The Metaphysics of Peter Abelard

Abelard"s philosophy is the example in the Western
tradition of the cast of mind that is now called "nominalism."
Although it is his view that universals are mere words (nomina)
that is typically thought to justify the label, Abelard"s
nominalism-or, better, his irrealism-is in fact the hallmark of
his metaphysics. He is an irrealist not only about universals,
but also about propositions, events, times other than the
present, natural kinds, relations, wholes, absolute space,
hylomorphic composites, and the like. Instead, Abelard holds that
the concrete individual, in all its richness and variety, is more
than enough to populate the world. He preferred reductive,
atomist, and material explanations when he could get them; he
devoted a great deal of e?ort to pouring cold water on the
metaphysical excesses of his predecessors and contemporaries. Yet
unlike modern philosophers, Abelard did not conceive of
metaphysics as a distinct branch of philosophy. Following
Boethius, he distinguishes philosophy into three
branches:

logic, concerned with devising and assessing
argumentation, an activity also known as dialectic; physics,
concerned with speculation on the natures of things and their
causes; and ethics, concerned with the upright way of
life.1

Metaphysics falls under Abelard"s account of "physics"
as the second branch of philosophy, which is suciently broad to
allow for traditional metaphysical concerns as well as issues
proper to natural philosophy.2 Determining his metaphysical
commitments is a matter of teasing them out of his
discussions

in philosophy of language and natural
philosophy.

Antirealism

Abelard is notorious for his claim that
universals are nothing but words,a thesis he defends by arguing
at length that ontological realism about universals is
incoherent. More exactly, Abelard holds that there
cannot

be any real object in the world that
satis?es Boethius"s criteria for the universal: being present as
a whole in many at once so as to constitute their substance (i.e.
to make the individual in which it is present what it
is).

In his discussion of universals, Abelard
echoes Boethius"s own dialectical strategy by attacking the view
that the universal is a real constituent of each individual
thing, and thereafter the view that the universal

is the collection of things; to this
Abelard adds further arguments against a family of views that
identify the universal with the individual thing in some fashion
In each case Abelard tries to show that realism about universals
leads to absurd consequences.

Individuals

From his antirealist arguments, Abelard concludes that
there are no (nonsemantic) real objects in the world that satisfy
Boethius"s criteria for the universal, whether as things in their
own right or as real constituents of

or in things. Instead, everything that exists is
individual, or, as Abelard sometimes puts it, "personally
distinct.". He explains the individuality of the individual as
follows:

Thus we say that individuals consist only in their
personal distinctness, namely in that the individual is in itself
one thing, distinct from all others; even putting all its
accidents aside, it would always

remain in itself personally one-a man would neither be
made something else nor be any the less a this if his accidents
were taken away from him, e.g. if he were not bald or
snubnosed.

To understand this passage properly we have to consider
several topics.

First, the distinctive feature of individuals is their
individuality, which, as Abelard maintains here, is ontologically
primitive . Nearly all individuals, it turns out, are also
form-matter composites, the exceptions being God, angels, and
human beings; matter is basic and primary, whereas most forms are
reducible to and supervenient upon their material
components

Hylomorphic individuals are also one type within a wide
variety of integral wholes present in the world, wherein the form
is the organizing principle of the parts of the whole composite.
Individuals have natures, and thereby belong to natural kinds;
their natures also set the limits of what is possible.

Identity

Abelard endorses the traditional account of
identity, derived from Boethius, which holds that things may be
either generically, speci?cally, or numerically the same or
di?erent.Yet the distinctions represented in the traditional
account are not su-ciently -grained for Abelard"s philosophical
purposes. He elaborates an original theory of identity,
apparently developed in the instance for theological problems surrounding
the

Trinity, but of general application. Four
kinds of identity are at the heart of Abelard"s new theory:
essential sameness and di-erence, closely tied to numerical
sameness and di-erence; sameness and di?erence in de?nition;
sameness and di-erence in property (in proprietate).

Roughly, Abelard"s account of essential and
numerical sameness is intended to improve upon the
identity-conditions for things in the world given by the
traditional account; his account of sameness in de?nition in
meant to supply identity-conditions for the features of things;
and his account of sameness in property opens up the possibility
of there being di-erent identity-condiitons for a single thing
having several distinct features.

