Thematic evaluation of UNODC alternative development initiatives

Executive
Summary

1. Background

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
works with the international community and Member States to take
action against illicit drug production, trafficking and crime.
The United Nations and other international agencies have
undertaken various forms of rural development initiatives that
aim at reducing and eradicating the production of illicit drug
crops for about 30 years. The mandate for UNODC and its
predecessor agencies to undertake drug control and especially
Alternative Development (AD) is articulated in the United Nations
General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) 1998
Resolution S-20/4 E and United Nations Commission on
Narcotic Drug (CND 45/14) documents. A historical analysis of
these initiatives shows that the concept of AD has evolved over
the last 30 years. UNODC has adopted a project approach as its
preferred implementation modality to this day.

The initial rural development activities designed to
curb drug production and promote licit economic activities that
involved crop substitution began in the 1970s. This approach was
followed in the 1980s by Integrated Rural Development (IRD). IRD
attempted to address the broad socio-economic and infrastructural
development issues as a basis of creating conditions for licit
economic development. This approach was expensive and met with
limited success. Alternative Development was then developed and
viewed as a unique development approach that addressed problems
in drug dependent economies. Today AD has evolved even further
and now encompasses sustainable livelihoods.

UNGASS defines AD as a process to prevent and eliminate
the illicit cultivation of crops through rural development
measures within the context of sustained national economic
growth. The ultimate goal of AD is to help shape a set of
conditions which, given sufficient time and growth of the licit
economy, could lead to permanent behavioural change in drug
producing areas. AD aims at creating conditions for those who
give up growing illicit drug crops to participate in licit
economic activities and hence permanently give up growing drugs.
UNODC"s AD projects have placed more emphasis on measuring the
reduction of drug crop acreages than the impact on the
livelihoods of beneficiaries, although there are
exceptions.

2. Purpose and Objectives

The main purpose of this Thematic Evaluation was to
review Alternative Development strategies in different regions
and countries to determine if there was a common understanding of
AD within UNODC, as well as to assess the appropriateness of its
strategies. The evaluation is expected contribute to UNODC
strategy development in this area.

In addition, the evaluation assessed the outcomes and
sustainability of selected Alternative Development interventions
with a view to defining lessons learned and best practices.
Ongoing, as well as recently concluded projects were
reviewed.

3. Methodology

The Thematic Evaluation used information already
available (e.g. evaluation reports, Project Progress Reports,
existing literature on AD etc.), and findings from the country
reports and the project evaluation reports produced as part of
this exercise.

In addition to document reviews, the evaluation team
conducted field visits and interviews with relevant key
informants. Field visits (Lao PDR, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Thailand,
Myanmar, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia) were conducted to collect
information to complement and refine information already
available, as well as to produce country reports as an input to
the final comprehensive report. The major sources of information
were semi- structured interviews with different stakeholders, by
using open-ended questions.

The evaluation team consisted of five
consultants and two IEU evaluators.

4. Limitations

The evaluation faced various limitations. The field
visit in Lao was postponed because of a regional meeting that
coincided with this exercise. One project site in Colombia was
not visited because of security concerns. Further, the consultant
responsible for reporting on Colombia and for writing the Latin
America Regional Report failed to deliver acceptable products.
This failure affected the timely execution of this evaluation and
resulted in missing information in some instances. Fortunately,
the Lead Evaluator visited Colombia in the course of the
Evaluation to collect necessary information.

5. Major Findings

The key findings of the report are
organized in the following three categories: A. Alternative
Development as a Discipline

B. Alternative Development as practiced at
UNODC C. External Relations and Synergies

A. Alternative Development as a
Discipline

Finding 1. There is no universally
accepted definition of Alternative Development operating around
the world across agencies and writers, despite the UNGASS
definition of 19981. At least four views are found: that AD is a
multifaceted strategic (or systemic) approach to a problem, that
AD is one leg of a stool along side eradication, interdiction,
policing and education, that AD is a series of discrete projects
(or pilot projects), and that AD is equivalent to crop
substitution. (Pages 5-8)

