending, with interest payments remitted to the national treasury. Focusing on net government debt provides a clearer picture of sustainability.

Improve data collection and monitoring of debt. Better information is essential for avoiding future credit crises. Governments and businesses should invest in improving the granularity and reliability of data about debt. Government debt reporting remains relatively opaque. Treatment of unfunded future pension and health-care liabilities and intragovernment borrowing varies across governments, for example. Microeconomic data about household finances, including the liabilities, assets, and incomes of individual households, are available in only a few advanced economies but should be expanded to more countries. To monitor business debt, a central credit register that collects all data about commercial loans of a certain size from different sources could be helpful. This information would be useful for regulators as well as lenders.

Create a healthy mix of bank and non-bank credit intermediaries. Given the constraints on bank lending due to new regulations, non-bank intermediaries will play an important role in funding economic growth. Corporate bond markets, which provide capital for large companies, could expand significantly in most countries, and private placements of bonds with insurers, pension funds, and other investors can provide financing for smaller companies. "Plain vanilla" securitization, which has proven sustainable in providing liquidity to the mortgage market, can be a useful component of the financial system and applied to other forms of debt, such as loans to small and medium-sized enterprises. New and fast-growing non-bank intermediaries, such as credit funds and online peer-to-peer lending platforms, could be another important source of non-bank lending, but should be monitored as they continue to grow and evolve. For all non-bank intermediaries, it will be important to strengthen reporting standards and monitoring to avoid excessive risk-taking and leverage.

Promote financial deepening in developing economies. Rising levels of debt relative to GDP should be expected in developing economies, which need to fund growing businesses, infrastructure, and housing. This should be accompanied by the introduction of a wider range of financial products and services and more intermediaries, as well as the development of debt and equity capital markets. But developing economies today should also learn from the mistakes of recent years and take action now to avoid future financial crises. This includes strengthening regulations on lending, adopting macroprudential regulations, expanding rules for financial disclosure, and creating a legal system that protects the rights of minority shareholders and efficiently disposes of bad debt through bankruptcy. Many developing economies have these elements in place on paper, and the challenge now is ensuring they function effectively in practice…

(A continuación se presenta un conjunto de gráficos "seleccionados", correspondientes a la versión completa del Informe de McKinsey Global Institute)

Household debt: Lessons not learned

Unsustainable household debt in some of the world"s largest economies, notably in the

United States, was at the core of the 2008 financial crisis. Household debt not only touched off the crisis, but it also made the subsequent recession more severe and long lasting, as households cut consumption and struggled to repay debt. Between 2000 and 2007, household debt relative to income rose by 35 percentage points in the United States, reaching 125 percent of disposable income. Even more problematic was the poor quality of loans that were made and subsequently securitized, including subprime mortgages. In the United Kingdom, household debt rose by 51 percentage points, to 150 percent of income…

Shadow banking: Out of the shadows?

In the years prior to 2008, the global financial system became ever more complex, interconnected, and highly leveraged, contributing to the severity of the crisis. Credit intermediation chains became very long, involving multiple layers of securitization, multiple leveraged parties, and an opaque distribution of risk. This was reflected in the rise of non-bank entities and off-balance sheet activities, much of which was funded by debt. Between 2000 and 2007, financial-sector debt -including debt issued by banks and other financial institutions- grew from $ 20 trillion to $ 37 trillion, or from 56 percent of global GDP to 71 percent. Much of this debt was used to fund the so-called shadow banking system, whose vulnerability and pro-cyclical interaction with the real economy were starkly exposed by the financial crisis…

Appendix: Technical notes

Anexo III: La libertad económica que no fue (el cinismo de los países avanzados)

Base: 2015 Index of Economic Freedom – The Heritage Foundation – WSJ

2015 Economic Freedom Heat Map

What are the benefits of economic freedom?

Economic freedom brings greater prosperity. The Index of Economic Freedom documents the positive relationship between economic freedom and a variety of positive social and economic goals. The ideals of economic freedom are strongly associated with healthier societies, cleaner environments, greater per capita wealth, human development, democracy, and poverty elimination.

How do you measure economic freedom?

We measure economic freedom based on 10 quantitative and qualitative factors, grouped into four broad categories, or pillars, of economic freedom:

1. Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption);

2. Limited Government (fiscal freedom, government spending);

3. Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); and

4. Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom).

Each of the ten economic freedoms within these categories is graded on a scale of 0 to 100. A country"s overall score is derived by averaging these ten economic freedoms, with equal weight being given to each.