Conceptualism in
Abelard

For Abelard, as for the ancients, the
inquiry into knowledge began, not with the possibility of
knowledge, but with the fact of knowledge. We discourse about
Socrates, about men, about animals; and these discourses have
meaning because, normally, we know what we are talking
about.

Abelard raises two questions about universal nouns,
questions that he thinks are more important and more fruitful
than those posed earlier by Porphyry (Logica
Ingredientibus as quoted in Tweedale 1976,
92): [4]

There is the question as to what is the common cause of
the application [impositio] of universal nouns, in
virtue of which cause different things agree. Or there is the
question about the ideas associated with universal nouns, since
no thing seems to be conceived by those ideas nor do the
universal utterances seem to deal with any thing.

This passage indicates Abelard's twofold purpose in the
theory of knowledge. On the one hand, because he wanted to avoid
the kind of nominalism which implies that universals are merely
mental figments, he sought to discover the causes, in reality,
for the application of universal nouns to existing things. On the
other hand, because he wanted to avoid the kind of realism which
implies that universals or essences are material substances, he
sought to understand the nature of human abstractions, which he
held are not things. (As we shall see, the motivation for this
twofold purpose was at least partly theological: Abelard believed
that both nominalism and realism led to heresy.)

Against the nominalists, Abelard answers the first of
his questions as follows (Logica Ingredientibus as
quoted in Tweedale 1976, 205):

Individual men who are separate from each other, while
they differ both in their own essences and in their own forms …
nevertheless agree in this: that they are men. I do not say that
they agree in man, since a man is not any thing unless it is a
distinct man. Rather I say in being a man. Being a man is not a
man nor any thing if we consider the matter carefully…. We mean
merely that they are men and do not differ at all in this regard,
that is, not in as much as they are men, although we call on no
essence.

Abelard's point may seem obvious: that we call men 'men'
simply because they are indeed men. But Abelard is not attempting
here to define what it is to be a man. He is merely noting why
universals nouns are commonly applied — and showing a certain
courage in not losing sight of three crucial facts: (1) that we
do possess universal knowledge, (2) that the only things are
particulars (and therefore that "essences" do not exist), and (3)
that universals are truly tied to particulars.

Against the realists, Abelard contends that "being a
man" is not a universal thing, even though it is universally
applied — i.e., we cannot infer the existence of physical or
metaphysical universals from the existence of linguistic ones.
Abelard's phrase "being a man" is an example for him of
a dictum (roughly, a statement of how things
stand in the world), which is closely allied with his notion of
a status(roughly, the condition of being a certain
sort of thing). In the same passage as that quoted above,
Abelard declares that men "agree in
the status of a man, i.e. in this: that they
are men". Now Abelard admits that it may sound strange that
a dictum or status, neither of
which is a thing, could be the cause of the common application of
universal nouns; but he thinks that the demand that a cause be a
physical thing is spurious. And he is emphatic that
a dictum or statusis not a thing: "we
cannot call the status of a man the things
themselves established in the nature of man" (Logica
Ingredientibusas quoted in Tweedale 1976, 206).

Abelard's denial that natures are things is not a mere
logical quibble for him, but an issue of great theological
moment. For the main context of his denial is a discussion of the
status and meaning of the Trinity within Christian theology.
There existed two opinions concerning the Trinity: one was that
the Trinity exists "only in words, not in reality" (nominalism),
the other was that the Trinity exists "only in reality, not in
words" (realism). Now the first view leads to heresy, since it
claims that God is not truly three. And, Abelard argues, so also
the second view leads to heresy: for if the divine Persons are
different in reality, then their different natures or properties
require three separate essences, thus undermining the oneness of
God.

Yet according to Abelard the three Persons do have
different properties or natures. It is only that "when we hear
properties spoken of, we are not to understand that we believe
that there are some forms in God. Rather we speak of properties
as distinguishers…. Or if someone understands some forms by
this, it is certain that they are not in any way different from
the substances they are in" (Theologica
Christiana as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 191). "For if
the paternity is in God, is it not true that God the Father
consists of two items, i.e. of God and paternity, and that He
relates as a whole to these two which he is made up?" Abelard
answers: "Certainly not!" (Theologica Christiana as
quoted in Tweedale 1976, 193).