Finding 2. A drop in illicit crop
production is not the only indicator by which success can be
measured. Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence at the
macro level that the rural development components of AD reduced
the amount of drug crops cultivated. There is an attribution gap
between AD interventions and reduction of illicit crop
cultivation at a national level. Agriculture and social
interventions are not seen to overcome the incentive pressure
exerted by the market conditions of the illicit drug trade. Where
reduction in drug cropping occurs, other factors, including
general economic growth, can be identified as alternate
explanations for the change or as contributory factors to change.
Further, intimidation and coercion by traffickers are another
constraint that AD has to deal with. (Pages 8-10)

Finding 3. From a technical perspective,
the rural development methodologies used in AD projects are not
notably different from those employed in other development
settings. They need to be informed by good development practices,
but must be adapted to local conditions. (Pages 10-11)

B. Alternative Development as practiced at
UNODC

Finding 4. There is limited information
available on the impact on the livelihoods of beneficiaries of
UNODC AD projects, as opposed to crop reduction data. According
to the information available, beneficiary"s livelihoods show an
improvement due to AD interventions. (Pages 11-12)

Finding 5. Eradication is less
politically acceptable than AD and there is little evidence that
eradication reduces cultivation in the long-term – drug
crops move, production technologies evolve, and total production
decreases very slowly if at all. (Pages 12-13)

Finding 6. UNODC has used projects as a
modality to implement AD emphasizing the first part of the UNGASS
definition: "[…] through specifically designed rural
development measures", and less on the second part "[…] in the
context of sustained national economic growth and sustainable
development efforts". (Page 13)

Finding 7. UNODC"s AD interventions have
played a vital and very positive role in the formulation of drug
control policy in many countries. (Pages 13-14)

Finding 8. Despite some efforts at
improvement UNODC working and funding processes hinder efficient
implementation of AD activities. (Pages 15-17)

Finding 9. UNODC is less likely to
produce significant impact with AD at the macro level, given the
resources it receives for AD. (Pages 17-18)

Finding 10. UNODC field projects are not
designed within realistic budget expectations. Changes from
agreed designs, many of which are not accompanied by formal
adjustment of indicators, mean that there is no clear way of
measuring performance or improving effectiveness. (Pages
18-20)

C. External Relations and Synergies

Finding 11. There is a gap between what
UNODC is expected to do and what it is enabled to do. National
governments, not UNODC, are responsible for developing and
implementing national drug control and economic development
programs. UNODC has no control over the funds donors will
provide. Drug policy planning and administration take place
within complex international and national political systems that
UNODC can influence but not control. UNODC's role is best
described as catalytic. (Pages 20-21)

Finding 12. UNODC has not used the
Office's unique leadership position to its best advantage to
mould the diverse views of the donor community into a strategic
consensus leading to coherent action on AD. This has negative
effects on funding for UNODC AD projects. (Page 21)

Finding 13. UNODC has not taken full
advantage to identify opportunities to partner with other
organizations on AD and rural development and in some cases
misses opportunities for multiplying the impact of
investments. This process should begin at the design stage of
project development. (Pages 21-22)

6. Outcomes

The report identified several outcomes,
including:

• Some AD interventions, in particular road
construction, have proved to have lasting positive impacts in
remote rural areas.

• Several technology introductions accomplished in
AD projects, in particular the gabion weir technology2 in
Southeast Asia, have proved their worth repeatedly in bringing
irrigation water to farmers fields at a very low cost. This is
something UNODC AD could have capitalized on and hence created
better impacts.

• The development of marketing skills that is the
focus of the many Latin America projects is starting to have a
positive impact and this trend is likely to continue into the
future. This is an area that UNODC should both monitor and study
closely and hence replicate best practices.

• UNODC has been unable to build a consensus of
opinion around AD. The Office needs to invest in building
consensus especially among donors. Success will depend on UNODC"s
ability to build this consensus and hence mobilize and galvanize
donors to provide resources.

7. Sustainability

The interventions mentioned above as having had
important positive outcomes and impacts can be considered
sustainable, in particular road building and gabion weir
construction. Some other interventions undertaken in AD projects,
however, are unlikely to be sustainable. These include paying
teachers' salaries in Lao PDR and non-agricultural careers
training in Myanmar. Unless complementary activities to support
market system development and trade are undertaken, the
sustainability of the market interventions in Latin America will
be limited. UNODC should note the successes, but also deal with
shortcomings if its AD interventions are to become
sustainable.

• Sustainability of AD will only be achieved if all
involved look to development as a long-term endeavour. Donors
must realize this and provide UNODC with the necessary support to
stay until the work is complete. A drop in illicit crop
production is not the only indicator by which success can be
measured. Development indicators must be the basis for which to
assess impact and sustainability.

