Anexo del Paper - La nueva normalidad: una economía desigual, dominada por la pobreza, la exclusión social y la marginalidad - Información complementaria

Del Paper - **“Crecimiento vs. Desigualdad”: ¿un falso debate? (Parte II)**, publicado el 15/11/15





Fuente: Informe publicado el **2/10/14** por el banco Julius Baer



Del Paper **- La era de la desigualdad (¿consecuencia directa del "imperialismo monetario"?) - Parte I**, publicado el 15/12/14

- Un largo viaje a ninguna parte: Gráficos, comentarios e Informes

- Informe mundial sobre Salarios - OIT - 2010/2011

Gráfico 6 Índice de ingresos semanales promedio, nominales y reales, en Estados Unidos (totalidad de empleados no agrícolas), marzo 2006 a marzo 2010 (marzo del 2006 = 100)



Nota: Los ingresos nominales se refieren a los ingresos semanales promedio de todos los empleados incluidos en el estudio de Estadísticas de Empleo Actual (CES-*Current Employment Statistics*). Los ingresos reales de todos los empleados se calculan utilizando el Índice de Precios al Consumidor del período 1982-84 sobre la totalidad de consumidores urbanos (IPC-U). El promedio anual no es una serie oficial y se calculó como promedio aritmético anual de los ingresos semanales reales.

Fuente: *Bureau of Labor Statistics* (BLS) de EE.UU. y cálculos de los autores.

Nota: Observamos que, en 2008, el índice de precios al consumidor, que abarca a todos los consumidores urbanos (IPC-U), aumentó con relativa rapidez durante la primera parte del año, lo cual desgasta el poder adquisitivo de los salarios en ese periodo. La caída en los precios al consumidor durante la última parte de 2008 dio posteriormente impulso a los ingresos reales (a pesar de que los ingresos nominales aumentaron sólo modestamente), lo cual explica por qué el nivel promedio de los salarios reales fue mayor en 2009 que en 2008.

Gráfico 7 Crecimiento de los salarios en países avanzados seleccionados, 2007-2009 (en porcentajes)



Nota: Crecimiento salarial se refiere al crecimiento año a año de los salarios mensuales reales promedio.

Fuente: OIT, *Global Wage Database*.

Gráfico 8 Horas semanales trabajadas, o pagadas, en países avanzados seleccionados, 2007-2009 (cambios en horas semanales)



Fuente: OIT, *Global Wage Database*.

Nota: En general, las semanas laborales más cortas parecen haber desempeñado un papel importante en amortiguar el crecimiento de los salarios en países desarrollados. El gráfico muestra que el promedio de horas trabajadas o pagadas por semana disminuyó entre 2007 y 2009 en casi todos los países donde estos datos estaban disponibles. Ello ocurrió ya sea como resultado de acuerdos a nivel de empresa, como en los Estados Unidos, donde la disminución en los ingresos semanales entre febrero de 2009 y febrero de 2010 fue resultado tanto de la caída en los salarios por hora como de menos horas de trabajo, o fue una medida dentro de esquemas más amplios conocidos como "repartición del trabajo", los cuales promueven una reducción del tiempo de trabajo para evitar despidos, redistribuyendo un volumen reducido de trabajo. En Alemania, por ejemplo, los salarios mensuales reales de todos los trabajadores se redujeron durante tres años consecutivos, incluido el 2009, cuando los salarios mensuales nominales cayeron por primera vez en la historia del país después de la guerra. Sin embargo, esta caída se debió principalmente a una reducción en las horas de trabajo para preservar el empleo. La restricción de la muestra a trabajadores de tiempo completo indica un crecimiento de los salarios mensuales reales en Alemania de 0 por ciento en 2008 y 0,8 por ciento en 2009.

Cuadro 1 Crecimiento acumulado de salarios, por región desde 1999 (1999 = 100)

	1999	2006	2007	2008	2009
Países avanzados	100	104,2	105,0	104,5	105,2
Europa Central y del Este	100	144,8	154,4	161,4	161,3
Europa del Este y Asia Central	100	264,1	308,9	341,6	334,1
Asia	100	168,8	180,9	193,8	209,3*
América Latina y el Caribe	100	106,7	110,3	112,4	114,8
África	100	111,2*	112,8*	113,4**	116,1**
Oriente Medio	100	101,9*	102,4*	...	...
Mundial	100	115,6	118,9	120,7	122,6

* Estimación provisoria. ** Estimación tentativa. ... = Sin estimación disponible.
Nota: Sobre cobertura y metodología, ver el Apéndice Técnico 1.
Fuente: OIT, *Global Wage Database*.

Nota: El cuadro muestra que los salarios mundiales promedio aumentaron casi una cuarta parte durante ese período. En los países avanzados, los salarios reales aumentaron sólo 5 por ciento en términos reales durante toda la década, lo que refleja un período de moderación salarial.

- Informe mundial sobre Salarios - OIT - 2012/2013

Gráfico 1 Crecimiento económico anual promedio, 1995-2012 (PIB a precios constantes)



Nota: Los grupos de países son aquellos utilizados por el FMI y descritos en el apéndice del FMI, 2012a. Las principales economías avanzadas incluyen Canadá, Francia, Alemania, Italia, Japón, Reino Unido y Estados Unidos. Los mercados emergentes y en desarrollo constituyen un grupo de 151 economías no clasificadas como economías avanzadas. Las cifras para 2012 son proyecciones.

Fuente: Base de datos Perspectivas de la economía mundial del FMI.

Nota: Tras un período de crecimiento económico robusto a principios del siglo XXI, la economía mundial se contrajo en 2009 como resultado de la crisis financiera y económica mundial. El impacto de la crisis se ha sentido en forma muy diversa alrededor del mundo. En el grupo de países más avanzados, 2009 se llamó el año de la "Gran Recesión", el revés económico más severo desde la "Gran Depresión" de los años 30.

Gráfico 2 Tasas de desempleo total en el mundo y en las economías desarrolladas, 2005-2011 (como % de la fuerza de trabajo)



Nota: Las cifras para 2011 son estimaciones preliminares. Para la definición de «economías desarrolladas», ver el Apéndice I.

Fuente: OIT, 2012a.

Nota: El desempleo mundial aumentó en 27 millones desde el inicio de la crisis, llevando el número total a cerca de 200 millones o 6 por ciento de la fuerza de trabajo mundial. Tal vez la preocupación más seria se refiere al desempleo juvenil, el cual ha llegado a proporciones alarmantes. La OIT estima que en 2011 el desempleo afectó 75 millones de jóvenes de entre 15 y 24 años a nivel mundial, representando más de 12 por ciento de todos los jóvenes. Muchos más no aparecen en las estadísticas de desempleo porque se desilusionaron al punto que dejaron de buscar trabajo.

Cuadro 1 Crecimiento salarial real acumulado por región desde 2000 (índice: 2000=100)

Grupo por región	2000	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
África	100,0	103,9	105,3	108,1**	108,6**	115,4**	117,8**
Asia	100,0	149,0	158,8	165,1	174,6	185,6	(194,9)
Europa del Este y Asia Central	100,0	204,4	233,9	253,4	244,4	257,9	271,3
Economías desarrolladas	100,0	103,3	104,5	104,1	104,9	105,5	105,0
América Latina y el Caribe	100,0	106,4	108,4	109,3	111,0	112,6	115,1
Oriente Medio	100,0	98,3	100,1	97,2	95,8**	(94,6)	(94,4)
Mundial	100,0	112,8	116,1	117,3	118,8	121,3	122,8*

* Tasas de crecimiento publicadas como «estimaciones provisionales» (en base a cobertura de c.75%)

** Tasas de crecimiento publicadas como «estimaciones tentativas» (en base a cobertura de c.40%-c.74%)

() Tasas de crecimiento publicadas que probablemente cambien (en base a cobertura menor a 40%)

Nota: Para cobertura y metodología, ver el Apéndice I.

A pesar del crecimiento salarial promedio real más acelerado en regiones emergentes durante la última década, las diferencias absolutas en niveles salariales entre países y regiones continúan siendo considerables. El gráfico 8 presenta estimaciones de la Oficina de Estadísticas Laborales de los Estados Unidos comparando la remuneración neta por hora en el sector manufacturero en 2010. La tasa de remuneración por hora varió desde casi 35 dólares de los Estados Unidos en Dinamarca y poco más de 23 dólares de los Estados Unidos en Estados Unidos, a 13 dólares de los Estados Unidos en Grecia, entre 5 dólares de los Estados Unidos y 6 dólares de los Estados Unidos en Brasil y menos de 1,50 dólares de los Estados Unidos en Filipinas. Utilizando una metodología diferente y no comparable, los costos de la remuneración total por hora en el sector manufacturero se estimaron en 1,36 dólares de los Estados Unidos en China para 2008 y 1,17 dólares de los Estados Unidos en India para 2007 (Departamento del Trabajo de los Estados Unidos, *Bureau of Labor Statistics*, 2011). Sin embargo, estas diferencias se miden en dólares corrientes y, por lo tanto, dependen de las fluctuaciones en la tasa de cambio. No obstante, apuntan a la persistencia de amplias brechas en los salarios y la productividad laboral en el mundo.

Fuente: Global Wage Database de la OIT.

Nota: El cuadro adopta una visión de más largo plazo y muestra el aumento acumulado de los salarios promedio reales desde el año 2000. Vemos que entre 2000 y 2011 los salarios promedio mensuales reales a nivel mundial aumentaron cerca de un cuarto, pero las diferencias entre regiones son claras.

En las economías desarrolladas los salarios promedio sufrieron una doble recaída: cayeron en 2008 y nuevamente en 2011.

Gráfico 34 Productividad y compensación por hora en Estados Unidos, 1947 T1–2012 T1



Fuente: Cifras obtenidas de Fleck, Glaser y Sprague (2011), utilizando datos actualizados publicados por la División of Major Sector Productivity del Bureau of Labor Statistics de los Estados Unidos, a 26 de junio de 2012.

Nota: Las zonas sombreadas son zonas que han registrado retrocesos de la actividad económica. Una publicación de la Oficina de Estadísticas Laborales de Estados Unidos, por ejemplo, indica que la brecha entre productividad laboral por hora y el aumento en la retribución por hora ha resultado en una menor participación del trabajo en Estados Unidos (Fleck, Glaser y Sprague, 2011). Desde 1980 la productividad laboral por hora en el sector empresarial no agrícola aumentó 90 por ciento, mientras que la compensación real por hora aumentó 26,7 por ciento, una cifra mucho menor.

Gráfico 35 Tendencias de la productividad laboral y los salarios en Alemania, 1991-2011: (a) por mes; (b) por hora



Nota: Otro ejemplo es Alemania, donde la productividad laboral (definida como el valor agregado por ocupado) aumentó en casi un cuarto (22,6 por ciento) durante las dos últimas décadas, mientras que los salarios mensuales reales permanecieron estables durante el mismo período. De hecho, entre 2003 y 2011 cayeron por debajo del nivel visto a mediados de los años 1990.



Nota: Los salarios promedio nominales mensuales y por hora publicados por la Oficina Federal de Estadística fueron deflactados utilizando el IPC de la misma fuente.

Fuente: Oficina Federal de Estadística, Cuentas Nacionales: Producto Interno, Resultados Trimestrales, Factsenie 18, Serie 1.2 (mayo 2012), cuadro 1.12; Oficina Federal de Estadística, 2012.

Nota: La caída de los salarios mensuales se atribuye en parte a una marcada reducción en el tiempo de trabajo por mes, desde 122,7 horas en 1991 hasta 110,7 horas en 2011, a medida que el número de trabajadores a tiempo parcial y formas atípicas de empleo, tales como los así llamados "miniempleos", aumentaron sustantivamente.

Gráfico 36 Tendencias en el crecimiento de los salarios promedio y la productividad laboral en economías desarrolladas (índice: 1999 = 100)



Nota: Debido a que los índices se refieren a promedios ponderados, los desarrollos en las tres economías desarrolladas más grandes (Estados Unidos, Japón y Alemania) tienen un impacto particular sobre este resultado. La productividad laboral se mide como producto por trabajador (ver nota 9).

Fuentes: Global Wage Database de la OIT; Modelo Econométrico de Tendencias de la OIT, marzo 2012.

Nota: Dado que algunas de las economías grandes, inclusive Estados Unidos, Alemania y Japón, han visto rezagado el crecimiento de los salarios en relación al aumento en la productividad, nuestro informe considera que en las economías desarrolladas en su conjunto la productividad laboral promedio ha sobrepasado el crecimiento de los salarios promedio reales. Sobre la base de los datos de 36 países, estimamos que desde 1999 la productividad laboral promedio aumentó en más de dos veces los salarios promedio en las economías desarrolladas.

Gráfico 37 Factores que inciden en la participación del trabajo en la renta



Fuente: Stockhammer, 2012.

Nota: El gráfico ofrece una ilustración de los "sospechosos habituales": cambios tecnológicos, globalización, mercados financieros, instituciones del mercado de trabajo y la declinación en el poder de negociación de los trabajadores. En nuestra ilustración, los círculos para los cambios tecnológicos, globalización y mercados financieros se superponen, reflejando las dificultades para distinguir entre estos fenómenos tanto a nivel conceptual como empírico. La estructura del diagrama indica, además, que el poder de negociación de los trabajadores deriva directamente de las instituciones del mercado laboral (particularmente la existencia y fuerza de los sindicatos) pero es también influenciada por la globalización y los mercados financieros, los cuales permiten mayores opciones para la inversión en activos financieros además de en activos reales, tanto a nivel nacional como en el extranjero. De hecho, mientras gran parte de la evidencia se ha centrado en el papel de la globalización y especialmente la tecnología, muchos estudios han pasado por alto los efectos potenciales de los mercados financieros y la reducción de las instituciones sociales y del trabajo.

La globalización de los mercados financieros y la "financiarización", definida como el papel creciente de los motivos financieros, los actores financieros y las instituciones financieras en la operación de las economías nacionales e internacionales se han incluido solo más recientemente en esta ecuación. Un informe del IIEL identificó la integración internacional de los mercados financieros como un importante motor de la declinación en la participación de los salarios, al menos en las economías avanzadas.

Gráfico 38 Descomposición de cambios en la participación del trabajo en la renta promedio ajustada entre 1990-1994 y 2000-2004



Nota: La descomposición se basa en las estimaciones del cuadro A4. (a) Economías desarrolladas (cuadro A4, columna 3); (b) países en desarrollo (cuadro A4, columna 4). FIN significa «financiarización»; GLOB significa «globalización»; TECH significa «tecnología»; WFST significa «medidas del estado de bienestar» o instituciones del mercado de trabajo. Ver el Apéndice III para una explicación detallada de los pasos que conducen a la descomposición.

Fuente: Estimaciones OIT (Stockhammer, 2012).

Nota: El gráfico 38(a) muestra que, en el caso de las economías avanzadas, todos los factores contribuyeron a la caída en la participación del trabajo en la renta a lo largo del tiempo, jugando la financiarización mundial el papel más preponderante. Estas estimaciones significan que, en términos de contribución relativa, la financiarización mundial contribuye 46 por ciento de la caída en la participación del trabajo en la renta, en comparación a contribuciones de 19 por ciento de la globalización, 10 por ciento de la tecnología y 25 por ciento de los cambios en dos variables institucionales amplios: el consumo público y la densidad sindical. Estos resultados abren la posibilidad de que el impacto de las finanzas se podría haber subestimado en muchos de los estudios anteriores y sugieren que pasar por alto el papel de los mercados financieros podría tener implicancias serias para nuestra comprensión de las causas de las tendencias en la participación del trabajo en la renta.

En el caso de las economías en desarrollo, el gráfico 38(b) ilustra el impacto positivo de la tecnología sobre la participación del trabajo, lo cual se podría posiblemente explicar mediante un efecto de "ponerse al día" del crecimiento económico, la contracción de los mercados laborales y el agotamiento del exceso de oferta laboral. Este efecto de la tecnología compensa parcialmente los efectos adversos de la financiarización, la globalización y la reducción del estado de bienestar. No obstante, tal como fue el caso con la descomposición para las economías avanzadas, la financiarización se destaca como el factor más adverso en términos de explicar la declinación en la participación del trabajo en la renta entre las economías del mundo en desarrollo que se incluyen en la muestra.

Gráfico 39 Los efectos macroeconómicos de la participación funcional del ingreso



Fuente: OIT.

Nota: La demanda agregada es la suma del consumo de los hogares, inversión del sector privado, exportaciones netas y el consumo público. El mecanismo económico ilustrado en el gráfico indica que un desplazamiento entre los dos componentes de la distribución funcional del ingreso (participación del trabajo y del capital) afecta los principales elementos de la demanda agregada y, en última instancia, estos cambios afectan el crecimiento del ingreso nacional en un proceso dinámico.

Cuadro 2 Dirección de los efectos de una disminución de 1% en la participación del trabajo en la renta sobre el consumo privado de productos y servicios nacionales, inversión y exportaciones netas en 16 economías

	Consumo particular	Inversión	Exportaciones netas
Euro área-12	↘	↗	↗
Argentina	↘	→	↗
Australia	↘	↗	↗
Canadá	↘	↗	↗
China	↘	→	↗↗
Francia	↘	↗	↗
Alemania	↘	↗	↗
India	↘	→	↗
Italia	↘	↗	↗
Japón	↘	↗	↗
México	↘	↗	↗
República de Corea	↘	→	↗
Sudáfrica	↘	↗	↗
Turquía	↘	→	↗
Reino Unido	↘	↗	↗
Estados Unidos	↘	—	↗

Fuente: Onaran y Galanis, de próxima aparición.

Nota: El cuadro ilustra el hallazgo que una declinación de 1 por ciento en la participación del trabajo se ha asociado sistemáticamente a una menor participación del consumo privado en relación al PIB en todos los 15 países, además de la eurozona como conjunto. Inversamente, una participación del trabajo 1 por ciento más baja se asoció a una mayor participación de las exportaciones netas en todos los países, especialmente China (según se destaca mediante las dos flechas ascendentes) que ha seguido muy explícitamente una estrategia de crecimiento liderada por la exportación. El vínculo entre la participación del trabajo y la inversión es menos claro. Una participación del trabajo 1 por ciento más baja se asoció a tasas más altas de inversión en el PIB en nueve países, así como en el grupo de la eurozona, pero no tuvo efecto perceptible sobre la inversión en cinco economías emergentes y en Estados Unidos.

Gráfico 40 Costos laborales unitarios en una selección de países de la eurozona, 2000-2010 (índice: 2000 = 100)



Fuente: Calculado en base a Eurostat. El costo laboral real unitario se define como la retribución por ocupado a precios actuales dividido por el PIB a precios corrientes por persona ocupada.

Nota: En años recientes, muchos países han implementado estrategias de crecimiento impulsadas por la exportación en base a bajos costos laborales unitarios. En Alemania, miembro de la eurozona que no puede devaluar su moneda unilateralmente, los excedentes de exportación se potenciaron mediante la baja inflación y la declinación en los costos laborales reales unitarios en relación a otros países de la eurozona.

Gráfico 41 Cambios en el balance de cuenta corriente y el endeudamiento de los hogares (países seleccionados), 2003-10



Notas: Los balances de cuenta corriente se presentan como promedios para el período 2003-2010. Los aumentos en el endeudamiento de los hogares se presentan como promedios entre 2000 y 2008. Irlanda comienza en 2001; Suiza comienza en 1999 y finaliza en 2007.
La línea en el diagrama de dispersión se basa solamente en 16 observaciones, las cuales podrían no ser suficientes para generar una estimación estadísticamente confiable.

Fuente: Generado desde Lavoie y Stockhammer, 2012, cuadro 13.

Nota: En algunos de los principales "motores de la demanda" en el mundo, el auge en el consumo desde el cambio de siglo se basó en un crecimiento vertiginoso del endeudamiento de los hogares más que en el alza de los salarios. En Estados Unidos en particular, el fuerte crecimiento en el consumo de cara al estancamiento de la mediana salarial fue posible solamente mediante el consumo financiado por el endeudamiento y el basado en la riqueza. El gráfico plantea que los déficits en cuenta corriente se asocian al mayor endeudamiento de los hogares en una selección de economías avanzadas que comparten el acceso fácil a los mercados de crédito, lo cual es indicativo de cómo la financiarización ha contribuido a los desequilibrios externos al canalizar recursos hacia el endeudamiento de los hogares para la demanda del consumo.

Gráfico A1 Efecto de una disminución de 1% en la participación del trabajo en la renta sobre el consumo privado de productos y servicios domésticos, inversión y exportaciones netas: (a) consumo privado de productos y servicios; (b) inversión; (c) exportaciones netas

	Consommation des ménages	Investissement	Exportations nettes
Zone euro 12	↘ (-0,439)	↗ (0,299)	↗ (0,067)
Argentine	↘ (-0,153)	→ (0,015)	↗ (0,192)
Australie	↘ (-0,256)	↗ (0,174)	↗ (0,272)
Canada	↘ (-0,326)	↗ (0,182)	↗ (0,266)
Chine	↘ (-0,412)	→ (0,000)	↗↗ (1,986)
France	↘ (-0,305)	↗ (0,088)	↗ (0,198)
Allemagne	↘ (-0,501)	↗ (0,376)	↗ (0,096)
Inde	↘ (-0,291)	→ (0,000)	↗ (0,310)
Italie	↘ (-0,356)	↗ (0,130)	↗ (0,126)
Japon	↘ (-0,353)	↗ (0,284)	↗ (0,055)
Mexique	↘ (-0,438)	↗ (0,153)	↗ (0,381)
Rép. de Corée	↘ (-0,422)	→ (0,000)	↗ (0,359)
Afrique du Sud	↘ (-0,145)	↗ (0,129)	↗ (0,506)
Turquie	↘ (-0,491)	→ (0,000)	↗ (0,283)
R.-U.	↘ (-0,303)	↗ (0,120)	↗ (0,037)
E.U.	↘ (-0,426)	→ (0,000)	↗ (0,037)

Fuente: Ottaran y Calanis, de próxima aparición.

Nota: El eje vertical muestra el % de cambio en cada uno de los ítems correspondientes: % de cambio en el consumo privado de bienes y servicios, % de cambio en bienes de inversión, % de consumo del valor de las exportaciones menos el valor de las importaciones (exportación neta).

Nota: El gráfico A1 presenta los resultados de simular el impacto de una caída de 1 por ciento en la participación del trabajo en la renta sobre cada uno de los componentes de la demanda agregada. En comparación a la inversión y las exportaciones netas, la respuesta del consumo privado de productos nacionales es negativa y sustancial en todas las unidades económicas: en este caso no es posible distinguir entre economías desarrolladas y en desarrollo ya que todas parecen sufrir pérdidas de magnitud similar.

Mientras cae el consumo, la inversión es afectada positivamente por una declinación en la participación del trabajo en la renta en todas salvo seis unidades económicas y, en estas, el efecto es distinto a cero pero no significativo.

En el caso de las exportaciones netas, el gráfico A1(c) muestra que una caída de 1 por ciento en la participación del trabajo en la renta induce un aumento en exportaciones netas en todos los países. Es importante observar que en el caso de las exportaciones netas la magnitud se estima con un compuesto de elasticidades que dependen de los precios relativos de las exportaciones e importaciones, el grado de apertura de la economía y la elasticidad de los precios a nivel nacional.

Las estimaciones presentadas en el gráfico A1 son informativas: para la mayoría de las economías consideradas, el impacto de disminuir la participación del trabajo en la renta (digamos, reduciendo los salarios por debajo de la productividad promedio para ganar en competitividad) probablemente tendría un efecto tan negativo sobre el consumo doméstico(bienes y servicios comercializados a nivel nacional) que requeriría de una respuesta masiva en forma de inversión nacional y exportaciones netas para compensar el efecto adverso sobre la demanda agregada.

- Informe Tendencias Mundiales del Empleo - OIT - Enero 2013

Parte 3 del Informe (en inglés). **Regional economic and labour market developments**

Developed Economies and European Union

Unemployment has started to become entrenched and further job destruction threatens

Macroeconomic conditions deteriorated in 2012 in much of the Developed Economies region, substantially increasing uncertainty to the outlook. Spillovers of the Euro area economic woes to the rest of the Developed Economies region and the global economy are becoming increasingly visible.

The loss in risk appetite of investors in Europe is spreading more widely, also affecting economies in other countries in the region. As recessionary conditions spread throughout the region, unemployment rates are expected to go up again after having receded since their peak in 2010 (see Table 1). Indeed, the regional unemployment rate is expected to remain elevated throughout 2013 and to slowly decline only from next year onward, mainly thanks to improving labour market conditions outside the Euro area. Overall, unemployment rates will remain almost 2 percentage points higher than before the crisis over the entire forecast horizon.

Table 1. Labour market situation and outlook

		2009	2010	2011	2012p	2013p	2014p	2015p	2016p	2017p
Labour force participation rate (%)		60.5	60.3	60.0	60.0	59.9	59.9	59.8	59.7	59.7
Unemployment rate (%)	Total	8.4	8.8	8.4	8.6	8.7	8.6	8.4	8.2	8.0
	Male	8.8	9.1	8.7	8.8	8.9	8.7	8.5	8.2	8.0
	Female	7.9	8.4	8.2	8.3	8.5	8.4	8.3	8.2	8.0
	Youth	17.4	18.1	17.6	17.9	17.7	17.3	16.8	16.3	15.9
	Adult	7.1	7.5	7.2	7.3	7.5	7.5	7.3	7.2	7.0
Employment growth (% p.a.)	Total	–2.2	–0.2	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5
	Male	–3.1	–0.3	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5
	Female	–1.1	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.4
	Youth	–7.6	–4.1	–1.1	–0.9	–0.3	–0.1	0.0	–0.1	–0.3
	Adult	–1.5	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Memorandum item:										
GDP annual growth rate (%)		–3.7	2.5	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.5

* 2012 are preliminary estimates; 2013–17 are preliminary projections.

Source: ILO, *Trends Econometric Models*, October 2012 (see Annexes 4 and 5); IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, October 2012.

Recessionary conditions have significantly reduced job creation rates; thereby lowering chances for job-seekers to return to employment quickly (see Figure 15). As a consequence the average duration of unemployment has increased with some 33.6 per cent of all job-seekers in the Developed Economies and European Union region being unemployed for 12 months or longer, up from 28.5 per cent prior to the crisis. The incidence of long-term unemployment is 31.3 per cent in the United States and 39.4 per cent in Japan. Overall, with the onset of the crisis, unemployment outflows have decreased by 33 per cent and remained broadly at that lower level for most of the region. At the same time, worker inflows into unemployment have experienced an

upward trend since the beginning of the crisis. The simultaneous drop in unemployment outflows and jump in job destruction rates magnified problems of joblessness in developed economies. At the same time, gross labour market turnover -the sum of job creation and destruction in a given period- has been trending downwards over the last three decades and is now 7 per cent below the region's turnover rate after the recession in the early 2000s. This bodes ill for faster labour market adjustment, thereby preventing a faster employment recovery. At the same time, as unemployment duration lengthens, job-seekers lose their skills and competences and will find it more and more difficult to get an alternative job opportunity. An increasing number have dropped out from the labour market altogether or returning to non-market activities. In OECD countries as a whole, for instance, the share of discouraged workers in the total labour force increased by 50 per cent between 2007 and 2011, whereas the increase in discouragement among youth in these countries was almost twofold.

Figure 15. Unemployment flows: Developed Economies and European Union countries



Note: Unemployment outflows measure the probability with which an unemployed person is leaving the unemployment pool during a given year. Unemployment inflows measure the probability with which an employed person is entering the unemployment pool during a given year.
Source: ILO, *Trends Econometrics Models*, October 2012.

The problem of an increasing detachment from the labour market is particularly severe among younger people who have been particularly hard hit by the crisis. In the Developed Economies region, youth unemployment rates have deteriorated substantially with the crisis and not shown signs of improvements since. As recessionary conditions have taken hold of most European countries again, youth unemployment has further increased, reaching more than 50 per cent of young active people in countries such as Greece and Spain and more than 22 per cent in the Euro area overall. So far, only Austria, Germany and Switzerland have managed to keep youth unemployment low, in some cases even lower than prior to the crisis but even there, the slowdown in economic activity has started to push up youth unemployment (Austria,

Switzerland) or prevented it from falling further (Germany). Some young people have started to return to or prolong education, to acquire new skills in order to improve their future labour market chances (Barrow and Davis, 2012). Others have dropped out completely or are increasingly frustrated in their job search without, nevertheless, returning to the education system. This group of young people that is neither in employment, education nor training (NEET) has grown since the crisis, in particular among European crisis countries, and is expected to increase further as recessionary conditions continue to prevail in the Euro area (see Figure 16).

Figure 16. The evolution of NEET rates in selected European countries and the Euro area



Note: The figure displays the rate of young persons not in employment, education or training as a share of the total youth population (15–24 years).
Source: Eurostat, 2012.

More than among the adult population, rising and more persistent unemployment for young people has fuelled their inactivity rates. The rapid and substantial increase in youth unemployment in some advanced economies has significantly lengthened the average duration of unemployment even for younger cohorts, a situation without precedence. As a consequence, youth participation rates have dropped in advanced economies by more than could have been expected on the basis of precrisis trends (see Figure 17). As the prospects of finding a job are dim and not all countries offer second-chance education opportunities or activation measures targeted at young job-seekers, fewer young people decide to search actively for a job, waiting for economic conditions to improve before returning to the labour market. This is likely to hamper their future chances for employment further, as essential skills for job search and employment are lost or not sufficiently acquired. Indeed, existing studies point to the particularly harmful effect of unemployment and inactivity early in a person's career. Important job experience is not being gained and might be difficult to acquire when a young person eventually finds employment later on. As a consequence, as the crisis continues, young unemployed, once they eventually become employed, will be less productive, earn lower wages and have fewer stable employment opportunities. Existing evidence already points to a loss of at least 1 per cent of GDP among European countries due to the higher youth unemployment in the European Union (Eurofound, 2012).

Figure 17. Labour market participation gap



Note: The figure displays the difference between labour force projections based on historical averages of participation rates between 1999 and 2007 and the actual labour force. The participation gaps have been calculated at the country-level and aggregated across four different labour market groups at the regional level. Source: ILO, *Trends Econometric Models*, October 2012.

Nevertheless, a closer look at job creation dynamics around boom–bust periods reveals a more general pattern of sluggish employment growth, irrespective of any specific sectorial pattern or labour market mismatch. Indeed, when analyzing the effect of growth on job creation around the time of banking crises, large drops in employment during banking recessions can be detected alongside more sluggish employment growth immediately afterwards (see Figure 21). This pattern of an L-shaped evolution of employment following a banking crisis contrasts with a more pronounced recovery of employment after a business cycle downturn that was not induced by foul credits and liquidity-constrained banks. Indeed, job creation falls more than four times faster when a recession follows a banking crisis than during normal business cycle downturns. In contrast, employment creation does not react at all -or only very weakly- to growth in the recovery period following such a banking crisis.

Differences in the responsiveness of job creation to growth of this magnitude cannot be explained by sectorial or occupational shifts alone. Instead, downturns induced by banking crises come with strong cleansing effects whereby over-investment and misallocation induced by excessive leveraging prior to the crisis wipe out large parts of the economy. As a consequence, credit constraints worsen during a financial market crisis and depress the employment recovery for some time. In addition, persistent problems of the financial sector to restore sustainable balance sheets during such downturns also affect monetary policy transmission mechanism. This will affect financing conditions in particular for small and medium-size enterprises where many jobs originate. Despite record low refinancing rates for banks, both short- and long-term interest rates for corporations are sizeable, in particular in countries where sovereign debt risk spills over to the private credit market. Even companies that have sufficient own funds to invest are reluctant to enter any longer term commitments. Job creation is further impaired by the fact that banking-related crises require firms to build up new

collateral to finance their activities, which is easier done through physical investment rather than through new hires (Calvo et al., 2012). This liquidity-hoarding is one of the major reasons for low investment and employment growth in developed economies and explains why job creation has been so slow despite large slack on labour markets and rapidly falling hiring costs in many advanced economies.

Figure 21. The responsiveness of job creation around banking crisis



Note: The figure displays the effect of downturns and recoveries on the responsiveness of job creation to changes in GDP. The chart distinguishes between recessions and recoveries unrelated to financial sector difficulties and those that have been induced by a banking sector crisis.
Source: ILO, *Trends Econometric Models*, October 2012; see Appendix 2 for methodological details.

Box 5. Why do some asset price bubbles have worse effects on output and employment than others?

