Hamas in levels I and II of the isaeli-palestinian conflict negotiations?

"[B]ut if the enemy inclines towards
peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah:
for He is the one that heareth and knoweth (all things)"
Sura 8 – Al-Anfal (Madina): Verse 61.

Résumé

Le conflit Israélo-palestinien
à été largement analyse de toutes les
perspectives possibles avec plus ou moins de
succès.   Dans les premières
années de ce siècle,  la recherche d"une
solution par la voie d"une médiation a été
relancée et a été revisitée par les
académiques, des praticiens et des politiciens.  Les
Israéliens et les Palestiniens font partie du conflit mais
ne sont pas les seules parties en cause.  Pour cette raison
leurs perspectives sont importantes mais ne sont pas seules
à prendre en cause.  Ce document est sans doute trop
ambitieux mais il tente de résumer les points de vue en
couvrant les niveaux I et II des négociations (Putman
1988) en ayant l"intervention d"un tiers… et en
considérant l'intervention d'une tierce partie comme
l'élément clé de ce conflit d"une nature
à plusieurs de cercles concentriques.

Mots-clés. Négociations de
niveaux I et II, BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement) ou MESORE (MEilleure SOlution de Rechange), ZOPA (ZO
de Possible Accord), opportunités, perception, obstacles,
barrières, options, actions créatives, concessions,
gouvernement unitaire.

 Summary. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
has broadly been analyzed from all possible perspectives with
much or less success. In the early part of 2000 decade, solution
via mediation took new stamina and came to the minds of scholars,
practitioners and politicians. Israelis and Palestinians are just
a part of the conflict but not the only one. For this reason
their perspectives are important, but not solely those to take
into account. This paper fails for being too ambitious, but
attempts to offset it through a synthesizing exercise trying to
cover Level I and Level II negotiations (Putman
1988)[1] and having third-party intervention as
the frontispiece of the way out of this "multi-ripples" conflict
[2]

Keywords. Level I and
Level II negotiations, BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement), ZOPA (Zone of Possible Agreement), opportunities,
perception, obstacles, barriers, options, creative actions,
concessions, unity government.

***

Introduction

Can the Palestinians successfully engage in negotiations
with Israel and the International Community in order to conclude
a final peace agreement without a "Palestinian reconciliation"?
Current policy of isolating Hamas from the peace process has not
help to make it happen. Israel cannot defeat Hamas armed groups,
who easily blend into the ordinary population, as demonstrated in
the 2008/2009 Israeli campaign, nor can the Palestinian
Authority, led by Fatah. Therefore, the irrefutable facts lead us
to think that Hamas has to be engaged in the peace negotiations,
which requires said "reconciliation" with Fatah via negotiations
between the two Palestinian factions in order to engage in a
definitive peace negotiation with the non-Palestinian
actors.

There is in negotiations an inextricable need for having
the "domestic front" in agreement in order to provide the
negotiators with the proper BATNA based on agreed upon common
interests. Hamas and Fatah interests have to find common grounds
before the Palestinians, as a whole, can have any chance to have
a successful outcome of future negotiations with Israel and the
International Community. The intervention of the International
Community is also necessary in this "reconciliation."

How this can be achieved? What is the method to be
followed? There are many theories presented over the years by
specialized commentators and presented by politicians in
different occasions and have in common that the involvement of
the International Community, presented in this paper as the
Quartet Plus, is a must for the resolution of the conflict.
Putman offers in his two-level game theory a proper framework for
many negotiations, that can find its applicability in the
intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict, i.e., in the form of a
primary and necessary negotiations process between the
Palestinian constituents [factions] for building up a common
front and BATNA [Level II negotiations]; and a secondary process
consisting in the bargaining between international negotiators
that, eventually, should lead to a tentative agreement. This
paper intends to present Putman"s theory applied to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict specially focusing on the role that
Hamas can play in both levels and what the strategy advice should
be.