8. Lessons Learned

Some lessons learned and best practices
from this evaluation include:

• It appears unwise to implement AD projects under
a national executing modality where partner organizations lack
familiarity and experience with the ambitious and demanding
nature of AD approaches, or where qualified local staff is not
available or unwilling to work in a remote area. Where strong
implementing partners are available, UNODC may take a secondary
role;

• AD activities are found to be effective only when
they are culturally appropriate. In Latin America, working with
farmer"s organizations is a necessary condition for success. In
Asia, adjusting program activities to accommodate ethnic
differences is necessary;

• Knowledge management is key to improving
organizational performance and learning;

• To improve their effectiveness, UNODC AD
initiatives must support and strengthen communication and
cooperation between organizations and actors in the construction
of a better future in drug affected regions;

• It is seen to be essential that UNODC attract
implementation partners as early in the program formulation
process as possible. To maximize the attractiveness of
cooperation, UNODC will need to advocate interests much wider
than drug control;

• The Kokang and Wa initiative (KOWI) as an
innovative partnership mechanism is a model that should be
replicated.

9. Constraints

Some constraints identified from this
evaluation include:

• Weaknesses in project design and monitoring
systems hinder adequate monitoring and evaluation of AD
interventions.

• Inadequate performance monitoring by
Headquarters, Field Offices and on-site project staff negatively
affects project implementation;

• AD is not well defined in UNODC and the Office
has trouble articulating a strategy and communicating it to
donors and partners. There is no framework or common language for
AD worldwide;

• Inadequate resources and a limited capacity at
UNODC and an inability of donors to commit funding to long-term
projects and skill development;

10. Recommendations

The evaluation makes only one
recommendation, as all other steps that UNODC can take must
follow from it:

The Executive Committee of UNODC should immediately
commission an externally managed, high-level strategic exercise
to determine how the Office will continue to address the AD goals
as spelled out in its mandate. The participants in this exercise
must be willing to challenge every aspect of the Office's
rationale to AD, its approach to design and mode of
implementation, soliciting and allocating funding, monitoring and
evaluation. No question should be taboo, including whether UNODC
has the capacity to properly execute its mandate to undertake AD
in the UN system. The Executive Committee should then decide upon
the course of action to be taken, based upon the recommendations
of the review.

Following the adoption of a comprehensive
strategy, UNODC will need to redesign and realign AD operations
top-to-bottom within the Office to meet the prerequisites
for implementing the chosen strategy. This redesign
would include, but not limited to, the Office"s relationships
with donors, and to the processes of programme/project design,
staffing and implementation.

A fundamental principle of Results Based Management,
"managing available resources to achieve results," must be
applied in UNODC. In reality, the results that UNODC promises are
not adjusted to match the resources that materialize once
projects have begun and therefore UNODC cannot deliver on its
promises. In particular the 50 per cent rule and others that
result in a misalignment of expectations and budget resources
must be reconsidered.

11. Options for Action

As a contribution to the high-level review exercises the
evaluation team has identified some options that may be
considered. The team members of this evaluation are not in
agreement on the best course of action for UNODC, with at least
one member arguing that UNODC should stop all rural development
projects as soon as possible. However, the team believes that it
is the responsibility of the Office to formulate its own
strategy. The following list of strategic options may not be
comprehensive but it outlines the possibilities most clearly seen
at this writing.

A. UNODC continues to directly implement
field projects on AD.

B. UNODC continues to support AD projects
but out-sources implementation.

C. UNODC shifts its focus on AD to research
and knowledge management aspects and is established as a Centre
of Excellence for AD.

D. UNODC focuses on promoting policy
dialogue while maintaining a repository of knowledge about AD
best practices.

E. UNODC expands AD activities to embrace
the wider agenda of the Millennium

Development Goals to address poverty as a
root of crime.

12. Conclusions

Alternative Development planning and administration
takes place within complex international and national political
systems that UNODC can influence but not control. The political
debate on AD in the international press and scholarly
publications is fierce and some question UNODC"s ability to
confidently take on AD as a drug suppression tool.

UNODC has gained ample experience in AD and should have
a comparative advantage over other international actors. Despite
this the Office faces a series of challenges.