Financial globalization has brought about more frequent financial asset price bubbles. Whereas the post-war period was mostly immune from asset price bubbles in the Developed Economies region, deregulation of the banking sector in the 1980s in the United States led to the savings and loans crisis in 1989. Similarly, the opening of the capital account pushed Scandinavian countries through a real-estate and asset price boom in the early 1990s. Periods of rapid increases and declines of asset prices became more frequent with the real estate bubble in Japan at the end of the 1980s, strong housing price swings in France and Switzerland at the turn of the 1990s and the IT bubble at the turn of the 2000s in several countries of the Developed Economies and European Union region. More recently, the United States housing bubble burst in 2007-08, while European economies are currently experiencing a sovereign debt crisis (Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2012).

Not all asset pricing bubbles have the same impact on the real economy, however. For instance, the stock market crash in 1987 and the crash of the IT bubble in 2001 had very little direct negative impact on GDP. In contrast, the stock and housing market bubbles have triggered long-lasting periods of economic recession and stagnation in Japan over the 1990s and in the USA and other advanced economies since 2008.

Existing evidence shows that besides the wealth effect of higher asset prices on consumption and investment decisions, it is primarily the severity of credit constraints that explains differences in crisis impacts. Indeed, as banks screen the credit worthiness of borrowers they take their clients' income or wealth as collateral. Asset price bubbles affect the credit constraints through the value of the collateral. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) describe the interaction between credit rationing and asset pricing bubbles for firms. A similar analysis can be made when the collateral takes the form of real estate (Iacoviello, 2005).

To illustrate the importance of the credit channel for explaining differences in the impact of asset price bubbles, a medium-scale semi-structural macroeconomic model is used by the ILO for the estimates in this box. This model takes into account the main characteristics of modern economies. The financial sector is made of commercial banks and traders. Banks make decisions regarding loan application according to the collateral of borrowers. The collateral of borrowing firms takes the form of equities. Traders' expectations are subject to opinion dynamics and may lead to bubbles when the same beliefs are shared by a sufficient number of traders. The real sector is composed of workers and firms. Workers receive labour income depending on wages and the level employment, while firms form investment decisions based on the profit rate. Lastly, fiscal authorities engage in public spending either to limit the level of debt or to sustain economic activity, while monetary authorities set the interest to stabilize the inflation gap and the output gap. The model is calibrated to mimic characteristics of the United States economy. Consumption accounts for 70 per cent of GDP, while the share of investment is 12 per cent of GDP at the steady state. On the income side, the labour share of income accounts for 77 per cent of GDP. Population growth at the rate of 1 per cent annually and the real annual interest rate is 2 per cent. Public spending amounts to 18 per cent of GDP while the public debt to GDP ratio is close to 50 per cent.

The impact of asset price bubbles on output and employment is compared under two scenarios, assuming a 1 per cent increase in the value of equities. The simulated path of output is then recalibrated to match the magnitude of output swings during the past two recessions in the United States (see figure B5.1).

In the first scenario (Panel A), credit rationing is less severe and banks are more accommodative. In the second scenario (Panel B), credit rationing by banks is severe and credit decisions are highly sensitive to the value of the stock market, which is used as collateral by banks.

In Figure B5.1, an increase in stock prices is associated with increased employment instability when credit decisions depend more heavily on the value of the stock market (Panel A vs. Panel B). Economic instability takes the form of amplified output fluctuations. The standard deviation of employment is 20 per cent lower under scenario 1 (panel A) than under scenario 2 (panel B). Under scenario 1, employment reaches a peak after 3 years. When the economy unfolds, employment reaches a through after 7 years. In Panel A, the transmission channel between asset pricing bubble and credit is weaker reducing the degree of employment instability. These implied elasticities by the two scenarios are in line with the estimations of Gilchrist et al. (2005) using a VAR model for the United States.

Figure B5.1. Severity of credit constraints and the employment effects of asset price bubbles



Note: The figure illustrates the impact on output of two types of asset pricing bubbles. Panel A corresponds to the dotcom bubble, which is not characterized by credit expansion. Panel B corresponds to the housing bubble, which took place along fast credit expansion. The dashed line illustrates the output gap in the USA. The solid line is the output gap as produced by the ILO macroeconomic model. In the ILO macroeconomic model, panel A corresponds to a scenario in which there is no credit rationing from banks. Panel B corresponds to a scenario in which credit rationing is inversely related to the value of the collateral of borrowers (in the form of financial assets).

Source: ILO Macroeconomic Model

New sources of employment growth

The sluggish recovery in much of the Developed Economies region following the financial crisis and the double dip in the Euro area have led to a substantial increase in trend unemployment rates in the region (see Figure 22). This implies that higher unemployment might already have become persistent, at least in certain countries of the region. In particular European countries in the Baltics and the Mediterranean have suffered from a strong and potentially lasting increase in their underlying unemployment rate, preventing a stronger employment recovery. Together with the increase in unemployment duration this rise in trend unemployment will pose serious challenges to policy-makers in finding the proper activation measures. On the one hand, higher trend unemployment has reduced the production potential, which further depresses a level of activity that is already below its medium-term sustainable growth rate (Ho and Yetman, 2012). This will feed into a self-sustaining slow-growth path of economic expansion whereby low activity and weak employment hold each other down. In addition, the decline in the efficiency of labour market matching in reaction to structural adjustment caused by the financial crisis will exacerbate problems for faster employment growth and further reduce the effectiveness of policy interventions that aim at stimulating the recovery.

Figure 22. Trend unemployment has increased (2011 vs. pre-crisis)



Note: The figure displays the increase of trend unemployment between 2011 and pre-crisis trends based on the estimation of a crisis-induced shift of the Beveridge curve (i.e. the relationship between vacancies and unemployment). The shift is measured at an assumed average level of economic activity, reflecting neutral business cycle conditions. Only countries for which the crisis effect on unemployment was statistically significant have been displayed.
Source: ILO calculations, see Appendix 1 for methodological details.

Del Paper **- La era de la desigualdad (¿consecuencia directa del "imperialismo monetario"?) - Parte III**, publicado el 15/2/15

- Informes de organismos internacionales - Primer trimestre del año 2014 (Selección de párrafos, tablas y cuadros, vinculados con la desigualdad de ingresos)

- Informe de OXFAM - Gobernar para las élites - Secuestro democrático y desigualdad económica - 20 de enero de 2014

Dada la magnitud del incremento de la concentración de la riqueza, la monopolización de oportunidades y la inequidad en la representación política suponen una tendencia grave y preocupante. Por ejemplo:

• Casi la mitad de la riqueza mundial está en manos de sólo el 1% de la población.

• La riqueza del 1% de la población más rica del mundo asciende a 110 billones de dólares, una cifra 65 veces mayor que el total de la riqueza que posee la 3 mitad más pobre de la población mundial.

• La mitad más pobre de la población mundial posee la misma riqueza que las 85 personas más ricas del mundo.

• Siete de cada diez personas viven en países donde la desigualdad económica ha aumentado en los últimos 30 años.

• El 1% más rico de la población ha visto cómo se incrementaba su participación en la renta entre 1980 y 2012 en 24 de los 26 países de los que tenemos datos.

• En Estados Unidos, el 1% más rico ha acumulado el 95% del crecimiento total posterior a la crisis desde 2009, mientras que el 90% más pobre de la población se ha empobrecido aún más.

Esta masiva concentración de los recursos económicos en manos de unos pocos supone una gran amenaza para los sistemas políticos y económicos inclusivos. El poder económico y político está separando cada vez más a las personas, en lugar de hacer que avancen juntas, de modo que es inevitable que se intensifiquen las tensiones sociales y aumente el riesgo de ruptura social.

El aumento de la concentración de los ingresos y la riqueza en manos de unos pocos

El último cuarto de siglo ha sido testigo del aumento de la concentración de la riqueza en manos de un menor número de personas. Este fenómeno mundial es la causa de la situación actual, en la que el 1% de las familias del mundo posee casi la mitad (el 46%) de la riqueza mundial. Por su parte, la riqueza de la mitad más pobre de la población es menor que la de las 85 personas más ricas del mundo.

Durante el pasado año, 210 personas se han incorporado al selecto club de los multimillonarios que superan los mil millones de fortuna, formado por 1.426 personas cuya riqueza conjunta asciende a 5,4 billones de dólares. Los beneficios empresariales, los salarios de los directores y las transacciones bursátiles baten récords cada día, y no parece que vayan a reducirse. Durante la redacción del presente informe, el índice industrial Dow Jones alcanzó el punto más alto de sus 117 años de historia. La riqueza del 1% más rico de la población mundial asciende a 110 billones de dólares, una cifra 65 veces mayor que la de la riqueza total que posee la mitad más pobre de la población.

Habida cuenta de la reciente crisis financiera mundial, esta tendencia podría parecer sorprendente. Sin embargo, aunque debido a la crisis el porcentaje de la riqueza en manos de los más acaudalados descendió temporalmente, lo cierto es que ya se han recuperado e incluso han aumentado ese porcentaje. En Estados Unidos, el 1% más rico de la población ha acaparado el 95% del crecimiento económico posterior a la crisis financiera entre 2009 y 2011, mientras que el 90% con menos recursos se ha empobrecido en este período. La Gran Recesión de 2008 no ha cambiado la tendencia hacia la concentración de la renta: la participación en la renta nacional estadounidense en manos del 10% más rico de la población se mantiene en el 50,4% (el porcentaje más elevado desde la Primera Guerra Mundial). Si el porcentaje de ingresos que acapara el 1% más rico de la población se hubiese mantenido desde 1980, el resto de los estadounidenses habrían tenido a su disposición 6.000 dólares adicionales por persona en 2012.

Las élites mundiales son cada vez más ricas y, sin embargo, la mayor parte de la población mundial se ha visto excluida de esta prosperidad. Así, mientras las acciones y beneficios de las empresas alcanzan nuevos récords, los salarios como porcentaje del producto interior bruto (PIB) se han estancado. El hecho de que la fortuna conjunta de las 10 personas más ricas de Europa supere el coste total de las medidas de estímulo aplicadas en la Unión Europea entre 2008 y 2010 (217.000 millones de euros frente a 200.000 millones de euros) nos da una idea de la magnitud de la concentración de la riqueza. Además, las políticas de austeridad posteriores a la recuperación están perjudicando en mayor medida a las personas pobres, pero enriqueciendo a las ricas. La austeridad también está teniendo un impacto sin precedentes en las clases medias.

En muchos países, la población adinerada se aleja cada vez más del resto en términos de riqueza. La base de datos de los ingresos más elevados del mundo (The World Top Incomes Database) abarca 26 países, con información sobre el porcentaje de ingresos antes de impuestos que va a manos del 1% más rico de la población desde la década de

1980 (gráfico 1.1). En todos los países excepto dos (Colombia y los Países Bajos), el porcentaje del total de ingresos que está en manos del percentil más rico ha aumentado (y en Colombia se ha mantenido en torno al 20%). El 1% más rico de la población de China, Portugal y Estados Unidos ha más que duplicado su participación en la renta nacional desde 1980, y la situación está empeorando. Incluso en países más igualitarios como Suecia y Noruega, la participación en la renta del 1% más rico de la población se ha incrementado en más del 50% (gráfico 1.2).

Es probable que, en realidad, la concentración de riqueza sea mucho mayor, dado que una considerable cantidad de los ingresos de los más acaudalados se ocultan en paraísos fiscales. Se calcula que hay 18,5 billones de dólares no registrados y en terceros países de baja tributación.

Apenas hay datos disponibles sobre la participación en la renta nacional en manos de la población más rica en los países en desarrollo. No obstante, existen otros datos que respaldan el argumento de que la desigualdad está aumentando.

Por ejemplo, entre 1988 y 2008 el coeficiente de Gini aumentó en 58 países (de los que existen datos disponibles). Siete de cada diez personas en todo el mundo viven en países donde la desigualdad se ha incrementado.

El aumento del nivel de desigualdad también es característico de los países de renta media y población elevada, cuya importancia radica en que es donde vive actualmente la mayor parte de la población pobre del mundo. Antes de la globalización, se trataba de países de renta baja con niveles de desigualdad considerablemente inferiores. Sin embargo, el crecimiento económico les ha situado entre los países de renta media y ha creado una brecha entre ricos y pobres…

Gráfico 1: Los ricos se enriquecen

1.1 Porcentaje del incremento de la participación en la renta del 1% más rico, 1980-2012



1.2 Participación del 1% más rico en la renta nacional



Fuente: F. Alvaredo, A. B. Atkinson, T. Piketty and E. Saez, (2013) The World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/ . Sólo incluye países con datos de 1980 y posteriores a 2008.

Actualmente también disponemos de cálculos fiables sobre la distribución de la riqueza (frente a la distribución del ingreso) entre países. Según Credit Suisse, el 10% de la población mundial posee el 86% de los recursos del planeta, mientras que el 70% más pobre (más de 3.000 millones de adultos) sólo cuenta con el 3%. Puede afirmarse que los multimillonarios más ricos de la actualidad no tienen parangón en la historia. El mexicano Carlos Slim, propietario de grandes monopolios en México y otros lugares, podría pagar los salarios anuales de 440.000 mexicanos con los ingresos que genera su riqueza.

Cuadro 1: La concentración de la riqueza mundial

Riqueza (dólares americanos)	Porcentaje de la población mundial	Número de adultos (millones)	Porcentaje de la riqueza mundial	Riqueza total (billones de dólares)
<10.000	68,7	3.207	3,0	7
10.000–100.000	22,9	1.066	13,7	33
100.000–1 millón	7,7	361	42,3	102
> 1 millón	0,7	32	41,0	99

Fuente: 'Global Wealth Report 2013'. Zurich: Credit Suisse

No obstante, algunos países están consiguiendo resistirse a esta tendencia mundial. Durante la última década, los países de América Latina han reducido su desigualdad, aunque estos avances deben matizarse, ya que se están produciendo en algunos de los países más desiguales del mundo. Además, la velocidad y la profundidad de la reducción de la desigualdad varían de un país a otro, de modo que es demasiado pronto para hablar de una tendencia real.

Entre los países miembros del G20, las economías emergentes solían ser las más desiguales (por ejemplo Sudáfrica, Brasil, México, Rusia, Argentina, China y Turquía) mientras que los países desarrollados solían tener menores niveles de desigualdad (Francia, Alemania, Canadá, Italia, y Australia). Sin embargo, incluso esto está cambiando, y en la actualidad los niveles de desigualdad están aumentando en *todos* los países de renta alta del G20 (a excepción de Corea del Sur), mientras que en Brasil, México y Argentina la desigualdad se está reduciendo.

La desigualdad preocupa a los ciudadanos

En la actualidad, los debates sobre la desigualdad y la concentración de los ingresos y la riqueza son uno de los temas más importantes del debate político mundial. Pero no siempre ha sido así. Hace sólo unos años Anne Krueger, entonces Primera Subdirectora Gerente del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) declaró: *"Las personas pobres están desesperadas por mejorar sus condiciones materiales en términos absolutos, en lugar de avanzar en el ámbito de la distribución de los ingresos. Por lo tanto, parece mucho mejor centrarse en el empobrecimiento que en la desigualdad"*.

Esta visión ya no es la predominante, ¿qué es lo que ha cambiado el debate? Los datos expuestos en el capítulo anterior son parcialmente responsables de este cambio, además de ir en contra del consenso generalizado sobre la idea de que la prosperidad compartida y el crecimiento inclusivo deberían ser un objetivo de primer orden. Por el contrario, el crecimiento económico parece seguir más bien un modelo en el que "el vencedor se lo lleva todo". Estudios recientes también indican que la desigualdad crónica retrasa el crecimiento económico a largo plazo, y dificulta la reducción de la pobreza.

Las recientes investigaciones que corroboran el aumento de la desigualdad están influyendo en la opinión pública mundial. El sondeo mundial llevado a cabo por el *Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project* indica que el aumento de la desigualdad preocupa a los ciudadanos de todos los continentes. En noviembre de 2013, el Foro Económico Mundial lanzó su informe *Perspectivas de la Agenda Mundial 2014*, en el que 1.592 miembros de las élites mundiales situaron las crecientes disparidades en materia de ingresos como el segundo mayor riesgo mundial de los próximos 12 a 18 meses.

Una encuesta encargada recientemente por Oxfam no sólo respalda estas conclusiones, sino que además pone de manifiesto que la mayor parte de la ciudadanía considera que las leyes y normativas están concebidas para favorecer a los ricos. La encuesta, realizada en seis países (España, Brasil, India, Sudáfrica, el Reino Unido y Estados Unidos), pone de manifiesto que la mayoría de los ciudadanos (ocho de cada diez en España, por ejemplo) considera que las leyes están diseñadas para favorecer a los ricos. Del mismo modo, la mayoría de los ciudadanos estaba de acuerdo con la afirmación de que "los ricos tienen demasiada influencia en el rumbo del país" (gráfico 3).

Gráfico 3: Encuesta de Oxfam sobre las opiniones acerca de la riqueza y el poder en seis países en 2013



Fuente: Encuesta realizada por Oxfam. Se preguntó a los encuestados si estaban de acuerdo con la afirmación "Los ricos tienen demasiada influencia en el rumbo de este país".

La manipulación del sistema en favor de las élites

Los mercados no son entes autónomos y espontáneos que funcionan según sus propias leyes naturales. En realidad, son construcciones sociales con leyes establecidas por instituciones y reguladas por gobiernos que deben rendir cuentas ante los participantes en el mercado y los ciudadanos. Cuando existe crecimiento y reducción de la desigualdad es porque las leyes que rigen los mercados actúan *en favor* de las clases medias y de los colectivos más pobres de la sociedad. Sin embargo, cuando sólo ganan los ricos, es porque las leyes se están empezando a inclinar exclusivamente en favor de sus intereses.

Oxfam lleva 70 años trabajando para combatir la pobreza y la injusticia en más de 90 países. Oxfam ha luchado contra el endeudamiento insostenible y contra los paraísos fiscales y, en el transcurso de estas experiencias, ha presenciado de primera mano cómo las personas y los colectivos ricos se apropian de las instituciones políticas para su propio engrandecimiento en detrimento del resto de la sociedad. Vivimos un nivel de desigualdad sin precedentes que pone de manifiesto que, si no se establecen controles sobre las instituciones representativas, éstas se deteriorarán aún más y las diferencias de poder entre ricos y pobres podrían perpetuarse hasta hacerse irreversibles…

La interacción entre la desigualdad y la manipulación de las reglas políticas

La concentración de la riqueza en manos de las élites da lugar a una influencia política indebida que, en último término, arrebata a los ciudadanos los ingresos procedentes de los recursos naturales, genera políticas fiscales injustas, fomenta las prácticas corruptas y desafía el poder normativo de los gobiernos. El conjunto de estas consecuencias empeora la rendición de cuentas y la inclusión social. Todo esto se produce en contextos diferentes. A continuación se exponen algunos estudios de caso de contextos nacionales muy distintos.

Comprar la política: cómo el dinero sesga la representación política e impulsa la desigualdad en Estados Unidos

Desde finales de la década de 1970, la escasa regulación del papel del dinero en la esfera política ha permitido que los ciudadanos acaudalados y las grandes empresas ejerzan una influencia indebida en la elaboración de políticas estatales. Un resultado pernicioso es la manipulación de las políticas públicas en favor de los intereses de las élites, que ha coincidido con una mayor concentración de riqueza en manos del 1% más rico de la población desde los inicios de la Gran Depresión…

A partir de la década de 1980, los sectores financiero y bancario inyectaron millones de dólares destinados a deshacer las normativas puestas en marcha tras la quiebra bursátil y la Gran Depresión de la década de 1930. La desregulación ha tenido dos grandes ramificaciones: por un lado, los directivos de empresas vinculadas a los sectores bancario y financiero se han hecho excepcionalmente ricos, y por otro lado ha aumentado el riesgo de los mercados mundiales, lo cual ha culminado en la crisis económica mundial que empezó en 2008. Tal y como muestra el gráfico 4, existe una correlación directa entre la desregulación financiera y la desigualdad económica en Estados Unidos.

Gráfico 4: La relación entre desregulación financiera y desigualdad en Estados Unidos



Fuente de los datos: Financial Deregulation, http://www.nber.org/papers/w14644.pdf; Income share - Piketty and Saez (2003, 2012)

En 2010 el Presidente Obama promulgó la ley de reforma de Wall Street y de protección del consumidor (conocida como Ley Dodd-Frank), cuyo objetivo es regular los mercados financieros y así proteger la economía de una segunda gran crisis. Sin embargo, el sector financiero se ha gastado más de mil millones de dólares en pagar a los cientos de personas que hacen incidencia política para debilitar la Ley y retrasar su plena aplicación. De hecho, en 2012 las cinco mayores asociaciones de consumidores utilizaron los servicios de veinte personas dedicadas a defender la Ley Dodd-Frank, mientras que los cinco grupos financieros más importantes enviaron a 406 personas para abogar por su derogación. A pesar de que la Ley Dodd-Frank se promulgó hace más de tres años, sólo 148 de sus 398 disposiciones se han terminado, y el sistema financiero sigue siendo tan vulnerable a las crisis como lo era en 2008.

El impacto de la austeridad en Europa: el aumento de la brecha de desigualdad

La desigualdad de ingresos iba en aumento en varios países europeos ya antes de la crisis, a pesar del elevado nivel de crecimiento económico. Portugal y el Reino Unido ya se encontraban entre los países más desiguales de la Organización de Cooperación y Desarrollo Económicos (OCDE), lo cual pone seriamente en duda el grado de equidad del crecimiento en estos países una vez que hayan salido totalmente de la recesión.

Con la enorme presión de los mercados financieros, se han puesto en marcha programas de austeridad en toda Europa a pesar de las masivas protestas ciudadanas. Dichas medidas, basadas en impuestos regresivos y en profundos recortes del gasto (especialmente en servicios públicos como la educación, la atención sanitaria y la protección social), ya han empezado a desmantelar los mecanismos de reducción de la desigualdad que permiten un crecimiento sostenible. Las medidas de austeridad también han tratado de debilitar los derechos laborales. Los colectivos más pobres de la sociedad han sido los más perjudicados, ya que son las personas más vulnerables quienes soportan la responsabilidad de los excesos de las últimas décadas, a pesar de ser los menos culpables de ellos. Aunque de forma tardía, los principales defensores de la austeridad, como el FMI, están empezando a reconocer que las duras medidas de austeridad no han dado los resultados esperados en términos de crecimiento y recuperación económicos, y que de hecho han empeorado las perspectivas de crecimiento e igualdad.

Mientras tanto, el 10% más rico de la población ha visto cómo su participación en el total de ingresos ha aumentado. Los ingresos conjuntos de las diez personas más ricas de Europa superan el coste total de las medidas de estímulo aplicadas en la UE entre 2008 y 2010 (217.000 millones frente a 200.000 millones de euros)…

- IMF Policy Paper - Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality - International Monetary Fund - January 23, 2014

Inequality of Income

Over the last three decades, inequality in the personal distribution of income has increased in most economies. Figure 1 presents trends in the average (unweighted) Gini coefficient for disposable incomes (i.e., market incomes minus direct taxes plus cash transfers) across regions over recent decades -which reflects both the inequality of market-determined incomes as well as the distributional impact of income taxes and public transfers. The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 (denoting complete equality) and 1 (denoting complete inequality). Between 1990 and 2010, the Gini for disposable income has increased in nearly all advanced and emerging European economies. Over one-third of advanced economies and half of emerging Europe experienced increases in their Ginis exceeding 3 percentage points, with most of the increases in emerging Europe occurring between 1990 and 1995 during the early years of their transition to market-based systems. Inequality also rose in most economies in Asia and the Pacific and in Middle East and North Africa. While average inequality fell in sub-Saharan Africa over this period, it still rose by more than 3 percentage points in more than one-fourth of these economies. Inequality also increased in over one-third of the economies in Latin America, although on average there was a slight decline. However, since 2000 there has been a substantial decline in the Gini in nearly all countries in this region. This

increase in inequality across the globe has also been accompanied by a widespread rise in public support for redistribution.

Figure 1. Trends in Disposable Income Inequality, 1980–2010



Sources: OECD; Luxembourg Income Study Database; Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC); World Bank; Eurostat.

Note: Disposable income is income available to finance consumption once income taxes and public transfers have been netted out. Therefore, the distributional impacts of indirect taxes and in-kind transfers are not included. The Gini coefficient ranges between 0 (complete equality) and 1 (complete inequality). Number of countries in parentheses.

More striking than changes in inequality within regions are the persistent differences across regions. For instance, between 1990 and 2010, average inequality in each region changed by less than 3¼ percentage points. In contrast, average inequality in the two most unequal regions (sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America) remained 12 percentage points higher than the two most equal regions (emerging Europe and advanced economies). As the following section shows, a large proportion of the differences in regional average disposable income inequalities can be explained by differences in fiscal policies, especially in the levels and composition of taxes and spending.

Figure. Public Support for Redistribution



Source: Integrated Values Survey 1981–2008

Support for redistribution grew more in countries where inequality increased and, more recently, in advanced economies where the crisis hit hardest. For instance, public support between the late 1990s and the late-2000s grew by more than 30 percentage points in China, Finland, Germany and several Eastern European countries, where the income Gini increased by over 20 percent. At the same time, support declined in countries where the Gini decreased, including in Bulgaria, Mexico, Peru, and Ukraine. Rising inequality thus seems to partly explain the increased public support for redistribution. Between 2008 and 2011, among advanced economies, public opinion changed more in favor of redistributive policies in countries that experienced large declines in GDP, such as Portugal, Ireland, and Slovenia.

More recently, the public debate has focused on the sharp increase in the share of total income going to top income groups. Over the last three decades the market income shares of the richest one-percent of the population have increased substantially in English-speaking advanced economies, as well as in China and India (Figure 2). For example, in the United States, the share of market income captured by the richest 10 percent surged from around 30 percent in 1980 to 48 percent by 2012, while the share of the richest one-percent increased from 8 percent to 19 percent. Even more striking is the fourfold increase in the income share of the richest 0.1 percent, from 2.6 percent to 10.4 percent. There has been substantial variation across countries in how much the share of the highest income groups has risen. The increase in the share of the top one-percent has been much less pronounced in Southern European and Nordic economies, and hardly any increases have been observed in continental Europe and Japan. While there is broad consensus about these trends, there is much less consensus on the factors driving them. Some emphasize the impact of new technologies and globalization on the supply and demand for skills (e.g., Goldin and Katz, 2008; Mankiw, 2013) -which can be expected to affect all economies- while others have highlighted the role of policy choices, such as reductions in top income tax rates. Rent-seeking behavior of top executives (at the expense of other incomes) and wealth accumulation have also been identified as factors behind the rising share at the top (see Stiglitz, 2012; Alvaredo and others, 2013)…

Figure 2. Gross Income Share of Top One-Percent in Selected Advanced and Developing Economies, 1925–2012



Source: The World Top Incomes Database. Available at: http://g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/topincomes/.

Note: Income refers to pre-tax-and-transfer gross income (see Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011, for details).

Inequality of Wealth

In advanced economies, household net wealth -financial assets and real estate minus debt- has increased substantially over the last four decades. Assessment of trends in this area requires caution, given the limited number of economies with comprehensive data. Internationally comparable data for eight large advanced economies show that the average ratio of net household wealth to national income grew by almost 80 percent between 1970 and 2010 (Piketty and Zucman, 2013). The largest increase was observed in Italy (by 180 percent) and the smallest increase was in the United States (by 21 percent). Explanations for the rapid growth in wealth include asset-price booms and a significant increase in private savings.

Wealth is more unequally distributed than income. The Gini coefficient of wealth in a sample of 26 advanced and developing economies in the early 2000s was 0.68, compared to a Gini of 0.36 for disposable incomes (Figure 4). The share of wealth held by the top 10 percent ranges from slightly less than half in Chile, China, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom, to more than two-thirds in Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. In Switzerland and the United States, where wealth is most unequally distributed, the top one-percent alone holds more than one-third of total household wealth.

The inequality of wealth has risen in recent decades in several advanced economies. For instance, between the mid-1980s and early-2000s, the growth of wealth in Canada and Sweden was all concentrated in the two upper deciles of the wealth distribution. During the same period, the Gini coefficients of wealth distribution in Finland and Italy rose from around 0.55 to above 0.6. In the United States, the Gini coefficient of wealth distribution rose from 0.80 in the early-1980s to almost 0.84 in 2007.

Figure 4. Inequality of Wealth and Incomes in Selected Economies, early-2000s



Sources: Davies and others (2008); OECD; Luxembourg Income Study Database; Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC); World Bank; Eurostat.

Non-financial assets represent a large share of household wealth. Survey data suggest that non-financial assets -such as primary residences and other real estate- represent between 70 and 90 percent of total household gross wealth in advanced economies. In developing economies, this share is even larger: e.g., in the early 2000s it exceeded 90 percent in India and Indonesia (Davies and others, 2008). Financial wealth is generally more unequally distributed than real estate: for example, Fredriksen (2012) reports that the Gini coefficient for financial wealth (on average 0.8 for a group of seven advanced countries) exceeds that for non-financial wealth (0.63).

Lifetime Inequality

Empirical studies suggest that lifetime inequality is usually lower than inequality in any given year. This occurs for two reasons. First, in many economies, individuals

experience significant fluctuations in incomes from year to year. Because of this, an individual who has relatively high income in one year may not necessarily have high incomes over their entire lifetime, relative to his or her peers of the same age. Bowlus and Robin (2012) find that because of this "earnings mobility" from one year to the next, the lifetime inequality of income is about 20-30 percent lower than annual income inequality in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In France and Germany, lifetime inequality is similar to that of annual income. Second, lifetime incomes also tend to be less unequal because of the age-income cycle that affects the entire population: incomes tend to be lower during early working years and peak in later years, before declining again (Paglin, 1975). Taking both of these factors into account, Björklund (1993) finds that the dispersion of lifetime income in Sweden is about 35-40 percent lower than that of annual income. The concept of lifetime income inequality is also important for assessing the redistributive effects of social insurance contributions and benefits.

Inequality of Opportunity

Income inequality can persist across generations, reflecting differences in economic opportunity. Restricted opportunities for increasing incomes can reflect a range of factors, including lack of access to education (including early childhood and tertiary education) and lack of access to certain professions or business opportunities (OECD, 2011a; Corak, 2013). This lack of access is in turn reinforced by low incomes. Therefore, high income inequality is both a symptom and a cause of low economic mobility, and family background is a key factor in determining the adult outcomes of younger generations.

Intergenerational income mobility is lower in countries with higher income inequality. Intergenerational earnings mobility, as measured by the elasticity between a parent's and an offspring's earnings, is low in countries such as Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, which have high Gini coefficients for disposable income. In contrast, mobility is much higher in the more egalitarian Nordic countries (Figure 5). This relationship between income inequality and intergenerational mobility is often referred to as the "Great Gatsby Curve" (Krueger, 2012). In low-mobility countries, about 50 percent of any economic advantage that a father has is passed onto his offspring, whereas in high-mobility countries this falls to less than 20 percent. Evidence for Nordic countries finds that intergenerational income mobility is flat across much of the parental income distribution but rises at the top end. In developing economies with available data, income mobility is extremely low, especially in the high inequality economies of Latin America.

Figure 5. The Great Gatsby Curve: Income Inequality and Economic Mobility



Sources: Corak (2013); OECD; Luxembourg Income Study Database; Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC); World Bank; Eurostat.

Note: The intergenerational earnings elasticity estimates in the chart are the elasticity between a father's income and a son's income. The upward slope of the line suggests that countries with a high inequality of income around 1985 (high Gini coefficients) had high intergenerational earnings elasticities. A high elasticity suggests a strong relationship between a father and son's income and less mobility of incomes across generations.

(…)

Evidence from recent fiscal consolidation episodes suggests that a progressive mix of adjustment measures can significantly help offset the adverse effects of adjustment on inequality, though the consolidation may still lead to reduced incomes for the poor in the short term. An analysis of 27 recent adjustment episodes in advanced economies and emerging Europe suggests that, in about half of these economies, market income inequality increased during fiscal consolidations. However, in many cases, the increase was muted by the design of adjustment measures. In almost two-thirds of the economies, fiscal measures led to either a decrease in inequality (a decline in the Gini coefficient for disposable income) or at least partly offset the effect of a worsening of market inequality (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Redistributive Effect of Fiscal Adjustments, 2007–2012
(Changes in market and disposable income Gini coefficients)



Sources: Euromod v. G1.0+; Eurostat; and staff calculations.

Note: An increase in Gini coefficient indicates an increase in inequality. The Gini coefficient for market income is estimated by Euromod based on post-tax income survey data by Eurostat and simulated figures for taxes, using the Euromod micro-simulation model. *Indicates that data for disposable income refer to 2007–11.

Appendix Figure 2. Change in Household Disposable Income by Type of Measure and Income Group, 2007–12

(Percentage)





Source: Avram and others (2013).