To overcome these theological difficulties, Abelard
attempts to develop a new mode of differentiation in which we use
"properties as distinguishers". For it was clear to him that both
God and God's paternity exist, and he realized that "exist" is
being used in two different senses here. "For when we say that a
man exists it is as though we posited a man in his manner of
substance, i.e. said that something is itself or that something
is a man. But if we say that paternity exists it is as though we
posited something to be a father, not paternity itself to be its
own essence" (Theologica Christiana as quoted in
Tweedale 1976, 195).

Thus all existence statements say that something is true
of an existing, concrete item. The first kind of statement says
that a concrete subject simply exists; the second states that a
particular thing possesses a certain property
or status or nature.

If, then, everything that is true is true of
particulars, whence universals? The fact that all particular men
agree in the dictum of "being a man" may be
the common cause of applying the term 'man' to them, but that
fact does not give us knowledge of what human beings are — and
it is this sort of knowledge that we associate with true,
universal knowledge of the things themselves. Types or natures
would seem to fit the bill, i.e., they seem to be things that are
truly predicated of many individuals at the same time — but
nowhere does Abelard take the easy way out by saying
this.

What Abelard says is that expressions
(sermones) are universals. This may strike the reader as
not much advanced from Roscelin's view that universals are
the flatus vocis (the blowing of the voice).
To buttress his claims, Abelard invokes the weight of Aristotle:
"he says that 'a universal is what is formed so as to be
predicated of many', that is, he draws on its formation, i.e. its
establishment. For what is the formation of expressions other
than their establishment by men? It gets its being a noun or an
expression from its establishment…. Thus we say that
expressions are universals since in virtue of their formation …
they are predicated of many" (Logica Nostrorum Petitioni
Sociorum as quoted in Tweedale 1976, 143).

It seems that earlier in his career, Abelard had held
the nominalist view that utterances (voces) are
universals, but that later on he revised his position. According
to his later view, utterances are the bare, concrete, physical
sounds of words, while sermones are these
sounds as vested by human beings with meaning
– sermones are, as it were, abstract yet
determinate entities. As we saw in the discussion of abstract
properties or types such as paternity, to say that a particular
thing "is" an abstract item (e.g., "Socrates is a biped") amounts
to noting a certain fact about a concrete item (Socrates has two
feet). Abelard applies this notion also to expressions: when he
says that expressions are universals, what he means is that
utterances have been established by human beings through language
as being universal, that is, as being predicable of many
simultaneously. Utterances (voces) established as
meaningful are expressions (sermones).

Now this talk of establishing utterances as meaningful
may lead one to believe that human beings impose on the world the
commonality of universals, or that meaning is merely a linguistic
convention. But Abelard is opposed to this view (Logica
Ingredientibus as quoted in Tweedale 1976,
208):

Now let us answer the question that we promised above to
discuss, namely whether the commonness of universal nouns is
judged to be due to a common cause of application
[impositio] or on account of a common conception or
both. Nothing prevents its being due to both, but that common
cause which is understood to pertain to the nature of things
seems to have the greater force.

It is all well for Abelard to say this, but what does he
claim is the cause of this objectivity of universal expressions?
What is the nature of the "common conceptions" that they provide
us with notions both universal and objective? Or, we moderns
might ask, what is it about the world and about the mind that
makes conceptual knowledge possible?

At first blush it may seem impossible to answer this
Kantian question in Abelardian terms, since there are in
Abelard's extant writings no treatments of the nature of the mind
or of the world. However, we do have his views on how the mind
interacts with the world to establish utterances as expressions
— that is, we are in possession of his theory of abstraction.
And his theory of abstraction is the explanatory key to Abelard's
views on universals.

Abelard's main presentation of the topic of abstraction
is contained in his Glosses on
Porphyry (McKeon 1929, 245-246):

In relation to abstraction it must be known that matter
and form always subsist mixed together, but the reason of the
mind has the following power: that it may now consider matter by
itself, now turn its attention to form alone, now conceive both
intermingled. The first two processes, of course, are by
abstraction; they abstract something from things that are
conjoined in order that they may consider something's very
nature. But the third process is by conjunction. For example, the
substance of this man is at once body and animal and man and
invested with infinite forms.