The primary problem is that there is no commonly
accepted definition of AD in the world community or within UNODC.
While UNGASS provides a definition of AD, UNODC still does not
have a strategic vision of AD and thus its efforts are
fragmented.

UNODC has not supported its AD effort with adequate
programme or technical staff. Staffing at the Sustainable
Livelihoods Unit at Headquarters is inadequate to support UNODC"s
AD initiatives. UNODC's funding is precarious and complex
internal procedures hamper the timely and efficient
implementation of projects even further.

UNODC is at a crossroad regarding its AD initiatives.
The challenge before it must be tackled with timely and
appropriate decisions.

1.
Introduction

1.1. Background

1. The original United Nations drugs agencies, the
Division on Narcotic Drugs and the Secretariat of the
International Narcotics Control Board, worked from the 1950s and
into the early 1980s on international drug-control treaties and
drug-related research. These separate agencies monitored the
status of drugs and drug control in Member States and worked on
drug treaty issues. In 1970, as worldwide heroin use grew, the
United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) was formed to
undertake small, grant-funded projects related to demand
reduction and anti-trafficking. UNFDAC was restructured and
renamed the UN International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) in
1991. In 1997, UNDCP was merged with CICP (the Centre for
International Crime Prevention) to form UNODCCP, the Office for
Drug Control and Crime Prevention. In 2002, the Office was
reorganized and again renamed as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC).

2. UNODC works to strengthen international action
against drug production, trafficking and crime. UNODC provides
statistics on drugs and crime and helps Member States to draft
legislation and train judicial officials and carries out research
and analytical work to increase knowledge and understanding of
drugs and crime issues and expand the evidence-base for policy
and operational decisions. It assists Member States in the
ratification and implementation of international treaties,
development of domestic legislation on drugs, crime and
terrorism, and provides substantive services to the treaty-based
and governing bodies.

3. UNODC also manages field-based technical cooperation
projects to enhance the capacity of Member States to counteract
illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. UNODC's mandate to undertake
Alternative Development (AD) is spelled out in UNGASS resolution
S-20/4 E3, CND 45/144 and other official documents. The Office
provides technical advice on Alternative Development to Member
States through its Field Offices, Regional Advisers and a
Vienna-based AD expert. Between 1979 and 2004, the Office funded
more than 120 technical cooperation projects aiming at reducing
or eliminating illicit crop cultivation.

4. Modern drug control agendas focus on demand
reduction, that is, suppressing the use of a substance and
thus reducing the size of the market, and supply
reduction, suppressing the cultivation or production of a
substance and thus its availability in the marketplace.
Interdiction and policing are activities that
use the law and law enforcement to prevent the spread of drugs
and drug precursor chemicals from place to place. Public
education about drugs warns people of the physical, legal
and economic consequences of growing, trafficking and using
drugs.

5. Permanent change in farmer behaviour so as to prevent
the planting of drug crops requires the following: 1. Reducing
the coercive power of the drug industry and 2. Improving
economies so as to assure adequate and stable income from licit
activities. It is important to note that farmers will stop drug
cropping even if it means a modest drop in income,
provided other social and economic supports are in
place. It is also important to note that farmers will not abandon
the illicit economy, even for profitable alternatives, if they
are threatened by dangerous criminals. Business stability is the
base for a licit economy and requires a legal and juridical
system that sustains the business community and markets. The
development of a licit economy requires a stable society where
people are assured of their rights and in which behavioural norms
casting drugs in a bad light can develop. Unfortunately, the
practice of AD in the past 30 years has paid little attention to
the systemic causes of drug cultivation and instead has focused
(at times exclusively) on providing assistance to small groups of
farmers in remote locations.

6. UNODC"s AD outcome indicators have, historically, put
more emphasis on the reduction of illicit crop production acreage
and less on measuring the change in beneficiary"s livelihoods.
There is evidence that this has begun to change in the past few
years.

7. In the course of 30 years, strategic thinking behind
Alternative Development has evolved as various approaches to
supply reduction have been tested. At the beginning of the
1970s the international community supported crop
substitution projects, first in Thailand and later Pakistan. The
idea of these projects was to replace narcotic crops with other,
legal crops. After many failures it became clear that the
economics of crop substitution required massive and long-term
subsidization of non-drug crops (e.g. Thailand). Additional
development measures are necessary to tackle not only crop
production, marketing and transport problems, but also the
underlying economic, ecological and social problems that support
an illicit economy and cause farmers to engage in illicit drug
crops.