***

Theoretical
framwork

Putman, as a consequence of his
observations in Europe and America, formulated that factions who
are prone to a change find themselves in a cul-de-sac
situation, like that of being outnumbered in parliament or not
having control in a geographical area or commercial/trade market,
welcome international pressure that becomes a sine qua
non condition to make the shifts happen. On the other hand,
Putman also noted that domestic "movements for change" were also
a requirement to lead all actors to an agreement on a specific
change. Therefore, he postulated a theory of "general
equilibrium" that, in negotiations, would take into account the
interaction of both domestic and international factors, intended
to create a conceptual framework for understanding the
interaction of diplomacy and domestic politics.

This relationship between domestic and
international politics and how they affect negotiations has been
discussed and theorized by scholars and presented by Putman:
Rosenau"s "linkage politics;" Hass" European integration
"spillover" that derive in to the study of new supranationalism
followed by Nye and Kohane who deepen on interdependence and
tranationalism; Allison"s "bureaucratic politics" and the
intra-national games and international relations; etc. However,
they were not successful in formulating that it is not the
abstract "state," understood as the decision-makers, the
individuals who run negotiations, "have a special role in
mediating domestic and international pressures precisely because
they are directly exposed to both spheres…[I]n short, we
need to move beyond the mere observation that domestic factors
influence international affairs and vice versa, and beyond simple
catalogs of instances of such influence, to seek theories that
integrate both spheres, accounting for the areas of entanglement
between them" (Putman 1988).

On international conflict and cooperation
Walton and Mckersie[3]developed their "behavioral
theory of social negotiations" that points out that "the
unitary-actor assumption is often radically misleading" (Putman
1988). For this reason Putman offers his theory of the two-level
game, that cannot be disregarded by the key decision-makers,
arguing that in international negotiations there are always two
levels that correspond to: a) a national level with "domestic
groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to
adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by
constructing coalitions among those groups;" and b) an
international level where "national governments seek to maximize
their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing
the adverse consequences of foreign developments." Be that as it
may, Putman states that:

"The political complexities for the players
in this two-level game are staggering. Any key player at the
international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may
upset the game board, and conversely, any leader who fails to
satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being
evicted from his seat. On occasion, however, clever players will
spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other
boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable
objectives." (Putman 1988)

The two-level negotiation theory is
analytically speaking formulated as follows: a) Level I,
consisting in the "bargaining between the negotiators, leading to
a tentative agreement"; and b) Level II, related to the "separate
discussions within each group of constituents about whether to
ratify the agreement" (Putman 1988).

It has to be noted that this theoretical
approach of a two-level game does come with risks related to the
fact that official commitments taken at Level I may find little
credibility at Level II in spite of the high "reputational costs
of reneging" (Putman 1988). In the case in point, this paper is
oriented in the sense that Fatah and Hamas give themselves
"negotiating room" at Level II in order to engage in Level I
negotiations with a minimum chance of success.

On another note, this introduction wants to
serve also to bring up all potential readers to the same level of
understanding of an important concept that will be repeated over
the text, BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement).
BATNA is a term coined in 1981 by Roger Fisher and William Ury
(Fisher and al, 1991). We may say that BATNA is basically the
negotiators" choice if you conclude the negotiations with the
other party do not lead to a favorable result. Some commentators
identify BATNA with the measure of the balance of power in a
negotiation. This understood as a standard against which an
agreement is measured and prevents from accepting unfavorable
agreements that do not concur with best interests of the party
that checks its BATNA and that, with this tool, being capable of
appreciating a better option outside the negotiation.

Having a good control of one"s BATNA
permits far greater flexibility and room for innovation during
the negotiation process in lieu of a using a "bottom
line"[4] negotiation approach that limits much the
negotiator"s ability to benefit from the ongoing learning process
that takes place during the negotiation sessions. Therefore, the
better a negotiator's BATNA, the greater that negotiator's power,
given the enticing alternative that the negotiator could abandon
the process if an acceptable agreement is not reached.

Your BATNA will be stronger than the
other"s if the latter need s you for reaching his/her objectives.
However, it is very important to understand that BATNA is a
dynamic element, an ongoing, changing tool of the negotiation
that evolves along with the experience the parties gain over the
negotiation process. This is true while the interests of the
parties may find accommodation when they understand each other"s
possibilities to fulfill the agreement. For this reason BATNA
becomes a mechanism for deciding whether continue or not with a
specific negotiation.

