- Metacognitive skills and
metacognitive knowledge - The emergence of conscious
control - The fallibility of metacognitive
knowledge - Metacognitive
strategies - Some practical
implications - Assessing students'
self-esteem - Enhancing students'
self-esteem - Peer teaching and peer
assessment - Conclusion
- References
Being aware of our thinking as we perform a specific task
and then using this awareness to control what we
are doing is commonly known in thinking skills literature as
"metacognition". More recently, the term "metacognitive approach"
has been applied to strategy training aimed at teaching EFL
students consciously to plan, monitor and
evaluate their own learning and to analyse the different stages
of a task in order to choose appropriate problem-solving
strategies (see Robbins 2002). The purpose of this article is to
provide some theoretical insights into the nature of
metacognition and to outline additional ways of supporting
students' metacognitive development.
Metacognitive skills and metacognitive
knowledge
A clear distinction is generally
made between metacognitive skills and metacognitive knowledge.
Metacognitive skills develop initially out of self-correcting
activities in domain-specific learning (Bruner 1986 quoted in Von
Wright 1992; 64) as children gradually learn to anticipate chains
of events and compare alternative procedures or mentally correct
an action plan before acting. Although these actions are often
intentional – i.e. purposeful and directed towards conscious
goals – (Von Wright 1992:61), most children nevertheless have
difficulty in reflecting on their own intentions and seeing their
goals as choices that exist among a number of alternative goals.
Metacognitive skills improve task performance, but the choice of
task remains largely predetermined by unconscious (or external)
factors. Voluntary action depends on metacognitive knowledge,
which results from introspection or
self-reflection.
The
emergence of conscious control
In order to understand how people
come to gain control over their actions, we need to understand
how self-knowledge and the ability to reflect on one's own
behaviour emerge. It is here that computer-based models of
cognition, which support much work on cognitive strategies, break
down (since computers cannot be said to be 'conscious" of what
they do) and that we must turn to social constructivist accounts
of cognitive and emotional development for a theoretical
explanation. Social constructivism starts from the notion that
individual minds are constructed out of social interactions and
social meanings. We shall return to the practical implications of
this point later.
Vygotsky's (1978) theory of cognitive
development is well known. Briefly, it states that the L1
linguistic system is at the root of all higher cognitive
functions. Firstly, language frees the child from the
stimulus-bound stage of natural perception. By using verbal
labelling, the child singles out separate elements and forms "new
(artificially introduced and dynamic) structural centres" which
can be re-synthesised into new concepts (1978:32). Later,
language acts as a cognitive barrier in problem solving,
mediating between the presentation of the task and the child's
final response. (By contrast, children with so-called 'attention
deficit disorder', or ADD, seem to possess little ability to
delay their responses). In short, problem solving is first
effected through "ego-centric speech" (the child talks to himself
or herself) and later, around the age of five, this is replaced
by inner speech (reflections) (1986:30). Once egocentric speech
has become thus internalised, the child is able to focus
consciously on cognitive processes such as memory and to bring
them under increasingly greater conscious control
(1986:170).
However, as Von Wright (1992:61) points out, a
crucial step towards greater expertise in self-reflection is the
development of the concept of self. The concept of self is a
social construct that we acquire by being treated as a self by
others. In G H Mead's (1934) words: "self-consciousness involves
the individual's becoming an object to himself by taking the
attitudes of other individuals towards himself within an
organised setting of social relationships, and … unless the
individual had thus become an object to himself, he would not be
self-conscious or have a self at all" (quoted in Von Wright
1992:61). This suggests that individuals with a poorly developed
or confused self-concept will lack insight into their own
intentions, motives and intellectual functions, and that
development of metacognitive awareness in later life may
ultimately depend on early social conditioning. My own
(unpublished) replication study based on Rosenberg (1979) found
that self-esteem, rather than age, determined teenagers' and
young adults' ability to focus on their psychological "inner
worlds", set realistic goals outside the classroom, follow them
through, evaluate the results and learn from their
mistakes.