8. An integrated rural development (IRD) approach
against drugs was adopted in the 1980s. IRD attacked
a broad range of social problems simultaneously yet still focused
almost exclusively on problems at the local level. Their
long-term impacts were uneven, with some interventions being more
effective than others in particular circumstances. IRD projects
in the 1980s, whether for drug control or with other
goals, were so complex that they were management nightmares and
impossible to evaluate. They were also expensive, generally
requiring large international staffs and a large complement of
local counterparts. IRD projects in remote drug producing regions
remained particularly difficult because, despite expensive
infrastructure improvements, unfavourable market conditions
persisted.

9. In mainstream development, and to some extent in AD
(as will be discussed in detail later), a more cost-cognizant
approach to development emerged. Today, good development practice
dictates that a holistic view of the situation be refined into a
progressively more focused consideration of the situation in
order to choose the best among many possible interventions to use
limited project funding and available skills in the most
effective way to achieve a set of narrowly specified results.
UNODC has, on paper at least, embraced this notion for its AD
interventions but the practice of AD, particularly in Asia, has
not moved far from the earlier IRD approach for reasons that will
be discussed later in this report.

1.2. Purpose of the Evaluation

10. The main purpose of this Thematic Evaluation was to
review Alternative Development strategies in different regions
and countries to determine if there was a common understanding of
AD within UNODC, as well as to assess the appropriateness of its
strategies. The evaluation is expected contribute to UNODC
strategy development in this area.

11. In addition, the evaluation assessed the outcomes
and sustainability of selected Alternative Development
interventions with a view to defining lessons learned and best
practices. Ongoing, as well as recently concluded projects were
reviewed.

1.3. Scope of the Evaluation

12. This Thematic Evaluation of UNODC's Alternative
Development Initiatives has reviewed the results of AD activities
implemented by UNODC in Asia and Latin America regions and in
seven countries to determine if a common understanding of AD
exists within UNODC, and to assess the overall appropriateness of
AD as a development and drug control strategy. In addition, the
evaluation exercise looked at the outcomes and sustainability of
selected AD interventions with a view to defining lessons learned
and best practices.

13. The evaluation examined various factors such
as:

A. Alternative Development
Strategy

i. What is AD and what does AD mean in
UNODC;

ii. The role of AD at UNODC and how it has
been implemented.

B. Role of UNODC

i. The organizational structure of UNODC
and its appropriateness for the task;

ii. The adequacy and appropriateness of
needs assessment and selection of project sites;

iii. Organization and management of
backstopping, monitoring and evaluation.

C. External Relations and
Synergies

i. The most effective use of financial
resources for AD, particularly in relation to other actors, donor
agencies and their funding strategies;

ii. Public relations with donors, recipient
countries and the general public;

iii. Linkages with other institutions
working in related fields;

iv. Evolution of Alternative Development
strategy and the way forward.

1.4. Evaluation Methodology

14. The team for this worldwide Thematic Evaluation was
comprised of five independent consultants. The UNODC Independent
Evaluation Unit oversaw the implementation of the activity and
staff from the Unit participated in the evaluation of Peru,
Myanmar, and Pakistan. Over the course of about 6 months, the
evaluation team reviewed relevant documents and conducted field
visits in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam and
Pakistan. Team members visited national capitals and project
sites and conducted interviews with project beneficiaries,
implementers, project partners and donors, using open- ended
questions. The Thematic Evaluation used information already
available (e.g. evaluation reports, Project Progress Reports,
existing literature on AD etc.), and findings from the country
reports and the project evaluation reports produced as part of
this exercise.

15. The evaluation team conducted formal project
evaluations in Viet Nam, Lao and Myanmar to assess design,
implementation and outcomes. The team members reviewed reference
documents on Thailand and Afghanistan

16. The final report was developed as
follows:

Base: Regional meetings were held in two
locations, Bangkok (Asia team members) and in Lima (Latin
American team). Documents were collected, distributed and read by
the team members in both regions followed by discussions via
Internet. Evaluation instruments were developed.

Country level: A total of seven countries were
reviewed for the present evaluation. In three countries, Lao PDR,
Myanmar and Viet Nam, formal project evaluations were conducted.
For each of the seven countries reviewed, a country report was
produced as an input to the final report.