The more a negotiator knows about his BATNA
and that of the other party, the better that negotiator is able
to prepare for a specific negotiation.

***

Negotiation
preliminaries of this case-study

Khalid Mishal[5]declared at
a press conference in Cairo in 2006 that "Hamas has announced
more than once…to establish a Palestinian state in the
1967 borders" and at the end of June 2006, Prime Minister in Gaza
Ismail Haniyeh announced "Hamas" willingness, in principle, to
sign a document drawn up by Palestinians from all factions, that
they accept the existence of Israel". This should be understood
as a willingness to have a Palestinian state and rule it. There
are necessarily two goals to achieve before this end state
arrives: a) Negotiate and reach a unity government with Fatah at
the Palestinian Authority; and b) Negotiate a peace settlement
with Israel[6]This supposes that Hamas will get
rid of its "spoiler" label [and perspective]; as this is always
the "greatest source of risk…who believe[s] that peace
emerging from negotiations threaten their power…and interests"
(Stedman 1997). Hamas does not have to change its interests but
its positions incorporating creativeness to surmount the inherent
complexity of the already Israeli-Palestinian conflict
intractability character.

Hamas needs to change its perspective and
narrative on the conflict vis-à-vis third-party
intervention, use an approach that will bring communication to
the parties and present options that can satisfy their interests.
We might be in presence of a Hamas" culture on the meaning they
give to mediatory roles[7]Along these lines, this
section contains some "strategy "as the "pointing-finger" where
[Fatah and] Hamas should head to a place where interests can meet
and regroup in a common perspective and prospective.

In the "strategic calculations" (Crocker
and al. 2007) Fatah and Hamas need to depart from
competition[8]and head towards common grounds in
form of compromise "to meet one another half way", where they
will "make moves towards one another" (Saner 2008) finding
cooperation bringing together their interests. Saner says that
"the fewer interests the two sides have in common, the less
cooperation will be an ingredient of their bargaining efforts".
Therefore it is necessary to create value inventing options for
mutual gain (Fisher and al, 1991), i.e., expanding the pie, the
creation of the Palestinian state. Nevertheless, in spite of
Hamas apparent denial for having a third-party intervening for
building-up the Palestinian reconciliation, they know a "unity
government" can expand the pie, which necessarily means a
permanent agreement with Israel. This is not achievable from
direct negotiations (Agha and Malley 2002). Fatah and Hamas need
to negotiate their reconciliation [incorporating in their
strategies third-party intervention], and in this process create
the trust that will help build and eventually strengthen said
"unity government".

The opportunities that Fatah and Hamas have
to seek together are those that will create a common front,
robust and realistic to be ready to engage in negotiations with
Israel and others. Their BATNAs can only find common grounds when
the parties overcome their perception of the existence of risks,
for Fatah fears to lose its leadership in the Palestinian
Authority (PA) and Hamas to lose its "democratic" legitimacy and
actual power, won in the 2006 elections. Guarantees that those
risks will not become actual realities may motivate them to
accept a third-party in form of mediation but their common
perception must be "as having an interest in achieving an
"outcome acceptable" [emphasis added] to both sides and as being
not so partial as to preclude such an achievement" (Touval and
Zartman 2001). However mediation can unlikely happen if the
prospect mediator does not see that Fatah and Hamas have decided
"to reevaluate their policies" (Touval and Zartman 2001) to move
trip wires (Fisher and al. 1991) of their BATNAs. The opportunity
of forming a "unity government" brings along a perspective of
creating values by "cultivating share interests" (Lax and
Sebenius 1992) and avoids exclusion of any of the parties when in
Level I negotiations with Israel and other actors of the
international community. In Level II negotiations Fatah and Hamas
have to look for a homogeneous strategy with "joint gains". What
are then their "joint gains"? The answer is: A package of
legitimacy within and outside Palestine that brings along
recognition and aid.