- Society at a Glance 2014 - OECD Social Indicators - The crisis and its aftermath - March 2014

(…)

The financial crisis in 2007-08 saw a fast, far-reaching deterioration in economic output for the OECD area as a whole and GDP fell steeply from its pre-recession peaks. But while in some countries, the Great Recession was followed by a moderate but continuous recovery, others avoided outright recession. A number of hard-hit countries, notably in Europe, faced a second recession in 2011-12 and output only began to stabilize in late 2013 (Figure 1.1). More than five years after the Great Recession started, economic output in the OECD is still not back to pre-crisis levels.

Of all the economic losses, however, the income drops suffered by workers have turned out to be the most difficult to reverse. In most countries, the recovery has not yet translated into significant improvements in labour market conditions. Employment and wages have continued to fall until recently (Figure 1.1)…

Figure 1.1. **Economic output has begun a recovery everywhere, but employment and wages have not**

GDP and total wage bill in real terms, business cycle peak=100



Note: All data are annual and all changes are in real terms. To focus on the effects of the Great Recession, the graph shows OECD countries that saw a drop in annual GDP at least once between 2007 and 2009. Australia, Korea and Poland are therefore excluded. Israel, Mexico, Turkey are also excluded as data on employee compensation are not available. "Peak" refers to the year with the highest GDP prior to the recession (either 2007 or 2008). The shaded area refers to the periods for which data are projected rather than recorded. "Low-growth" ("high-growth") countries are those where GDP growth between peak and p+4 is below (above) the country average minus (plus) 0.5 standard deviations.
"Low-growth" countries: Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain.
"High-growth" countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, the Slovak Republic, Sweden, Switzerland.
Source: OECD (2013), OECD Economic Outlook 2013, No. 93, *www.oecd.org/economy/outlook/economicoutlook.htm* and *http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00655-en.*

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The demand for social support has persisted despite a public awareness that something needs to be done about often-unprecedented debt levels and structural fiscal deficits. Figure 1.2 for instance, illustrates the findings from a 2013 survey which shows how, in some countries, attitudes have shifted markedly against government debt and in favour of spending cuts.

Figure 1.2. **Most people want to protect social spending, even where support for reducing fiscal gaps is strong**

Percentages of respondents saying that spending should be increased, maintained, or reduced, 2013



Note: The data are taken from Transatlantic Trends, an annual survey of public opinion by German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Compagnia di San Paolo*, Barrow Cadbury Trust, *Fundação Luso-Americana*, BBVA Foundation, Communitas Foundation, and Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Polling for the 2013 results took place in June and July by phone interview. In each country, the sample consists of approximately 1 000 randomly chosen men and women of 18 years of age and older. The 95% confidence interval attributable to sampling and other random effects is no more than plus or minus 3 percentage points.

Source: GMF (2013), *Transatlantic Trends*, German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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Since 2007, non-employment rates have increased much more markedly among young people, men, and low-skilled workers than among women and older workers (Figure 1.3). The surge in non-employment, especially among youth and men, reflects a combination of increasing numbers of unemployed (those looking for jobs) and so-called labour-market inactive (including discouraged jobseekers who are no longer available for work or not actively looking)…

Figure 1.3. **Employment perspectives of youth and low-skilled deteriorated sharply during the crisis**

Change in the shares of people without work, by age group, sex and education level

Weighted OECD average, Q4 2007-Q4 2012, in percentage points



Note: "Low", "medium" and "high" refer to less than upper secondary, upper secondary, and tertiary education. OECD average refers to Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Source: OECD (2013), OECD *Employment Outlook*, *www.oecd.org/employment/outlook*. See also Chapter 4 "Employment" and Chapter 4 "Unemployment".

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The most commonly used statistics of labour-market difficulties refer to individuals rather than households. They therefore do not show how these individual labour-market problems translate into predicaments at the family level. Since 2007 the proportion of people living in households with no income from work has gone up in most countries, approximately doubling in Greece, Ireland and Spain and increasing by 20% or more in Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovenia, the United States (Figure 1.5). In debates on fiscal consolidation and other policy reforms, such households deserve special attention as they are particularly vulnerable and highly dependent on government support. With more than one in eight working-age individuals in most countries now living in workless households, the success of redistribution measures and active social policies is gauged to a large extent on whether they can improve economic security for families without any income from work…

Figure 1.5. **Very large increases in the number of workless households are a major test for social policies**

Shares of adults living in workless households, in percentages



Note: Households are defined as "workless" if all household members are either unemployed or labour-market inactive. "Adults" refers to individuals aged 15-64. Data for the United States are for 2013, not 2012.
Source: OECD estimates based on the European Union Labour Force Survey and the United States Current Population Survey.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932965953

What do these recent trends mean for longer-term inequality trends? Information from earlier downturns provides pointers as to the distributional mechanics which tend to be at work well into the recovery phase. Figure 1.6 offers just such a historical perspective on the income trends among low-, middle- and high-income households across earlier economic cycles. These trends are for market incomes that is, before adding social transfers or subtracting taxes. By focusing on market income, Figure 1.6 indicates the space that redistribution policies have to bridge if they are to stem widening gaps between household incomes after taxes and government transfers…

Figure 1.6. **Recessions widen income gaps, and recoveries often fail to close them**

Household market incomes for working-age households at different points in the income distribution

In constant prices. Earliest available data point = 100



Note: Initial income gaps between "low" and "high" incomes differ from country to country. Comparisons of the gaps should therefore be made over time, not across countries. Start of series varies due to data availability. Separate series in Canada and the United Kingdom indicate a break due to changing underlying data sources.

Households headed by a working-age individual aged between 15 and 64. "Low" and "high" incomes refer to the 10th (15th in the United Kingdom) and 90th percentiles of the distribution of household market incomes. "Low-growth years" are the bottom third years in terms of real growth between 1979 and 2005 in each country.

Household incomes are market incomes (government transfers are not added and taxes are not subtracted) and account for differences in household size (they are divided by the square root of the household size).

Source: Immervoll, H. and L. Richardson (2011), "Redistribution Policy and Inequality Reduction in OECD Countries: What Has Changed in Two Decades?", *OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper*, No. 122, OECD Publishing, Paris, *www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers*; *OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections* for annual growth data, *http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-00655-en*.

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While there are no internationally comparable statistics on food insecurity that are as detailed as those of the United States, some unofficial estimates indicate that growing numbers of families and children suffer from hunger or food insecurity in economically distressed countries. Some 10% of students in Greece fall into that category according to Alderman (2013). The Gallup World Poll includes a question on whether respondents feel that they have "enough money to afford food". Responses confirm that rising numbers of families in OECD countries may have less money to spend on food and a healthy diet. By contrast, while large shares of people in the large emerging economies feel that they cannot afford adequate nutrition, their numbers have mostly declined since 2007 (Figure 1.7)…

Figure 1.7. **Growing numbers of people feel they cannot afford food**

Percentage of survey respondents



Note: Share of "yes" responses to the question "Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to buy food that you or your family needed?".
Results are averaged over a two-year period to minimise the impact of year-on-year fluctuations.
2008 data for Iceland, Luxembourg and China instead of 2006-07; 2009 data for Switzerland (instead of 2011/12).
For measurement details and limitations of the Gallup World Poll, see Chapter 7.
Source: Gallup World Poll, *www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/en-us/worldpoll.aspx*.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932965991

General Context Indicators (Reproducción parcial)

Household income

In 2010 half of the people in Mexico had incomes of less than USD 4.500. Half of the people in Luxembourg had incomes about eight times higher (Figure 3.1, Panel A). Countries with low household income included countries in Southern Europe, Turkey and much of Eastern Europe, as well as two Latin American countries -Chile and Mexico. Those with higher household incomes included Norway and Switzerland.

In most OECD countries incomes from work and capital (i.e. market income) fell considerably between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 3.1, Panel B). Higher unemployment and lower real wages brought down household market income, particularly in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and Spain (5% or more per year). By contrast, market income increased significantly in Chile and Poland as well as to a lower extent in Austria, Germany and the Slovak Republic. On average, between 2007 and 2010, real household disposable income declined by much less than the market income (-0.5%), thanks to the effect of public cash transfers and personal income taxes. At the same time, incomes from work and capital fell by 2% per year.

3.1. Household income of OECD countries varies between USD 4 500 and USD 36 400



Figure 3.2 focuses on the top and bottom 10% of the population. While on average across OECD countries real average household disposable income and the average income of the top 10% remained almost stable, the income of the bottom 10% fell by 2% per year over the period 2007 to 2010.

Out of the 33 countries where data are available, the top 10% has done better than the poorest 10% in 21 countries. This pattern was particularly strong in some of the countries where household income decreased the most. In Italy and Spain, while the income of the top 10% remained broadly stable, the average income of the poorest 10% in 2010 was much lower than in 2007. Incomes of poorer households also fell by more than 5% annually in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland and Mexico. Among these countries, Iceland was the only one where the decrease in average annual income at the top (-13%) exceeded that of the bottom (-8%).



Figure notes: Figures 3.1, Panel B and 3.2: 2007 refers to 2006 for Chile and Japan. 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States. 2010 refers to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland and Turkey. 2011 for Chile.

Self-sufficiency indicators -ELF- (Reproducción parcial)

Employment

Access to paid work is crucial for people's ability to support themselves. On average, two out of three working age adults in the OECD area are employed (Figure 4.1, Panel A). In Iceland and Switzerland about eight out of ten are employed, compared to about one out of two in Greece and Turkey. Gender differences in employment rates are small in the Nordic countries, but such differences tend to be largest in Chile, Korea, Mexico and Turkey.

The economic crisis has had a large impact on the employment rates in many countries (Figure 4.1, Panel B). On average, the employment rate declined by 1 percentage point in the OECD area from mid-2007 to mid-2013, but the variation across countries is large. While the rates dropped by 10 or more percentage points in Greece and Spain; Chile, Israel and Turkey experienced an increase of 5 or more percentage points over the same period.

Women have improved their relative position in the labour market compared to men (Figure 4.1, Panel B). Only in Estonia, Korea and Poland, was the change in the employment rate the same for both sexes. In spite of this relatively more favourable development for women, the long-term increasing trend in female employment rates came to a halt in OECD countries after the onset of the crisis.

4.1. The economic crisis has had a large impact on the employment rates in many countries



While employment has dropped, part-time work has increased in many countries. Even if these people avoid unemployment, the consequence for many of them is under-employment and reduced incomes. Involuntary part time as a share of total employment has increased substantially in Ireland, Italy and Spain following the onset of the crisis (Figure 4.2). The increase has been strongest for women, where involuntary part-time reached about 14% of total employment in Italy and Spain in 2012. But also in Australia and Ireland, about 10% of women worked involuntarily in part-time jobs. For men, the share of involuntary part-time was about 5% in Ireland and Spain in 2012.

Immigrants' employment thus seems to be more sensitive to economic conditions than that of the natives. On average, the change in employment rates for the foreign-born between 2007 and 2012 was approximately the same as for the native-born (Figure 4.3).This, however, hides large differences across countries. In those countries which experienced the sharpest drop in employment rates of the native-born (Greece, Ireland and Spain), foreign-born fared even worse than the natives. In contrast, in countries with increasing employment rates, such as Germany, there was a larger increase in the employment rates of the foreign-born than among the natives.

Figure notes: Figure 4.1: Panel A: Data for the Russian Federation are annual and refer to 2012. Data for Mexico refer to Q1 2013. Panel B: Data for South Africa refer to Q1 2007. Figure 4.2: Data for Switzerland refer to 2010 instead of 2012. Countries are ranked in increasing order of the percentage

point change of the total population. Figure 4.3: Data refer to 2008 instead of 2007 for Canada, Germany and Ireland; and to Q2 2007 for Switzerland.

4.2. Involuntary part-time work increased during the crisis

Percentage point change in the share of involuntary part-timers in total employment between 2007 and 2012



4.3. Immigrants' employment seems to be more sensitive to economic conditions than that of the natives in some countries

Percentage point change in the employment rates of the native-born and foreign-born population between 2007 and 2012, 15-64



Source: OECD calculations based on quarterly national labour force surveys, the OECD *Short-Term Labour Market Statistics* and the OECD *Labour Force Statistics Databases* (cut-off date: 8 October 2013), OECD *Employment Outlook 2013* (*www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdemploymentoutlook.htm*) and *International Migration Outlook 2013* (*www.oecd.org/els/mig/imo2013.htm*).

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Unemployment

Record high unemployment rates in a number of countries have put stress on the benefit systems (see "Recipients of out-of-work benefits" indicator). Unemployment, and particularly long-term unemployment, may also harm career chances in the future, reduce life satisfaction and increase social costs. Establishment in the labour market for youth has become more difficult, while older unemployed often have problems re-entering the workforce.

During the second quarter of 2013, the highest unemployment rates in the OECD were in Greece and Spain - eight times higher than the lowest unemployment rate, in Korea (Figure 4.4, Panel A). The average unemployment rate of 9.1% in the OECD covers a wide diversity. Austria, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland had an unemployment rate below 5%. As many as ten countries had an unemployment rate above 10%.

The economic crisis has had a strong, but varied impact on unemployment rates (Figure 4.4, Panel B). The average OECD unemployment rate increased by 3 percentage points between mid-2007 and mid-2013. Greece and Spain were hit particularly hard, seeing an increase of above 18 percentage points. Increases of more than 5 percentage points were also observed in Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. Countries which succeeded

in reducing their unemployment rates included Chile, Germany, Israel, Korea and Turkey.



In most countries, male unemployment has been more affected by the crisis than female unemployment. The gender difference is particularly strong in countries such as Ireland, Portugal and Spain, where the contraction of the construction industry is a major factor driving the increased unemployment. High representation of women in the public sector can also be one explanation why women have fared better than men during the crisis in many countries. However, women in Estonia, Luxembourg and Turkey had a stronger increase in the unemployment rates than men.

Long-term unemployment has increased in many countries. The share of people unemployed for one year or more as a percentage of the total unemployment has increased the most in Ireland, Spain and the United States (Figure 4.5), and by as much as 30 percentage points in Ireland. Mid-2013, six out of ten unemployed were out of work for one year or more in Greece, Ireland and the Slovak Republic. The share of long-term unemployed decreased by 10 percentage points or more in Germany and Poland. In spite of the positive achievements, long-term unemployment still accounts for more than 40% of total unemployment in Germany and Poland.

Youth have been hit particularly hard by the deteriorated labour market situation (see also the "NEETs'" indicator). The unemployment rate for young people aged 15-24 increased by 20 percentage points or more from mid-2007 to mid-2013 in Greece, Portugal and Spain (Figure 4.6). At the OECD level, the rate increased by 7 percentage points during the same period. Mid-2013, more than 50% of the age group was out of work in Greece and Spain. At the other end of the scale, youth unemployment rates dropped in Austria, Chile, Germany, Israel and Turkey. Germany, Japan and Switzerland had mid-2013 the lowest unemployment rate for this age group, at about 7%...

4.5. Higher incidence of long-term unemployment since the begining of the crisis

Percentage point change in the share of people unemployed for one year or more as a percentage of total unemployment between 2007 and Q2 2013



4.6. Unemployment hit youth hardest in most countries

Percentage point change in unemployment rates between 2007 and Q2 2013



Source: OECD calculations based on quarterly national labour force surveys, the OECD *Short-Term Labour Market Statistics* and the OECD *Labour Force Statistics Databases* (cut-off date: 8 October 2013).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932966390

Equity indicators (Reproducción parcial)

Income inequality

Income inequality is an indicator of how material resources are distributed across society. Some people consider that high levels of income inequality are morally undesirable. Others regard income inequality as harmful for instrumental reasons - seeing it as causing conflict, limiting co-operation or creating psychological and

physical health stresses (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009). Often the policy concern is focused more on the direction of change of inequality, rather than its level.

Income inequality varied considerably across the OECD countries in 2010 (Figure 5.1, Panel A). The Gini coefficient ranges from 0.24 in Iceland to approximately twice that value in Chile and Mexico. The Nordic and central European countries have the lowest inequality in disposable income while inequality is high in Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey and the United States. Alternative indicators of income inequality suggest similar rankings. The gap between the average income of the richest and the poorest 10% of the population was almost 10 to 1 on average across OECD countries in 2010, ranging from 5 to 1 in Denmark, Iceland and Slovenia to almost six times larger (29 to 1) in Mexico.

Keeping measurement-related differences in mind, emerging countries have higher levels of income inequality than OECD countries, particularly in Brazil and South Africa. Comparable data from the early 1990s suggest that inequality increased in Asia, decreased in Latin America and remained very high in South Africa.

The distribution of income from work and capital (market income, pre-taxes and transfers) widened considerably during the first phase of the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, market income inequality rose by 1 percentage point or more in 18 OECD countries (markers in Figure 5.1, Panel B). The increase was particularly large in Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Japan and Spain, but also in France and Slovenia. On the other hand, market income inequality fell in Poland and, to a smaller extent, in the Netherlands.

The distribution of income that households "take home" (disposable income, post-taxes and transfers) remained unchanged on average, due to the effect of cash public transfers and personal taxes. Between 2007 and 2010, the Gini coefficient for disposable income remained broadly stable in most OECD countries (bars in Figure 5.1, Panel B). It fell the most in Iceland, New Zealand, Poland and Portugal, and increased the most in France, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. Overall, the welfare state prevented inequality from going from bad to worse during the first phase of the crisis.

Income inequality increased especially at the top of the distribution: the share of pre-tax income of the top 1% earners more than doubled their share from 1985 to 2010 in the United Kingdom and the United States (Figure 5.2). In Spain and Sweden, the data show a clear upward trend albeit less marked than in English-speaking countries. The upward tendency is also less marked in France, Japan and most continental European countries. Overall, the economic 2007/08 crisis has brought about a fall in top income shares in many countries, but this fall appears to be of a temporary nature.

Figure notes: Figure 5.1: Gini coefficients refer to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key partners are for 2008/09. Gini coefficients are based on equivalized incomes for OECD countries and the Russian Federation and per capita incomes for all key partners except India and Indonesia for which per capita consumption was used.

5.1. Large differences in levels of income inequality and market income inequality rose considerably during the first years of the crisis



5.2. Top 1% income share differs widely over time and across OECD countries

Share of pre-tax income going to top 1% earners



Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/inequality.htm), except top 1% income shares from World Top Incomes Database.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932966466

Poverty

Poverty rates measure the share of people at the bottom end of the income distribution. Often a society's equity concerns are greater for the relatively disadvantaged. Thus poverty measures generally receive more attention than income inequality measures, with greater concerns for certain groups like older people and children, since they have no or limited options for working their way out of poverty.

The average OECD relative poverty rate in 2010 was 11% for the OECD (Figure 5.3, Panel A). Poverty rates were highest at above 20% in Israel and Mexico, while poverty in the Czech Republic and Denmark affected only about one in 20 people. Anglophone and Mediterranean countries and Chile, Japan and Korea have relatively high poverty rates.

The initial phase of the crisis had a limited impact on relative income poverty (i.e. the share of people living with less than half the median income in their country annually). Between 2007 and 2010, poverty increased by more than 1 percentage point only in Italy, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Turkey (bars in Figure 5.3, Panel B). Over the same period, it fell in Chile, Estonia, Portugal and the United Kingdom, while changes were below 1 percentage point in the other OECD countries.

By using an indicator which measures poverty against a benchmark "anchored" to half the median real incomes observed in 2005 (i.e. keeping constant the value of the 2005 poverty line), recent increases in income poverty are much higher than suggested by "relative" income poverty. This is particularly the case in Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Mexico and Spain ("diamond" symbols in Figure 5.3, Panel B). While relative poverty did not increase much or even fell in these countries, "anchored" poverty increased by 2 percentage points or more between 2007 and 2010, reflecting disposable income losses of poorer households in those countries. Only in Belgium, Germany, Israel and Poland did "anchored" poverty fall at the same time as relative poverty stagnated or increased.

Households with children and youth were hit particularly hard during the crisis. Between 2007 and 2010, average relative income poverty in OECD countries rose from 12.8 to 13.4% among children (0-18) and from 12.2 to 13.8% among youth (18-25). Meanwhile, relative income poverty fell from 15.1 to 12.5% among the elderly. This pattern confirms the trends described in previous OECD studies, with youth and children replacing the elderly as the group at greater risk of income poverty across the OECD countries.

Since 2007, child poverty increased considerably in 16 OECD countries, with increases exceeding 2 percentage points in Belgium, Hungary, Italy Slovenia, Spain and Turkey (Figure 5.4). On the other hand, child poverty fell by more than 2 percentage points in Portugal and the United Kingdom. At the same time, youth poverty increased considerably in 19 OECD countries.

In contrast to other age groups, the elderly have been relatively immune to rises in relative income poverty during the crisis. In the three years prior to 2010, poverty among the elderly fell in 20 out of 32 countries, and increased by 2 percentage points or more only in Canada, Korea, Poland and Turkey. This partly reflects the fact that old

age pensions were less affected by the recession. In many countries (at least until 2010), pensions were largely exempted from the cuts implemented as part of fiscal consolidation.

Figure notes: Figures 5.3 and 5.4: Data refer to 2009 for Hungary, Japan, New Zealand and Turkey, and 2011 for Chile instead of 2010, and to 2006 for Chile and Japan, 2008 for Australia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United States instead of 2007. Data for Switzerland are not available for 2007. Latest data for key partners are for 2008/09, changes are not available.

5.3. Large differences in levels of relative poverty and the evolution of poverty differs if the threshold is "anchored" at the time of the crisis



5.4. Poverty rose among children and youth and fell among the elderly

Percentage point changes in relative poverty rates between 2007 and 2010 by age group



Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm).

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Living on benefits

Most OECD countries operate transfer programmes that aim at preventing extreme hardship and employ a low income criterion as the central entitlement condition. These guaranteed minimum-income benefits (GMI) provide financial support for low-income families and aim to ensure an acceptable standard of living. As such, they play a crucial role as last-resort safety nets, especially during prolonged economic downturns when long-term unemployment rises and increasing numbers of people exhaust their entitlements for unemployment benefits.

In a large majority of OECD countries, incomes for the long-term unemployed are much lower than for the recently unemployed (Figure 5.6). Making GMI benefits more accessible is key to maintaining a degree of income security for the long-term unemployed. In addition, rising numbers of people who have neither a job nor an unemployment benefit means that the generosity of GMI benefits is likely to receive more public attention.

5.6. In most countries, benefit incomes decline significantly for people with long unemployment spells

Overall net replacement rates: Net income while out of work in percentage of net income in work, 2011



Source: OECD Tax-Benefit Models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932966504

Benefits of last resort are sometimes significantly lower than commonly used poverty thresholds (Figure 5.5). Poverty avoidance or alleviation is primary objectives of GMI programmes. When comparing benefit generosity across countries, a useful starting point is to look at benefit levels relative to commonly used poverty thresholds.

The gap between benefit levels and poverty thresholds is very large in some countries. In a few countries there is no generally applicable GMI benefit (Greece, Italy and Turkey). For GMI recipients living in rented accommodation, housing-related cash benefits can provide significant further income assistance, bringing overall family incomes close to or somewhat above the poverty line (Denmark, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom). However, family incomes in these cases depend strongly on the type of housing, the rent paid and also on the family situation. In all countries, income from sources other than public transfers is needed to avoid substantial poverty risks.

On average across OECD countries, GMI benefit levels have changed little since the onset of the economic and financial crisis. The real value of these benefits was largely the same in 2011 as in 2007. Most countries, including those with significant fiscal consolidation programmes, have so far not reduced benefit levels for the poorest. However, at the same time, countries that were especially hard-hit by the crisis and where GMI were non-existent or very low, have not taken major measures to strengthen benefit adequacy (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United States).

5.5. Minimum-income benefits alone cannot typically prevent income poverty

Net income level provided by cash minimum-income benefit, including housing assistance or not, in percentage of median household income



Social spending

In 2012-13, public social spending averaged an estimated 21.9% of GDP across the 34 OECD countries (Figure 5.7, Panel A). In general, public spending is high in continental and northern European countries, while it is below the OECD average in most countries in Eastern Europe and outside Europe. Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France spent more than 30% of GDP on social expenditures. By contrast, Korea and Mexico spent less than 10% of GDP. Social spending in the emerging economies in the late 2000s was lower than the OECD average, ranging from around 2% in Indonesia to about 15-16% in Brazil and the Russian Federation (Figure 5.7, Panel A).

Public social spending in per cent of GDP increased in all OECD countries with the exception of Hungary from 2007-08 to 2012-13 (Figure 5.7, Panel B). The growth fully took place during the period 2007-08, as a response to increased unemployment and other consequences of the economic crisis. In this initial phase, Estonia and Ireland had the strongest increase in expenditure shares. From 2009-10 to 2012-13, fiscal consolidation reduced public social spending. Nearly two-thirds of the OECD countries reduced social spending in this period. The real drop in public social spending in some countries is larger than indicated by change in the shares of GDP, since the level of GDP also fell. Indeed in some countries, the rise of the ratio of public social spending in GDP is explained largely by the fact that GDP declined.

5.7. Social expenditure increased during the crisis



On average in the OECD, pensions, health services and income support to the working-age population and other social services each amount to roughly one-third of the total expenditures. In a majority of OECD countries, pensions are the largest expenditure area (Figure 5.8). In Anglophone countries and most other countries outside of Europe, health dominates public social expenditure. In a few countries, such as Denmark, Ireland and Norway, the largest share is devoted to income support of the working age population.

Accounting for the impact of taxation and private social benefits (Figure 5.8) leads to a convergence of spending to- GDP ratios across countries. Net total social spending is 22-28% of GDP in many countries. It is even higher for the United States at 29% of GDP, where the amount of private social spending and tax incentives is much larger than in other countries.

In Europe, people seem to be most satisfied with the health care provisions and less satisfied with the pension provisions, unemployment benefits and the way inequality and poverty are addressed (Figure 5.9). Satisfaction with health care provisions is highest in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with pension provisions is highest in Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and lowest in Greece and Poland. Satisfaction with how inequality and poverty are addressed is in general quite low…

Figure notes: Figure 5.7, Panel A: Data refer to 2009 for Turkey, 2010 for Japan, 2012 for Chile, Korea, and Mexico and to the last years available for key partners. Figure 5.8: Income support to the working-age population refers to cash benefits towards incapacity, family, unemployment and other social policy areas. Data for Israel concern public social spending only. Total net social expenditure data are not available for Hungary, Greece, Switzerland and Turkey. Data for Switzerland refer to 2008



Source: OECD Social Expenditures Database (SOCX); OECD Employment Outlook 2013; Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA), Brazil; Asian Development Bank (ADB-SPI); World Health Organization (WHO); European Commission (2012) (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932966523

Social cohesion indicators (Reproducción parcial)

Life satisfaction

Life satisfaction is determined not only by economic development, but also by people's diverse experiences and living conditions. People in Norway and Switzerland are most satisfied with their lives (Figure 7.1, Panel A). The measured level in these countries was 3 steps higher than in Hungary, the country at the bottom of the 11-step ladder in 2012.

There are broad regional or cultural country groupings of life satisfaction. Four of the top five countries are Nordic. Continental Western and Eastern European OECD members are not particularly satisfied with their lives, with the notable exceptions of Switzerland and, to a lesser extent, Austria and the Netherlands. Predominantly Anglophone OECD countries are all in the top half of the list when measuring life satisfaction, and follow in a tight group after the predominately Nordic top cluster.

Life satisfaction deteriorated during the first years of the crisis between 2007 and 2012, particularly in European Mediterranean countries. Indeed life satisfaction dropped mostly in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, followed by the United States (Figure 7.1, Panel B). On the other hand, life satisfaction improved most in non-European countries, in Chile and Mexico, and to a lesser extent in Nordic and Eastern European countries.

Life satisfaction levels for men and women across OECD countries are highly correlated (Figure 7.2). In countries where life satisfaction is high, both men and women tend to have higher life satisfaction than in countries where the levels are lower. On average across OECD countries, women report slightly higher levels of life satisfaction than men do.

On average, the level of life satisfaction decreases with age (Figure 7.3). Beyond the OECD average, life satisfaction is "u-shaped" in some countries, increasing from about the age of 55. It is not surprising to see that on average 25-34 year-olds (entering the labour market) and 50+ (leaving the labour market) reported lower levels of life satisfaction in 2012 than in 2007. According to related data for Europe, groups who tended to see the greatest deterioration in incomes and labour-market prospects are more likely to have low levels of subjective well-being.

As for emerging economies, life satisfaction also varies between them, from above 6 in Argentina, Brazil and Saudi Arabia, to below 5 in India and South Africa. Between 2007 and 2012, it increased in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, China, Indonesia and the Russian Federation), and it decreased in three countries (India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa).

Figure notes: Figure 7.1: Data refer to 2011 for Chile instead of 2012; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic and Slovenia, average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Norway and Portugal, and 2008 for Iceland and Luxembourg.
Figures 7.2 and 7.3: Data refer to 2011 for Brazil and Chile and 2009 for Switzerland; and instead of 2007: 2006 for Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland; average between 2006 and 2008 for Austria, Finland, France, Ireland, Norway, Portugal; 2008 for Iceland and Portugal; and 2009 for Luxembourg.

7.1. Life satisfaction varies across countries and deteriorated in several European OECD countries during the crisis



7.2. Women report slightly higher levels of life satisfaction on average across OECD countries



Source: Gallup World Poll (www.gallup.com).

7.3. Life satisfaction decreases with age on average, despite an increase from 55 years and more in some countries



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Confidence in institutions

A cohesive society is one where citizens have confidence in national-level institutions and believe that social and economic institutions are not prey to corruption. Confidence and corruption issues are dimensions which are strongly related to societal trust.

Confidence in the national government is generally high in Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, while it is low in the Czech Republic, Greece and Japan. Large differences can be observed across countries (Figure 7.7, Panel A).

In a majority of OECD countries, trust in national governments declined from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.7, Panel B). The decline was particularly large in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia, all countries hit hard by the crisis. However, other countries experienced a substantial increase in trust, notably Israel, the Slovak Republic and Switzerland.

Youth tended to have more trust in national governments than the total population, and their confidence declined less from 2007 to 2012. This could be the consequence of less political involvement, but also that youth are more optimistic about the future.

The economic crisis from 2008 was closely related to the crisis in the financial sector. In most OECD countries, confidence in financial institutions fell from 2007 to 2012 (Figure 7.8). Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United States experienced the most substantial drops in confidence. Only in Iceland, Japan and Norway can a positive change be observed.

Corruption can be a sign of the degree of informality and distrust in the economy. Countries which suffered the biggest declines in GDP from 2007 to 2012 were also among those where corruption had increased (Figure 7.9). Increase in corruption was particularly high in countries such as Estonia, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. These

countries also saw a stronger decline in confidence in the national government. Lower levels of corruption could be seen particularly in Australia, Germany, Japan and Mexico.

Among the emerging economies, confidence in national governments increased in Brazil, Indonesia and the Russian Federation, while it declined in India and South Africa. While confidence in financial institutions in general declined in the OECD countries, it increased in Argentina, Indonesia, the Russian Federation and Saudi Arabia.

Figure notes: Figure 7.7: No data available for change in China.
Figure 7.9: No data available for change in Slovenia and Switzerland.



7.8. Confidence in financial institutions declined

Percentage points change between 2007 and 2012



7.9. Countries which suffered the biggest declines in GDP from 2007 to 2012 were also among those where corruption had increased

Percentage points variation in the corruption index between 2007 and 2012



Source: Gallup World Poll (*www.gallup.com*); OECD Economic Outlook 2013, No. 93 (*www.oecd.org/eco/outlook*).