Regional level: Two regional level reports were
prepared, one for Latin America and one for South East
Asia.

Global level: The final global evaluation report
was produced based on consultations between Latin America and
Asia teams, country reports, and regional reports produced as
part of the exercise.

1.5. Limitations

17. The evaluation faced various limitations. The field
visit in Lao was postponed because of a regional meeting that
coincided with this exercise. One project site in Colombia was
not visited because of security concerns. Further, the consultant
responsible for reporting on Colombia and for writing the Latin
America Regional Report failed to deliver acceptable products.
This failure affected the timely execution of this evaluation and
resulted in missing information in some instances. Fortunately,
the Lead Evaluator visited Colombia in the course of the
Evaluation to collect necessary information.

2. Major Findings
and Analysis

18. Findings and data are presented in section 2.1 with
analysis and supporting information following in section
2.2.

2.1. Findings

A. Alternative Development as a
Discipline

Finding 1. There is no universally accepted
definition of Alternative Development operating around the world
across agencies and writers, despite the UNGASS definition of
19985. At least four views are found: that AD is a multifaceted
strategic (or systemic) approach to a problem, that AD is one leg
of a stool along side eradication, interdiction, policing and
education, that AD is a series of discrete projects (or pilot
projects), and that AD is equivalent to crop
substitution.

19. After 30 years it would seem that the world
community would agree on what Alternative Development is.
Unfortunately, interviews with AD practitioners and policy
makers, and examination of written materials from many sources
confirm a lack of agreement on what AD is, on how AD should be
implemented, and on what results should be expected from AD. The
various uses of the terms, "Alternative Development", "process"
and "measures" very much depend on the writer's point of view
with policy theorists, donors, national governments, local
officials (including army and police officers) and even
villagers, having different perspectives on the meaning of AD.
Four major themes can be identified in the discussion:

i.AD is a multifaceted holistic, systemic,
strategic approach to a complex problem. ii.The UNGASS approach
in which AD is the leg of a stool with interdiction,
policing, eradication and education as the other
legs.

iii.AD is a series of discrete rural
development projects or pilot projects. iv.AD is no more than a
new name for crop substitution.

20. There are no specific dates by which to identify the
evolution of rural development interventions from crop
substitution through IRD to AD, the term "Alternative
Development" is commonly used as a catchall.

21. The current debate, however, is increasingly being
referred to as "development in drug environments". The four
themes provided of AD are not mutually exclusive. AD in UNODC is
the terme de rigueur and projects are the universal
mechanism for delivery. Only in Afghanistan is UNODC not involved
in rural development projects.

i. Strategic umbrella: AD is a holistic
approach

22. One group of writers promotes AD an extended (10-15
year) holistic process of social and economic development that,
by directly and indirectly addressing the systemic reasons that
farmers grow drugs, leads to the permanent elimination of drug
crops and a drug-based economy.

23. David Mansfield (2005), expert on AD, states
"Conceptually the main point of difference is one of is
development an end in itself (with reductions in illicit drug
crop cultivation an externality of a holistic development process
that includes creating the enabling environment for wider
economic growth and extending the writ of the state) or is it a
means to negotiate a reduction in drug crop cultivation (an
approach of conditional assistance). The response to this
question shapes the mechanisms of delivery. If it is the former
then we are typically looking at mainstreaming an analysis of the
causes of illicit drug crop cultivation (and how these differs by
socio-economic group), as well as drug control objectives, into
national development programmes (AD – or as it has moved on
conceptually within this model to AL – as an outcome). If it is
the latter a geographically discrete project intervention will
suffice. Clearly the latter approach has a far more limited in
terms of lasting change and outreach but it is easier from the
perspective of donor or UN agency delivery".

24. As a long term, holistic strategy, AD embraces a
long list of activities including land tenure, business law,
international trades issues, civil rights enforcement, education,
health, etc. AD when viewed from this perspective includes
economic development, eradication, interdiction, education and
policing as integral sub-components of the AD process. As a
systemic approach, AD should begin long before coercive measures
are started so as to prevent and mitigate economic hardship
during the process of economic realignment toward a stable licit
economy. In this view, AD should continue, even after drug crops
are gone, until the economy is robust enough to prevent
reinvestment in drug crops.