Since December 1992 deportation to Southern
Lebanon and contacts with Arafat, Hamas has "modeled itself on
the PLO"s structure" which has portrayed Hamas as a "parallel and
equal movement" to the PLO (Chehad 2007), confirmed by the 2006
elections. This actually means that both Palestinian movements
are de facto legitimate political parties; this obliges
Fatah to accept the reality of Hamas and to offer the integration
in the PLO and full participation in the PA. On the other hand,
Hamas is also obliged to recognize Fatah"s international
legitimacy and the compromises taken with Israel and the
international community on the way to a final peace settlement
started in the early 1990s. The value is built on Hamas" need to
be recognized internationally[9]and thus
participate in the formation of the State of Palestine, which
comes hand in hand with reconciliation with Fatah. On the other
flip of the coin, Fatah needs legitimacy in Palestine and
legitimize PA institutions, lost due to its galloping corruption
practices and "particularism"[10].

In spite of the
difficulty[11]of bringing Fatah and Hamas together
paragraph above tries to highlight the opportunities of the
parties and where their interests supplement each other taking
into account the real Hamas leaders" secularism. Although this
paper includes a pinch of speculation, it does not intend to be
naïve. The goal is to frame Level II negotiations,
permitting in the paragraphs below start developing the strategy
for Level I negotiations [with Israel and others] building on
Fatah and Hamas [difficult] reconciliation.

***

Oportunities and
obstacles in the negotiation[12]

"In order to obtain the goal of returning
to Palestine, all of us sometimes have to grit our teeth." Yasser
Arafat

Opportunities. These fortunately
exist. However, for successful negotiations among Israelis and
Palestinians, opportunities should not be searched first or only
among them but among the members of the international community;
for the conflict is in a stalemate and is intractable. With this
premise, we have to fish said opportunities in a sea of
disenchantment, deception and mistrust that has come thick and
stiff to pierce. A long-lasting peace settlement requires
exogenous multidisciplinary help and intervention. Opportunities
in accordance with Agha and Malley (2002) will come outside-in,
but there is a change for opportunities coming outside-in. The
dilemma of ripeness makes itself evident in this conflict that
parties hear each other but do not listen to one another and then
ripeness does not bloom but it is also difficult to have it pop
up spontaneously. However, we cannot forget that "ripeness is a
matter of perception and thus of persuasion" where "mediators
have an important role to play in capitalizing on the parties"
perception of ripeness" as long as it does not appear on its own
(Zartman 2000). There is a long story in this conflict that has
created generational and institutionalized perceptions, in form
of narratives that the parties cannot change on their
own.

A comparative analysis of the interests
demonstrates that there are opportunities and grounds [remote but
exists] for a possible agreement [or Zone of Possible
Agreement/ZOPA], but it does not anticipate that the solution is
close or easy. In spite of the simplicity of the charter below it
does give us a quick reference where parties" interests may have
some prospects in addressing the issue. In dark green, in Row 1,
we see which interests will require less effort to reconcile: 1)
Recognition (both parties want to be recognized); 5) Withdrawal
(both parties consider the need of Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
withdrawal and both would likely accept a multinational force to
replace temporarily the IDF to assure a secure environment,
interim IDF observation posts); 6) Type of Palestinian Army
(Israel does want a demilitarized Palestinian state, Palestinians
accept a Gendarmerie-type police); and 8) Territorial continuity
(Innovative solutions have been already presented by
international firms to maintain Palestinian territorial
continuity and to not disrupt Israel"s activities on surface).
The interests with yellow or red/yellow color show that do
partially coincide or do not at all.

FIGURE 1

Row 2 is all light green boxes that show
that all interests need to be worked out via Mediation: 1.
Recognition needs a mediator that convinces reluctant members of
the international community to support the process by recognizing
both states in equal footing; 2. A solution to the 1967 borders
"re-design" will not come up from the parties without aid; 3. The
division of Jerusalem administration will also need in impartial
mediator to deal with the Old City and East Jerusalem
arrangements; 4 and 8. Donors stirred up by mediator need to be
found and convinced to support Palestinian economic boosting and
investment in state-building, nationbuilding and in
infrastructures, the latter includes the territorial continuity
solution; 5. A mediator has to offer the parties a temporary
replacement to IDF after its withdrawal, an international force
that has the support and credibility of the parties. A NATO-led
force type like ISAF (Afghanistan) or KFOR (Kosovo) with a
similar trusteeship-like United Nations mandate will need to be
bought into by the parties with a mediator"s intervention; 6. A
Palestinian security force should not be threatening Israel"s
security and has to be credible and efficient for law
enforcement, specially anti-terrorism; a Western trained
Gendarmerie-like force needs to be built up with help from
nations holding this type of police forces; 7. The refugees issue
cannot even be discussed without the presence of mediators that
count on full back up from their principals when offer the only
possible solutions that mainly go for compensation, assimilation
[and swap of land if settle in Israeli territory close to
Palestinian territories] (Agha and Malley 2002).