Índice 2015 de Libertad Económica

Country Rankings

Business Freedom – Trade Freedom – Fiscal Freedom – Government Spending – Monetary Freedom – Investment Freedom – Financial Freedom – Property Freedom – Freedom from Corruption – Labor Freedom

Fundación Heritage

Fundada en el año 1973, la Fundación Heritage es un centro de investigación y una institución educativa -en pocas palabras, un laboratorio de ideas- cuya misión es formular y promover política pública de corte conservador, cimentada en los principios de libre empresa, gobierno limitado, libertad individual, valores americanos tradicionales y una sólida defensa nacional. Creemos que los principios e ideas sobre los que se fundó Estados Unidos se deben conservar y revitalizar. Como innovadores de ideas, pensamos que las soluciones más eficaces son coherentes con la aplicación de esas ideas y principios. Nuestra visión es forjar un Estados Unidos donde la libertad, la oportunidad, la prosperidad y la sociedad civil florezcan. El personal de la Fundación Heritage persigue ese fin aportando minuciosos y acreditados informes y estudios sobre temas de interés en el ámbito político con nuestro principal público en mente: Miembros del Congreso y sus asesores clave, responsables políticos del Poder Ejecutivo, los medios de comunicación de Estados Unidos e instituciones académicas y políticas…

The Wall Street Journal

El Wall Street Journal es la publicación financiera líder en el mundo, con más de dos millones de suscriptores y es el periódico más grande de Estados Unidos en circulación total pagada de ejemplares. La franquicia del Wall Street Journal, con un público lector de medios impresos de 3.6 millones en todo el mundo, abarca The Wall Street Journal, The Wall Street Journal Asia y The Wall Street Journal Europe. The Wall Street Journal Online en wsj.com es el proveedor más importante de noticias y análisis comerciales y financieros de Internet, con más de un millón de suscriptores y 36 millones de visitantes mensuales en todo el mundo. WSJ.com es el medio estrella de la red digital del Wall Street Journal en la que también están MarketWatch.com, Barrons.com, AllThingsD.com y SmartMoney.com. El Wall Street Journal ha obtenido 35 premios Pulitzer por su periodismo de excelencia y, en 2013, obtuvo el primer puesto en BtoB"s Media Power 50 por 14º año consecutivo.

Principles of Economic Freedom

(Ambassador Terry Miller and Anthony B. Kim)

"[A] society that puts freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both greater freedom and greater equality. Though a by-product of freedom, greater equality is not an accident. A free society releases the energies and abilities of people to pursue their own objectives. It prevents some people from arbitrarily suppressing others". Milton and Rose Friedman

In an economically free society, each person controls the fruits of his or her own labor and initiative. Individuals are empowered -indeed, entitled- to pursue their dreams by means of their own free choice.

In an economically free society, individuals succeed or fail based on their individual effort and ability. The institutions of a free and open market society do not discriminate either against or in favor of individuals based on their race, ethnic background, gender, class, family connections, or any other factor unrelated to individual merit. Government decision-making is characterized by openness and transparency, which illuminates the shadows where discrimination might flourish and promotes equal opportunity for all.

In an economically free society, the power of economic decision-making is widely dispersed, and the allocation of resources for production and consumption is on the basis of open competition so that every individual or firm gets a fair chance to succeed.

These three fundamental principles of economic freedom –empowerment of the individual, non-discrimination, and open competition- underpin every measurement and policy idea presented in the Index of Economic Freedom.

Economic Freedom: The Role of Government

As Friedrich Hayek once observed, "To be controlled in our economic pursuits means to be controlled in everything". Hayek"s keen insights into economic freedom are based on the moral truth that each person is, as a matter of natural right, a free and responsible being with inalienable dignity and fundamental liberties that righteous and effective political systems should regard as unassailable. Governments that are just, according to the U.S. Declaration of Independence, are instituted precisely to secure these rights.

Any discussion of economic freedom thus has at its heart reflection on the critical relationship between individuals and the government. In general, state action or government control that interferes with individual autonomy limits economic freedom.

However, the goal of economic freedom is not simply an absence of government coercion or constraint, but the creation and maintenance of a mutual sense of liberty for all. As individuals enjoy the blessings of economic freedom, they in turn have a responsibility to respect the economic rights and freedoms of others within the rule of law. Governments are instituted to ensure basic protections against the ravages of nature or the predations of one citizen against another. Positive economic rights such as property and contracts are given societal as well as individual defense against the destructive tendencies of others.

A comprehensive view of economic freedom should encompass all liberties and rights of production, distribution, or consumption of goods and services. The highest forms of economic freedom should provide an absolute right of property ownership; full freedom of movement for labor, capital, and goods; and an absolute absence of coercion or constraint of economic activity beyond that which is necessary for the protection and maintenance of liberty itself. An economically free society encourages the handling of economic decisions in a decentralized fashion. Individuals are free to work, produce, consume, and invest in any way they choose under the even-handed application of laws, with their economic freedoms at once both protected and respected by the state.

Some government action is necessary for the citizens of a nation to defend themselves, promote the peaceful evolution of civil society, and enjoy the fruits of their labor. For example, citizens are taxed to provide revenue for public safety, the protection of property, and the common defense. Other goods -what economists call "public goods"- may be supplied more efficiently by government than through private means. Some public goods, such as the maintenance of a police force to protect property rights, a monetary authority to maintain a sound currency, and an impartial judiciary to enforce contracts among parties, are themselves vital ingredients of an economically free society. When government action rises beyond the minimal necessary level, however, it leads inevitably and quickly to the loss of freedom -and the first freedom affected is often economic freedom.