25. AD, when viewed holistically, should be part of a
nationwide strategy for poverty elimination that focuses on the
maturation of a just civil society and on the growth of small and
medium sized businesses that recycle money in the economies of
drug growing areas. In this approach, projects are only
methodological tools used toward specific ends. This broad
conceptual approach to AD is seen in the widely published
writings of Chouvy (2004), Mansfield (2002), McCoy (2004),
Kennefick and Morgan (2003), and Berridge and Edwards (1981).
Members of this evaluation team strongly support a strategic view
of AD with Bechtstadt (2005), in particular, arguing that
eradication and interdiction are subcomponents of AD and that
breaking the power of drug traffickers is of particular
importance in reducing coercion to grow drugs.

ii. The UNGASS mandate: AD is a leg of a
stool.

26. The most commonly quoted definition of AD is derived
from the Political Declaration and Action Plan on International
Cooperation on the Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on
Alternative Development, adopted by the Special Session of the
General Assembly in 1998 (UNGASS) and seems to support AD as a
holistic activity. UNGASS defines Alternative Development
as:

"… a process to prevent and eliminate the
illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances through specifically designed rural
development measures in the context of sustained national
economic growth and sustainable development efforts in countries
taking action against drugs, recognizing the particular
socio-cultural characteristics of the target
communities and groups, within the
framework of a comprehensive and permanent solution to the
problem of illicit drugs."

27. Seldom quoted, however, is the preceding paragraph
that says,

"…effective crop control strategies can
encompass a variety of approaches, including Alternative
Development, law enforcement and eradication."

28. In this view, AD is an equal and separate
component of a drug control program. The UNGASS definition
and description of AD as rural development measures distinct from
eradication and law enforcement is further supported in 2002 by
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Resolution 45/14: The Role Of
Alternative Development In Drug Control And Development
Cooperation, which lists "comprehensive measures such as
Alternative Development, law enforcement and eradication" against
drugs.

29. UNGASS and CND 45/14 texts, by specifying that AD is
one of several separate components of the anti-drugs strategy,
predisposes the drug control community to view the components
separately. So, for example, we find that even the most
progressive thinkers use the term Alternative Development to
describe a component of something else:

• The government of Lao PDR calls its
anti-opium program the "Balanced Approach to Opium Elimination"
and lists the components as 1. Alternative Development, 2. Demand
reduction, and 3. Law enforcement;

• The National Drug Control Strategy of Peru
consists of four elements: 1. Reduction of drug consumption and
rehabilitation of drug addicts, 2. Interdiction of illicit drug
trafficking and related crime, 3. Alternative Development,
environmental protection and rehabilitation of damaged
ecosystems, and 4. Eradication of illicit cultivation. The
Peruvian strategy is implemented through five programs: a.
Prevention and rehabilitation, b. Alternative Development, c.
Environmental protection, d. Eradication, e. Interdiction and
prevention of money laundering;

• UNODC in Bolivia cites eradication,
complemented by AD, as being the main focus of the drug control
program. A report prepared for US Agency for International
Development in Bolivia, cites 1. Interdiction, 2. Eradication and
3. Alternative Development as necessary components of a drug
suppression program.

iii. AD is a project

30. Although CND 45/14 and UNGASS imply that AD projects
should only be undertaken where needed, in practice, UNGASS' use
of the phrase "rural-development measures" is commonly taken to
mean "rural-development projects" and the definition of AD is too
often reduced to a simple equation: AD = time and
geographically limited, externally-funded projects. This
simplification is most often heard in conversations with UNODC
field officers and officials of national governments. The
discussion begins with the national strategy that includes AD as
one of several components of drug control approach. Then, a map
is presented showing the regions where illicit crops are grown.
It is explained that law enforcement and eradication are underway
across the illicit crop zone and that interdiction and drug
awareness programs are underway nation wide. But when the
discussion turns to AD, the official will explain that AD only is
underway at the sites of externally funded AD projects. Villagers
certainly understand that AD, if they have heard of it at all, is
a local project that they either participate in or
do not. In this context, AD at least in Asia is not a part of
the national economic development strategy, nor is AD seen to
complement national growth.

iv. AD as a synonym for crop
substitution

31. At the farthest conceptual remove from AD as a
holistic strategy, AD is merely a new name for crop
substitution. Although less frequently seen today than
previously, one contemporary example of this use is found in the
Lao-American Integrated Rural Development Projects (funded by the
US Narcotics Affairs Section in Lao PDR and currently underway).
The project lists activities as: 1. Road Construction 2. Demand
Reduction, 3. Agriculture and Alternative Development (which in
this project is promotion of cattle and pig banks and five high
value crops, 4. Public Health 5. Education, Teacher Training and
Gender