Barriers. In the instant case exist
all types of barriers, i.e., strategic and tactical,
psychological and institutional/organizational/ structural (Arrow
and al. 1995). Both parties are intransigent especially in the
Row 1 yellow/red traffic lights of Figure 1. Israelis and
Palestinians are also looking for justice, in this regard the
Palestinian side has been more capable to present the injustice
that suffers, "the refugee problem as such was seen as an issue
of justice, and the rights of refugees to return was seen as the
absolute core of the Palestinian problem" (Crocker and al. 2007).
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its attempts of negotiation
have also suffered from "reactive devaluation of compromises and
concession," but not only when these came from the parties (Camp
David 2000 or IDF"s withdrawal from Gaza 2005). Channels of
information are damaged and the Palestinian Level II issue also
fuels uncertainty in such [lack of] communication. Barriers of
culture and ideology (Salacuse 2003) are of great concerned in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that necessarily have to be
taken into account but only as an add-on to the negotiation
process, while ideology, in the broader sense possible, poses
more problems; for dealing with it, obliges to understand and
manage it by both parties. At this point there is no other
solution than to overcome it focusing on interests, looking for
gaps between ideology and reality, structuring deals around
ideological obstacles and keep confidentiality in the
negotiations to avoid "ideological differences surface". This
approach paves the road to deal making (Salacuse 2003). The
series of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have all used these
tools to avoid failure in more or less amount, the question is:
Why these theories do not work in the former British Mandate of
Palestine? The answer is simple, firstly the conflict is of an
intractable nature and this intractability needs to be broken,
and secondly it is a need for more resources that should come not
only from inside but mainly from the international community. We
could call those resources a "cocktail of multidisciplinary
solutions" in all tracks with third-party intervention having the
objective of changing the conflict dynamics. But there is a key
enabler that needs to be sustainable over the time, i.e., the
firm commitment of the international community for peace in the
former Mandate. These wisely combined in time and space may break
current deadlock.

Options. These are linked to
perceptions that in turn are, when irreconcilable, barriers for
the negotiation. We can see a certain ZOPA looking at Row 1 in
Figure 1 but as this figure shows in Row 2 -all squares colored
in green mediation is required. Mediation is a remedy for
stalemate and crisis situations (Touval and Zartman 2001).
Neither Israelis nor Palestinians move, besides they communicate
badly due to their narratives (Crocker and al. 2007), i.e.,
perceptions, and mistrust. Israelis and Palestinians think their
BATNAs top the other party, for this reason the mediation in this
conflict should carry a "powerful carrot" to satisfy interests
colored in Row 1 in yellow and yellow/red. The "powerful carrot"
should come in form of a sustainable commitment of the
international community, in form of a Kosovo-like United Nations
Security Council resolution – "trusteeship-like" , which
would include not only the deployment in Palestine of a,
possibly, NATO-led international force, like in Afghanistan, but
also guarantees for a sustainable investment on state-building
and nationbuilding activities to include holistic economic
measures and infrastructure; the latter will also cover the
Palestinian territorial continuity.

This would be a "package" to offer to the
parties/that the parties offer themselves that actually meet
their four competing interests to make then reconcile. This
should trigger the consent for mediation that would also be of a
specific style, as Holbrook"s[13]"mediator with
muscle," but it will be more "Kolbian" or "Touval-Zartmanian"
depending on the topic to be addressed. An important role for the
mediator with the Palestinian, is that he would have to care the
coalition, the "unity government" between Fatah and Hamas built
up in the "A sui generis introduction" above to avoid
the conflict increase in complexity or escalate.