The
fallibility of metacognitive knowledge
Conventional analyses
usually divide metacognitive knowledge into knowledge concerning
person, task and strategy variables (Von
Wright 1992:64). Thus, Marzano et al (1988) list the various
types of knowledge that are important to metacognition as: (a)
executive control, which evaluates current state of knowledge;
(b) declarative knowledge, which is being conscious of the facts
surrounding a situation; (c) conditional knowledge which
describes why a strategy works; (d) procedural knowledge, which
has to do with various actions performed in a task. However,
knowing when, how and why to use a particular strategy in an
objective, factual sense does not guarantee that it will be used.
This knowledge only counts as metacognitive knowledge when it is
spontaneously integrated with awareness of our thinking on a
specific task and when we use this awareness to control what we
are doing (cited in Harrison 1991:37).
The value of Von Wright's emphasis on
self-knowledge, I believe, is that it emphasises the subjective
basis of metacognitive knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge
includes conscious knowledge of one's actions, intentions and
motives, and also of one's intellectual functions. The latter
"creates conditions for a wider application of specific
competences and learned rules" (Von Wright 1992:62) by
integrating information which previously belonged to separate
cognitive systems (transfer of learning). But, like any other
type of self-knowledge, it is fallible.
How, then, do
metacognitive strategies such as planning, monitoring and
evaluating one's own learning evolve? According to Vygotsky
(1968:168) " in order to subject a function to intellectual and
volitional control, we must first possess it". In other words,
self-reflection will develop first as a skill before it can be
used as a series of consciously controlled strategies. We have
already noted the role played by language and social
relationships in the emergence of these processes. The emphasis
on social interaction as a condition for the training of
reflective skills is today shared by most approaches to
instruction (Von Wright 1991:66). Reciprocal (peer) teaching, for
example, forces the "teacher" to use a whole series of
metacognitive processes such as determining what the learner
already knows, deciding what is to be taught/learnt and how;
monitoring comprehension and evaluating the outcome in terms of
increased comprehension, which in turn encourage the "teacher" to
reflect upon his or her own thinking processes (ibid). In social
constructivist terms, metacognitive processes begin as social
processes and gradually become
"internalised".
The effective use of
metacognitive strategies is one of the primary differences
between more and less able learners and students need to be
taught such strategies through direct instruction, modelling, and
practice. Robbins has already provided an excellent bibliography
for the CALLA approach to strategy training in SHARE 90. Perhaps
the main implication of this article is that instruction is more
likely to produce permanent results in students with (1) high
self-esteem (the basis of accurate metacognitive knowledge) and
(2) extensive experience of peer teaching and assessment
(resulting in a broader range of metacognitive
skills).
Assessing students'
self-esteem
Recent empirical
research in developmental and educational psychology strongly
supports a multifaceted view of self-concept, which distinguishes
academic self-concept from physical self-concept, and so on. The
clearest example of measures based on this view is Marsh's (1992)
"Self-Description Questionnaire I, II, or III" for ages seven to
young adult. Other widely used measures, such as Fitts' (1991)
"Tennessee Self Concept Scale", stress the
distinctiveness of various self-concept facets but place global
self-concept at the top of the hierarchy. Unfortunately, such
instruments are expensive and generally available only to trained
psychologists. However, interested readers can find a test of global
self-concept at: http://literacy.kent.edu/Midwest/Resc/Kansas/psassessment.html. This
contains (1) a self and tutor rating scale, (2) a checklist for
identifying difficult daily living situations and (3) a tutor
observation checklist. Please note, however, that teachers
without training in counselling should not try to offer therapy
and that these scales are not designed for
children.
Enhancing students'
self-esteem
One
effective way of enhancing students' self-esteem and academic
achievement is adventure education. In a meta-analysis of
ninety-six studies of adventure education, Hattie, et al. (1997)
categorized the benefits of adventure studies into six broad
outcomes: leadership, self-concept, academic achievement,
personality, interpersonal relations and adventuresomeness. All
of the outcomes except adventuresomeness maintained effects over
time. Positive change is thought to take place because
participation in problem-solving tasks challenges self-imposed
limits, leading to improvements in relationships with others and
self-concept.