6. Food For Work.

Finding 2. A drop in illicit crop production is
not the only indicator by which success can be measured.
Nonetheless, there is little empirical evidence at the macro
level that the rural development components of AD reduced the
amount of drug crops cultivated. There is an attribution gap
between AD interventions and reduction of illicit crop
cultivation at a national level. Agriculture and social
interventions are not seen to overcome the incentive pressure
exerted by the market conditions of the illicit drug trade. Where
reduction in drug cropping occurs, other factors, including
general economic growth, can be identified as alternate
explanations for the change or as contributory factors to change.
Further, intimidation and coercion by traffickers are another
constraint that AD has to deal with.

32. Based on the empirical evidence, we find that the
objectives of preventing investment and reinvestment in drug
crops have not been met by rural development initiatives. Despite
massive expenditures over 30 years, AD interventions have little
apparent effect in slowing the movement of drugs from one region
to another in response to localized suppression efforts. Where
cultivation has been suppressed, often trafficking has increased
and traffickers from one country practice their skills across
international borders. Without policing, it is widely observed
that investment in drug crops increases rapidly in response to
demand. Evidence for this finding come from data on drug supplies
and demand supplied by UNODC, the government of the United
States, and respective national governments. To
summarize:

• It is difficult to measure the effect AD
interventions have on the total area under cultivation. Far more
data is available on the results of forced eradication
techniques. Total coca production in the Andean region had been
decreasing for three years, until a slight increase in 2004. In
Colombia the trend remained downward, whereas in Bolivia and
Peru, the area under coca cultivation increased;

• Huge tracts of Colombia have been developed for
coca in the past 15 years. Coca leaf production grew from 40,000
hectares in 1990 to about 160,000 hectares in 2000
dropping to about 80,000 hectares in 2004, in response largely to
extensive eradication activities. The contribution of AD to this
decrease is difficult to measure;

• Opium production in Afghanistan fell
to its lowest under the Taliban in 2001.

However, following the fall of the Taliban
in late 2001, production increased rapidly despite international
intentions to prevent it. Now opium production represents up
to 60 per cent of the national economy;

• Poppy production has been steady at low levels in
Pakistan for some years but recent reports suggest that
production is rising again. Farmers continue to oppose opium
eradication and suppression. The Pakistan military and
paramilitary use force to suppress opium in some tribal areas,
approaching these regions only in armoured vehicles;

• Bolivia's drug control program was helped by a
surge in worldwide coffee and cacao prices but farmers are
reinvesting in coca as prices for these substitute crops
fall.

33. Even on a geographically limited scale, based on
aggregate data, UNODC's rural development interventions cannot be
proved to have reduced drug cropping. A clear example of this can
be found in the Peru Coca Cultivation Survey of 2004, where the
amount of area under illicit cultivation in areas where AD
projects are present has remained unchanged.

34. There are three main constraints to the
analysis:

35. First, an examination of the chronological
pattern of drug production taken from official sources such as
UNODC's annual drug surveys indicates that drug crop production
rose in the 1980s and 1990s in response to improved markets
regardless of the presence of rural development projects. From
1995 onward the area under drug crop cultivation (although not
necessarily the value of the crops produced) dropped in many
places irrespective of the presence of AD projects.

• In Lao PDR poppy cultivation has as dropped
rapidly in areas without AD projects as in areas with AD
projects. There is little evidence that AD projects have
influenced Lao farmers' decisions not to grow drugs, although
there is evidence that sites with active or recently active AD
projects are better buffered against economic
hardship.

• In Peru the area under illicit crops increased by
14 per cent in 2004 according to UNODC"s Peru Coca Cultivation
Survey. The same survey shows that in those areas benefiting from
AD projects, the area under illicit crops remained
stable.

• In China and Viet Nam elimination of poppy
followed effective campaigns and eradication programs, not AD
interventions. AD was never practiced in China at all.

• In Lao PDR, Pakistan, Viet Nam and Latin America,
poorly designed AD projects actually increased drug crop
cultivation as farmers sought to participate in development
projects aimed at former drug cultivators6.