Perceptions and BATNAs. The fact
that some interests in Row 1 of Figure 1 roughly coincide, green
color, does not mean that perceptions are automatically
reconcilable; in fact these are in certain topics far away from
each other. However, it is also true that Israelis and
Palestinians have developed perceptions that in general terms
dovetail one another like the two-state solution, 1967 borders,
and Jerusalem as the capital of both states, these are
"springboards". This time the traffic color in Figure 1 is not
helpful as while they may be close in the specific interest, the
perception on how to reach it may differ, for that reason BATNAs
need to change (Fisher and al. 1991). In the latter the mediator
has the role of testing the BATNAs, in the instant case we might
say for all parties, "ripples" included. Notwithstanding that all
interests are critical issues for the parties; refugees, if well
approached, may start providing legitimacy to the process via
mediation (Bercovitch 1997). The Palestinian side alternative is
that refugees should have the right to go back to the Palestinian
[former] territories, to be assimilated in the nations of
"accueil" and to received compensation; this without creating in
Israel the perception of having their security in peril to avoid
that Israel"s alternative be the withdrawal from
negotiations.

***

Strategy
advice

Introduction. As it has been said
above, the further Hamas moves away from its Islamic group
inception and behavior the more chances it has to meet its
interests to become a legitimate and recognized player in the
resolution of the conflict. This requires creativeness.
Notwithstanding the above, Hamas"s leaders will have to approach
negotiations with Fatah with an "integrative bargaining"
mentality (Saner 2008 ) and take courageous and risky decisions
in Level I and II negotiations as well as maintaining
confidentiality to the extreme to avoid ideological differences
becoming insurmountable obstacles (Salacuse 2003).

Hamas Leaders" Creative Actions and
Concessions (in Level II negotiations). Hamas wants to become
a legitimate player in the conflict within and outside Palestine.
Unequivocal Joint Decisions to be taken by Haniyeh and Mishal,
who will re-accept the eighteen-point National Conciliation
Document of the Prisoners[14]dated May 11 2006
(first version). This amounts to use [already developed]
objective criteria (Fisher an al. 1991) that will help to deal
with the internal Palestinian conflict mythology and set Fatah
and Hamas relationship "on a political level" (Chehab 2007) for,
with all Palestinian movements, this means: (1) accept the PA as
"the only representative of the Palestinian people" (Chehab
2007); and (2) accept Arab summits decisions, which implies the
recognition of all United Nations resolutions.

Their decisions will seek common standards
to create a principled negotiation not only for Fatah but also
for all Palestinian players. Therefore, they will abolish Hamas
charter and join the 2003 third draft Constitution of the State
of Palestine[15]and urge PA to apply it in all
Palestine. Hamas leaders will permit the return and establishment
of Fatah and other movements in Gaza Strip and require that the
PA convene new elections in six months.

Before declaring the refusal of acceptance
of funds other than those from legitimate international and
Palestinian sources, they will require from Fatah share the
control of funds, and participate in the PA budget and fiscal
institutions. Hamas" proposal then will make Fatah change its
BATNA as the alternative of not sharing is prejudicial for a
"unity government", which Fatah desperately should seek due to
the loss of support in Palestine.

Haniyeh and Mishal will make the idea of
third-party intervention in Level II negotiations part of their
BATNA, always retaining ownership of the process; in case direct
negotiations with Fatah fail.

Hamas" leaders will convince all armed
factions and declare a unilateral sin die "Hudna"
(long-term ceasefire) and will stop all rhetorical of terrorism
or Omar Abdel-Razeq-like statements[16]This will
favor a joint Palestinian position with better instruments of
persuasion to overcome Israel"s mistrust and will open lines of
communications (Salacuse 2003). Hence, Hamas would then give more
"togetherness" and eventually more "negotiation power" to the
Palestinian delegation (Salacuse 2003). The latter understood as
instruments of persuasion.