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932966694

Del Paper **- Los daños causados por la crisis ya abarcan "tres generaciones" (abuelos-pensionistas, padres-trabajadores o parados, e hijos-empobrecidos y sin futuro) (Parte II)**, publicado el 15/1/16

Anexo: Informes de Organismos Internacionales sobre pensiones, salarios y niñez

- Pensions at a Glance 2013 - OECD and G20 indicators

(…)

5.4. Income poverty rates

Percentage with incomes less than 50% of median equivalised household disposable income

	2007				2010			
	Older people (aged over 65)			Whole population	Older people (aged over 65)			Whole population
	All 65+	66-75	75+		All 65+	66-75	75+	
Australia	39.2	35.2	44.7	14.6	35.5	31.2	41.5	14.4
Austria	9.9	9.0	11.2	7.2	11.3	11.1	11.5	8.1
Belgium	13.5	12.0	15.4	9.1	11.0	10.9	11.2	9.7
Canada	5.0	5.4	4.5	11.3	7.2	6.9	7.6	11.9
Chile	21.6	21.3	22.1	19.2	19.8	20.0	19.5	18.0
Czech Republic	3.6	3.2	4.2	5.4	3.7	3.4	4.0	5.8
Denmark	12.1	9.3	15.8	6.1	8.0	5.7	11.2	6.0
Estonia	29.5	24.6	36.7	13.9	6.7	4.6	9.5	11.7
Finland	13.0	7.7	19.4	8.0	9.7	6.1	14.0	7.3
France	5.3	3.6	6.8	7.2	5.4	4.5	6.3	7.9
Germany	10.1	8.1	13.0	8.5	10.5	8.5	13.3	8.8
Greece	15.2	11.5	20.7	13.9	15.8	13.2	19.1	14.3
Hungary	4.7	5.1	4.3	6.4	1.6	2.2	0.7	6.8
Iceland	9.4	5.0	14.5	6.5	3.0	0.7	6.0	6.4
Ireland	13.4	12.4	14.7	9.8	8.0	6.9	9.6	9.0
Israel	22.1	21.1	23.4	19.9	20.8	20.1	21.7	20.9
Italy	14.5	14.1	15.0	12.0	11.0	10.5	11.7	13.0
Japan	21.7	19.4	24.5	15.7	19.4	16.6	22.8	16.0
Korea	44.6	43.2		14.8	47.2	45.6		15.2
Luxembourg	2.7	2.6	2.8	7.2	1.9	1.4	2.8	7.2
Mexico	29.0	28.4	30.1	21.0	27.6	26.7	29.1	20.4
Netherlands	1.6	1.6	1.7	6.7	1.4	1.3	1.6	7.5
New Zealand	23.5	19.7	29.3	11.0	12.5	10.2	15.8	10.3
Norway	8.0	4.0	12.6	7.8	5.5	2.7	9.0	7.5
Poland	7.7	8.6	6.4	10.1	9.7	11.2	7.7	11.0
Portugal	15.2	12.6	18.7	13.6	9.9	7.6	12.6	11.4
Slovak Republic	7.2	6.6	8.1	6.7	4.3	3.5	5.7	7.8
Slovenia	17.5	15.1	21.1	8.2	16.7	13.1	22.0	9.2
Spain	20.6	17.4	24.2	13.7	12.5	11.6	13.4	15.4
Sweden	9.9	5.9	15.1	8.4	9.5	6.3	14.2	9.1
Switzerland					21.8	19.4	25.8	9.5
Turkey	13.7	13.9	13.1	17.0	17.6	15.9	20.7	19.3
United Kingdom	12.2	9.9	14.9	11.3	8.6	7.0	10.5	10.0
United States	22.2	18.9	26.3	17.3	19.9	16.4	24.3	17.4
OECD	**15.1**	**13.2**	**16.7**	**11.2**	**12.8**	**11.3**	**13.8**	**11.3**

Source: OECD Income Distribution Database; OECD (2008), Table 5.3.

StatLink http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932907775

- Global Wage Report 2014/15 - Wages and income inequality - OIT - December 2014

Figure 1 Annual average economic growth, 1995–2013 (GDP in constant prices)



Note: Country groups are those used by the IMF as described in the appendix of the IMF's *World Economic Outlook*, Apr. 2014.
Source: IMF, *World Economic Outlook* database, Apr. 2014. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

The global economy contracted sharply between 2007 and 2009, quickly recovered in 2010, but subsequently decelerated (figure 1). While growth rates after 2010 declined across the globe, they remained much higher in emerging and developing economies than in advanced economies…

How have recent economic trends been reflected in average real wages? Figure 2 provides two estimates. The first is a global estimate based on wage data for 130 economies using the methodology described in Appendix I and the Global Wage Database. The second is also a global estimate, but omits China because of its large size (in terms of number of wage earners) and high real wage growth, which remained in double digits for most of the 2000s and accounted for much of the global wage growth. As can be seen from figure 2, global real wage growth dropped sharply during the crisis in 2008 and 2009, recovered somewhat in 2010 and then decelerated again. It has yet to rebound to its pre-crisis rates…

Figure 2 Annual average global real wage growth, 2006–13

Note: Global wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real wages in 130 countries, covering 95.8 per cent of all employees in the world (for a description of the methodology, see Appendix I).
Source: ILO Global Wage Database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 3 shows estimates for the G20 as a whole and for its developed as well as its emerging members. Together, the countries of the G20 produce about three-quarters of world GDP and employ more than 1 billion of the world's 1.5 billion paid employees…

Figure 3 Annual average real wage growth in the G20, 2006–13



Note: The estimate for the G20 uses the methodology specified in Appendix I, but is restricted to 18 out of 19 individual countries for which data are available (Argentina identified some inconsistencies in its wage series for some years and has been excluded).

Source: ILO Global Wage Database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Looking at developed economies, it is apparent from figure 4 that the growth rates of average real wages have tended to fluctuate within a low and narrow range since 2006. This pattern has become particularly pronounced in 2012 and 2013, years of virtually flat wages, contributing in the current low inflation environment to concerns about possible risks of deflation…

Figure 4 Annual average real wage growth in developed economies, 2006–13

Note: Wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real wages in 36 countries (for a description of the methodology, see Appendix I).

Source: ILO Global Wage Database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 5 looks at the individual developed economy members in the G20, which represent the largest developed economies in the world. It shows the variety that exists within the overall trend depicted in figure 4. In France and the United States, average wages are consistent with the pattern shown in figure 4, having been relatively stagnant, with only minor fluctuations. However, Australia and Canada show more positive growth in average wages partially attributed by some to their natural-resource based growth during a boom in commodities (Downes, Hanslow and Tulip, 2014; Statistics Canada, 2014). Conversely, notable declines are observed in Italy and the United Kingdom, where the deep recession was accompanied by an unprecedented period of falling real wages. According to the Low Pay Commission, British wages fell more sharply than at any time since records began in 1964 (Low Pay Commission, 2014)…

Figure 5 Average real wage index for developed G20 countries, 2007–13



Source: ILO Global Wage Database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 6 shows the extent to which wages changed in selected European countries most affected by the crisis. Most striking is the large decline in Greek wages, resulting in part from a series of specific policy measures, including a 22 per cent cut in the minimum wage for unskilled workers aged 25 and over and a 32 per cent cut for those under 25 in 2012. Collective bargaining was also decentralized, with priority given to enterprise-level agreements in cases of conflict with higher-level agreements, which tended to facilitate downward wage adjustments (ILO, 2014a)…

Are differences in wage trends across countries a product of differences in labour productivity growth? Figure 7 shows the relationship between wages and productivity from 1999 to 2013 in the group of developed economies where labour productivity refers to GDP (output) per worker. This definition captures how productively labour is used to generate output, but also captures the contribution to output of other elements such as changes in hours worked, changes in the skill composition of labour, and the contribution of capital. While other measures of productivity exist, labour productivity as defined here is used by the ILO as a decent work indicator, and is the only one readily available for all countries up to and including 2013.

Figure 7 shows that after a narrowing of the gap during the depth of the crisis between 2008 and 2009, labour productivity has continued to outstrip real wage growth in this group of countries. Even when changes in real wages are calculated using not the CPI but the GDP deflator, the trend presented in figure 7 persists…

Figure 6 Average real wage index for selected European countries most affected by the crisis, 2007–13



Source: ILO Global Wage Database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 7 Trends in growth in average wages and labour productivity in developed economies (index), 1999–2013



Note: Wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real wages in 36 economies (for a description of the methodology, see Appendix I). Index is based to 1999 because of data availability.
Sources: ILO Global Wage Database; ILO *Trends Econometric Models*, Apr. 2014. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Since wages represent only one component of labour costs, it may be more appropriate to compare gains in labour productivity with increases in average compensation per employee (as opposed to wages). Compensation of employees includes wages and salaries payable in cash or in kind and social insurance contributions payable by employers (CEC, IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, 2009, para. 7.42).

To address this argument, figure 8 compares the change in labour productivity with the changes in average real wages and in average real compensation per employee; as can be seen, the gap still persists…

Figure 8 Labour productivity, real wages and estimated real compensation per employee in developed economies (indices), 1999–2013



Note: Wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real wages in 33 economies (for a description of the methodology, see Appendix I). Iceland, Israel and Malta were excluded from this figure for reasons of data availability; these three countries collectively contribute less than 1 per cent of the total employees in developed economies. Index is based to 1999 because of data availability.
Sources: ILO Global Wage Database; ILO *Trends Econometric Models*, Apr. 2014; IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, Apr. 2014; European Commission AMECO database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

The overall picture for developed economies is strongly influenced by the largest economies in the group, in particular Germany, Japan and the United States. Figure 9 shows the relationship between productivity and real compensation per employee (as opposed to real wages) for selected developed economies between 1999 and 2013, using both the CPI and the GDP deflator. Real labour compensation per employee is used instead of wages since it is more closely linked to trends in the labour income share. In several countries, labour productivity grew faster than labour compensation. However, in the cases of France and the United Kingdom they grew fairly closely in line, while in Australia, Canada and Italy the relationship between real compensation per employee and labour productivity growth, during this particular period, depends on the deflator used…

Figure 9 Estimated real labour compensation per employee and labour productivity growth in the largest developed economies, deflated by the CPI and GDP deflator, 1999–2013



Sources: European Commission AMECO database; IMF, *World Economic Outlook*, Apr. 2014; ILO *Trends Econometric Models*, Apr. 2014. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 10 shows how the labour income share has changed since 1991 in the developed G20 countries. The unadjusted labour income only includes compensation of employees, whereas the adjusted labour income share used in figure 10 makes an adjustment to account for the self-employed as well. In Canada (and also in Australia), part of the decline is tied to the rise in commodity prices; profits in the mining, oil and gas sectors in Canada doubled between 2000 and 2006 (Sharpe, Arsenault and Harrison, 2008; Rao, Sharpe and Smith, 2005). In Japan, the decline is attributable in part to labour market reforms in the mid-1990s, when more industries were allowed to hire non-regular workers; the consequent influx of non-regular workers, who often earned less than regular workers, contributed to the stagnation of wages over time (Sommer, 2009; Agnese and Sala, 2011). In France, the labour income share remained relatively stable. In Italy and the United Kingdom, the trend is unclear: while the labour income share declined in the early part of the 1990s, since then wages and productivity have grown at a similar pace. In the United Kingdom, the Low Pay Commission has estimated that employees' compensation and productivity have grown at more or less the same rate since 1964 (Low Pay Commission, 2014). In Italy, one factor contributing to the decline in the labour income share at the beginning of the 1990s was a set of labour market reforms that changed the wage bargaining system to curb wage growth (Lucidi and Kleinknecht, 2010). In Germany, after years of wage moderation, the labour income share has partly recovered in recent years.

Turning to European countries most affected by the crisis, figure 11 points to the large decline in the Greek labour income share, to the sharp reversals of wage shares in the Irish labour market, and to the continuously falling labour income share in Spain since 2009…

Figure 10 Adjusted labour income share in developed G20 countries, 1991–2013



Note: Adjusted wage share, total economy, as a percentage of GDP at current market prices (compensation per employee as a percentage of GDP at market prices per person employed).
Source: European Commission AMECO database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 11 Adjusted labour income share in selected European countries most affected by the crisis, 1991–2013



Note: Adjusted wage share, total economy, as a percentage of GDP at current market prices (compensation per employee as a percentage of GDP at market prices per person employed).
Source: European Commission AMECO database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

In emerging and developing economies, data constraints make it difficult to compare wage and labour productivity trends. In addition, labour productivity refers to output per worker, while wages refer only to a subcategory of the working population, namely employees. Employees typically represent about 85 per cent of employment in developed countries, but in emerging and developing economies this proportion is often much lower, and changes more rapidly (see figure 14). For this reason, a more appropriate comparison in this group of countries would be between wages and the labour productivity of employees only. Unfortunately, such data are generally not available. All of these issues create some uncertainty in analyses related to wages and productivity in emerging and developing economies. As a result, subsequent analyses for this group of countries focus only on levels and trends in the labour income share, for which data are more widely available…

Figure 14 Employees as a share of total employment, 1999 and 2013



Source: ILO *Trends Econometric Models*, Apr. 2014. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

The persistent difference in wages between developed economies and emerging and developing economies across the world is evident from figure 19, which shows the shape of the world distribution of average wages if the abovementioned differences between countries' wage data are disregarded and country wages in local currency are converted to purchasing power parity dollars (PPP$), which capture the difference in the cost of living between countries.[19] The difference in wage levels between the emerging and developing economies (on the left side of the distribution) and the developed economies (on the right) is quite substantial. For instance, the average wage in the United States, measured in PPP$,

is more than triple that in China. However, the figure also shows that the difference in wage levels is decreasing over time. Between 2000 (the red line) and 2012 (the blue line) the wage distribution shifts to the right and becomes more compressed; this implies that in real terms average wages grew across the world, but they grew by much more in emerging and developing economies. This is consistent with trends in average real wage growth presented in section 3 of this report. The average wage in developed economies in 2013 lies at around US$ (PPP) 3.000 compared to an average wage in emerging and developing economies of about US$ (PPP) 1.000. The estimated world average monthly wage is about US$ (PPP) 1.600…

Figure 19 Global average monthly wage distribution in 2000 and 2012 (2012 PPP$)



Note: Refers to countries for which wage levels for 2000 and 2012 are available, and covers 83 countries which represent 73 per cent of the world's employees. Wage levels have been converted to constant 2012 PPP$: PPP$1 is equivalent to the purchasing power of US$1 in the United States.

Source: ILO Global Wage Database. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

"Top-bottom" inequality is measured by comparing the top and the bottom of the income distribution: see figure 20, where each person represents 10 per cent of the population. The measure of "top-bottom inequality" (also termed the D9 / D1 ratio) is the ratio between two cut-off points: the threshold value above which individuals are in the top 10 per cent and the threshold value below which they are in the bottom 10 per cent of the distribution. Figure 20 also sets out the boundaries of what is understood in this report as constituting "lower", "middle" and "upper" income groups. Middle-class inequality (D7/D3) is measured by cutting out the top and the bottom 30 per cent of the distribution and comparing the "entry point" and the "exit point" of a statistical middle, comprising the 40 per cent of individuals grouped around the median (as shown in figure 20)…

Figure 20 Measures of inequality



In our sample of developed economies, between 2006 and 2010 "top-bottom inequality" increased in about half of the countries, and decreased or remained stable in the remaining countries. Figure 21(a) shows these trends with countries ordered from left to right, from

the countries where inequality decreased to those where it increased. Using the methodology and data sources described in Appendix II, inequality increased most in Spain and the United States (where inequality, measured by the D9/D1 ratio, is highest), and declined most in Bulgaria and Romania.

Over the same period, trends in middle-class inequality in developed economies have also been mixed, increasing in about half the countries where a change can be observed and decreasing in the other half (figure 21(b)). Countries are again ordered from left to right, starting with the countries where inequality decreased most and moving to the countries where it increased most. We see that according to our methodology, the country where inequality among the middle class increased most is Ireland, followed by Spain. On the other side, Romania and the Netherlands are the two countries in the sample where inequality among the middle class fell most. The United Kingdom is one example of a country where middle-class inequality increased while top-bottom inequality remained more or less stable and even declined somewhat…

Figure 21 Inequality in a sample of developed economies in the crisis years, 2006–10: (a) top–bottom inequality (D9/D1); (b) middle-class inequality (D7/D3)



Note: For methodology, definitions and database, see Appendix II.
Source: ILO estimates. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

In developed economies, these mixed trends frequently took place in a context of stagnating or declining household incomes between 2007 and 2009/10 (see figure 23). With the exception of Spain, where inequality increased, some of the countries most adversely affected by the crisis have seen a reduction in inequality as a result of a general downward "flattening effect" of the crisis, meaning that incomes have fallen more for high-income than for lower-income households. Thus, inequality declined in Romania and Portugal and remained almost unchanged in Greece, three countries severely hit by the crisis.[28] A few countries, such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, have been able to combine growing household income and falling inequality during this period…

In contrast to developed economies, in emerging and developing economies these trends frequently took place in a context of increasing household incomes (see figure 23). A comparison of figures 21 and 22 also shows that total inequality remains higher in emerging and developing economies than in developed economies even after progress on reducing inequality in the former group. The difference is particularly marked in top-bottom inequality, while the middle class, though more stretched, shows a proportionally smaller difference in inequality…

Figure 23 Recent evolution of real household income in selected countries





Note: For methodology, definitions and databases, see Appendix II.
Source: ILO estimates. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 25 Change in inequality between the top and bottom 10 per cent (D9/D1) in developed economies, 2006–10



Note: For methodology, definitions and databases, see Appendix II.
Source: ILO estimates. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

In developed countries, the labour market effect (i.e. wage plus employment effects) would have increased inequality in two-thirds of countries if other income sources had not offset

the increase. In those countries where inequality did increase, other income sources offset about one-third of the increase in inequality generated by the labour market effect. Country-specific developments can be seen in figure 25, which shows the findings from the decomposition of "top-bottom inequality" (D9/D1) for developed economies. Countries are ranked from top to bottom, starting with the country where inequality increased most, to the country where it declined most, over the period 2006-10. The ranking of countries is thus the same as in section 7, but figure 25 focuses on the change in (rather than the levels of) top-bottom inequality. In addition to showing the actual change in inequality, the figure shows how much of the change was due, respectively, to the wage effect, to the employment effect and to changes in other sources of income in the household.

When looking at countries where top-bottom inequality increased, labour market effects (wage plus employment effects) were more important than other income effects in explaining this increase in a majority of cases. In Spain and the United States, the two countries where inequality increased most, the labour market effect accounted for, respectively, 90 per cent and 140 per cent of the increase in inequality - meaning that in Spain inequality was further increased by other income sources, while in the United States (as in some other countries) other income sources partially offset the increase in inequality caused by the labour market effect. The employment effects dominate the wage effects in countries where inequality increased the most, suggesting that job losses were the major cause of top-bottom inequality in these countries during the crisis. (The bars in figure 25 show that within the labour market effect, the wage effect contributed to the overall increase in inequality in both Spain and the United States, but in these two countries the employment effect was even larger, as many workers lost their jobs and hence their wages.)

Among countries where top–bottom inequality declined, this was predominantly a result of the labour market effect in Germany and Belgium. Note that in Greece, Romania and Portugal, the wage effect contributed to less inequality; this occurred because the whole wage distribution was flattened (i.e. wages have fallen more for high-income than for lower-income households). In Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, while the wage effect contributed to more inequality, it was more than offset by other factors and inequality declined.

Looking at middle-class inequality (figure 26), the labour market effect contributed to higher inequality in almost three-quarters of the countries in the sample. In countries where inequality increased, other income sources offset only about 5 per cent of the increase. Here again, countries are ranked from top to bottom, from the country where household income inequality increased most, to the country where it declined most, over the period 2006-10. As in the D9/D1 analysis (shown in figure 25), here too the labour market effect is the dominating factor behind the increase in inequality. It is notable, though, that other incomes offset the increase in inequality much less among the middle class (as might be expected, since wages are the major source of household income for the middle classes, as will be seen later in this report).

When looking at middle-class inequality, labour market effect is dominated by changes in the distribution of wages rather than by changes in employment in most countries with increases in middle-class inequality, with Spain the most notable exception. This was the case for example in Ireland, where middle-class inequality increased most, but also in other countries where inequality increased, such as Estonia, Iceland, Sweden and the United States. Considering the labour market effect in those countries where inequality decreased, the decline in inequality was exclusively due to the wage effect in Greece, Portugal and

Romania. In Bulgaria and the Netherlands, middle-class inequality fell even though the wage effect pushed towards more inequality.

Taken together, the evidence shows that the labour market effect was the largest force pushing towards more inequality over the period 2006-10; other income sources offset some of these increases in some countries. In this sense, the last few years have been no different from the three decades before the crisis, when other evidence shows that increases in inequality were largely driven by changes in the distribution of wages (see OECD, 2011; Salverda, Nolan and Smeeding, 2009b, p. 11; Daly and Valletta, 2004). The difference is that during the crisis, employment played a larger role in explaining changes in inequality…

Figure 26 Change in inequality within the middle class (D7/D3) in developed economies, 2006–10



Note: For methodology, definitions and databases, see Appendix II.
Source: ILO estimates. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

To better understand the role of wages in household income, the report next addresses the great variation in the weight of income sources across countries, and across households

located at different places in the distribution of income. This is of key importance in order to: (a) understand how recent changes in wages and employment have affected households at different parts of the income distribution, and how this, in turn, has affected income inequality; and (b) develop appropriate policy responses, for example with regard to the mix of minimum wages and transfers. The link between wages and household income is not well documented in the literature, either for developed economies or for emerging and developing economies. This report provides some illustrations of the type of information that policy-makers may find useful in designing policies to address inequality.

It is not surprising that, in most developed economies, wages are a major determinant of changes in inequality, given that wages represent about 80 per cent of household income in the United States and about 70 per cent -with some substantial variation between countries- in Europe. Figure 29 provides an estimate of the respective percentages of total household income that, on average, come from wages and from other income sources across a selection of developed economies. In contrast to the previous section, this section disaggregates other income sources, breaking them down into income from self-employment, capital gains, pensions, unemployment benefits, other social transfers and remaining residual income. As pointed out earlier, households where no member is of working age are excluded from the analyses. In Germany and Sweden, wages represent at least 75 per cent of household income, whereas in Greece and Italy they account for between 50 and 60 per cent, with self-employment and pensions playing a relatively larger role than in other developed countries. Taken together, pensions, unemployment benefits and other social transfers represent on average between 15 and 20 per cent of household income in both Europe and the United States. In all countries, reported capital gains are a relatively small proportion of reported incomes…

Figure 29 Share of wages in household income, latest year: Selected developed economies and European average



WG = wages; SEI = self-employment income; UB = unemployment benefits; ST = other social transfers; PEN = old-age pensions; OI = residual income; CG= capital gains.

The European average includes: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

In the case of European economies, *social transfers* include old-age benefits, survivor benefits, sickness benefits, disability benefits and education allowances (aggregated at the household level) and family and/or children allowances, housing allowances as well as social exclusion allowances not elsewhere classified (e.g., incomes for destitute people, drug addicts, alcoholics or victims of criminal violence, among others). The aggregation excludes unemployment benefits and old-age pensions which, for the purpose of illustration, are singled out in the figure. *Old-age benefits* cover benefits that provide a replacement income when the aged person retires from the labour market, or guarantee a certain income when a person has reached a prescribed age (private pension plans are included as part of *capital gains*). *Capital gains* include individual private pension plans, dividends from incorporated business, interest and profits received from capital investment in an unincorporated business in which the person does not work, and income from the rent of property or land. *Residual income* includes regular intra-household transfers (e.g. alimony, child support, cash support from households in other countries), in-kind payments, value of goods produced for own consumption, and income received from family members aged 15 or below with a non-working status.

In the case of the United States, all variables except *residual income* are defined as in the EU-SILC. *Residual income* includes income received from other household members who are neither the head of household nor the spouse of the head (this is the case in about 6 per cent of households). While the data set indicates that this particular income is not from social transfers, it does not indicate whether it is from employment or from capital gains.

Source: ILO estimates; see Appendix II.

We have seen in section 8 that other (non-wage) income sources play a larger role in changes in top-bottom inequality than in respect of middle-class inequality. This reflects the fact that income sources at both the top and the bottom of the income distribution are more diverse than in the middle, where households rely mostly on wages. In figure 30, households are ranked in ascending order by their per capita household income and divided into six groups: the "bottom 10 per cent", the "lower" income group (11th-30th percentiles), the "lower middle" class (31st-50th percentiles), the "upper middle" class (51st-70th percentiles), the "upper" income group (71st-90th percentiles) and the "top 10 per cent". As before, these labels are formulated purely for practical purposes, to facilitate the description of results, and do not have a sociological interpretation. For all the selected countries shown in figure 30, it is for the poorest 10 per cent of households that wages represent the smallest source of household income, and in the middle classes and upper-income groups that wages frequently make up the largest source of household income. This pattern can in fact be observed in almost all developed economies.

There is also great variability across countries in the proportion of household income made up by wages in the top and bottom 10 per cent of households. Figure 30 shows, for example, that among the bottom 10 per cent, wages represent about 50 per cent of household income in the United States, more than 30 per in Italy and about 25 per cent in France. By contrast, in the United Kingdom wages represent less than 20 per cent of household income among the poorest households, in Germany less than 10 per cent, and in Romania less than 5 per cent. In all countries, social transfers play an important role in supporting low-income households (as compared with other income groups), even though the type of transfers varies across countries. In Germany, for instance, unemployment benefits and other social transfers play an almost equally important role, whereas in other countries unemployment benefits make up a much smaller share of household income in the bottom 10 per cent. Among the middle and upper classes, wages represent the highest share of household income in almost all countries, reaching about 80 per cent or more in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Italy and France, the richest 10 per cent of households draw a large share of their household income from income sources other than wages, particularly from self-employment income and capital gains (even though both of these household income sources are likely to be underestimated in household surveys)…

Figure 30 Household income by group and source in selected developed economies, latest year





(a)–(d): wages represent less than 30 per cent of household income among the poorest 10 per cent of households.
(e)–(f): wages represent more than 30 per cent of household income among the poorest 10 per cent of households.
WG = wages; SEI = self-employment income; UB = unemployment benefits; ST = other social transfers; PEN = old-age pensions; OI = residual income; CG= capital gains.
Note: "Bottom 10%" reflects up to the first decile; "lower" reflects from above the first decile to the third decile inclusive; "lower middle" reflects from above the third decile to the fifth included; "upper middle" reflects from above the fifth decile and up to the seventh included; "upper" reflects from above the seventh decile to the ninth included; "top 10%" reflects the tenth decile.
Source: ILO estimates.

Figure 31 shows the change in income sources in two countries over the period 2006 to 2010 to provide an illustration of why top-bottom inequality (D9 / D1) increased in Spain (the country in our sample where inequality rose most) and why it declined in Romania (the country in our sample where inequality declined most, together with Bulgaria). The figure shows the real change (i.e., adjusted for inflation) in household income of the top and bottom 10 per cent, broken down by source of income.

In Spain, growing inequality between 2006 and 2010 is the result of household income falling more in real terms in the bottom 10 per cent than in the top 10 per cent (the overall bars -where 2006 serves as the base year equal to 100- shrink more for the bottom 10 per cent across time than for the top 10 per cent). Looking at the different components of the bars, we see that the share of household income from wages declined in real terms between 2007 and 2010 for those in the bottom 10 per cent. Incomes from self-employment and from pensions also declined. For the bottom 10 per cent, only income from unemployment benefits increased, but not enough to prevent a sharp decline in overall real income. For the top 10 per cent, household income from wages also declined, but by proportionally less than at the bottom.

In Romania, a different story emerges: over the whole period 2006-10, top-bottom inequality declined because household income, in real terms, fell at the top (the overall size of the bar shrank) but increased slightly at the bottom. Looking at the different components,

wages accounted for a small proportion of household income in both 2006 and 2010 for households at the bottom: most household income came from self-employment and from social transfers. In Romania, the top 10 per cent rely to a much larger extent on wages, although this source of income has been declining. The fall in inequality in the country may have been due to fiscal consolidation measures affecting the top of the income distribution, including public sector wage cuts, and modest gains, mostly from social transfers, for low-income households (Domnisoru, 2014)…

Figure 31 Real growth in household income by source of income for the top and bottom 10 per cent, Spain and Romania, 2006–10



WG = wages; SEI = self-employment income; UB = unemployment benefits; ST = other social transfers; PEN = old-age pensions; OI = residual income; CG= capital gains.

Note: The D9/D1 ratio used in the report cannot be compared to the ratio of the top to the bottom 10 per cent in this figure, since the former is a "threshold measure" and this figure shows averages within deciles.

Source: ILO estimates.

Figure 36 shows the gender wage gap, calculated for each decile of the wage distribution and split into an explained and unexplained component, for selected countries. Wage earners are ranked according to their level of wages, from the lowest decile to the highest. The total unadjusted wage gap is the sum of the two bars: the dark bar represents the proportion of the wage gap which can be explained by observable labour market characteristics, and the light bar is the "unexplained" gap. The gaps are provided in absolute values: for example, in the first decile in Belgium there is an unadjusted gender wage gap of about € 400, whereas in Estonia it is about € 50. The shapes of the decompositions vary across countries and across groups. In Belgium and Estonia, women receive lower wages than men throughout the distribution, but the unexplained part of the gap tends to be higher among better-paid women. In the United States, the unexplained part is proportionally small, and affects predominantly better-paid women. In Peru and Vietnam, the explained part tends to increase at higher wage levels of the wage distribution. By contrast, in Sweden

the unadjusted gender wage gap is very small (the light and dark bars generally offset each other; the negative dark bars imply that women would actually earn more than men if discrimination and other unexplained factors did not exist). A similar situation can be observed in Chile and in the Russian Federation, where discrimination and other unexplained factors alone account for differences in pay between men and women.

Figure 36 Explained and unexplained gender wage gaps in selected countries, latest year



Note: In Europe in 2010, the bottom 10 per cent of women earned about €100 per month less than the bottom 10 per cent of men. Conversely, the top 10 per cent of high-earning women earned close to €700 per month less than the top 10 per cent of men.
Source: ILO estimates.

Figure 37 presents (1) the level of the average gender wage gap at the national level for the countries included (the dark bar) and (2) a counterfactual estimate of the contribution of the unexplained part of the wage gap to the overall unadjusted wage gap (the light bar). The counterfactual wage gap is the gap which would exist if men and women were equally remunerated entirely according to the observable labour market characteristics taken into account in this report (i.e. education, experience, economic activity, location, work intensity

and occupation). Once these adjustments are taken into account, in our sample of developed economies (figure 37(a)) the mean gender wage gap nearly disappears (e.g. Austria, Iceland, Italy) or even reverses (e.g. Lithuania, Slovenia, Sweden) in about half the countries in the sample. It declines substantially in other countries but remains largely explained in Germany and the United States. Among our sample of emerging and developing economies (see figure 37(b)), the gender wage gap reverses in Brazil and the Russian Federation. In all other countries in the sample, the wage gap declines substantially, though less so in Argentina and Peru, where much of the gender wage gap is also due to differences in education and other observable labour market characteristics. The existence of negative "explained" gender wage gaps (i.e. negative light bars), in the presence of positive unadjusted wage gaps (i.e. positive dark bars), points to the importance of gaining a better understanding of the factors that influence pay for men and women with equal experience, qualifications and other observable labour market characteristics, in order to address them effectively…

Figure 37 Eliminating the unexplained gender wage penalty: Mean wage gap before and after adjustment in selected economies, latest year: (a) developed economies; (b) emerging and developing economies

Source: ILO estimates. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 38 shows the results of applying the counterfactual estimation across different wage levels for two countries with available data, the Russian Federation and the United States. The first column shows the distribution of men by wage level, the second column shows the distribution of women, and the third column shows the distribution of women absent the unexplained wage gap. Consistent with figure 36 -which showed that in the United States the unexplained wage gap is small at the bottom- the elimination of the unexplained component brings about the greatest increase in the proportion of women in the top category with wages above one and a half times the median wage (where, according to figure 38, the unexplained wage penalty is highest). In the Russian Federation, once the unexplained penalty is removed, the percentage of women on low pay declines considerably, and the proportion earning higher wages equal to at least one and a half times the median wage increases…

Figure 38 Wage distribution and counterfactual wage distribution, Russian Federation and United States, latest year



G1: Wage distribution for males; G0: Wage distribution for females; G0-CTFL: Wage distribution for females once the unexplained component is eliminated and the gap is fully described by the explained component.

Source: ILO estimates.

Figure 39 shows that in Germany, for example, high-wage migrant workers earn less than high-wage nationals, even though they would earn higher wages than nationals if they were remunerated according to their labour market attributes (the dark bar is negative). In Argentina as well, the wage gap among migrant and national top wage earners is exclusively due to the unexplained part.

In Cyprus, even though the overall unadjusted wage gap is higher at the top than at the bottom of the wage distribution, the unexplained part accounts for a larger share of the gap at the bottom. This implies that while the wage gap is smaller at the bottom, migrant workers at the bottom would earn more than their national counterparts if they were remunerated according to their observable labour market characteristics alone. By contrast, among high wage earners the gap is large, but can be attributed to migrants' lower levels of education and other observable labour market attributes. One exception to this pattern is Brazil, where according to the available survey data, high-wage migrants (mostly university graduates) earn more than high-wage nationals for both explained and unexplained reasons.
Figure 40 shows what would remain of the wage gap if the unexplained component was eliminated using the same counterfactual approach as employed for the gender wage gap above. Among developed economies (figure 40(a)), in Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden, the mean wage gap reverses when the unexplained part is eliminated, implying that on average migrant workers may have more education or experience, work in higher-paid regions, or be more highly skilled, etc., than their national counterparts.
In most other countries, the migration penalty declines but is not eliminated after the adjustment. In the emerging and developing economies for which data permit analysis (figure 40(b)), the results are similar, except in Chile. There, migrant workers earn more than their national counterparts on average, although if they were paid according to their observable labour market attributes, they would earn slightly less than national workers (as shown by the increase in the light bar).

Figure 39 Explained and unexplained migrant–national wage gaps in selected countries, latest year



Source: ILO estimates.

