Hamas in levels I and II of the isaeli-palestinian conflict negotiations? (página 2)

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"International Mediation in the Psot-Cold War Era" In
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United States Institute of Peace Press 2001.

FIGURE 1

Figure 1. Comparative table of interests.
Traffic light assessment on less effort in the negotiation rounds
and the need of mediation[19]

Row 1 LESS EFFORT IN THE NEGOTIATION ROUNDS
Row 2 NEED OF MEDIATION

Autor:

Andres Munoz
Mosquera.[20]

Alumni of The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy.[21]

[1] “The politics of many international
negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and
politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those
groups. At the international level, national governments seek
to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures,
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign
developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by
central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain
interdependent, yet sovereign.” Robert D. Putnam,
“Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level
games,” International Security, Vol 42, No.3 (Summer,
1988): 434.

[2] Also of “multilevel nature”
in Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, Grasping
the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict (U.S.
Institute of Peace, Washington D.C. 2005) p. 355

[3] Putman 1998, note: Richard E. Walton and
Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations:
An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1965).

[4] A “Bottom line” indicates the
worst possible outcome that can be accepted. Therefore, bottom
line approaches tend to be barriers beyond in the negotiation
process, that while it is intended to fence off a party against
the pressure and temptation to agree to a deal that not
convenient, unfortunately creates inflexibility, inhibits the
potential creativity and innovation that parties develop during
the negotiation process, reducing the incentive to seek adapted
solutions bring differences closer.

[5] “Hamas internal leadership
profile…resembles the profile of its electoral
candidates: professional, educated at secular institutions,
with only a handful affiliated with traditional religious
institutions…Its political theory also encourages Hamas
to privilege political over religious authority. In
Hamas’ theoretical framework, legislators in Islamic
state do not have to be religious scholars or have religious
expertise…Rhetorically, Hamas has acted, to use
Stedman’s terminology…, as a “total
spoiler”, unwilling to compromise on its vision of a
liberated Islamic state in all of British Mandate Palestine.
Its actual behavior has been more ambiguous. During the 1990s
it staged suicide attacks which undermined the peace process
and since coming to power it has refused to recognize Israel,
even in the face of crippling financial sanctions…But
from early 2005, it has, notwithstanding violations, rocket
attacks and various suspensions, broadly honoured a ceasefire
with Israel although tensions have increased since summer
2007…” [to end up in the late 2008 Israeli
incursion that ended up with no harm to the Hamas political
infrastructure] Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy,
Religion, Violence (Columbia University Press, New York, 2008)
p. 164-165.

[6] “On June 25, 2009 speech by Hamas
leader Khalid Mishal, in which Mishal said the armed movement
was ready to deal with the international community in order to
reach an agreement with Israel”. From PTSS Daily
“The George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies”, by Leigh A. Truly and al.

[7] Jacob Bertcovitch, Resolving
International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder London, 1996) p. 125

[8] Raymond Saner, The Expert Negotiator
(Marinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2008) p.
111-134

[9] Hamas officials Bassem Naim and Mahmoud
al-Zahar, had a recent meeting in Switzerland with a former
senior U.S. diplomat (Pickering) represented an opening in
relations with the Obama administration, and a path to easing
the Islamist group's isolation. From Washington Post, 16 Jul
09. Available in
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/15/AR2009071503791.html

[10] Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Corruption:
Diagnosis and Treatment,” Journal of Democracy, Volume
17, Number 3, July (2006): 87.

[11] The recent nominations of June 15 at the
new PA Cabinet, with the expulsion of Hamas members and
harassment of sympathizers, do not help to head towards a
“unity government”. According to Hamas data, in
June the Palestinian Authority detained more than 470 of its
activists, three of whom were killed (Imana, a Hamas West Bank
website, July 2, 2009). According to Fatah data, more than 190
of its activists were detained and interrogated (Wafa News
Agency, July 2, 2009). Sources within the Palestinian
Authority's security forces told the Israeli daily Haaretz that
a Hamas-affiliated squad had been detained which had planned to
attack senior Palestinian Authority figures and among others,
had followed the movements of Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. According
to the sources, when the squad was captured it had in its
possession weapons, maps and pictures of senior Palestinian
figures. The squad operated in the Ramallah region, directed by
Hamas both in the Gaza Strip and abroad (Avi Issacharoff,
Haaretz , July 3, 2009).

[12] Note above sections continuously refers
to “Third-party”; so that no dedicated paragraph to
it is in this paper.

[13] “Holbrooke…faced a
situation in which he had to manipulate BATNAs to bring about a
situation in which mediation and negotiation were
possible…aggressive approach” (Non-attributable
comments – The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy)

[14] Signed by Fatah PLC member, Marwan
Barghouthi, Fatah Secretary; by Hamas Sheikh Abdul Khaleq
al-Natsheh, Higher Leading Commission; by Islamic Jihad
Movement, Sheikh Bassam al-Sa'di; by PFLP Abdul Rahim Mallouh,
member of PLO Executive Committee and Deputy General Secretary
of the PFLP; and DFLP, Mustafa Badarneh.

[15] Available in
http://www.jmcc.org/documents/palestineconstitution-eng.pdf

[16] “Omar Addel-Razeq, who was elected
to the Palestinian Legislative Council from Hamas in 2006 and
was recently released from Israeli prison: ‘The
recognition of its right to exist is another matter. I don't
think time lies on the Israeli side. What if the balance of
power’” June 2009, available in The Palestinian
Telegraph
http://www.paltelegraph.com/palestine/gaza-strip/1388-former-us-diplomat-talks-with-hamas

[17] “Quartet Plus” would include
China and Jordan and Egypt, plus key Arab countries.

[18] This is independent issue and linked to
that of “Borders 1967” at the same time. Mediation
here will have to have a more Touval and Zartman role, i.e.,
formulator to satisfy Israel, Palestine and the Muslim and
Christian worlds with substantive suggestions to draft a
comprehensive agreement signed by Quartet plus and parties on
the ownership and use of the Old City and neighborhoods.
Besides it will need to use the “carrot and stick”
tools as a good manipulator to avoid blocked positions on the
above that can overrun common interests and develop a network
of talks in its role of communicator.

[19] Table filled out with data and criteria
available in The RAND Palestinian State Study Team Building a
Successful Palestinian State (Santa Monica, CA, RAND 2005) and
Robert E. Hunter, Seth G. Jones Building a Successful
Palestinian State: Security (Santa Monica, CA, RAND 2006).

[20] Andres.Munoz[arroba]alumni.tufts.edu

[21] DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions of
the author expressed therein do not state or reflect those of
the university he is an alumni of nor the organization he works
for.