Palestinian leaders with these decisions
should seek the "transformation of the Palestinian resistance
from violence to nonviolent civil resistance" [this will also
require a big transformation of the security systems (Chehab
2007)]. Hamas" decisions described above will provide the
necessary "high level of mutual trust within the [Palestinian]
confronting society…Attaining this level of internal trust
is the primary challenge…requires emergence of leadership"
that believes in the "efficacy of militant nonviolent resistance"
(Crocker and al. 2007)

Palestinian Delegation"s Decisions with
Hamas embedded (in Level I negotiations). The above changes
will lead all parties to share their perception of "desirability
of accord" (Haass 1992) and to Hamas to get into a path of
moderation [concessions to match Fatah"s skills in dealing with
international negotiations]. Hamas will give back the stolen
nationalistic approach to the Palestinian cause and abandon the
religious perception Hamas" secular leaders (see footnote 2
above) have given to the conflict. This will permit understanding
that this is not a conflict that involves a clash of cultures but
a divergence of "interests, opposing ideologies, competing
ambitions, and historical antagonisms" (Bercovitch 1997) and as
such the negotiations have to be framed in Level II.

Bassem Naim and Mahmoud al-Zahar will be
appointed members of the Palestinian delegation as they hold
power in Hamas for failures in negotiations do not only come from
the strategy chosen but from the inappropriateness of the persons
who applies it (Bercovitch 1997).

The Palestinian delegation will present
Israel and the international community with a vision that an
overnight solution will not take place as there is strong need of
transformational measures in the "multi-ripples" of the conflict
to change perceptions and expectations to eventually achieve a
consolidated peace settlement [this will help to develop the
Palestinian BATNA and the others" BATNA too and avoid developing
alternatives that may mean separation of any of the parties from
the negotiation rounds]. Palestinians will consent mediation to
progressively reach consensus among the negotiators in three
net-worked key enablers for a final peace:

Security: Palestine will promote and
consent deployment of an international force; preferable led by
NATO, in the Palestinian territories to monitor IDF withdrawal
under a UN Security Council mandate; in parallel they will
require a strong international investment, to train a
Gendarmerie-type unit strong enough but not to be perceived as a
menace by Israel. This will be formulated by the Quartet
plus[17]mediator in form of an agreement covering
resources and timeline for the above.

Economy. Palestine will permit mediation to
take the form of Kolb"s mediator roles for its economic
development. Deal maker to permit "multi-ripples" (all parties)
agree to a five-year program for boosting Palestinian economy.
Quartet plus mediator will orchestrate and guarantee that
Palestine"s neighbors ease tariffs and costumes fees as well as
access to roads, ports and airports and will facilitate a network
of donors. This will be incorporated in a framework plan for
heavy support in statebuilding activities and support, as
required by Palestinians, in nationbuilding ones.

Refugees. Palestinians will be ready to
incorporate in their BATNA the "best option…to live among
people who share their habits, language…- that is among the
current Arab citizens of Israel-" and include those areas in the
"land swap [relates to interest 2 "Borders 1967" in Figure
1]…to end up as part of the new Palestinian state" (Agha
and Malley 2002).

***

Conclusion

In mid-December 2010, Brazil, Argentina and
Uruguay announced the initiative to recognize "free and
independent" Palestine within 1967 borders. The Argentine Foreign
Ministry said that this declaration was intended to help
"definitively advance the negotiation process that will lead to
the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle
East." While the need, for the Palestinian people and the
International Community, of having an independent Palestinian
state is not under question, it is necessary to point out that
this type of attitude goes against the interim agreement signed
by Israel and the Palestinian Authority in 1995, which
consecrates to negotiations the status of the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip. This initiative was useful in 1988 when the
Palestinian Declaration of Independence was adopted by the
Palestinian National Council in Algiers, but since then a lot of
water has gone under the bridge and it will be irresponsible, by
the members of the International Community, to forget all what
has happened at the different negotiation tables over the last 22
years. Be that as it may, the Argentine Foreign Ministry said
that the statement was made to help "definitively advance the
negotiation process that will lead to the establishment of a just
and lasting peace in the Middle East," but international politics
should be taken much more serious than that. Well-intentioned
declarations may only help to stagnant even more the conflict, it
that is possible yet. It has to be noted that the leaders of
these countries have forgotten the maxim in international
relations that states that shortcuts lead to future failures,
i.e., in order to have a sound Palestinian state, negotiations
with Israel and its neighbors is a must; but negotiations between
Fatah and Hamas [Level II] have to come first, they are an a
priori requirement for success in Level I.