Figure 41 shows the counterfactual applied across the wage distribution for two countries, Cyprus and Spain. The first column shows the wage distribution of national employees, whereas the second column presents the same information for migrant employees. The third column shows how migrants would be distributed in these groups if the "unexplained" wage gap were eliminated. We see that in Cyprus, migrant workers are heavily represented in the lowest wage groups.

However, this picture changes significantly once the unexplained wage penalty is removed, with the migrant wage distribution becoming more similar to the national wage distribution. This is consistent with figure 37(a), which shows the unexplained component contributing more to the wage gap at the bottom of the wage distribution. By contrast, the corresponding changes in Spain are smaller because most of the wage gap between migrants and nationals is explained by a difference in observable factors.

Figure 40 Eliminating the unexplained migrant wage penalty: Mean wage gap before and after adjustment in selected economies, latest year



Source: ILO estimates. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Figure 41 Wage distribution and counterfactual wage distribution, Cyprus and Spain, latest year



G1: Wage distribution for nationals, G0: Wage distribution for migrants, G0-CTFL: Wage distribution for migrants once the unexplained component is eliminated and the gap is fully described by the explained component.

Source: ILO estimates.

- Series estadísticas ampliadas, para "arqueólogos" de la economía (dentro del marasmo de la "sobreinformación" disponible en Internet, algunos "sospechosos" cambios de metodología y ciertas "intoxicaciones" políticamente correctas)

Fuentes consultadas:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introduction

- Del Informe *"Neoliberalismo y distribución del ingreso en los Estados Unidos de América"*, de febrero de 2009, del Profesor Carlos Encinas Ferrer, investigador y académico de la Universidad de La Salle Bajío en León, México, publicado en la Revista Latinoamericana de Economía Problemas del Desarrollo, se presentan los gráficos (numerados del 1 al 12), que abarcan del año 1959 al 2007.

- Ingresos de los hogares publicados por el U.S. Department of Commerce y Eurostat: http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/IE-1.pdf

- Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage: 2013 - U.S. Department of Commerce - U.S. Census Bureau - September 2014

- Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013 Current Population Reports - U.S. Department of Commerce - U.S. Census Bureau - September 2014

- Table 693 - "Share of aggregate income received by each fifth and top 5 percent household: 1970 to 2008", cuya fuente es el U.S. Census Bureau - The 2011 Statistical Abstract - The National Data Book.

- Table A-2 Selected measures of household income dispersion: 1967 to 2013 - U.S. Census Bureau

- Income Inequality Update - Rising inequality: youth and poor fall further behind - OECD - June 2014

Un inmenso panorama de sufrimiento y sueños rotos: buscando respuestas

¿Pero, cómo se llegó a esta situación? ¿Es consecuencia de la "globalización"? ¿Es consecuencia de la crisis sub-prime? ¿Cuándo comenzó el "descenso a los infiernos? ¿Cuándo comenzó el fin -aunque no se dieran cuenta, o no quisieran darse cuenta- del sueño americano? ¿Cuándo comenzó la ficción de sustituir empleos por crédito?

Antes de dejarlos con la batería de Gráficos y Tablas (el TAC de la desigualdad) un "recordatorio" final: Pese a las virtudes de la democracia debemos recordar los fallos de quienes se declaran partidarios de ella, porque la democracia es algo más que elecciones periódicas, aun cuando se celebren de forma justa. La democracia en EEUU o Europa, por ejemplo, ha ido acompañada de una desigualdad cada vez mayor y la riqueza está distribuida de forma aún más inequitativa.

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion

% and 1 000 persons

The Europe 2020 strategy promotes social inclusion, in particular through the reduction ... more

unit 1000 persons

geo \ time	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	118085	121543	124232[e]	:
EU (27 countries)	:	124339[e]	123051[e]	119360	116418	114286	116780	120171	122860[e]	:
Euro area (18 countries)	:	69271	70725	70641	70475	70085	71616	75372	76742[e]	:
Euro area (17 countries)	:	68245	69798	69876	69736	69277	70817	74550	76007[e]	:
Belgium	2257	2338	2247	2261	2194	2145	2235	2271	2356	:
Bulgaria	:	:	4734	4663	3421[b]	3511	3719	3693	3621	:
Czech Republic	:	1988	1832	1613	1566	1448	1495	1598	1580	:
Denmark	880	921	896	905	887	962	1007	1039	1057	:
Germany	:	15022	16444	16760	16345	16217	15962	16074	15909	:
Estonia	352	347	293	293	291	312	289	307	311	:
Ireland	1007	1038	991	1005	1050	1150	1220	1319	:	:
Greece	3283	3131	3154	3064	3046	3007	3031	3403	3795	:
Spain	10558	10481	10519	10373	11124	11232	12316	12791	13090	:
France	11597	11127	11184	11382	11150[b]	11200	11712	11840	11760	:

Italy	15285	14621	15256	15412	15099	14835	14757	17112	18194	:
Cyprus	:	188	193	195	181[b]	188	202	207	234	:
Latvia	:	1027	927	765	740[b]	808	798	821	731	702
Lithuania	:	1400	1217	967	928	943	1068	1011	975	:
Luxembourg	71	77	74	73	72	85	83	84	95	:
Hungary	:	3185	3121	2916	2794	2924	2948	3051	3188	3285
Malta	:	81	78	79	81	82	86	90	94	:
Netherlands	:	2705	2603	2558	2432	2483	2483	2598	2492	:
Austria	1405	1369	1454	1376	1532	1406	1373	1407	1542[b]	:
Poland	:	17080	14938	12958	11491[b]	10454	10409	10196	10128	:
Portugal	2876	2745	2640	2653	2757	2648	2693	2601	2665	:
Romania	:	:	:	9904	9418	9112	8890	8630	8907	:
Slovenia	:	362	343	335	361	339	366	386	392	:
Slovakia	:	1724	1439	1150	1111	1061	1118	1112	1109	:
Finland	885	887	886	907	910	886	890	949	916	:
Sweden	1521	1325	1489	1264	1367	1459	1418	1538	1519	:
United Kingdom	:	14530	14193	13527	14069	13389	14211	14044	15078[b]	:
Iceland	39	38	36	38	36	36	42	41	38	:
Norway	724	746	780	764	701	724	716	705	689	:
Switzerland	:	:	:	1306	1333	1338	1291	1308	1331	:
Turkey	:	:	48934	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

At-risk-of-poverty threshold (source: SILC)

PPS

The threshold is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after ... more

hhtyp Single person

geo \ time	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Belgium	:	9177[b]	8828	9320	9707	9787	10046	10501	10412	10797	10996	:
Bulgaria	1845	1983	2176	2253	1920[b]	1979	2859	3436	3535	3436	3476	:
Czech Republic	:	:	:	4585[b]	4956	5305	5835	5666	5803	5915	6109	:
Denmark	:	9381[b]	9025	9513	9688	10121	10561	10751	10783	11291	11196	:
Germany	:	:	:	9391[b]	9100	10395	10804	10770	10557	10945	11398	:
Estonia	2137	2352	2479[b]	2835	3376	3895	4538	4861	4453	4496	4741	:
Ireland	:	8145[b]	8597	9048	9563	10633	10901	10386	9649	10097	:	:
Greece	:	6140[b]	6179	6450	6697	6873	7219	7521	7568	6889	5969	:
Spain	6676[b]	6970	7012[b]	6896	7335	7614	8161	8114	7789	7500	7392	:
France	8223	8506	8315[b]	8702	8989	9089	10496[b]	10644	10682	10835	11217	:
Croatia	:	4131	:	:	:	:	:	:	4540[b]	4423	4425	:
Italy	:	:	7847[b]	8208	8323	8640	9157	9158	9135	9480	9358	:
Cyprus	:	7822	:	8866[b]	9817	10951	10945[b]	11256	10829	11394	11429	:
Latvia	:	:	:	2350[b]	2689	3355	4288	4283	3531	3408	3603	3947
Lithuania	:	:	:	2308[b]	2772	3428	4170	4289	3615	3563	4041	:
Luxembourg	:	15151[b]	15657	16538	15851	16108	16166	16265	15981	16001	15996	:
Hungary	3566	3722	:	3337[b]	3646	3894	3958	4097	4029	4210	4432	4516
Malta	:	:	:	7054[b]	7246	7465	7958	8146	8033	8428	8777	:

Netherlands	9882	9869	:	9612[b]	9897	10522	11485	11618	11302	11251	11404	:
Austria	:	9067[b]	9874	10458	10452	10686	11124	11350	11479	12150	12300[b]	:
Poland	:	:	:	2855[b]	3057	3365	4039	4417	4552	4924	5117	:
Portugal	:	:	4823[b]	4942	5157	5349	5702	5655	5844	5750	5736	:
Romania	:	:	:	:	:	1726	1838	2056	2126	2134	2161	:
Slovenia	6069	6088	:	6946[b]	7292	7753	8287	8599	8019	8285	8475	:
Slovakia	:	:	:	2394[b]	2772	3365	4058	4694	5022	5314	5744	:
Finland	7705	7923	7905[b]	8474	8886	9145	9933	10421	10339	10646	10921	:
Sweden	8314[b]	:	8419[b]	8648	9068	9545	10680	11295	11005	11084	11814	:
United Kingdom	9811	9783	:	10137[b]	10578	11267	11126	10091	10178	10082	10582[b]	:
Iceland	:	:	9691	10307	11136	11937	12978	12958	10977	10287	10216	:
Norway	:	10912[b]	11142	11388	12119	12420	13871	14402	13962	14519	15434	:
Switzerland	:	:	:	:	:	12316	12950	13519	13389	13841	14521	:
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Former Yugoslav Republic of Ma	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Serbia	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	1859282835	1837523032	:	:	2134	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

In work at-risk-of-poverty rate

%

The share of employed persons of 18 years or over with an equivalised disposable income ... more

sex Total

geo \ time	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	8.4	8.9	9.2[e]	:
EU (27 countries)	:	:	8.2[e]	8.2[e]	8.4	8.6	8.4	8.4	8.9	9.2[e]	:
Euro area (18 countries)	:	:	7.3	7.4	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.1	8.6	8.9[e]	:
Euro area (17 countries)	9.1	8.4	7.3	7.4	8.0	8.0	8.1	8.1	8.6	8.9[e]	:
Belgium	6.5	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.3	4.8	4.6	4.5	4.2	4.6	:
Bulgaria	:	:	:	5.4	5.8	7.5	7.4	7.7	8.2	7.4	:
Czech Republic	:	:	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.6	3.2	3.7	4.0	4.5	:
Denmark	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.1	5.0	5.9	6.5	6.4	5.6	:
Germany	:	:	4.8	5.5	7.4	7.1	6.8	7.2	7.7	7.8	:
Estonia	:	9.1	7.5	7.5	7.8	7.3	8.1	6.5	7.9	8.3	:
Ireland	7.5	6.7	6.0	6.2	5.6	6.5	5.3	5.5	5.6	:	:
Greece	13.5	13.1	12.9	13.8	14.2	14.3	13.8	13.8	11.9	15.1	:
Spain	:	10.8	10.6	10.1	10.2	11.2	11.7	12.8	12.2	12.3	:
France	:	5.4	6.1	6.0	6.5	6.5[b]	6.6	6.5	7.6	8.0	:
Croatia	:	10	8	7	7	8.3	7.6	6.1[b]	6.9	6.1	:
Italy	:	9.4	8.8	9.6	9.8	8.9	10.2	9.4	10.7	11.0	:
Cyprus	:	:	6.5	7.2	6.3	6.3[b]	6.8	7.3	7.3	7.9	:
Latvia	:	:	9.0	11.1	9.2	10.5	10.8	9.4	9.3	8.6	8.9
Lithuania	:	:	10.0	10.0	8.0	9.3	10.3	12.6	9.5	7.6	:

Luxembourg	7.1	8.5	9.8	10.3	9.3	9.4	10.0	10.6	9.9	10.2	:
Hungary	:	:	8.7	6.8	5.8	5.8	6.2	5.3	6.1	5.3	6.6
Malta	:	:	4.3	4.1	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.9	6.1	5.2	:
Netherlands	:	:	5.8	4.4	4.6	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.4	4.6	:
Austria	7.7	7.4	6.8	6.4	6.1	6.3	6.0	5.0	5.4	8.1[b]	:
Poland	:	:	13.8	12.8	11.7	11.5	11.0	11.4	11.1	10.4	:
Portugal	:	12.4	11.9	11.2	9.7	11.8	10.3	9.7	10.3	9.8	:
Romania	:	:	:	:	18.3	17.5	17.6	17.2	18.9	19.1	:
Slovenia	:	:	4.6	4.8	4.7	5.1	4.8	5.3	6.0	6.5	:
Slovakia	:	:	8.9	6.3	4.9	5.8	5.2	5.7	6.3	6.2	:
Finland	:	4.4	3.7	4.5	5.0	5.1	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.8	:
Sweden	:	6.1	5.5	7.4	6.4	6.8	6.9	6.5	6.8	6.7	:
United Kingdom	:	:	8.2	7.8	8.0	8.5	6.7	6.8	7.9	9.0[b]	:
Iceland	:	6.9	7.9	6.6	7.0	6.7	7.7	6.6	6.4	5.2	:
Norway	4.4	4.4	4.5	6.1	5.8	5.4	5.6	5.2	5.6	5.1	:
Switzerland	:	:	:	:	7.6	9.5	8.1	7.6	7.7	8.5	:
Turkey	:	:	:	17.2	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) (source: SILC)

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

geo \ time	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5.0	5.1	5.1[e]	:
EU (27 countries)	:	:	:	5.0	5.0[e]	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.1[e]	:
EU (15 countries)	:	4.6[e]	4.8[e]	4.8	4.7	4.9	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.1[e]	:
New Member States (12)	:	:	7.2[u]	6.0	5.8	5.5	5.2	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	:
Euro area (changing compositior	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Euro area (18 countries)	:	:	:	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.1	:
Euro area (17 countries)	:	:	5.0	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.1	5.0[e]	:
Euro area (16 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	:	4.3	3.9	4.0	4.2	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	:
Bulgaria	3.8	3.6	4	3.7	5.1	7.0	6.5	5.9	5.9	6.5	6.1	:
Czech Republic	:	:	:	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	:
Denmark	:	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.6	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.5	:
Germany	:	:	:	3.8	4.1	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	:
Estonia	6.1	5.9	7.2	5.9	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.4	:
Ireland	:	4.9	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.7	4.6	:	:
Greece	:	6.4	5.9	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.6	6.0	6.6	:
Spain	5.1[b]	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.7	6.4	7.2	7.1	7.2	:
France	3.9	3.8	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.4[b]	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.5	:
Croatia	:	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.3	5.5[b]	5.4	5.4	:
Italy	:	:	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.6	5.5	:

Cyprus	:	4.1	:	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3[b]	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.7	:
Latvia	:	:	:	6.7	7.8	6.4	7.3	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.3
Lithuania	:	:	:	6.9	6.3	5.9	5.9	6.4	7.3	5.8	5.3	:
Luxembourg	:	4.1	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.1	:
Hungary	3	3.3	:	4.0	5.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.0	4.2
Malta	:	:	:	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.3	4.0	3.9	:
Netherlands	4	4	:	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.6	:
Austria	:	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	4.2[b]	:
Poland	:	:	:	6.6	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.9	:
Portugal	7.3	7.4	7.0	7.0	6.7	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.6	5.7	5.8	:
Romania	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.9	5.3	7.8	7.0	6.7	6.0	6.2	6.3	:
Slovenia	3.1	3.1	:	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	:
Slovakia	:	:	:	3.9	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	:
Finland	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.7	:
Sweden	3.3[b]	:	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.7	:
United Kingdom	5.5	5.3	:	5.9	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.4[b]	:
Iceland	:	:	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.8	4.2	3.6	3.3	3.4	:
Norway	3.2	3.8	3.6	4.1	4.8	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	:
Switzerland	:	:	:	:	:	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.4	:

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source: SILC)

Number

The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the ... more

geo \ time	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	30.5	30.8	30.6[e]	:
EU (27 countries)	:	:	:	30.6[e]	30.3[e]	30.6	30.9	30.5	30.5	30.8	30.6[e]	:
EU (15 countries)	:	30[e]	30[e]	29.9	29.6	30.3	30.8	30.4	30.5	30.9	30.7[e]	:
New Member States (12)	:	:	37.4[u]	33.2	33.0	31.8	31.3	30.7	30.2	30.5	30.3	:
Euro area (changing compositior	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Euro area (18 countries)	:	:	:	29.3	29.3	30.0	30.3	30.2	30.3	30.6	30.5	:
Euro area (17 countries)	:	:	:	29.3	29.2	30.0	30.3	30.2	30.2	30.5	30.4[e]	:
Euro area (16 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	:	28.3[b]	26.1	28.0	27.8	26.3	27.5	26.4	26.6	26.3	26.6	:
Bulgaria	26	24	26	25	31.2[b]	35.3	35.9	33.4	33.2	35.0	33.6	:
Czech Republic	:	:	:	26.0[b]	25.3	25.3	24.7	25.1	24.9	25.2	24.9	:
Denmark	:	24.8[b]	23.9	23.9	23.7	25.2	25.1	26.9	26.9	27.8	28.1	:
Germany	:	:	:	26.1[b]	26.8	30.4	30.2	29.1	29.3	29.0	28.3	:
Estonia	35	34	37.4[b]	34.1	33.1	33.4	30.9	31.4	31.3	31.9	32.5	:
Ireland	:	30.6[b]	31.5	31.9	31.9	31.3	29.9	28.8	30.7	29.8	:	:
Greece	:	34.7[b]	33.0	33.2	34.3	34.3	33.4	33.1	32.9	33.5	34.3	:
Spain	31[b]	31	31.0[b]	32.2	31.9	31.9	31.9	33.0	34.4	34.5	35.0	:
France	27	27	28.2[b]	27.7	27.3	26.6	29.8[b]	29.9	29.8	30.8	30.5	:
Croatia	:	29	30	30	28	29	28	27	31.4	31.0	30.5	:

Italy	:	:	33.2[b]	32.8	32.1	32.2	31.0	31.5	31.2	31.9	31.9	:
Cyprus	:	27	:	28.7[b]	28.8	29.8	29.0[b]	29.5	30.1	29.2	31.0	:
Latvia	:	:	:	36.2[b]	38.9	35.4	37.5	37.5	35.9	35.1	35.7	35.2
Lithuania	:	:	:	36.3[b]	35.0	33.8	34.0	35.9	37.0	33.0	32.0	:
Luxembourg	:	27.6[b]	26.5	26.5	27.8	27.4	27.7	29.2	27.9	27.2	28.0	:
Hungary	24	27	:	27.6[b]	33.3	25.6	25.2	24.7	24.1	26.8	26.9	28.0
Malta	:	:	:	27.0[b]	27.1	26.3	28.1	27.4	28.6	27.2	27.1	:
Netherlands	27	27	:	26.9[b]	26.4	27.6	27.6	27.2	25.5	25.8	25.4	:
Austria	:	27.4[b]	25.8	26.2	25.3	26.2	26.2	25.7	26.1	26.3	27.6[b]	:
Poland	:	:	:	35.6[b]	33.3	32.2	32.0	31.4	31.1	31.1	30.9	:
Portugal	:	:	37.8[b]	38.1	37.7	36.8	35.8	35.4	33.7	34.2	34.5	:
Romania	30	30	31	31	33	37.8[b]	36.0	34.9	33.3	33.2	33.2	:
Slovenia	22	22	:	23.8[b]	23.7	23.2	23.4	22.7	23.8	23.8	23.7	:
Slovakia	:	:	:	26.2[b]	28.1	24.5	23.7	24.8	25.9	25.7	25.3	:
Finland	26	26	25.5[b]	26.0	25.9	26.2	26.3	25.9	25.4	25.8	25.9	:
Sweden	23[b]	:	23.0[b]	23.4	24.0	23.4	24.0	24.8	24.1	24.4	24.8	:
United Kingdom	35	34	:	34.6[b]	32.5	32.6	33.9	32.4	32.9	33.0	32.8[b]	:
Iceland	:	:	24.1	25.1	26.3	28.0	27.3	29.6	25.7	23.6	24.0	:
Norway	:	26.6[b]	25.2	28.2	29.2	23.7	25.1	24.1	23.6	22.9	22.6	:

Inequality of income distribution

Income quintile share ratio

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

geo \ time	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5.0
EU (27 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	5.0	5.0[s]	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0
Euro area (18 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	5.0
Euro area (17 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	5.0	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.9	5.0
Belgium	4.2	4.3	4	:	4.3	3.9	4.0	4.2	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9
Bulgaria	:	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.6	4	3.7	5.1	7.0	6.5	5.9	5.9
Czech Republic	:	:	3.4	:	:	:	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5
Denmark	3	:	3	:	3.6	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.7	3.6	4.6	4.4
Germany	3.6	3.5	3.6	:	:	:	3.8	4.1	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5
Estonia	:	6.3	6.1	6.1	5.9	7.2	5.9	5.5	5.5	5.0	5.0	5.0
Ireland	4.9	4.7	4.5	:	4.9	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.7
Greece	6.2	5.8	5.7	:	6.4	5.9	5.8	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.6
Spain	5.7	5.4	5.5	5.1[b]	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.7	6.4	7.2
France	4.4	4.2	3.9[b]	3.9	3.8	4.2	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.4[b]	4.4	4.4
Croatia	:	:	:	:	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.3	5.5[b]
Italy	4.9	4.8	4.8	:	:	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.2	5.2
Cyprus	:	:	:	:	4.1	:	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3[b]	4.4	4.5
Latvia	:	5.5	:	:	:	:	6.7	7.8	6.4	7.3	7.4	6.8

Lithuania	:	5	4.9	:	:	:	6.9	6.3	5.9	5.9	6.4	7.3
Luxembourg	3.9	3.7	3.8	:	4.1	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.1
Hungary	:	3.3	3.1	3	3.3	:	4.0	5.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4
Malta	:	4.6	:	:	:	:	3.9	4.0	3.9	4.3	4.0	4.3
Netherlands	3.7	4.1	4	4	4	:	4.0	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.7
Austria	3.7	3.4	3.5	:	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7
Poland	:	4.7	4.7	:	:	:	6.6	5.6	5.3	5.1	5.0	5.0
Portugal	6.4	6.4	6.5	7.3	7.4	7.0	7.0	6.7	6.5	6.1	6.0	5.6
Romania	:	4.5	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.8	4.9	5.3	7.8	7.0	6.7	6.0
Slovenia	:	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.1	:	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4
Slovakia	:	:	:	:	:	:	3.9	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.8
Finland	3.4	3.3	3.7[b]	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6
Sweden	3.1	:	3.4	3.3[b]	:	3.3	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.5
United Kingdom	5.2	5.2[b]	5.4	5.5	5.3	:	5.9	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.4
Iceland	:	:	:	:	:	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.8	4.2	3.6
Norway	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.8	3.6	4.1	4.8	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.4
Switzerland	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.5
Turkey	:	:	:	10.8	9.9	:	:	11.3	:	:	:	:

Income inequality for older people (source: SILC)

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

sex Total

geo \ time	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	4.0	4.1	4.0[e]	:
EU (27 countries)	:	:	:	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.0[e]	:
EU (15 countries)	:	:	:	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.2	4.1[e]	:
New Member States (12)	:	:	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	:
Euro area (changing compositior	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Euro area (18 countries)	:	:	:	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.1	:
Euro area (17 countries)	:	:	4.3	4.1	4.0	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.1[e]	:
Euro area (16 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	4.4	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.4	3.7	3.0	3.2	:
Bulgaria	:	:	:	:	3.5	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.7	4.3	:
Czech Republic	:	:	:	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	:
Denmark	:	3.5	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	3.2	3.6	3.2	3.1	:
Germany	:	:	:	3.5	3.4	4.2	4.0	3.7	3.8	3.9	3.9	:
Estonia	:	:	3.5	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	2.9	2.9	2.9	:
Ireland	4.6	4.0	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.1	:	:

Greece	6	5.7	5.1	5.0	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.5	4.5	:
Spain	4.3	:	4.2	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.1	:
France	:	:	4.1	4.5	4.0	4.0	4.4[b]	4.9	4.4	4.5	4.6	:
Croatia	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	5.4[b]	5.3	4.7	:
Italy	4.1	:	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.7	4.2	4.2	4.3	:
Cyprus	:	:	:	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.6[b]	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.6	:
Latvia	:	:	:	4.0	4.5	4.9	5.6	5.2	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.9
Lithuania	:	:	:	3.5	3.6	3.7	4.1	4.0	3.6	3.4	3.4	:
Luxembourg	3	3.7	3.0	3.2	3.0	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.6	:
Hungary	:	:	:	2.6	3.3	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.8
Malta	:	:	:	3.8	4.0	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.7	3.3	3.5	:
Netherlands	:	:	:	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.1	:
Austria	3.8	4.3	4.4	3.9	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.6	4.1	4.1[b]	:
Poland	:	:	:	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	:
Portugal	5.6	:	6.1	5.7	6.0	6.0	5.4	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.4	:
Romania	:	:	:	:	:	5.5	4.9	4.5	4.1	4.2	4.2	:

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/income_social_inclusion_living_conditions/introduction (datos disponibles al mes de abril 2014)

GDP per capita in PPS

Code: tec0011

Index (EU28 = 100)

Data from 1st of June 2014. For most recent GDP data, consult dataset more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	100[b]	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
EU (27 countries)	100[b]	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Euro area (18 countries)	109[b]	109	109	108	108	108	108	108	108
Euro area (17 countries)	109[b]	109	109	109	109	109	109	108	108
Belgium	120[b]	118	116	116	118	120	120	120	119
Bulgaria	37[b]	38	40	43	44	44	46	47	47
Czech Republic	79[b]	80	83	81	82	81	81	81	80
Denmark	124[b]	124	122	124	123	128	125	126	125
Germany	116[b]	115	115	116	115	120	123	123	124
Estonia	62[b]	66	70	69	64	64	69	71	72
Ireland	144[b]	145	146	131	128	128	128	129	126

GDP per capita in PPS

Code: tec0011

Index (EU28 = 100)

Data from 1st of June 2014. For most recent GDP data, consult dataset more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Greece	91[b]	92	90	93	95	89	81	76	75
Spain	102[b]	105	105	103	103	99	96	96	95
France	110[b]	108	108	107	109	109	109	109	108
Croatia	59[b]	60	62	65	63	60	60	61	61
Italy	105[b]	105	104	104	104	103	101	100	98
Cyprus	93[b]	93	94	99	100	97	93	91	86
Latvia	50[b]	53	57	58	54	55	60	64	67
Lithuania	55[b]	58	62	64	58	62	67	72	74
Luxembourg	254[b]	270	274	263	252	262	265	263	264
Hungary	63[b]	63	61	64	65	66	67	67	67
Malta	80[b]	79	78	81	84	87	86	86	87

GDP per capita in PPS

Code: tec0011

Index (EU28 = 100)

Data from 1st of June 2014. For most recent GDP data, consult dataset more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Netherlands	131[b]	131	132	134	132	130	129	127	127
Austria	125[b]	126	124	124	126	126	129	130	129
Poland	51[b]	52	54	56	60	63	65	67	68
Portugal	80[b]	79	79	78	80	80	77	76	75
Romania	35[b]	39[b]	43	49	50	51	51	53	54
Slovenia	87[b]	88	88	91	86	84	84	84	83
Slovakia	60[b]	63	68	72	73	74	75	76	76
Finland	114[b]	114	117	119	114	114	116	115	112
Sweden	122[b]	123	125	124	120	123	125	126	127
United Kingdom	124[b]	122	118	114	112	108	105	104	106

GDP per capita in PPS

Code: tec0011

Index (EU28 = 100)

Data from 1st of June 2014. For most recent GDP data, consult dataset more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Iceland	130[b]	123	121	123	120	114	114	115	116
Norway	177[b]	185	181	191	176	180	185	194	191
Switzerland	136[b]	139	144	148	150	152	154	158	158
Montenegro	31	36	40	43	41	42	42	41	42
Former Yugoslav Republic of Ma	29[b]	30	31	34	36	36	36	35	35
Serbia	32	32	33	36	36	35	36	35	36
Turkey	42[b]	44	45	47	46	50	53	54	55
Albania	22	23	23	25	27	26	30	30	30
Bosnia and Herzegovina	25	27	28	26	29	28	29	29	29
United States	165	159	156	151	150	151	149	155	155
Japan	113	109	109	105	102	105	103	106	106

Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) (source: SILC)

Code: tessi18

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	5	5.1	5.1	:
EU (27 countries)	5	5[s]	5	5	5	5	5.1	5.1	:
EU (15 countries)	4.8	4.7	4.9	4.9	4.9	5	5.1	5.1	:
New Member States (12)	6	5.8	5.5	5.2	5.1	5	5	5	:
Euro area (changing compositior	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Euro area (18 countries)	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.9	5	5.1	5	:
Euro area (17 countries)	4.6	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.9	5	5.1	5	:
Euro area (16 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	4	4.2	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	:
Bulgaria	3.7	5.1	7	6.5	5.9	5.9	6.5	6.1	6.6
Czech Republic	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4

Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) (source: SILC)

Code: tessi18

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Germany	3.8	4.1	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	:
Estonia	5.9	5.5	5.5	5	5	5	5.3	5.4	5.5
Ireland	5	4.9	4.8	4.4	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.7	:
Greece	5.8	6.1	6	5.9	5.8	5.6	6	6.6	:
Spain	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.7	6.4	7.2	7.1	7.2	6.3[b]
France	4	4	3.9	4.4[b]	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.5	:
Croatia	4.7	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.3	5.5[b]	5.4	5.4	:
Italy	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.6	5.5	5.7
Cyprus	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.3[b]	4.4	4.5	4.3	4.7	4.9
Latvia	6.7	7.8	6.4	7.3	7.4	6.8	6.5	6.5	6.3
Lithuania	6.9	6.3	5.9	5.9	6.4	7.3	5.8	5.3	6.1

Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) (source: SILC)

Code: tessi18

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Hungary	4	5.5	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.9	4	4.2
Malta	3.9	4	3.9	4.3	4	4.3	4	3.9	4.1
Netherlands	4	3.8	4	4	4	3.7	3.8	3.6	:
Austria	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.8	4.2[b]	4.1[p]
Poland	6.6	5.6	5.3	5.1	5	5	5	4.9	4.9
Portugal	7	6.7	6.5	6.1	6	5.6	5.7	5.8	:
Romania	4.9	5.3	7.8	7	6.7	6	6.2	6.3	:
Slovenia	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.6
Slovakia	3.9	4.1	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6
Finland	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.6
Sweden	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.7	:

Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20) (source: SILC)

Code: tessi18

The ratio of total income received by the 20 % of the population with the highest income ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Sweden	3.3	3.6	3.3	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.7	:
United Kingdom	5.9	5.4	5.3	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.3	5.4[b]	:
Iceland	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.8	4.2	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.4
Norway	4.1	4.8	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3
Switzerland	:	:	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.5	4.5	4.4	:
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Former Yugoslav Republic of Ma	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Serbia	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	:	11.3	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source: SILC)

Code: tessi19

Number

The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	30.5	30.8	30.6	:
EU (27 countries)	30.6[s]	30.3[s]	30.6	30.9	30.5	30.5	30.8	30.6	:
EU (15 countries)	29.9	29.6	30.3	30.8	30.4	30.5	30.9	30.7	:
New Member States (12)	33.2	33	31.8	31.3	30.7	30.2	30.5	30.3	:
Euro area (changing compositior	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Euro area (18 countries)	29.3	29.3	30	30.3	30.2	30.3	30.6	30.5	:
Euro area (17 countries)	29.3	29.2	30	30.3	30.2	30.2	30.5	30.4	:
Euro area (16 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Belgium	28	27.8	26.3	27.5	26.4	26.6	26.3	26.6	:
Bulgaria	25	31.2[b]	35.3	35.9	33.4	33.2	35	33.6	35.4
Czech Republic	26[b]	25.3	25.3	24.7	25.1	24.9	25.2	24.9	24.6

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source: SILC)

Code: tessi19

Number

The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Denmark	23.9	23.7	25.2	25.1	26.9	26.9	27.8	28.1	27.5
Germany	26.1[b]	26.8	30.4	30.2	29.1	29.3	29	28.3	:
Estonia	34.1	33.1	33.4	30.9	31.4	31.3	31.9	32.5	32.9
Ireland	31.9	31.9	31.3	29.9	28.8	30.7	29.8	29.9	:
Greece	33.2	34.3	34.3	33.4	33.1	32.9	33.5	34.3	:
Spain	32.2	31.9	31.9	31.9	33	34.4	34.5	35	33.7[b]
France	27.7	27.3	26.6	29.8[b]	29.9	29.8	30.8	30.5	:
Croatia	30	28	29	28	27	31.4	31	30.5	:
Italy	32.8	32.1	32.2	31	31.5	31.2	31.9	31.9	32.5
Cyprus	28.7[b]	28.8	29.8	29[b]	29.5	30.1	29.2	31	32.4
Latvia	36.2[b]	38.9	35.4	37.5	37.5	35.9	35.1	35.7	35.2