On a day-to-day basis, variations on
Circle Time have been used at most levels of education for
enhancing students' general and academic self-esteem by
challenging limiting beliefs and fostering awareness of multiple
options. Hillyard (2002), a firm proponent of the metacognitive
approach in bilingual education in Argentina, claims that not
only children but also adolescents find whole-class discussions
of this type highly rewarding.
Peer
teaching and peer
assessment
Peer
teaching may involve learners of different ages or of the same
age. Although not exclusively an experiment in peer teaching, the
University of Dundee's paired reading project has shown the value
of support from more able readers (teachers, parents, other
adults or older children) in developing reading and thinking
skills among primary school children. Interestingly, it was the
least able children (both tutors and tutees) that benefited most
from this activity. The corresponding web page
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/psychology/ReadOn/ also contains links to
other articles on peer teaching.
Group projects are another
obvious activity for promoting planning, monitoring and
evaluation through peer teaching, especially among older
children. Books such as "Project Work" by Diana L. Fried-Booth
(O.U.P.) – which also contains a project in which adult EFL
students teach primary school children – provide valuable advice
and worksheets for teacher, group and individual
reviews.
Self-evaluation is a difficult
strategy to acquire, partly because it often comes at the end of
a project or task when learners have run out of time, interest or
both, partly because it often involves comparing oneself with
others, a strategy recommended by Oxford (1990: 163) but which is
potentially threatening to learners with low self-esteem.
Nevertheless, many ELT textbooks contain reading and writing
activities (e.g. jigsaw reading; assessing other students'
drafts) in which learners teach one another and receive peer
feedback on their understanding or performance. A non-threatening
and on-going method of peer assessment and awareness raising in
oral skills, which comes with a rationale and materials, can be
found at http://www.finchpark.com/courses/assess/oralpeer02.htm
Finally, games can also include informal peer teaching and
evaluation. One of my own can be found at
http://www.eslcafe.com/ideas/sefer.cgi?display:989526399-5862.txt
Metacognitive
strategy training enhances learning inside and outside the
classroom but many students have difficulty in using this
approach once there is no longer a reminder to do so. Within a
social-constructivist perspective, metacognitive skills and
metacognitive knowledge, including a realistic self-concept,
develop through social interaction and are then internalised. The
key to more effective metacognitive strategy training would seem
to be through simultaneous training in social strategies together
with social learning tasks. The latter may serve to reduce or
eliminate negative aspects of an individual's self-concept such
as learned helplessness, negative self-labels, competitiveness,
perfectionism etc., which prevent realistic and effective
goal-setting, planning, attending, monitoring or evaluating in
real life contexts.
Fried-Booth, D. L. (1986). Project
Work. Oxford: O.U.P.
Harrison, C.J. (1991).
'Metacognition and motivation'. Reading Improvement. Vol. 28. No.
1 35-38.
Hattie, J.; Marsh, H. W.; Neill, J.
T. & Richards, G. E. (1997). Adventure education and Outward
Bound: Out-of-class experiences that make a lasting difference.
Review of Educational Research, 67,
43-87.
Hillyard, S. (2002). Personal
Communication (interview regarding on-going investigation at
Wellspring School, Buenos
Aires).
Oxford, R. (1990). Language
Learning Strategies: What Every Teacher Should Know. Boston MA.:
Heinle and Heinle Publishers.
Robbins, J.A. (2002).
http://jillrobbins.com/articles/LSIrobbins.html (visited Dec.13
2002)
Von Wright, J. (1992). 'Reflections
on reflection'. Learning and Instruction. Vol. 2.
59-68
Vygotsky, L.S. (1975). Mind in
society. The development of higher psychological processes.
Cambridge MA.: Harvard University
Press.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1986). Thought and
language. Cambridge MA.: MIT
Press.
Douglas Andrew
Town
BSc (Hons) Psychology, MA (English
Language Teaching), Diploma in
Translation (Spanish)
Profesor de la
Universidad de
Belgrano, Argentina (Licenciatura en Inglés).