Negotiations in intractable conflict
environments last many years. This is the case of the present
conflict, but it is also two-pronged, between Hamas and Fatah,
and also between Israel and the Palestinian, which adds more
complexity when trying to solve it. This unavoidable fact means
that many decision makers and negotiators will be involved during
the developing history of the attempts to solve the conflict and,
as a consequence, many different ideas on how to solve it will be
tried. Be that as it may, decision makers tend to grab the first
option in hand when pressure increases; this is a natural impulse
that makes them take shortcuts that lead to unanticipated delays,
rush and wrong judgments that are deadly and can head off the
negotiation process as a whole.

Hamas needs to regularize itself
vis-à-vis not only Fatah but also with the International
Community. Hamas is, among the actors of the conflict, the one of
which requires the biggest change in attitude. However, it is not
its interests what it is required to shift, but its positions,
which, in turn, require visionary leaders who during Level II [
first] and Level II [later on] of negotiations are able to adapt
their BATNA. Avoiding sitting at the table of negotiations
impedes Hamas fulfilling its goals with respect to the
Palestinian people as an alternative to Fatah, or simply as a
legitimate supplement to [officially/internationally recognized]
Palestinian politics. Therefore, no negotiation process equates
to no learning experiences, which, in turn, leads to voluntarily
renounce to gain a better position [to the parties] to model
one"s BATNA or to abandon the negotiations table.

Putman"s two-level game approach is not
presented to this intractable situation naively; the extreme
characteristics of this conflict at Level I and II bring along
uncertainty among the negotiators and unpredictable outcomes.
However, the application of this model is a continuous reminder
to Hamas and Fatah to give themselves "negotiating room," first,
at Level II that will, in turn, permit them to jump into Level I
negotiations with at least a chance for success. This is a
proposal that would not have worked before June 2007 when Hamas
was not an actor to count on in the conflict. However, no matter
the model that may be applied since them, but it cannot disregard
that Hamas should be part of the negotiations process.
Nevertheless, this can only happen with a common Palestinian
front that requires Hamas and Fatah to engage in sound and
successful Level II negotiations.

This Palestinian attitude and decision
should dovetail with the help provided by a Quartet Plus mediator
[as representative of the International Community and legitimated
by it], should turn into green all Row 1 boxes now in yellow or
yellow/red in Figure 1 in a gradual process but "3 Capital
Jerusalem."[18] Although the parties would have to
seriously consider to include "3 Capital Jerusalem" in the
solution package and have remarkable BATNAs, both at Level II and
I.

In light of above, we can see that Hamas is
nowadays the first deadlock to be approached by the International
Community to turn it into a "partner for peace" and change
perspectives to tow out the conflict from its intractability.
Access to PA institutions and international legitimacy can permit
Hamas taking the decisions to model its BATNA over the
negotiations in Level II and, later on, in Level I and,
consequently, become a reliable actor in both levels.

The strategic advice outlined above in
section V is intended to highlight the fact that the conflict
requires transformational measures to change perceptions and
expectations to make BATNAs evolve. Mediation appears to be the
tool that negotiators of all times cannot abandon, however the
question is that of prioritization in this multi-pronged
conflict, i.e., what elements need to be approached first. This
paper highlights three of those and considers them as net-worked
key enablers for a final peace: security, economy and refugees.
These elements fit well with Putman"s theory of "general
equilibrium" that, in negotiations, takes into account the
interaction of both domestic and international factors. The goal
is to create among the negotiators, mediator(s) are hereby
included, a conceptual framework for understanding the
interaction of diplomacy and domestic politics that lead them, as
Putman puts it, to "spot a move on [the] board that will trigger
realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise
unattainable objectives."

Boston (USA) and Mons (Belgium) January
2011

***

"Sanctions and negotiations can be
very ineffective, and indeed foolish, unless the people you are
talking with and negotiating with and trying to reach agreements
with are people who can be trusted to keep their
word."

Caspar Weinberger

"The significant problems we face
cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we
created them."Albert Einstein

"In business, you don't get what you
deserve, you get what you negotiate."Chester L
Karrass

References

Agha and Malley 2002

Arrow and al. 1995

Bercovitch 1997

Chehad 2007

Crocker and al. 2007

Putman 1988

Fisher and al, 1991

Haass 1992

Lax and Sebenius 1992

Salacuse 2003

Saner 2008

Stedman 1997

Touval and Zartman 2001

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