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source: SILC)

Code: tessi19

Number

The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Lithuania	36.3[b]	35	33.8	34	35.9	37	33	32	34.6
Luxembourg	26.5	27.8	27.4	27.7	29.2	27.9	27.2	28	:
Hungary	27.6[b]	33.3	25.6	25.2	24.7	24.1	26.8	26.9	28
Malta	27[b]	27.1	26.3	28.1	27.4	28.6	27.2	27.1	27.9
Netherlands	26.9[b]	26.4	27.6	27.6	27.2	25.5	25.8	25.4	:
Austria	26.2	25.3	26.2	26.2	25.7	26.1	26.3	27.6[b]	27[p]
Poland	35.6[b]	33.3	32.2	32	31.4	31.1	31.1	30.9	30.7
Portugal	38.1	37.7	36.8	35.8	35.4	33.7	34.2	34.5	:
Romania	31	33	37.8[b]	36	34.9	33.3	33.2	33.2	:
Slovenia	23.8[b]	23.7	23.2	23.4	22.7	23.8	23.8	23.7	24.4
Slovakia	26.2[b]	28.1	24.5	23.7	24.8	25.9	25.7	25.3	24.2

Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income (source: SILC)

Code: tessi190

Number

The Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares of the ... more

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,234

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Finland	26	25.9	26.2	26.3	25.9	25.4	25.8	25.9	25.4
Sweden	23.4	24	23.4	24	24.8	24.1	24.4	24.8	:
United Kingdom	34.6[b]	32.5	32.6	33.9	32.4	32.9	33	32.8[b]	:
Iceland	25.1	26.3	28	27.3	29.6	25.7	23.6	24	24
Norway	28.2	29.2	23.7	25.1	24.1	23.6	22.9	22.5	22.7
Switzerland	:	:	30.3	31.1	30.7	29.6	29.7	28.8	:
Montenegro	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Former Yugoslav Republic of Ma	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Serbia	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
Turkey	:	44.8	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion

Code: t2020_5

% and 1 000 persons

The Europe 2020 strategy promotes social inclusion, in particular through the reduction ... more

unit 1000 persons

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,2

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EU (28 countries)	:	:	:	:	:	118,085	121,543	124,488	:
EU (27 countries)	124,339[e]	123,051[e]	119,360	116,418	114,286	116,780	120,171	123,118	:
Euro area (18 countries)	69,271	70,725	70,641	70,475	70,085	71,616	75,372	77,066	:
Euro area (17 countries)	68,245	69,798	69,876	69,736	69,277	70,817	74,550	76,335	:
Belgium	2,338	2,247	2,261	2,194	2,145	2,235	2,271	2,356	:
Bulgaria	:	4,734	4,663	3,421[b]	3,511	3,719	3,693	3,621	3,493
Czech Republic	1,988	1,832	1,613	1,566	1,448	1,495	1,598	1,580	1,508
Denmark	921	896	905	887	962	1,007	1,039	1,057	1,059
Germany	15,022	16,444	16,760	16,345	16,217	15,962	16,074	15,909	:
Estonia	347	293	293	291	312	289	307	311	313
Ireland	1,038	991	1,005	1,050	1,150	1,220	1,319	1,378	:

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion

Code: t2020_5

% and 1 000 persons

The Europe 2020 strategy promotes social inclusion, in particular through the reduction ... more

unit 1000 persons

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Greece	3,131	3,154	3,064	3,046	3,007	3,031	3,403	3,795	:
Spain	10,481	10,519	10,373	11,124	11,232	12,316	12,791	13,090	12,630[b]
France	11,127	11,184	11,382	11,150[b]	11,200	11,712	11,840	11,760	:
Croatia	:	:	:	:	:	1,304	1,372	1,370	:
Italy	14,621	15,256	15,412	15,099	14,835	14,757	17,112	18,194	17,326
Cyprus	188	193	195	181[b]	188	202	207	234	240
Latvia	1,027	927	765	740[b]	808	798	821	731	702
Lithuania	1,400	1,217	967	928	943	1,068	1,011	975	917
Luxembourg	77	74	73	72	85	83	84	95	:
Hungary	3,185	3,121	2,916	2,794	2,924	2,948	3,051	3,188	3,285
Malta	81	78	79	81	82	86	90	94	99

People at risk of poverty or social exclusion

Code: t2020_5

% and 1 000 persons

The Europe 2020 strategy promotes social inclusion, in particular through the reduction ... more

unit 1000 persons

☑ Flags ○ Codes ◉ Labels ○ Codes & Labels ○ 1 234,56 ○ 1.234,56 ◉ 1,23

geo \ time	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Netherlands	2,705	2,603	2,558	2,432	2,483	2,483	2,598	2,492	:
Austria	1,369	1,454	1,376	1,532	1,406	1,373	1,407	1,542[b]	1,572[p]
Poland	17,080	14,938	12,958	11,491[b]	10,454	10,409	10,196	10,128	9,748
Portugal	2,745	2,640	2,653	2,757	2,648	2,693	2,601	2,667	:
Romania	:	:	9,904	9,418	9,112	8,890	8,630	8,907	:
Slovenia	362	343	335	361	339	366	386	392	410
Slovakia	1,724	1,439	1,150	1,111	1,061	1,118	1,112	1,109	1,070
Finland	887	886	907	910	886	890	949	916	854
Sweden	1,325	1,489	1,264	1,367	1,459	1,418	1,538	1,519	:
United Kingdom	14,530	14,193	13,527	14,069	13,389	14,211	14,044	15,078[b]	:
Iceland	38	36	38	36	36	42	41	38	40
Norway	746	780	764	701	724	716	705	681	714
Switzerland	:	:	1,301	1,333	1,338	1,291	1,308	1,350	:
Former Yugoslav Republic of Ma	:	:	:	:	:	972	1,038	:	:
Turkey	:	48,934	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

Gráfica 1.
EEUU: % de la población en umbrales de pobreza (1959-2007)



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Census Bureau.

Gráfica 2.
EEUU: Millones de familias en niveles de pobreza (2007)



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements.

Gráfica 4.
EE.UU: Distribución media del ingreso familiar anual promedio (todas las razas). (dólares constantes de 2007)



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Census Bureau, Tablas F-3 All races. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/ineqtoc.html

Gráfica 5.
EEUU: Quintil inferior de la distribución del ingreso familiar anual promedio según origen étnico (dólares de 2007)



Fuente: elaboración con datos del US Census Bureau, Tablas F-3 por raza. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/ineqtoc.html

Gráfica 6.
EEUU: Porcentaje de individuos pobres en el quintil inferior



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Census Bureau

Gráfica 7.
EEUU: Segundo quintil de la distribucion del ingreso familiar anual promedio segun origen étnico (dólares de 2007)



Fuente: elaboración con datos del US Census Bureau, Tablas F-3 por raza. http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/ineqtoc.html

Gráfica 8.
EEUU: Quintil superior de la distribución del ingreso familiar anual promedio según origen étnico (dólares de 2007)



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos d 3 por raza.
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/inco

http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/ineqtoc.html

Gráfica 10.
EEUU: Porcentaje del ingreso total en poder del 5% más rico de la población



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Census Bureau.
Ingresos promedio por familia y número de familias por quintil provienen respectivamente de http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f03AR.html, y http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f01AR.html. Cálculos propios del ingreso total a partir de los datos de dichas tablas.

Gráfica 11.
EEUU: Porcentaje del ingreso total en poder del 20% más rico de la población



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Census Bureau.
Ingresos promedio por familia y número de familias por quintil provienen respectivamente de http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f03AR.html, y http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f01AR.html. Cálculos propios del ingreso total a partir de los datos de dichas tablas.

Gráfica 12.
EEUU: Ingreso total en millones de dólares constantes de 2007



Fuente: elaboración propia con datos del US Census Bureau. Ingresos promedio por familia y número de familias por quintil provienen respectivamente de http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f03AR.html, y http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/f01AR.html. Cálculos propios del ingreso total a partir de los datos de dichas tablas.

Table 693. Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Households: 1970 to 2008

[Households as of March of the following year, (64,778 represents 64,778,000). Income in constant 2008 CPI-U-RS-adjusted dollars. The shares method ranks households from highest to lowest on the basis of income and then divides them into groups of equal population size, typically quintiles. The aggregate income of each group is then divided by the overall aggregate income to derive shares. Based on the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC); see text, this section and Section 1, and Appendix III. For data collection changes over time, see <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/history.html>]

Year	Number of households (1,000)	Income at selected positions (dollars)					Percent distribution of aggregate income					
		Upper limit of each fifth										
		Lowest	Second	Third	Fourth	Top 5 percent	Lowest 5th	Second 5th	Third 5th	Fourth 5th	Highest 5th	Top 5 percent
1970.	64,778	18,250	34,960	50,849	72,548	114,678	4.1	10.8	17.4	24.5	43.3	16.6
1980.	82,368	18,604	34,889	53,488	78,316	126,035	4.2	10.2	16.8	24.7	44.1	16.5
1990.	94,312	19,962	37,787	57,810	88,161	151,310	3.8	9.6	15.9	24.0	46.6	18.5
1995 [1]	99,627	20,201	37,756	58,922	91,359	158,521	3.7	9.1	15.2	23.3	48.7	21.0
2000 [2, 3] . . .	108,209	22,405	41,260	65,233	102,232	181,568	3.6	8.9	14.8	23.0	49.8	22.1
2001.	109,297	21,854	40,515	64,456	101,549	183,030	3.5	8.7	14.6	23.0	50.1	22.4
2002.	111,278	21,442	39,946	63,625	100,552	179,525	3.5	8.8	14.8	23.3	49.7	21.7
2003.	112,000	21,053	39,803	63,747	101,693	180,425	3.4	8.7	14.8	23.4	49.8	21.4
2004 [4]	113,343	21,072	39,525	62,955	100,311	179,133	3.4	8.7	14.7	23.2	50.1	21.8
2005.	114,384	21,151	39,704	63,593	101,141	183,081	3.4	8.6	14.6	23.0	50.4	22.2
2006.	116,011	21,395	40,338	64,073	103,619	185,824	3.4	8.6	14.5	22.9	50.5	22.3
2007.	116,783	21,071	40,602	64,382	103,842	183,801	3.4	8.7	14.8	23.4	49.7	21.2
2008.	117,181	20,712	39,000	62,725	100,240	180,000	3.4	8.6	14.7	23.3	50.0	21.5

[1] Data reflect full implementation of the 1990 census-based sample design and metropolitan definitions, 7,000 household sample reduction, and revised race edits. [2] Implementation of Census 2000-based population controls. [3] Implementation of a 28,000 household sample expansion. [4] Data have been revised to reflect a correction to the weights in the 2005 ASEC.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008*, Current Population Reports, P60-236RV, and Historical Tables—Tables H1 and H2, September 2009. See also <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/income.html> and <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/index.html>.

Table 1. Median Household Income in the Past 12 Months: 2000, 2011, and 2012

(In 2012 inflation-adjusted dollars. Data are limited to the household population and exclude the population living in institutions, college dormitories, and other group quarters. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see www.census .gov/acs/www/)

Area	2000 ACS median household income (dollars)		2011 ACS median household income (dollars)		2012 ACS median household income (dollars)		Change in median income (2000–2012)		Change in median income (2011–2012)	
							Percent		Percent	
	Estimate	Margin of error (±)[1]	Estimate	Margin of error (±)[1]	Estimate	Margin of error (±)[1]	Estimate	Margin of error (±)[1]	Estimate	Margin of error (±)[1]
United States . . .	55,030	259	51,324	75	51,371	53	*–6.6	0.4	0.1	0.2

Figure 4.
Change in U.S. Median Household Income: 2000 ACS to 2012 ACS
(Percentage change)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Surveys.

http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/IE-1.pdf

Table A-3.

Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion: 1967 to 2010

(Income in 2010 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars. For further explanation of income inequality measures, see Current Population Reports, Series P60-204, "The Changing Shape of the Nation's Income Distribution: 1947–1998." Standard errors presented in this table were calculated using general variance formula parameters and may differ from the standard errors in text tables that were calculated using replicate weights. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/apsd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar11.pdf*)

Measures of income dispersion	2010	2009[1]	2008	2007	2006	2005	2004[2]	2003	2002	2001	2000[3]
MEASURE											
Household Income at Selected Percentiles											
10th percentile limit	11,904	12,320	12,315	12,789	12,977	12,607	12,589	12,490	12,871	13,160	13,398
20th percentile limit	20,000	20,791	20,974	21,337	21,666	21,419	21,338	21,320	21,713	22,131	22,689
50th (median)	49,445	50,599	50,939	52,823	52,124	51,739	51,174	51,353	51,398	52,005	53,164
80th percentile limit	100,065	101,651	101,508	105,156	104,930	102,420	101,580	102,980	101,824	102,833	103,525
90th percentile limit	138,923	139,904	140,050	143,012	143,825	140,823	139,514	140,125	138,299	139,937	141,805
95th percentile limit	180,810	182,972	182,277	186,126	188,175	185,397	181,399	182,707	181,797	185,345	183,865
Household Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles											
90th/10th	11.67	11.36	11.37	11.18	11.08	11.17	11.08	11.22	10.75	10.63	10.58
95th/20th	9.04	8.80	8.69	8.72	8.69	8.66	8.50	8.57	8.37	8.38	8.10
95th/50th	3.66	3.62	3.58	3.52	3.61	3.58	3.54	3.56	3.54	3.56	3.46
80th/50th	2.02	2.01	1.99	1.99	2.01	1.98	1.98	2.01	1.98	1.98	1.95
80th/20th	5.00	4.89	4.84	4.93	4.84	4.78	4.76	4.83	4.69	4.65	4.56
20th/50th	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.43
Mean Household Income of Quintiles											
Lowest quintile	11,034	11,743	11,803	12,147	12,276	11,900	11,825	11,850	12,107	12,483	12,860
Second quintile	28,636	29,740	29,890	30,960	31,119	30,554	30,256	30,441	30,784	31,365	32,110
Third quintile	49,309	50,352	50,766	52,544	52,148	51,711	51,263	51,673	51,874	52,499	53,472
Fourth quintile	79,040	79,993	80,769	83,190	82,542	81,334	80,830	81,791	81,596	82,315	83,124
Highest quintile	169,633	173,664	173,221	176,632	181,858	178,230	174,803	174,359	174,211	179,768	180,129
Shares of Household Income of Quintiles											
Lowest quintile	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.6
Second quintile	8.5	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.9
Third quintile	14.6	14.6	14.7	14.8	14.5	14.6	14.7	14.8	14.8	14.6	14.8
Fourth quintile	23.4	23.2	23.3	23.4	22.9	23.0	23.2	23.4	23.3	23.0	23.0
Highest quintile	50.2	50.3	50.0	49.7	50.5	50.4	50.1	49.8	49.7	50.1	49.8
Summary Measures											
Gini index of income inequality	0.469	0.468	0.466	0.463	0.470	0.469	0.466	0.464	0.462	0.466	0.462
Mean logarithmic deviation of income	0.572	0.550	0.541	0.532	0.543	0.545	0.543	0.530	0.514	0.515	0.490
Theil	0.399	0.403	0.398	0.391	0.417	0.411	0.406	0.397	0.398	0.413	0.404
Atkinson:											
e=0.25	0.097	0.097	0.096	0.095	0.099	0.098	0.097	0.095	0.095	0.098	0.096
e=0.50	0.191	0.190	0.188	0.185	0.192	0.192	0.190	0.187	0.186	0.189	0.185
e=0.75	0.292	0.288	0.285	0.281	0.289	0.289	0.286	0.283	0.279	0.282	0.275

Table A-3.

Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion: 1967 to 2010—Con.

(Income in 2010 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars. For further explanation of income inequality measures, see Current Population Reports, Series P60-204, "The Changing Shape of the Nation's Income Distribution: 1947–1998." Standard errors presented in this table were calculated using general variance formula parameters and may differ from the standard errors in text tables that were calculated using replicate weights. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *www.census.gov/apsd/techdoc/cps/cpsmar11.pdf*)

Measures of income dispersion	1999[4]	1998	1997	1996	1995[5]	1994[6]	1993[7]	1992[8]	1991	1990	1989
MEASURE											
Household Income at Selected Percentiles											
10th percentile limit	13,538	12,958	12,482	12,329	12,325	11,679	11,420	11,419	11,587	11,838	12,224
20th percentile limit	22,423	21,528	20,859	20,435	20,456	19,532	19,267	19,185	19,657	20,215	20,536
50th (median)	53,252	51,944	50,123	49,112	48,408	46,937	46,419	46,646	47,032	48,423	49,076
80th percentile limit	103,678	100,188	96,846	94,116	92,514	91,421	89,597	88,321	88,612	89,276	91,187
90th percentile limit	141,032	135,320	132,282	127,374	124,584	123,487	121,455	118,077	118,468	119,832	122,162
95th percentile limit	185,813	176,596	171,410	165,414	160,526	159,767	155,478	150,767	150,499	153,224	155,771
Household Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles											
90th/10th	10.42	10.44	10.60	10.33	10.11	10.57	10.64	10.34	10.22	10.12	9.99
95th/20th	8.29	8.20	8.22	8.10	7.85	8.18	8.07	7.86	7.66	7.58	7.59
95th/50th	3.49	3.40	3.42	3.37	3.32	3.40	3.35	3.23	3.20	3.16	3.17
80th/50th	1.95	1.93	1.93	1.92	1.91	1.95	1.93	1.89	1.88	1.84	1.86
80th/20th	4.62	4.65	4.64	4.61	4.52	4.68	4.65	4.60	4.51	4.42	4.44
20th/50th	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42
Mean Household Income of Quintiles											
Lowest quintile	12,974	12,320	11,972	11,893	11,855	11,222	10,934	11,048	11,281	11,589	11,874
Second quintile	31,856	31,109	29,931	29,193	28,976	27,967	27,720	27,682	28,936	29,158	29,543
Third quintile	53,323	52,054	50,356	49,104	48,450	47,113	46,465	46,638	47,067	48,161	49,108
Fourth quintile	82,992	80,506	77,994	75,998	74,480	73,314	72,211	71,594	71,748	72,613	74,283
Highest quintile	176,980	170,358	166,282	159,843	155,428	154,128	150,446	138,723	137,583	140,915	145,209
Shares of Household Income of Quintiles											
Lowest quintile	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8
Second quintile	8.9	9.0	8.9	9.0	9.1	8.9	9.0	9.4	9.6	9.6	9.5
Third quintile	14.9	15.0	15.0	15.1	15.2	15.0	15.1	15.8	15.9	15.9	15.8
Fourth quintile	23.2	23.2	23.2	23.3	23.3	23.4	23.5	24.2	24.2	24.0	24.0
Highest quintile	49.4	49.2	49.4	49.0	48.7	49.1	48.9	46.9	46.5	46.6	46.8
Summary Measures											
Gini index of income inequality	0.458	0.456	0.459	0.455	0.450	0.456	0.454	0.433	0.428	0.428	0.431
Mean logarithmic deviation of income	0.476	0.488	0.484	0.464	0.452	0.471	0.467	0.416	0.411	0.402	0.406
Theil	0.386	0.389	0.396	0.389	0.378	0.387	0.385	0.323	0.313	0.317	0.324
Atkinson:											
e=0.25	0.092	0.093	0.094	0.093	0.090	0.092	0.092	0.080	0.078	0.078	0.080
e=0.50	0.180	0.181	0.183	0.179	0.175	0.180	0.178	0.160	0.156	0.156	0.158
e=0.75	0.268	0.271	0.272	0.266	0.261	0.268	0.266	0.242	0.237	0.236	0.239

Table IE-2. Measures of Individual Earnings Inequality for Full-Time, Year-Round Workers by Sex: 1967 to 2010

Year	Gini Coefficient			Income ratios			
				Men		Women	
	Both sexes combined	Men	Women	90/10	50/10	90/10	50/10
2010	0,397	0,408	0,357	5,50	2,40	4,94	2,22
2009	0,404	0,415	0,365	5,50	2,33	4,88	2,19
2008	0,403	0,416	0,356	5,50	2,25	4,69	2,19
2007	0,394	0,404	0,356	5,26	2,37	4,84	2,32
2006	0,411	0,419	0,373	5,56	2,33	4,67	2,16
2005	0,409	0,424	0,357	5,88	2,35	4,83	2,17
2004 35/	0,405	0,418	0,355	6,13	2,50	4,69	2,14
2003	0,401	0,410	0,359	5,93	2,47	4,64	2,14
2002	0,405	0,418	0,352	5,81	2,44	4,44	2,22
2001	0,409	0,419	0,362	5,77	2,44	4,62	2,23
2000 30/	0,405	0,418	0,345	5,67	2,47	4,67	2,25
1999 29/	0,399	0,408	0,344	5,33	2,39	4,50	2,17
1998	0,393	0,401	0,345	5,31	2,43	4,33	2,08
1997	0,394	0,403	0,341	5,36	2,38	4,46	2,23
1996	0,393	0,401	0,343	5,42	2,46	4,36	2,16

Table H-1. Income Limits for Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of All Households: 1967 to 2012

(Households as of March of the following year. Income in current and 2012 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars (29))

Year	Number (thousands)	Upper limit of each fifth (dollars)				Lower limit of top 5 percent
		Lowest	Second	Third	Fourth	
CURRENT DOLLARS						
2012	122.459	20.599	39.764	64.582	104.096	191.156
2011	121.084	20.262	38.520	62.434	101.582	186.000
2010 (37)	119.927	20.000	38.000	61.500	100.029	180.485
2009 (36)	117.538	20.453	38.550	61.801	100.000	180.001
2008	117.181	20.712	39.000	62.725	100.240	180.000
2007	116.783	20.291	39.100	62.000	100.000	177.000
2006	116.011	20.035	37.774	60.000	97.032	174.012
2005	114.384	19.178	36.000	57.660	91.705	166.000
2004 (35)	113.343	18.486	34.675	55.230	88.002	157.152
2003	112.000	17.984	34.000	54.453	86.867	154.120
2002	111.278	17.916	33.377	53.162	84.016	150.002
2001	109.297	17.970	33.314	53.000	83.500	150.499
2000 (30)	108.209	17.920	33.000	52.174	81.766	145.220
1999 (29)	106.434	17.136	31.920	50.384	79.232	142.000
1998	103.874	16.116	30.408	48.337	75.000	132.199
1997	102.528	15.400	29.200	46.000	71.500	126.550
1996	101.018	14.768	27.760	44.006	68.015	119.540

Social Security Online

Automatic Increases

Office of the Chief Actuary

Enter another year? 2005

Year must be after 1989 Go

Automatic increases

Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2005

January 10, 2011

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2005.

Net compensation components for 2005

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$5,187,693,318,654.53
Deferred compensation plan Contributions[a] Distributions[b]	 + 187,799,732,485.68 - 1,315,629,514.65
Net compensation	5,374,177,421,625.56

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 45,338,401 workers.

[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 71,654 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $5,374,177,421,625.56 divided by 151,603,359, or $35,448.93. Based on data in the table below, about 65.8 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $35,448.93 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $23,962.20 for 2005.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	25,800,867	25,800,867	17.01866	$52,584,037,311.39	$2,038.07
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	14,955,146	40,756,013	26.88332	110,514,011,142.68	7,389.70
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	13,040,926	53,796,939	35.48532	162,355,229,820.98	12,449.67
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	12,478,603	66,275,542	43.71641	218,154,652,842.55	17,482.30
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	11,921,592	78,197,134	51.58008	267,824,952,648.57	22,465.54
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,951,856	89,148,990	58.80410	300,653,949,958.55	27,452.33
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,854,261	99,003,251	65.30413	319,609,034,351.17	32,433.59
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,485,280	107,488,531	70.90115	317,572,926,135.65	37,426.33
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,175,557	114,664,088	75.63427	304,328,205,382.53	42,411.79
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	5,968,474	120,632,562	79.57117	282,996,121,786.07	47,415.16

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	4,926,228	125,558,790	82.82059	258,132,510,481.27	52,399.63
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	3,988,360	129,547,150	85.45137	228,998,907,354.05	57,416.81
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,347,579	132,894,729	87.65949	208,876,102,227.56	62,396.17
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	2,739,247	135,633,976	89.46634	184,635,152,314.56	67,403.62
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,256,433	137,890,409	90.95472	163,364,923,471.52	72,399.63
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	1,871,032	139,761,441	92.18888	144,843,317,109.12	77,413.60
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	1,542,949	141,304,390	93.20664	127,166,258,863.54	82,417.67
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,280,912	142,585,302	94.05155	111,979,360,024.41	87,421.59
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,093,503	143,678,805	94.77284	101,033,233,540.68	92,394.11
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	916,550	144,595,355	95.37741	89,296,840,008.63	97,427.13
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	784,591	145,379,946	95.89494	80,339,757,272.07	102,396.99
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	642,032	146,021,978	96.31843	68,968,812,231.04	107,422.70
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	546,022	146,568,000	96.67860	61,381,415,192.54	112,415.64
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	464,224	147,032,224	96.98481	54,512,710,233.07	117,427.60
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	410,324	147,442,548	97.25546	50,217,004,058.94	122,383.78
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	347,337	147,789,885	97.48457	44,259,128,851.50	127,424.17
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	310,652	148,100,537	97.68948	41,130,129,902.49	132,399.37
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	267,527	148,368,064	97.86595	36,763,626,718.58	137,420.25
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	235,945	148,604,009	98.02158	33,605,175,135.10	142,428.00
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	209,638	148,813,647	98.15986	30,910,414,514.61	147,446.62
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	189,830	149,003,477	98.28508	28,920,081,689.01	152,347.27
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	166,721	149,170,198	98.39505	26,245,711,843.16	157,422.95
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	149,936	149,320,134	98.49395	24,347,360,451.02	162,385.02
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	137,049	149,457,183	98.58435	22,951,064,004.66	167,466.12
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	122,004	149,579,187	98.66482	21,035,846,240.75	172,419.32
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	110,249	149,689,436	98.73755	19,559,435,261.78	177,411.45
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	102,912	149,792,348	98.80543	18,767,161,923.77	182,361.26
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	89,793	149,882,141	98.86466	16,831,520,235.52	187,448.02
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	83,862	149,966,003	98.91997	16,137,509,598.31	192,429.34
195,000.00 — 199,999.99	79,057	150,045,060	98.97212	15,612,597,426.06	197,485.33

200,000.00 — 249,999.99	553,935	150,598,995	99.33751	122,804,534,347.47	221,694.85
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	288,496	150,887,491	99.52780	78,631,690,773.04	272,557.30
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	178,501	151,065,992	99.64554	57,635,860,138.81	322,888.16
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	117,824	151,183,816	99.72326	43,978,232,480.13	373,253.60
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	82,506	151,266,322	99.77769	34,924,274,955.15	423,293.76
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	59,658	151,325,980	99.81704	28,260,593,139.55	473,710.03
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	195,374	151,521,354	99.94591	130,511,513,243.39	668,008.61
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	39,925	151,561,279	99.97224	47,966,871,541.18	1,201,424.46
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	14,991	151,576,270	99.98213	25,716,087,320.08	1,715,435.08
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	7,854	151,584,124	99.98731	17,480,388,266.63	2,225,666.96
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	4,662	151,588,786	99.99039	12,699,958,491.41	2,724,143.82
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	3,105	151,591,891	99.99244	10,031,544,925.78	3,230,771.31
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,099	151,593,990	99.99382	7,840,560,008.36	3,735,378.76
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,559	151,595,549	99.99485	6,594,837,150.82	4,230,171.36
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,166	151,596,715	99.99562	5,520,142,143.77	4,734,255.70
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	4,511	151,601,226	99.99859	30,760,431,713.06	6,818,982.87
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,515	151,602,741	99.99959	20,406,458,202.63	13,469,609.37
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	516	151,603,257	99.99993	14,862,157,267.50	28,802,630.36
50,000,000.00 and over	102	151,603,359	100.00000	10,135,095,957.34	99,363,685.86

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Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2006

January 10, 2011

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to incor utions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2(

compensation: compensación, indemnización, enmienda, pago de dinero
Inhabilitar

Net compensation components for 2006

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$5,504,411,170,970.31
Deferred compensation plan Contributions[a] Distributions[b]	 + 201,842,208,022.83 - 1,659,947,378.61
Net compensation	5,704,593,431,614.53

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 46,845,935 workers.

[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 73,770 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $5,704,593,431,614.53 divided by 153,852,734, or $37,078.27. Based on data in the table below, about 66.2 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $37,078.27 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $24,891.59 for 2006.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	25,600,469	25,600,469	16.63959	$52,355,067,500.69	$2,045.08
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	14,735,008	40,335,477	26.21694	108,774,109,947.88	7,382.02
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,805,934	53,141,411	34.54044	159,422,884,337.50	12,449.14
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	12,213,200	65,354,611	42.47868	213,550,531,488.46	17,485.22
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	11,818,074	77,172,685	50.16010	265,541,011,708.56	22,469.06
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,942,145	88,114,830	57.27219	300,397,551,691.62	27,453.26
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,926,055	98,040,885	63.72385	321,908,559,336.14	32,430.66
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,671,127	106,712,012	69.35984	324,508,701,609.42	37,424.05
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,373,254	114,085,266	74.15225	312,751,148,935.10	42,416.98
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,180,108	120,265,374	78.16915	293,081,037,281.43	47,423.29

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,164,162	125,429,536	81.52571	270,620,142,434.13	52,403.50
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,210,607	129,640,143	84.26249	241,763,246,540.49	57,417.67
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,553,065	133,193,208	86.57188	221,714,178,622.14	62,400.82
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	2,941,999	136,135,207	88.48410	198,315,248,944.71	67,408.33
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,447,183	138,582,390	90.07470	177,195,663,692.39	72,408.02
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,034,752	140,617,142	91.39723	157,517,206,199.45	77,413.47
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	1,689,225	142,306,367	92.49518	139,220,427,542.49	82,416.75
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,406,346	143,712,713	93.40927	122,939,315,314.71	87,417.55
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,199,463	144,912,176	94.18889	110,847,458,984.74	92,414.24
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,014,855	145,927,031	94.84851	98,876,912,092.88	97,429.60
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	872,744	146,799,775	95.41577	89,368,349,411.94	102,399.27
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	723,282	147,523,057	95.88589	77,696,776,875.07	107,422.52
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	614,808	148,137,865	96.28549	69,117,269,060.39	112,420.90
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	529,050	148,666,915	96.62936	62,126,699,856.25	117,430.68
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	464,309	149,131,224	96.93115	56,821,016,910.31	122,377.59
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	393,341	149,524,565	97.18681	50,118,419,458.89	127,417.23
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	348,498	149,873,063	97.41332	46,141,844,450.43	132,402.04
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	305,126	150,178,189	97.61165	41,933,164,186.25	137,429.01
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	269,012	150,447,201	97.78650	38,313,988,010.96	142,424.83
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	236,149	150,683,350	97.93999	34,822,024,298.80	147,457.85
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	214,606	150,897,956	98.07948	32,695,431,674.63	152,350.97
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	189,031	151,086,987	98.20234	29,758,722,894.63	157,427.74
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	169,540	151,256,527	98.31254	27,532,376,446.98	162,394.58
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	151,578	151,408,105	98.41106	25,381,138,058.66	167,446.05
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	137,920	151,546,025	98.50070	23,782,100,352.87	172,434.02
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	129,770	151,675,795	98.58505	23,017,372,632.98	177,370.52
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	117,556	151,793,351	98.66146	21,437,811,318.62	182,362.54
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	102,646	151,895,997	98.72818	19,239,826,400.99	187,438.64
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	95,724	151,991,721	98.79039	18,421,649,144.79	192,445.46
195,000.00 — 199,999.99	90,240	152,081,961	98.84905	17,820,057,685.72	197,474.04

200,000.00 — 249,999.99	624,776	152,706,737	99.25513	138,685,096,142.42	221,975.71
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	328,791	153,035,528	99.46884	89,614,736,646.81	272,558.36
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	201,924	153,237,452	99.60008	65,194,619,442.91	322,867.12
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	133,314	153,370,766	99.68673	49,770,990,623.26	373,336.56
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	93,670	153,464,436	99.74762	39,654,226,650.67	423,339.67
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	68,034	153,532,470	99.79184	32,231,744,473.88	473,759.36
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	225,173	153,757,643	99.93819	150,610,234,730.51	668,864.54
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	45,976	153,803,619	99.96808	55,292,348,467.93	1,202,635.04
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	17,718	153,821,337	99.97959	30,408,093,498.63	1,716,226.07
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	9,243	153,830,580	99.98560	20,556,291,320.07	2,223,984.78
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	5,384	153,835,964	99.98910	14,707,106,013.83	2,731,631.87
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	3,550	153,839,514	99.99141	11,468,535,124.77	3,230,573.27
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,503	153,842,017	99.99303	9,359,512,602.03	3,739,317.86
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,814	153,843,831	99.99421	7,690,319,909.97	4,239,426.63
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,305	153,845,136	99.99506	6,183,113,275.47	4,738,017.84
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	5,162	153,850,298	99.99842	34,834,525,444.51	6,748,261.42
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,729	153,852,027	99.99954	23,396,975,319.25	13,532,085.20
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	581	153,852,608	99.99992	16,848,593,135.91	28,999,299.72
50,000,000.00 and over	126	153,852,734	100.00000	11,239,925,456.61	89,205,757.59

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Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2007

January 10, 2011

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2007.