Throughout history, governments have imposed a wide array of constraints on economic activity. Such constraints, though sometimes imposed in the name of equality or some other noble societal purpose, are in reality imposed most often for the benefit of societal elites or special interests, and they come with a high cost to society as a whole. By substituting political judgments for those of the marketplace, government diverts entrepreneurial resources and energy from productive activities to rent-seeking, the quest for economically unearned benefits. The result is lower productivity, economic stagnation, and declining prosperity.

Government provision of goods and services beyond those that are clearly considered public goods also imposes a separate constraint on economic activity, crowding out private-sector activity and usurping resources that otherwise might have been available for private investment or consumption. Constraining economic choice distorts and diminishes the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services (including, of course, labor services). The wealth of a nation inevitably declines as a result.

Measuring Economic Freedom

The Index of Economic Freedom takes a broad and comprehensive view of economic freedom, measuring country performance in 10 separate areas. Some of the aspects of economic freedom that are evaluated are concerned with a country"s interactions with the rest of the world -for example, the extent of an economy"s openness to global investment or trade. Most, however, focus on policies within a country, assessing the liberty of individuals to use their labor or finances without undue restraint and government interference.

Each of the measured aspects of economic freedom plays a vital role in developing and sustaining personal and national prosperity. All are complementary in their impact, however, and progress in one area is often likely to reinforce or even inspire progress in another. Similarly, repressed economic freedom in one area -respect for property rights, for example- may make it much more difficult to achieve high levels of freedom in other categories.

The 10 measured aspects of economic freedom may be grouped into four broad categories:

• Rule of law (property rights, freedom from corruption);

• Government size (fiscal freedom, government spending);

• Regulatory efficiency (business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom); and

• Market openness (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom).

Rule of Law

Property Rights. The ability to accumulate private property and wealth is understood to be a central motivating force for workers and investors in a market economy. The recognition of private property rights and an effective rule of law to protect them are vital features of a fully functioning market economy. Secure property rights give citizens the confidence to undertake entrepreneurial activity, save their income, and make long-term plans because they know that their income, savings, and property (both real and intellectual) are safe from unfair expropriation or theft.

The protection of private property requires an autonomous and accountable judicial system that is available to all equally and without discrimination. The independence, transparency, and effectiveness of the judicial system have proven to be key determinants of a country"s prospects for long-term economic growth. Such a system is also vital to the maintenance of peace and security and the protection of human rights.

A key aspect of property rights protection is the enforcement of contracts. The voluntary undertaking of contractual obligations is the foundation of the market system and the basis for economic specialization, gains from commercial exchange, and trade among nations. Even-handed government enforcement of private contracts is essential to ensuring equity and integrity in the marketplace.

Freedom from Corruption. In the context of economic freedom, corruption can best be understood as the failure of integrity in the economic system, a distortion by which individuals or special-interest groups are able to gain at the expense of the whole. Often a direct result of the government"s concentration of economic or political power, corruption manifests itself in many forms such as bribery, extortion, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, embezzlement, and graft.

Corruption can infect all parts of an economy in systematic ways. There is a direct relationship between the extent of government intervention in economic activity and the prevalence of corruption. In particular, excessive and redundant government regulations provide opportunities for bribery or graft. In addition, government regulations or restrictions in one area may create informal markets in another. For example, by imposing numerous burdensome barriers on conducting business, including regulatory red tape and high transaction costs, a government can incentivize bribery and encourage illegitimate market interactions.

Ensuring transparency is crucial to dealing effectively with corruption. Openness in regulatory procedures and processes can promote equitable treatment and greater efficiency.

Government Size

Fiscal Freedom. Fiscal freedom is a direct measure of the extent to which government permits individuals and businesses to keep and manage their income and wealth for their own benefit and use. A government can impose fiscal burdens on economic activity through taxation, but it also does so when it incurs public debt that ultimately must be paid off through taxation.

The marginal tax rate confronting an individual is, in effect, the government"s cut of the profit from that individual"s next unit of work or engagement in a new entrepreneurial venture; whatever remains after the tax is the individual"s actual reward for the effort. Therefore, the higher the government"s cut, the lower the individual"s reward -and the lower the incentive to undertake the work at all. Higher tax rates interfere with the ability of individuals and firms to pursue their goals in the marketplace and thereby reduce overall private-sector activity.

While individual and corporate income tax rates are important to economic freedom, they are not a comprehensive measure of the tax burden. Governments impose many other indirect taxes, including payroll, sales, and excise taxes, as well as tariffs and the value-added tax (VAT). In the Index of Economic Freedom, the burden of these taxes is captured by measuring the overall tax burden from all forms of taxation as a percentage of total GDP.

Government Spending. The cost of excessive government is a central issue in economic freedom, both in terms of generating revenue (see fiscal freedom) and in terms of spending. Government spending comes in many forms. Some government spending—for example, to provide infrastructure, fund research, or improve human capital -may be considered investments. Government also spends on public goods, the benefits of which accrue broadly to society in ways that markets cannot price appropriately.

All government spending that must eventually be financed by higher taxation, however, entails an opportunity cost. This cost is the value of the private consumption or investment that would have occurred had the resources involved been left in the private sector.