Net compensation components for 2007

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$5,815,546,063,947.82
Deferred compensation plan Contributions[a] Distributions[b]	 + 217,038,111,860.58 - 2,526,833,236.26
Net compensation	6,030,057,342,572.14

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 49,302,119 workers.

[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 68,345 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $6,030,057,342,572.14 divided by 155,570,422, or $38,760.95. Based on data in the table below, about 66.6 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $38,760.95 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $25,737.20 for 2007.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	25,233,419	25,233,419	16.21993	$51,477,125,732.71	$2,040.04
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	14,603,523	39,836,942	25.60702	107,793,228,587.40	7,381.32
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,640,644	52,477,586	33.73237	157,374,853,308.34	12,449.91
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,999,692	64,477,278	41.44572	209,817,250,231.69	17,485.22
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	11,660,518	76,137,796	48.94105	262,038,598,373.87	22,472.29
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,829,087	86,966,883	55.90194	297,322,022,107.14	27,455.87
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,925,497	96,892,380	62.28201	321,914,267,319.88	32,433.06
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,748,525	105,640,905	67.90552	327,484,166,380.96	37,433.07
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,509,832	113,150,737	72.73281	318,594,155,286.38	42,423.61
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,355,941	119,506,678	76.81838	301,448,656,428.27	47,427.86

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,368,056	124,874,734	80.26894	281,312,147,079.39	52,404.85
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,403,847	129,278,581	83.09972	252,873,369,860.30	57,421.02
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,726,094	133,004,675	85.49483	232,515,486,901.26	62,401.94
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,116,831	136,121,506	87.49832	210,121,300,739.98	67,415.04
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,611,648	138,733,154	89.17708	189,114,665,157.96	72,412.00
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,192,141	140,925,295	90.58618	169,698,894,556.45	77,412.40
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	1,825,549	142,750,844	91.75963	150,464,047,813.30	82,421.26
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,530,485	144,281,329	92.74342	133,798,605,776.73	87,422.36
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,304,596	145,585,925	93.58201	120,562,894,937.66	92,413.97
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,114,699	146,700,624	94.29853	108,608,582,993.21	97,433.10
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	962,908	147,663,532	94.91749	98,605,854,246.73	102,404.23
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	804,695	148,468,227	95.43474	86,448,982,217.57	107,430.74
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	685,244	149,153,471	95.87521	77,034,278,769.12	112,418.76
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	592,089	149,745,560	96.25580	69,535,346,106.38	117,440.70
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	521,372	150,266,932	96.59094	63,810,363,395.43	122,389.32
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	442,781	150,709,713	96.87556	56,418,939,635.25	127,419.51
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	389,295	151,099,008	97.12579	51,545,299,036.66	132,406.78
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	342,897	151,441,905	97.34621	47,127,268,098.01	137,438.55
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	305,487	151,747,392	97.54257	43,511,850,077.27	142,434.38
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	268,748	152,016,140	97.71532	39,628,022,129.06	147,454.20
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	241,922	152,258,062	97.87083	36,861,324,451.24	152,368.63
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	214,002	152,472,064	98.00839	33,689,476,551.93	157,425.99
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	188,967	152,661,031	98.12986	30,689,662,202.23	162,407.52
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	169,628	152,830,659	98.23889	28,403,012,132.62	167,442.95
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	153,085	152,983,744	98.33729	26,398,913,594.59	172,446.12
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	140,205	153,123,949	98.42742	24,875,872,885.79	177,425.01
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	135,464	153,259,413	98.51449	24,696,959,299.60	182,313.82
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	115,958	153,375,371	98.58903	21,735,481,370.14	187,442.71
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	106,219	153,481,590	98.65731	20,440,446,092.78	192,436.82
195,000.00 — 199,999.99	101,127	153,582,717	98.72231	19,970,254,499.72	197,476.98

200,000.00 — 249,999.99	698,095	154,280,812	99.17104	155,049,898,351.66	222,104.30
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	365,744	154,646,556	99.40614	99,706,099,206.32	272,611.72
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	227,133	154,873,689	99.55214	73,323,794,451.03	322,823.17
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	151,089	155,024,778	99.64926	56,409,988,598.82	373,356.03
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	105,540	155,130,318	99.71710	44,684,891,482.85	423,392.95
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	76,927	155,207,245	99.76655	36,445,713,079.28	473,770.11
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	252,890	155,460,135	99.92911	169,157,992,992.84	668,899.49
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	52,558	155,512,693	99.96289	63,256,692,989.50	1,203,559.74
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	20,234	155,532,927	99.97590	34,757,626,168.71	1,717,783.24
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	10,821	155,543,748	99.98285	24,074,945,877.40	2,224,835.59
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	6,474	155,550,222	99.98702	17,675,712,021.74	2,730,261.36
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	4,209	155,554,431	99.98972	13,610,674,328.53	3,233,707.37
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,911	155,557,342	99.99159	10,878,966,404.90	3,737,192.17
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	2,184	155,559,526	99.99300	9,240,315,569.81	4,230,913.72
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,579	155,561,105	99.99401	7,479,767,292.83	4,737,028.05
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	6,252	155,567,357	99.99803	42,158,750,246.99	6,743,242.20
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	2,096	155,569,453	99.99938	28,369,725,183.44	13,535,174.23
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	818	155,570,271	99.99990	23,823,259,265.64	29,123,788.83
50,000,000.00 and over	151	155,570,422	100.00000	14,190,602,694.85	93,977,501.29

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Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2008

January 10, 2011

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2008.

Net compensation components for 2008

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$5,942,130,003,268.88
Deferred compensation plan	
Contributions[a]	+ 223,580,219,475.15
Distributions[b]	- 2,323,491,822.33
Net compensation	6,163,386,730,921.70

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 50,889,838 workers.

[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 66,608 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $6,163,386,730,921.70 divided by 155,434,562, or $39,652.61. Based on data in the table below, about 66.2 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $39,652.61 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $26,514.38 for 2008.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	24,596,809	24,596,809	15.82454	$49,955,916,999.79	$2,030.99
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	14,302,015	38,898,824	25.02585	105,618,963,100.30	7,384.90
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,379,776	51,278,600	32.99047	154,177,311,464.33	12,453.97
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,708,666	62,987,266	40.52333	204,732,802,232.30	17,485.58
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	11,426,640	74,413,906	47.87475	256,788,787,610.01	22,472.82
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,629,682	85,043,588	54.71343	291,868,158,332.66	27,457.84
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,800,998	94,844,586	61.01898	317,928,850,718.02	32,438.42
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,674,122	103,518,708	66.59954	324,757,045,666.11	37,439.76
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,490,687	111,009,395	71.41873	317,808,192,332.82	42,427.11
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,420,193	117,429,588	75.54921	304,506,489,554.06	47,429.49

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,301,609	119,215,777	78.99388	277,922,136,520.21	52,422.22
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,395,963	123,611,740	81.90670	252,428,789,840.32	57,422.86
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,729,822	127,341,562	84.37813	232,756,599,889.11	62,404.21
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,124,692	130,466,254	86.44859	210,672,359,836.68	67,421.80
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,663,699	133,129,953	88.21359	192,911,915,197.40	72,422.57
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,262,760	135,392,713	89.71293	175,190,329,565.09	77,423.29
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	1,903,250	137,295,963	90.97404	156,869,518,449.26	82,421.92
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,607,260	138,903,223	92.03903	140,521,817,492.12	87,429.42
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,381,000	140,284,223	92.95410	127,624,390,972.37	92,414.48
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,183,030	141,467,253	93.73799	115,258,230,231.65	97,426.30
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	1,025,302	142,492,555	94.41737	105,002,731,824.09	102,411.52
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	873,979	143,366,534	94.99648	93,894,659,638.59	107,433.54
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	753,066	144,119,600	95.49547	84,662,499,440.62	112,423.74
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	654,494	144,774,094	95.92915	76,861,689,397.18	117,436.81
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	577,780	145,351,874	96.31199	70,722,760,569.97	122,404.31
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	494,372	145,846,246	96.63957	62,997,406,373.02	127,429.16
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	437,216	146,283,462	96.92927	57,891,303,797.22	132,408.93
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	378,229	146,661,691	97.17989	51,982,549,943.15	137,436.71
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	337,397	146,999,088	97.40346	48,059,447,760.69	142,441.83
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	300,891	147,299,979	97.60283	44,368,779,815.80	147,457.98
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	271,864	147,571,843	97.78297	41,425,224,164.13	152,374.81
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	238,184	147,810,027	97.94079	37,496,905,469.44	157,428.31
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	208,258	148,018,285	98.07879	33,824,594,145.14	162,416.78
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	187,126	148,205,411	98.20278	31,333,698,142.29	167,447.06
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	166,369	148,371,780	98.31302	28,690,328,285.63	172,449.97
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	150,896	148,522,676	98.41300	26,773,108,571.89	177,427.56
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	140,044	148,662,720	98.50580	25,542,408,851.66	182,388.46
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	[illegible]	148,786,542	98.58785	23,209,738,825.30	187,444.39
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	112,945	148,899,487	98.66268	21,735,439,129.11	192,442.69

150: (no se han obtenido resultados)
Inhabilitar

195,000.00 — 199,999.99	108,372	149,007,859	98.73449	21,397,480,463.31	197,444.73
200,000.00 — 249,999.99	711,569	149,719,428	99.20599	158,051,757,378.61	222,117.26
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	368,345	150,087,773	99.45006	100,303,661,461.52	272,309.01
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	217,974	150,305,747	99.59449	70,355,983,023.10	322,772.36
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	142,454	150,448,201	99.68888	53,161,558,551.31	373,184.04
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	99,121	150,547,322	99.75456	41,955,976,290.52	423,280.40
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	71,229	150,618,551	99.80176	33,743,916,530.20	473,738.46
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	221,035	150,839,586	99.94822	146,696,951,893.49	663,682.00
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	39,938	150,879,524	99.97468	47,922,426,818.64	1,199,920.55
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	14,569	150,894,093	99.98434	24,999,543,139.95	1,715,940.91
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	7,152	150,901,245	99.98907	15,929,313,996.06	2,227,253.08
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	4,166	150,905,411	99.99184	11,369,006,070.86	2,728,998.10
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	2,730	150,908,141	99.99364	8,823,715,904.14	3,232,130.37
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	1,841	150,909,982	99.99486	6,870,693,430.16	3,732,044.23
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,415	150,911,397	99.99580	5,996,927,394.95	4,238,111.23
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,029	150,912,426	99.99648	4,864,010,072.56	4,726,929.13
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	3,689	150,916,115	99.99893	24,962,145,644.16	6,766,642.90
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,193	150,917,308	99.99972	15,942,214,986.70	13,363,130.75
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	353	150,917,661	99.99995	10,135,019,059.06	28,711,102.15
50,000,000.00 and over	72	150,917,733	100.00000	6,057,555,672.59	84,132,717.67

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Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2009

October 27, 2010

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2009.

Net compensation components for 2009

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$5,718,676,461,574.08
Deferred compensation plan Contributions[a] Distributions[b]	 + 209,685,825,910.28 - 1,995,666,112.73
Net compensation	5,926,366,621,371.63

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 48,534,389 workers.

[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 61,023 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $5,926,366,621,371.63 divided by 150,917,735, or $39,268.85. Based on data in the table below, about 65.9 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $39,268.85 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $26,261.29 for 2009.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	24,315,992	24,315,992	16.11208	$49,028,574,504.54	$2,016.31
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	14,053,382	38,369,374	25.42403	103,868,343,297.43	7,390.99
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,180,076	50,549,450	33.49470	151,706,999,176.09	12,455.34
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,345,745	61,895,195	41.01254	198,265,509,739.58	17,474.88
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	10,931,009	72,826,204	48.25556	245,657,686,567.18	22,473.47
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,151,492	82,977,696	54.98207	278,734,377,401.77	27,457.48
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,359,654	92,337,350	61.18390	303,627,966,073.97	32,440.08
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,270,472	100,607,822	66.66402	309,648,803,745.54	37,440.28
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,153,936	107,761,758	71.40430	303,500,450,717.81	42,424.26
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,152,410	113,914,168	75.48097	291,824,690,257.70	47,432.58

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,301,609	119,215,777	78.99388	277,922,136,520.21	52,422.22
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,395,963	123,611,740	81.90670	252,428,789,840.32	57,422.86
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,729,822	127,341,562	84.37813	232,756,599,889.11	62,404.21
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,124,692	130,466,254	86.44859	210,672,359,836.68	67,421.80
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,663,699	133,129,953	88.21359	192,911,915,197.40	72,422.57
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,262,760	135,392,713	89.71292	175,190,329,565.09	77,423.29
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	1,903,250	137,295,963	90.97404	156,869,518,449.26	82,421.92
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,607,260	138,903,223	92.03903	140,521,817,492.12	87,429.42
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,381,000	140,284,223	92.95410	127,624,390,972.37	92,414.48
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,183,030	141,467,253	93.73799	115,258,230,231.65	97,426.30
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	1,025,302	142,492,555	94.41737	105,002,731,824.09	102,411.52
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	873,979	143,366,534	94.99648	93,894,659,638.59	107,433.54
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	753,066	144,119,600	95.49547	84,662,499,440.62	112,423.74
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	654,494	144,774,094	95.92915	76,861,689,397.18	117,436.81
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	577,780	145,351,874	96.31199	70,722,760,569.97	122,404.31
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	494,372	145,846,246	96.63957	62,997,406,373.02	127,429.16
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	437,216	146,283,462	96.92927	57,891,303,797.22	132,408.93
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	378,229	146,661,691	97.17989	51,982,549,943.15	137,436.71
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	337,397	146,999,088	97.40345	48,059,447,760.69	142,441.83
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	300,891	147,299,979	97.60283	44,368,779,815.80	147,457.98
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	271,864	147,571,843	97.78297	41,425,224,164.13	152,374.81
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	238,184	147,810,027	97.94079	37,496,905,469.44	157,428.31
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	208,258	148,018,285	98.07879	33,824,594,145.14	162,416.78
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	187,126	148,205,411	98.20278	31,333,698,142.29	167,447.06
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	166,369	148,371,780	98.31302	28,690,328,285.63	172,449.97
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	150,896	148,522,676	98.41300	26,773,108,571.89	177,427.56
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	140,044	148,662,720	98.50580	25,542,408,851.66	182,388.46
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	123,822	148,786,542	98.58784	23,209,738,825.30	187,444.39
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	112,945	148,899,487	98.66268	21,735,439,129.11	192,442.69

195,000.00 — 199,999.99	108,372	149,007,859	98.73449	21,397,480,463.31	197,444.73
200,000.00 — 249,999.99	711,569	149,719,428	99.20599	158,051,757,378.61	222,117.26
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	368,345	150,087,773	99.45006	100,303,661,461.52	272,309.01
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	217,974	150,305,747	99.59449	70,355,983,023.10	322,772.36
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	142,454	150,448,201	99.68888	53,161,558,551.31	373,184.04
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	99,121	150,547,322	99.75456	41,955,976,290.52	423,280.40
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	71,229	150,618,551	99.80176	33,743,916,530.20	473,738.46
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	221,035	150,839,586	99.94822	146,696,951,893.49	663,682.00
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	39,938	150,879,524	99.97468	47,922,426,818.64	1,199,920.55
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	14,569	150,894,093	99.98433	24,999,543,139.95	1,715,940.91
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	7,152	150,901,245	99.98907	15,929,313,996.06	2,227,253.08
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	4,166	150,905,411	99.99183	11,369,006,070.86	2,728,998.10
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	2,730	150,908,141	99.99364	8,823,715,904.14	3,232,130.37
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	1,841	150,909,982	99.99486	6,870,693,430.16	3,732,044.23
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,415	150,911,397	99.99580	5,996,927,394.95	4,238,111.23
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,029	150,912,426	99.99648	4,864,010,072.56	4,726,929.13
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	3,689	150,916,115	99.99893	24,962,145,644.16	6,766,642.90
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,193	150,917,308	99.99972	15,942,214,986.70	13,363,130.75
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	353	150,917,661	99.99995	10,135,019,059.06	28,711,102.15
50,000,000.00 and over	74	150,917,735	100.00000	38,389,555,641.59	518,777,778.94

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Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2010

September 20, 2014

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2010.

Net compensation components for 2010

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$5,799,538,431,420.40
Deferred compensation plan	
Contributions[a]	+ 212,364,705,164.50
Distributions[b]	- 2,072,080,672.79
Net compensation	6,009,831,055,912.11

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 47,852,636 workers.
[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 59,102 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $6,009,831,055,912.11 divided by 150,398,796, or $39,959.30. Based on data in the table below, about 66.2 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $39,959.30 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $26,363.55 for 2010.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	24,124,490	24,124,490	16.04035	$48,646,973,007.81	$2,016.50
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	14,029,306	38,153,796	25.36842	103,753,773,866.59	7,395.50
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,239,188	50,392,984	33.50624	152,427,728,694.61	12,454.07
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,314,730	61,707,714	41.02939	197,591,579,979.58	17,463.22
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	10,711,552	72,419,266	48.15149	240,657,454,356.43	22,467.09
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	9,920,973	82,340,239	54.74794	272,372,689,057.65	27,454.23
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,181,734	91,521,973	60.85286	297,856,791,084.05	32,440.15
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,123,718	99,645,691	66.25431	304,119,965,262.31	37,436.06
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,083,492	106,729,183	70.96412	300,495,102,674.41	42,421.89
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,097,608	112,826,791	75.01841	289,248,398,193.81	47,436.37

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,261,803	118,088,594	78.51698	275,827,977,102.56	52,420.81
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,391,809	122,480,403	81.43709	252,201,137,270.38	57,425.34
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,755,285	126,235,688	83.93398	234,345,106,845.96	62,404.08
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,152,922	129,388,610	86.03035	212,574,544,714.55	67,421.44
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,688,746	132,077,356	87.81809	194,725,012,743.34	72,422.24
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,290,214	134,367,570	89.34085	177,309,820,908.13	77,420.63
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	1,932,596	136,300,166	90.62584	159,302,114,025.99	82,429.08
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,628,721	137,928,887	91.70877	142,392,656,555.10	87,426.06
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,403,871	139,332,758	92.64220	129,742,569,123.36	92,417.73
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,210,074	140,542,832	93.44678	117,904,205,038.18	97,435.53
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	1,040,609	141,583,441	94.13868	106,569,974,109.48	102,411.16
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	890,767	142,474,208	94.73095	95,697,619,665.68	107,432.83
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	772,130	143,246,338	95.24434	86,816,591,986.17	112,437.79
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	672,117	143,918,455	95.69123	78,936,296,312.24	117,444.28
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	598,154	144,516,609	96.08894	73,212,549,384.88	122,397.49
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	509,430	145,026,039	96.42766	64,914,648,997.80	127,426.04
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	450,398	145,476,437	96.72713	59,634,801,743.25	132,404.68
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	391,891	145,868,328	96.98770	53,858,115,803.95	137,431.37
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	348,926	146,217,254	97.21970	49,701,898,494.99	142,442.52
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	311,559	146,528,813	97.42685	45,943,416,303.38	147,462.97
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	285,585	146,814,398	97.61674	43,518,448,133.81	152,383.52
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	248,689	147,063,087	97.78209	39,150,566,369.42	157,427.82
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	217,907	147,280,994	97.92698	35,392,486,406.72	162,420.14
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	194,939	147,475,933	98.05659	32,640,763,728.60	167,440.91
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	173,966	147,649,899	98.17226	30,000,284,388.51	172,449.12
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	158,372	147,808,271	98.27756	28,098,893,722.00	177,423.37
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	145,880	147,954,151	98.37456	26,606,092,824.50	182,383.42
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	129,145	148,083,296	98.46043	24,208,233,519.82	187,450.03
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	119,376	148,202,672	98.53980	22,972,949,697.47	192,441.95

195,000.00 — 199,999.99	115,214	148,317,886	98.61641	22,748,330,596.58	197,444.15
200,000.00 — 249,999.99	754,976	149,072,862	99.11839	167,770,686,013.48	222,219.89
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	400,691	149,473,553	99.38481	109,147,681,171.06	272,398.63
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	239,537	149,713,090	99.54407	77,330,214,517.35	322,832.02
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	155,994	149,869,084	99.64780	58,236,608,391.83	373,325.95
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	109,488	149,978,572	99.72059	46,369,580,509.46	423,512.90
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	78,367	150,056,939	99.77270	37,125,440,813.66	473,738.19
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	248,132	150,305,071	99.93768	165,132,665,514.88	665,503.30
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	47,058	150,352,129	99.96897	56,407,545,099.25	1,198,681.31
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	17,624	150,369,753	99.98069	30,281,661,733.66	1,718,205.95
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	8,767	150,378,520	99.98652	19,483,916,134.04	2,222,415.44
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	5,094	150,383,614	99.98991	13,898,453,753.59	2,728,396.89
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	3,276	150,386,890	99.99208	10,587,274,867.50	3,231,768.89
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,296	150,389,186	99.99361	8,582,789,583.21	3,738,148.77
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,685	150,390,871	99.99473	7,136,341,859.33	4,235,217.72
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,221	150,392,092	99.99554	5,777,737,172.66	4,731,971.48
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	4,607	150,396,699	99.99861	31,219,871,728.03	6,776,616.39
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,537	150,398,236	99.99963	20,800,268,400.87	13,533,030.84
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	479	150,398,715	99.99995	13,975,877,397.41	29,177,197.07
50,000,000.00 and over	81	150,398,796	100.00000	6,447,878,556.79	79,603,438.97

Office of the Chief Actuary

Enter another year? 2011
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Automatic increases

Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2011

September 20, 2014

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2011.

Net compensation components for 2011

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$6,018,898,816,536.09
Deferred compensation plan Contributions[a] Distributions[b]	 + 221,406,548,587.99 - 1,698,115,182.82
Net compensation	6,238,607,249,941.26

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 49,034,358 workers.
[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 55,262 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $6,238,607,249,941.26 divided by 151,380,749, or $41,211.36. Based on data in the table below, about 66.6 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $41,211.36 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $26,965.43 for 2011.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	23,548,858	23,548,858	15.55605	$47,555,114,507.09	$2,019.42
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	13,849,317	37,398,175	24.70471	102,498,069,431.92	7,400.95
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,248,261	49,646,436	32.79574	152,584,757,819.80	12,457.67
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,331,564	60,978,000	40.28121	197,866,824,752.72	17,461.56
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	10,719,626	71,697,626	47.36245	240,836,786,906.74	22,466.90
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	9,925,624	81,623,250	53.91917	272,509,406,254.02	27,455.14
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,183,235	90,806,485	59.98549	297,916,367,842.65	32,441.33
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,177,245	98,983,730	65.38726	306,124,476,446.16	37,436.14
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,118,374	106,102,104	70.08956	301,997,837,348.09	42,425.12
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,156,216	112,258,320	74.15627	292,029,487,834.18	47,436.52

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,437,201	118,251,612	76.97055	285,000,166,908.01	52,416.71
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,568,352	122,819,964	79.94411	262,359,915,949.22	57,429.88
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,932,564	126,752,528	82.50383	245,421,183,211.26	62,407.42
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,331,743	130,084,271	84.67248	224,634,035,978.54	67,422.38
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,872,834	132,957,105	86.54242	208,064,761,906.17	72,424.92
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,473,508	135,430,613	88.15244	191,516,039,796.28	77,426.89
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	2,097,234	137,527,847	89.51754	172,870,543,883.48	82,427.88
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,790,548	139,318,395	90.68302	156,537,324,612.08	87,424.25
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,544,850	140,863,245	91.68857	142,776,231,315.99	92,420.77
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,338,847	142,202,092	92.56003	130,454,386,174.71	97,437.86
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	1,171,733	143,373,825	93.32272	119,999,937,569.68	102,412.36
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	994,423	144,368,248	93.96999	106,838,496,790.27	107,437.68
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	873,171	145,241,419	94.53834	98,165,459,835.55	112,424.10
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	763,062	146,004,481	95.03502	89,614,007,707.54	117,440.01
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	682,898	146,687,379	95.47952	83,595,323,916.05	122,412.61
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	592,056	147,279,435	95.86490	75,443,210,201.19	127,425.80
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	524,661	147,804,096	96.20640	69,469,980,977.22	132,409.27
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	457,040	148,261,136	96.50389	62,814,075,394.80	137,436.71
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	406,767	148,667,903	96.76866	57,942,508,918.79	142,446.43
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	366,387	149,034,290	97.00714	54,028,568,606.42	147,463.12
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	334,544	149,368,834	97.22490	50,980,836,341.18	152,389.03
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	289,242	149,658,076	97.41316	45,533,883,998.04	157,424.87
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	254,482	149,912,558	97.57881	41,334,132,311.83	162,424.58
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	228,916	150,141,474	97.72781	38,330,391,364.45	167,443.04
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	205,305	150,346,779	97.86145	35,404,476,536.04	172,448.19
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	187,519	150,534,298	97.98350	33,271,769,049.44	177,431.46
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	172,973	150,707,271	98.09609	31,549,655,376.24	182,396.42
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	152,840	150,860,111	98.19558	28,649,912,185.05	187,450.35
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	141,392	151,001,503	98.28761	27,211,154,312.32	192,451.87

195,000.00 — 199,999.99	132,632	151,134,135	98.37394	26,190,609,342.00	197,468.25
200,000.00 — 249,999.99	889,250	152,023,385	98.95276	197,428,650,390.97	222,017.04
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	481,491	152,504,876	99.26616	131,099,976,147.45	272,279.18
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	288,002	152,792,878	99.45362	92,998,527,035.45	322,909.31
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	188,850	152,981,728	99.57655	70,493,610,753.02	373,278.32
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	131,391	153,113,119	99.66207	55,633,820,317.14	423,421.85
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	94,663	153,207,782	99.72369	44,855,858,825.15	473,847.85
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	305,108	153,512,890	99.92228	203,304,014,055.67	666,334.59
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	59,767	153,572,657	99.96118	71,691,398,838.14	1,199,514.76
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	21,919	153,594,576	99.97545	37,655,292,524.30	1,717,929.31
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	10,981	153,605,557	99.98260	24,423,801,656.70	2,224,187.38
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	6,569	153,612,126	99.98688	17,941,046,566.02	2,731,168.60
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	4,401	153,616,527	99.98974	14,219,111,245.40	3,230,881.90
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,951	153,619,478	99.99166	11,015,715,508.28	3,732,875.47
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	2,176	153,621,654	99.99308	9,207,611,931.02	4,231,439.31
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,654	153,623,308	99.99415	7,835,992,842.95	4,737,601.48
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	6,067	153,629,375	99.99810	41,153,891,735.77	6,783,235.82
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	2,021	153,631,396	99.99942	27,309,707,840.18	13,512,967.76
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	728	153,632,124	99.99989	20,832,426,527.70	28,615,970.51
50,000,000.00 and over	166	153,632,290	100.00000	16,177,553,041.48	97,455,138.80

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Automatic increases

Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2012

September 20, 2014

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2012.

Net compensation components for 2012

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$6,297,781,982,042.81
Deferred compensation plan	
Contributions[a]	+ 233,158,457,110.85
Distributions[b]	- 1,842,478,462.91
Net compensation	6,529,097,960,690.75

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 50,466,637 workers.
[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 55,566 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $6,529,097,960,690.75 divided by 153,632,290, or $42,498.21. Based on data in the table below, about 67.1 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $42,498.21 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $27,519.10 for 2012.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	23,303,064	23,303,064	15.16808	$47,183,753,407.04	$2,024.79
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	13,839,616	37,142,680	24.17635	102,500,638,297.93	7,406.32
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,312,564	49,455,244	32.19066	153,421,129,619.73	12,460.53
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,420,589	60,875,833	39.62437	199,398,369,215.82	17,459.55
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	10,798,184	71,674,017	46.65296	242,604,011,694.86	22,467.11
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,017,271	81,691,288	53.17325	275,019,343,966.28	27,454.52
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,282,086	90,973,374	59.21501	301,162,172,349.52	32,445.53
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,317,471	99,290,845	64.62889	311,393,440,479.48	37,438.48
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,261,520	106,552,365	69.35545	308,087,495,327.81	42,427.41

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,325,632	117,583,952	77.67431	279,168,814,446.73	52,419.85
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,460,061	122,044,013	80.62056	256,131,662,435.93	57,427.84
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	3,823,536	125,867,549	83.14634	238,609,328,987.88	62,405.41
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,227,533	129,095,082	85.27840	217,605,428,055.26	67,421.60
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,768,308	131,863,390	87.10711	200,490,688,675.02	72,423.55
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,370,646	134,234,036	88.67312	183,541,626,714.98	77,422.62
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	2,006,420	136,240,456	89.99853	165,400,359,612.62	82,435.56
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,698,990	137,939,446	91.12086	148,538,519,291.58	87,427.54
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,473,961	139,413,407	92.09454	136,224,554,972.27	92,420.73
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,274,459	140,687,866	92.93643	124,189,841,568.99	97,445.14
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	1,101,965	141,789,831	93.66437	112,859,380,474.37	102,416.48
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	945,576	142,735,407	94.28901	101,587,134,032.16	107,434.13
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	823,228	143,558,635	94.83282	92,559,516,383.21	112,434.85
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	720,769	144,279,404	95.30895	84,646,700,882.11	117,439.43
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	645,555	144,924,959	95.73540	79,019,898,407.25	122,406.14
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	552,570	145,477,529	96.10042	70,413,929,951.94	127,429.88
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	491,706	145,969,235	96.42523	65,104,923,367.06	132,406.20
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	426,915	146,396,150	96.70724	58,671,777,324.86	137,431.99
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	379,410	146,775,560	96.95788	54,045,677,922.33	142,446.64
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	341,470	147,117,030	97.18345	50,354,465,169.67	147,463.80
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	311,597	147,428,627	97.38928	47,483,615,455.37	152,387.91
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	271,033	147,699,660	97.56832	42,668,033,036.40	157,427.45
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	239,889	147,939,549	97.72679	38,963,331,999.21	162,422.34
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	215,228	148,154,777	97.86897	36,039,576,037.98	167,448.36
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	191,181	148,345,958	97.99526	32,968,717,068.63	172,447.67
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	174,384	148,520,342	98.11046	30,942,065,912.58	177,436.38
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	160,874	148,681,216	98.21673	29,343,022,886.39	182,397.55
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	143,334	148,824,550	98.31141	26,867,809,248.41	187,448.96
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	132,252	148,956,802	98.39877	25,451,282,084.67	192,445.35

195,000.00 — 199,999.99	125,329	149,082,131	98.48157	24,746,199,321.06	197,449.91
200,000.00 — 249,999.99	830,393	149,912,524	99.03011	184,479,893,702.61	222,159.74
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	442,737	150,355,261	99.32258	120,618,956,459.65	272,439.30
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	265,254	150,620,515	99.49780	85,653,506,840.57	322,911.27
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	174,468	150,794,983	99.61305	65,134,613,852.76	373,332.72
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	121,258	150,916,241	99.69315	51,345,384,043.70	423,439.15
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	87,229	151,003,470	99.75077	41,318,211,837.40	473,675.17
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	274,585	151,278,055	99.93216	182,637,313,702.19	665,139.44
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	52,135	151,330,190	99.96660	62,473,242,841.03	1,198,297.55
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	18,937	151,349,127	99.97911	32,491,871,564.74	1,715,787.69
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	9,471	151,358,598	99.98537	21,044,463,444.75	2,221,989.59
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	5,587	151,364,185	99.98906	15,236,614,849.48	2,727,154.98
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	3,784	151,367,969	99.99156	12,221,902,623.40	3,229,889.70
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,535	151,370,504	99.99323	9,472,346,036.31	3,736,625.66
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,796	151,372,300	99.99442	7,613,277,092.90	4,239,018.43
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,367	151,373,667	99.99532	6,481,046,808.42	4,741,073.01
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	5,033	151,378,700	99.99865	34,167,628,514.33	6,788,720.15
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,550	151,380,250	99.99967	20,805,612,524.67	13,422,975.82
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	406	151,380,656	99.99994	11,434,484,063.33	28,163,753.85
50,000,000.00 and over	93	151,380,749	100.00000	7,419,868,268.73	79,783,529.77

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Automatic Increases

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Development of the AWI

Wage Statistics for 2013

October 26, 2014

The national average wage index (AWI) is based on compensation (wages, tips, and the like) subject to Federal income taxes, as reported by employers on Forms W-2. Beginning with the AWI for 1991, compensation includes contributions to deferred compensation plans, but excludes certain distributions from plans where the distributions are included in the reported compensation subject to income taxes. We call the result of including contributions, and excluding certain distributions, *net compensation*. The table below summarizes the components of net compensation for 2013.

Net compensation components for 2013

Compensation subject to Federal income taxes	$6,463,355,960,937.75
Deferred compensation plan	
Contributions[a]	+ 243,322,474,751.79
Distributions[b]	- 2,020,839,319.13
Net compensation	6,704,657,596,370.41

[a] Wages on which contributions were paid by 51,737,311 workers.
[b] Distributions, to the extent included in reported wages (see text above), paid to 58,640 workers.

The "raw" average wage, computed as net compensation divided by the number of wage earners, is $6,704,657,596,370.41 divided by 155,772,341, or $43,041.39. Based on data in the table below, about 66.9 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the $43,041.39 raw average wage. By definition, 50 percent of wage earners had net compensation less than or equal to the *median* wage, which is estimated to be $28,031.02 for 2013.

Distribution of wage earners by level of net compensation

	Wage earners			Net compensation	
Net compensation interval	Number	Cumulative number	Percent of total	Aggregate amount	Average amount
$0.01 — 4,999.99	23,115,933	23,115,933	14.83956	$47,182,613,119.80	$2,041.13
5,000.00 — 9,999.99	13,909,297	37,025,230	23.76881	103,038,350,002.21	7,407.88
10,000.00 — 14,999.99	12,340,772	49,366,002	31.69112	153,713,709,556.38	12,455.76
15,000.00 — 19,999.99	11,455,940	60,821,942	39.04541	199,992,520,521.28	17,457.54
20,000.00 — 24,999.99	10,854,603	71,676,545	46.01365	243,861,562,226.06	22,466.19
25,000.00 — 29,999.99	10,097,107	81,773,652	52.49562	277,228,136,438.50	27,456.19
30,000.00 — 34,999.99	9,385,751	91,159,403	58.52092	304,526,040,389.11	32,445.57
35,000.00 — 39,999.99	8,440,392	99,599,795	63.93933	316,022,370,825.34	37,441.67
40,000.00 — 44,999.99	7,406,037	107,005,832	68.69373	314,249,875,620.58	42,431.58
45,000.00 — 49,999.99	6,386,571	113,392,403	72.79367	302,973,681,899.86	47,439.18

50,000.00 — 54,999.99	5,552,820	118,945,223	76.35837	291,075,098,815.79	52,419.33
55,000.00 — 59,999.99	4,680,154	123,625,377	79.36285	268,784,784,711.21	57,430.76
60,000.00 — 64,999.99	4,035,207	127,660,584	81.95331	251,823,416,999.80	62,406.57
65,000.00 — 69,999.99	3,428,109	131,088,693	84.15402	231,142,482,302.71	67,425.65
70,000.00 — 74,999.99	2,968,987	134,057,680	86.06000	215,031,183,359.11	72,425.77
75,000.00 — 79,999.99	2,559,327	136,617,007	87.70299	198,162,943,189.00	77,427.75
80,000.00 — 84,999.99	2,179,245	138,796,252	89.10199	179,639,334,066.10	82,431.91
85,000.00 — 89,999.99	1,873,165	140,669,417	90.30449	163,773,160,357.76	87,431.25
90,000.00 — 94,999.99	1,617,254	142,286,671	91.34271	149,463,631,096.84	92,418.16
95,000.00 — 99,999.99	1,402,053	143,688,724	92.24277	136,614,877,209.07	97,439.17
100,000.00 — 104,999.99	1,229,162	144,917,886	93.03185	125,888,071,678.53	102,417.80
105,000.00 — 109,999.99	1,041,264	145,959,150	93.70030	111,869,716,730.65	107,436.46
110,000.00 — 114,999.99	914,048	146,873,198	94.28708	102,769,032,962.11	112,432.86
115,000.00 — 119,999.99	799,496	147,672,694	94.80033	93,895,453,365.83	117,443.31
120,000.00 — 124,999.99	719,798	148,392,492	95.26241	88,108,623,693.99	122,407.43
125,000.00 — 129,999.99	626,590	149,019,082	95.66466	79,847,785,243.54	127,432.27
130,000.00 — 134,999.99	555,283	149,574,365	96.02113	73,528,982,819.61	132,417.13
135,000.00 — 139,999.99	483,898	150,058,263	96.33178	66,505,565,747.55	137,437.16
140,000.00 — 144,999.99	433,681	150,491,944	96.61018	61,778,040,589.92	142,450.42
145,000.00 — 149,999.99	391,030	150,882,974	96.86121	57,663,715,129.94	147,466.22
150,000.00 — 154,999.99	353,108	151,236,082	97.08789	53,809,181,975.64	152,387.32
155,000.00 — 159,999.99	307,299	151,543,381	97.28517	48,379,154,675.10	157,433.49
160,000.00 — 164,999.99	271,993	151,815,374	97.45978	44,178,224,446.76	162,424.12
165,000.00 — 169,999.99	245,137	152,060,511	97.61714	41,048,141,226.33	167,449.80
170,000.00 — 174,999.99	219,905	152,280,416	97.75832	37,923,400,169.10	172,453.56
175,000.00 — 179,999.99	200,406	152,480,822	97.88697	35,557,443,971.46	177,427.04
180,000.00 — 184,999.99	185,956	152,666,778	98.00635	33,917,939,985.51	182,397.66
185,000.00 — 189,999.99	164,703	152,831,481	98.11208	30,872,961,835.03	187,446.26
190,000.00 — 194,999.99	152,007	152,983,488	98.20966	29,254,515,357.17	192,455.05

195,000.00 — 199,999.99	142,889	153,126,377	98.30139	28,217,116,050.47	197,475.78
200,000.00 — 249,999.99	958,080	154,084,457	98.91644	212,718,131,770.48	222,025.44
250,000.00 — 299,999.99	520,439	154,604,896	99.25054	141,720,256,166.76	272,309.06
300,000.00 — 349,999.99	306,130	154,911,026	99.44707	98,854,918,996.06	322,918.10
350,000.00 — 399,999.99	199,616	155,110,642	99.57521	74,542,893,470.43	373,431.46
400,000.00 — 449,999.99	138,283	155,248,925	99.66399	58,542,156,769.92	423,350.35
450,000.00 — 499,999.99	99,577	155,348,502	99.72791	47,165,771,264.74	473,661.30
500,000.00 — 999,999.99	310,753	155,659,255	99.92740	206,496,972,989.34	664,505.16
1,000,000.00 — 1,499,999.99	57,520	155,716,775	99.96433	69,059,675,758.86	1,200,620.23
1,500,000.00 — 1,999,999.99	21,063	155,737,838	99.97785	36,155,004,386.62	1,716,517.32
2,000,000.00 — 2,499,999.99	10,389	155,748,227	99.98452	23,096,902,224.09	2,223,207.45
2,500,000.00 — 2,999,999.99	6,068	155,754,295	99.98842	16,552,147,469.04	2,727,776.45
3,000,000.00 — 3,499,999.99	4,073	155,758,368	99.99103	13,161,734,400.78	3,231,459.46
3,500,000.00 — 3,999,999.99	2,827	155,761,195	99.99284	10,553,376,584.03	3,733,065.65
4,000,000.00 — 4,499,999.99	1,973	155,763,168	99.99411	8,355,942,195.01	4,235,145.56
4,500,000.00 — 4,999,999.99	1,416	155,764,584	99.99502	6,702,335,724.80	4,733,287.94
5,000,000.00 — 9,999,999.99	5,359	155,769,943	99.99846	36,086,602,354.52	6,733,831.38
10,000,000.00 — 19,999,999.99	1,723	155,771,666	99.99957	23,178,891,061.01	13,452,635.55
20,000,000.00 — 49,999,999.99	565	155,772,231	99.99993	16,114,956,321.52	28,522,046.59
50,000,000.00 and over	110	155,772,341	100.00000	12,286,086,101.65	111,691,691.83

Table A-2.

Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion: 1967 to 2013

(Income in 2013 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars. Beginning with 2010, standard errors were calculated using replicate weights. For further explanation of income inequality measures, see Current Population Reports, Series P60-204, *The Changing Shape of the Nation's Income Distribution: 1947–1998*. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *ftp://ftp2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/cpsmar14.pdf*)

Measures of income dispersion	2013[1]	2012	2011	2010[2]	2009[3]	2008	2007	2006	2005	2004[4]
MEASURE										
Household Income at Selected Percentiles										
10th percentile limit	12,401	12,414	12,429	12,672	13,163	13,157	13,664	13,864	13,469	13,450
20th percentile limit	20,900	20,898	20,986	21,368	22,213	22,409	22,797	23,147	22,884	22,798
40th percentile limit	40,187	40,342	39,896	40,599	41,867	42,194	43,928	43,642	42,956	42,763
50th (median)	51,939	51,759	51,842	52,646	54,059	54,423	56,436	55,689	55,278	54,674
60th percentile limit	65,501	65,520	64,664	65,706	67,118	67,863	69,656	69,321	68,802	68,112
80th percentile limit	105,910	105,609	105,211	106,870	108,603	108,451	112,348	112,106	109,425	108,527
90th percentile limit	150,000	148,122	148,742	148,269	149,473	149,628	152,793	153,662	150,455	149,056
95th percentile limit	196,000	193,934	192,645	192,829	195,487	194,744	198,856	201,045	198,077	193,806
Household Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles										
90th/10th	12.10	11.93	11.97	11.70	11.36	11.37	11.18	11.08	11.17	11.08
95th/20th	9.38	9.28	9.18	9.02	8.80	8.69	8.72	8.69	8.66	8.50
95th/50th	3.78	3.75	3.72	3.66	3.62	3.58	3.52	3.61	3.58	3.54
80th/50th	2.04	2.04	2.03	2.03	2.01	1.99	1.99	2.01	1.98	1.98
80th/20th	5.07	5.05	5.01	5.00	4.89	4.84	4.93	4.84	4.78	4.76
20th/50th	0.40	0.41	0.40	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.40	0.42	0.41	0.42
Mean Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	11,651	11,657	11,640	11,746	12,546	12,611	12,978	13,115	12,714	12,633
Second quintile	30,509	30,127	30,247	30,484	31,774	31,934	33,077	33,248	32,644	32,326
Third quintile	52,322	51,923	51,623	52,530	53,796	54,238	56,138	55,714	55,248	54,769
Fourth quintile	83,519	83,291	82,941	84,272	85,464	86,293	88,880	88,187	86,898	86,359
Highest quintile	185,206	184,548	184,380	180,977	185,542	185,068	188,712	194,296	190,420	186,758
Top 5 percent	322,343	322,674	322,571	306,844	320,801	318,849	322,654	343,608	335,484	325,447
Shares of Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4
Second quintile	8.4	8.3	8.4	8.5	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.6	8.6	8.7
Third quintile	14.4	14.4	14.3	14.6	14.6	14.7	14.8	14.5	14.6	14.7
Fourth quintile	23.0	23.0	23.0	23.4	23.2	23.3	23.4	22.9	23.0	23.2
Highest quintile	51.0	51.0	51.1	50.3	50.3	50.0	49.7	50.5	50.4	50.1
Top 5 percent	22.2	22.3	22.3	21.3	21.7	21.5	21.2	22.3	22.2	21.8

Summary Measures										
Gini index of income inequality	0.476	0.477	0.477	0.470	0.468	0.466	0.463	0.470	0.469	0.466
Mean logarithmic deviation of income	0.578	0.586	0.585	0.574	0.550	0.541	0.532	0.543	0.545	0.543
Theil	0.415	0.423	0.422	0.400	0.403	0.398	0.391	0.417	0.411	0.406
Atkinson:										
e=0.25	0.100	0.101	0.101	0.097	0.097	0.096	0.095	0.099	0.098	0.097
e=0.50	0.196	0.198	0.198	0.191	0.190	0.188	0.185	0.192	0.192	0.190
e=0.75	0.298	0.300	0.300	0.293	0.288	0.285	0.281	0.289	0.289	0.286
STANDARD ERROR										
Household Income at Selected Percentiles										
10th percentile limit	172	220	17	140	92	90	91	95	92	91
20th percentile limit	217	242	183	127	117	116	125	127	127	128
40th percentile limit	318	339	371	140	177	171	141	206	150	160
50th (median)	276	212	260	347	231	148	157	239	185	242
60th percentile limit	501	523	483	464	189	289	301	189	301	223
80th percentile limit	717	613	587	179	338	332	337	423	384	384
90th percentile limit	751	938	994	946	693	630	662	653	641	606
95th percentile limit	2,267	1,396	1,529	1,207	955	998	963	1,157	1,333	1,130
Household Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles										
90th/10th	0.167	0.211	0.082	0.130	0.095	0.091	0.089	0.090	0.090	0.088
95th/20th	0.133	0.114	0.094	0.076	0.063	0.063	0.064	0.069	0.076	0.069
95th/50th	0.045	0.031	0.030	0.026	0.022	0.023	0.021	0.025	0.028	0.025
80th/50th	0.014	0.013	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.009	0.011	0.010	0.011
80th/20th	0.051	0.056	0.042	0.031	0.030	0.029	0.031	0.032	0.031	0.032
20th/50th	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Mean Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	121	107	120	109	45	45	45	47	46	46
Second quintile	233	188	188	211	39	39	42	40	41	40
Third quintile	356	253	265	293	51	52	53	52	52	53
Fourth quintile	492	392	401	433	82	81	84	85	82	81
Highest quintile	1,897	1,644	1,371	1,352	914	895	905	1,091	1,022	1,010
Top 5 percent	5,938	5,230	4,362	4,290	2,880	2,801	2,847	3,586	3,281	3,292

Shares of Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Second quintile	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
Third quintile	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Fourth quintile	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.15	0.15	0.16
Highest quintile	0.24	0.20	0.17	0.18	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.34
Top 5 percent	0.30	0.26	0.23	0.23	0.30	0.30	0.29	0.31	0.31	0.31
Summary Measures										
Gini index of income inequality	0.0025	0.0020	0.0018	0.0019	0.0028	0.0027	0.0027	0.0028	0.0029	0.0029
Mean logarithmic deviation of income	0.0079	0.0068	0.0067	0.0066	0.0064	0.0063	0.0062	0.0063	0.0063	0.0063
Theil	0.0067	0.0059	0.0050	0.0049	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0001	0.0001
Atkinson:										
e=0.25	0.0013	0.0011	0.0010	0.0010	0.0011	0.0011	0.0011	0.0014	0.0013	0.0013
e=0.50	0.0022	0.0018	0.0016	0.0016	0.0018	0.0017	0.0018	0.0021	0.0020	0.0020
e=0.75	0.0028	0.0023	0.0021	0.0021	0.0024	0.0023	0.0024	0.0027	0.0026	0.0026

See footnotes at end of table.

Table A-2.

Selected Measures of Household Income Dispersion: 1967 to 2013—Con.

(Income in 2013 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars. Beginning with 2010, standard errors were calculated using replicate weights. For further explanation of income inequality measures, see Current Population Reports, Series P60-204, *The Changing Shape of the Nation's Income Distribution: 1947–1998*. For information on confidentiality protection, sampling error, nonsampling error, and definitions, see *ftp://ftp2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/techdocs/cpsmar14.pdf*)

Measures of income dispersion	2003	2002	2001	2000[5]	1999[6]	1998	1997	1996	1995[7]	1994[8]
MEASURE										
Household Income at Selected Percentiles										
10th percentile limit	13,345	13,751	14,060	14,314	14,464	13,844	13,335	13,172	13,168	12,478
20th percentile limit	22,778	23,199	23,644	24,241	23,957	23,001	22,286	21,833	21,856	20,868
40th percentile limit	43,063	43,218	43,834	44,639	44,625	43,398	42,256	41,040	40,849	39,168
50th (median)	54,865	54,913	55,562	56,800	56,895	55,497	53,551	52,471	51,719	50,148
60th percentile limit	68,968	68,837	69,736	70,576	70,439	68,987	66,568	65,058	63,748	62,327
80th percentile limit	110,023	108,788	109,867	110,606	110,769	107,040	103,469	100,553	98,842	97,673
90th percentile limit	149,708	147,758	149,508	151,503	150,678	144,575	141,329	136,086	133,105	131,933
95th percentile limit	195,203	194,230	198,022	196,440	198,521	188,675	183,133	176,727	171,505	170,694
Household Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles										
90th/10th	11.22	10.75	10.63	10.58	10.42	10.44	10.60	10.33	10.11	10.57
95th/20th	8.57	8.37	8.38	8.10	8.29	8.20	8.22	8.10	7.85	8.18
95th/50th	3.56	3.54	3.56	3.46	3.49	3.40	3.42	3.37	3.32	3.40
80th/50th	2.01	1.98	1.98	1.95	1.95	1.93	1.93	1.92	1.91	1.95
80th/20th	4.83	4.69	4.65	4.56	4.62	4.65	4.64	4.61	4.52	4.68
20th/50th	0.42	0.42	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.41	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
Mean Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	12,661	12,936	13,336	13,739	13,861	13,163	12,791	12,707	12,666	11,989
Second quintile	32,522	32,889	33,510	34,306	34,036	33,237	31,978	31,190	30,958	29,879
Third quintile	55,207	55,422	56,090	57,129	56,970	55,614	53,799	52,462	51,764	50,336
Fourth quintile	87,386	87,178	87,944	88,810	88,667	86,011	83,328	81,196	79,574	78,328
Highest quintile	186,284	186,126	192,063	192,449	189,084	182,010	177,654	170,775	166,058	164,670
Top 5 percent	320,744	325,020	342,711	341,423	328,647	317,243	311,763	297,483	286,593	284,504
Shares of Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.6
Second quintile	8.7	8.8	8.7	8.9	8.9	9.0	8.9	9.0	9.1	8.9
Third quintile	14.8	14.8	14.6	14.8	14.9	15.0	15.0	15.1	15.2	15.0
Fourth quintile	23.4	23.3	23.0	23.0	23.2	23.2	23.2	23.3	23.3	23.4
Highest quintile	49.8	49.7	50.1	49.8	49.4	49.2	49.4	49.0	48.7	49.1
Top 5 percent	21.4	21.7	22.4	22.1	21.5	21.4	21.7	21.4	21.0	21.2

Summary Measures										
Gini index of income inequality	0.464	0.462	0.466	0.462	0.458	0.456	0.459	0.455	0.450	0.456
Mean logarithmic deviation of income	0.530	0.514	0.515	0.490	0.476	0.488	0.484	0.464	0.452	0.471
Theil	0.397	0.398	0.413	0.404	0.386	0.389	0.396	0.389	0.378	0.387
Atkinson:										
e=0.25	0.095	0.095	0.098	0.096	0.092	0.093	0.094	0.093	0.090	0.092
e=0.50	0.187	0.186	0.189	0.185	0.180	0.181	0.183	0.179	0.175	0.180
e=0.75	0.283	0.279	0.282	0.275	0.268	0.271	0.272	0.266	0.261	0.268
STANDARD ERROR										
Household Income at Selected Percentiles										
10th percentile limit	91	92	97	97	97	95	100	93	94	87
20th percentile limit	127	133	131	138	133	140	132	133	122	121
40th percentile limit	206	202	201	220	161	221	277	267	223	234
50th (median)	238	180	170	179	266	328	247	265	299	228
60th percentile limit	239	287	279	257	213	356	309	340	281	288
80th percentile limit	404	297	318	325	346	334	459	350	371	318
90th percentile limit	641	582	567	657	632	547	584	630	577	583
95th percentile limit	902	924	994	1,259	1,105	1,094	957	870	1,019	967
Household Income Ratios of Selected Percentiles										
90th/10th	0.091	0.083	0.083	0.085	0.083	0.082	0.091	0.087	0.084	0.087
95th/20th	0.062	0.062	0.063	0.070	0.065	0.069	0.065	0.063	0.064	0.066
95th/50th	0.021	0.022	0.023	0.026	0.024	0.024	0.022	0.022	0.023	0.024
80th/50th	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010
80th/20th	0.032	0.030	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.032	0.034	0.032	0.031	0.031
20th/50th	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
Mean Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	46	46	47	48	48	47	46	43	44	44
Second quintile	42	41	42	43	43	44	43	42	42	41
Third quintile	53	53	54	54	55	55	52	52	50	50
Fourth quintile	83	81	83	83	84	81	79	76	76	77
Highest quintile	958	1,005	1,134	1,123	988	1,030	1,058	1,030	968	972
Top 5 percent	3,073	3,254	3,730	3,688	3,113	4,722	4,916	4,829	4,505	4,534

Shares of Household Income of Quintiles										
Lowest quintile	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Second quintile	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07
Third quintile	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
Fourth quintile	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
Highest quintile	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36
Top 5 percent	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.31	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.44	0.45
Summary Measures										
Gini index of income inequality	0.0028	0.0029	0.0030	0.0030	0.0041	0.0042	0.0043	0.0043	0.0043	0.0042
Mean logarithmic deviation of income	0.0054	0.0052	0.0051	0.0049	0.0059	0.0069	0.0067	0.0064	0.0063	0.0061
Theil	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0002	0.0001	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
Atkinson:										
e=0.25	0.0012	0.0012	0.0014	0.0013	0.0013	0.0015	0.0016	0.0016	0.0015	0.0015
e=0.50	0.0018	0.0020	0.0022	0.0021	0.0021	0.0023	0.0025	0.0024	0.0024	0.0023
e=0.75	0.0024	0.0025	0.0027	0.0026	0.0027	0.0029	0.0030	0.0030	0.0029	0.0028

See footnotes at end of table.

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Table M. **Real average annual wages and real unit labour costs in the total economy**

Annualised growth rates, percentages

	Average wages in 2013 in USD PPPs[a]	Average wages[b]					Unit labour costs[b]				
		2000-07	2007-13	2007	2012	2013	2000-07	2007-13	2007	2012	2013
Australia	50.449	1,6	0,2	2,1	-2,5	-1,2	0,9	0,2	1,9	-0,4	-2,4
Austria	45.199	0,9	0,2	0,7	-0,1	0,1	-1,1	0,5	-1,0	0,8	0,2
Belgium	48.082	0,3	0,5	-0,4	1,0	0,8	-0,3	0,8	-0,6	1,4	0,3
Canada	46.911	1,5	1,5	2,4	2,3	2,2	1,0	0,8	1,7	1,3	0,5
Chile[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..	0,3	2,0	2,1	0,8	..
Czech Republic	20.338	4,9	0,1	3,1	-0,6	-3,3	0,6	-0,3	-0,2	0,1	-0,6
Denmark	48.347	1,8	0,5	1,2	-1,2	0,3	1,3	0,1	3,7	-1,3	0,2
Estonia	18.944	8,1	-0,1	15,5	2,4	3,1	2,2	-0,2	7,3	0,2	4,0
Finland	40.060	2,3	0,7	1,6	0,6	0,6	0,0	1,1	-1,6	1,4	0,7
France	40.242	1,2	0,8	0,5	0,2	0,8	0,1	0,5	-0,3	0,1	0,3
Germany	43.682	0,1	0,7	0,0	1,2	0,7	-1,9	0,8	-2,2	1,4	0,6
Greece	25.503	3,2	-3,4	0,7	-4,0	-5,0	1,2	-2,6	0,8	-6,5	-5,8
Hungary	20.948	4,4	-0,8	-1,4	-4,5	2,7	1,0	-1,3	0,0	-3,1	2,3
Iceland	..	..	..	..	..	..	1,9	-2,8	4,8	0,8	0,5
Ireland	49.506	2,4	0,9	2,6	0,5	-3,3	1,2	-0,5	1,0	-0,5	-1,7
Israel[c]	28.817	..	-0,8	2,6	0,5	-0,2	-0,5	-1,2	0,7	0,3	..
Italy	34.561	0,2	-0,3	0,0	-1,8	0,5	0,5	0,5	0,0	-0,4	0,1
Japan	35.405	-0,5	0,5	-0,8	-1,6	0,7	-1,3	0,5	-1,7	-0,4	-0,5
Korea	36.354	2,4	1,3	1,6	4,3	0,9	0,5	-0,6	-0,1	0,5	0,2
Luxembourg	56.021	1,1	0,5	2,0	0,1	1,5	0,4	3,0	-0,3	3,0	1,2
Mexico[d]	..	..	-1,7	0,5	3,1	..	0,1	-1,1	-0,8	-2,9	..
Netherlands	47.590	0,7	0,5	1,8	-0,9	0,3	-0,3	0,5	0,0	0,0	-1,0
New Zealand[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..	2,3	-0,4	3,0	-1,8	..
Norway	50.282	3,4	1,9	4,2	2,1	1,2	2,3	2,9	6,8	2,4	2,2
Poland	22.655	0,5	1,8	2,0	-1,2	1,1	-1,5	-0,3	1,5	-2,3	1,5
Portugal[c]	23.688	0,2	0,4	1,1	-3,1	2,5	0,0	-1,2	-1,4	-6,2	..
Slovak Republic	20.307	3,6	1,1	6,1	-1,0	-0,1	-2,5	-0,9	-2,7	-1,9	-1,9
Slovenia	32.037		0,3	2,1	-2,9	-0,6	-0,3	0,0	-1,3	-1,1	-2,2
Spain	34.824	-0,1	0,6	1,4	-3,1	-0,6	0,2	-2,1	1,3	-6,3	-3,6
Sweden	40.818	1,9	1,1	3,3	1,8	1,2	-0,1	-0,1	2,7	1,5	0,2
Switzerland	54.236	1,1	0,8	1,2	2,1	1,0	0,2	1,1	-0,1	2,6	0,3
Turkey	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom	41.192	1,9	-1,0	2,2	0,0	-0,7	0,2	-0,3	-0,8	0,3	-0,7
United States	56.340	0,9	0,3	1,7	0,5	0,5	-0,4	-0,7	0,9	-0,6	-0,1
OECD[e]	43.772	0,8	0,4	1,2	0,1	0,4	-0,5	-0,2	0,0	-0,6	-0,1

Note: Average annual wages per full-time equivalent dependent employee are obtained by dividing the national-accounts-based total wage bill by the average number of employees in the total economy, which is then multiplied by the ratio of average usual weekly hours per full-time employee to average usually weekly hours for all employees. For more details, see: www.oecd.org/employment/outlook.

a) Average wages are converted in USD PPPs using 2013 USD PPPs for private consumption.

b) Average annual wages and unit labour costs are deflated by a price deflator for private final consumption expenditures in 2013 prices.

c) Annualised changes of real unit labour costs for 2007-13 refer to 2007-12.

d) Annualised real average wage changes for 2007-13 and 2011-12 refer to 2007-11 and 2010-11 respectively.

e) Aggregates are weighted averages computed on the basis of 2013 GDP weights expressed in 2013 purchasing power parities and include the countries shown.

Source: OECD estimates based on *OECD National Accounts Database;* OECD (2014) *OECD Economic Outlook*, Vol. 2014, No.1, OECD Publishing, Paris; OECD (2013) *OECD Economic Outlook*, Vol. 2013, No.1, OECD Publishing, Paris, for Israel and Mexico for average wages and unit labour costs and Chile, New Zealand and Portugal for unit labour costs (www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/economicoutlook.htm).

Table N. **Earnings dispersion and incidence of high and low pay**

	Earnings dispersion[a]						Incidence of (%)			
	9th to 1st earnings deciles		9th to 5th earnings deciles		5th to 1st earnings deciles		Low pay[b]		High pay[c]	
	2002	2012	2002	2012	2002	2012	2002	2012	2002	2012
Australia	3,07	3,38	1,84	1,99	1,67	1,70	13,8	18,9	..	..
Austria	3,23	3,35	1,90	1,94	1,70	1,72	15,2	16,1	19,7	20,9
Belgium	2,31	2,47	1,69	1,76	1,37	1,41	6,3	6,0	10,7	13,4
Canada	3,65	3,72	1,83	1,90	1,99	1,95	22,4	21,7	10,6	9,9
Chile	5,21	4,38	3,13	2,92	1,67	1,50	15,6	9,4	30,2	27,6
Czech Republic	3,23	3,44	1,77	1,83	1,83	1,88	18,3	19,7	..	..
Denmark	2,57	2,86	1,62	1,67	1,59	1,71	14,1	19,0	..	..
Estonia	5,88	4,05	2,35	2,06	2,50	1,97	28,3	..	25,2	..
Finland	2,45	2,54	1,71	1,73	1,44	1,47	7,3	8,9	16,0	16,4
France	3,03	2,97	2,00	1,99	1,51	1,50	..	..	..	..
Germany	3,07	3,26	1,74	1,84	1,77	1,77	17,6	18,3	15,6	19,1
Greece	3,44	2,71	2,00	1,75	1,72	1,55	20,0	11,8	22,1	16,2
Hungary	4,07	3,76	2,32	2,36	1,75	1,60	21,7	17,4	..	..
Iceland	3,15	2,88	1,72	1,75	1,83	1,65	18,7	14,7	15,8	16,8
Ireland	3,90	3,64	2,03	1,95	1,92	1,87	19,2	21,8	..	..
Israel	5,37	4,91	2,66	2,65	1,99	1,85	24,2	22,1	28,6	27,9
Italy	2,56	2,32	1,64	1,53	1,56	1,52	10,5	10,1	12,2	11,1
Japan	2,97	2,99	1,83	1,85	1,62	1,61	14,4	14,3	..	..
Korea	4,19	4,71	2,07	2,29	2,02	2,08	24,2	25,1	..	..
Luxembourg	3,03	3,18	1,90	2,03	1,60	1,56	20,8	..	18,0	..
Mexico	3,75	3,67	2,14	2,20	1,75	1,67	17,9	16,0	20,1	20,7
Netherlands	2,79	2,90	1,75	1,77	1,59	1,64	12,7	..	17,5	..
New Zealand	2,68	2,89	1,74	1,85	1,54	1,55	13,6	14,6	..	..
Norway	2,10	2,36	1,45	1,48	1,45	1,60	..	..	..	..
Poland	3,89	4,10	1,96	2,04	1,99	1,95	20,1	21,6	22,5	20,2
Portugal	4,65	3,81	2,84	2,57	1,64	1,49	14,1	8,8	27,5	27,9
Slovak Republic	3,25	3,60	1,89	1,98	1,72	1,82	17,0	19,0	..	..
Slovenia	..	3,34	..	2,03	..	1,64	..	..	..	..
Spain	3,55	3,08	2,10	1,88	1,69	1,65	16,3	14,6	23,3	20,6
Sweden	2,29	2,27	1,66	1,65	1,38	1,38	..	..	..	..
Switzerland	2,58	2,70	1,74	1,84	1,48	1,47	9,4	9,2	..	..
Turkey	..	3,80	..	3,22	..	1,18	..	..	..	..
United Kingdom[d]	3,54	3,55	1,95	1,98	1,81	1,79	20,5	20,5	..	..
United States	4,66	5,22	2,26	2,44	2,06	2,14	23,5	25,3	..	..
OECD[e]	3,44	3,38	1,98	2,02	1,72	1,67	17,2	16,3	19,7	19,2

Note: Estimates of earnings used in the calculations refer to gross earnings of full-time wage and salary workers. However, this definition may slightly vary from one country to another. Further information on the national data sources and earnings concepts used in the caculations can be found at: www.oecd.org/employment/outlook.

a) Earnings dispersion is measured by the ratio of 9th to 1st deciles limits of earnings, 9th to 5th deciles and 5th to 1st deciles. Data refer to 2003 (instead of 2002) for Chile and Ireland; to 2004 for Austria, Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Spain; and to 2005 for Mexico. They refer to 2010 (instead of 2012) for Estonia, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland and Turkey; and to 2011 for Chile and Israel.

b) The incidence of low pay refers to the share of workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings. Data refer to 2003 (instead of 2002) for Chile and Ireland; to 2004 for Austria, Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Spain; and to 2005 for Mexico and Poland. They refer to 2010 (instead of 2012) for Switzerland; and to 2011 for Chile and Israel.

c) The incidence of high pay refers to the share of workers earning more than one-and-a-half time median earnings. Data refer to 2003 (instead of 2002) for Chile; to 2004 for Austria, Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Spain; and to 2005 for Mexico and Poland. They refer to 2011 (instead of 2012) for Chile and Israel.

d) For the United Kingdom, there are breaks in series in 1997, 2004 and 2006 and 2011; in each case, data were spliced from *new-to-old* series on 2011 data, then 2006, 2004 and finally 1997.
e) Unweighted average for above countries.

Source:OECDEarningsDistributionDatabase,
www.oecd.org/employment/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm#earndisp.