Abelard's examples are not so important here as the
method or procedure of "attending to" or "considering" only
certain aspects of a thing — for we could just as well attend to
a man's bipedality or paternity or whatnot in isolation from all
his other forms or attributes or properties. 

Thus according to Abelard, we observe concrete things
that are similar in a certain respect or property (e.g., that men
walk on two feet) — and, comparing the concrete instances and
attending only to the property of bipedality in isolation from
the other characteristics of human beings, we come to know that
man is a biped — that is, we establish the physical utterance
"biped" as a universal expression referring to a fact about human
beings that we have attended to. By attending, then, to each
characteristic we observe, we can understand the nature of
things, thereby building up a body of abstract, general knowledge
about concrete things.

We can now better understand the "mode of
differentiation" that Abelard developed to analyze the
notoriously thorny theological issue of the Trinity
(Theologica Christiana as quoted in Tweedale 1976,
190):

The Persons, i.e. the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are
different from each other in the way that things which are
different by definition or property are different; that is,
although the very same essence which is God the Son is God the
Father or God the Holy Spirit, nevertheless the property of God
the Father in as much as He is the Father is other than that of
the Son and that of the Holy Spirit.

According to Abelard, God has certain properties or
characteristics, but these are not in reality separate from His
nature or essence — they are "aspects" or "properties" of His
nature. The result is that when we attend to God's power, we say
"Father"; when we attend to His wisdom, we say "Son"; when we
attend to His love, we say "Holy Spirit". Nor are our words in
any way arbitrary: according to Abelard, God is indeed powerful,
wise, and loving, and we simply recognize those facts when we use
the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Further, despite Abelard's claim that "words change
their ordinary sense when their application is transferred from
creatures to God" (Marenbon 1997, 155), he decidedly does not
think that these principles of analysis apply only to God and the
Trinity. For even though Abelard cleaved to the common medieval
view that God is not a substance (Marenbon 1997, 124), he held
that the relation of the essence or nature God to the aspect or
property Father is the same as, generally, that of any substance
to any of its attributes or properties.  It is mainly
the latter, i.e. the properties or features of concrete things,
that we deal with in abstraction — and Abelard claims that, as
in the case of the Trinity, we deal with them truly.  Thus,
no matter how much truth may be a relation between the mind's
abstractive power and the particular concretes, Abelard's focus
is always fundamentally on the particular concretes, whence we
truly derive our conceptual knowledge of the world.Abelard's
conceptualism does not exclude a kind of objectivism.

Biography of
Peter Abelard

Abelard, Peter, born at Pailais, in Brittany,
1079. Designed for the military profession, he followed those of
philosophy and theology. His life was one of strange chances and
changes, brought about mainly through his love for Heloise, the
niece of one Fulbert, a Canon of the Cathedral of Paris, and by
his rationalistic views. Although a priest, he married Heloise
privately. He was condemned for heresy by the Council of
Soissons, 1121, and again by that of Sens, 1140; died at St.
Marcel, near Chalons-sur-Saoae, April 21, 1142. For a long time,
although his poetry had been referred to both by himself and by
Heloise, little of any moment was known except the Advent
hymn,Mittit ad Virginem, (q.v.). In 1838 Greith pub, in
his Spicihgium Vaticanum, pp. 123-131, six poems
which had been discovered in the Vatican. Later on, ninety-seven
hymns were found in the Royal Library at Brussels, and pub. in
the complete ed. of Abelard's works, by Cousin, Petri
Abx-lardi Opp., Paris, 1849. In that work is one of his
best-known hymns, Tuba Domini, Paule,
maxima (q.v.). Trench in his Sac. Lat.
Poetry, 1864, gives his Ornarunt terram
germina (one of a series of poems on the successive
days' work of the Creation), from Du Meril's Poesies
Popul. Lat. du Moyen Age, 1847, p. 444.

Peter Abelard:
Moral Influence

Abelard was a logician, scholastic philosopher, and
theologian from France. He is perhaps best known for his tragic
love affair with his student Heloise. Abelard and Heloise carried
on a passionate romance, until her uncle discovered them. They
were separated but still managed to conceive a child together and
secretly marry. Heloise"s uncle was outraged and sent a gang of
thugs to Abelard"s home. They beat him severely and even
castrated him! Abelard and Heloise spent the rest of their lives
devoted to the monastic life. They continued a correspondence
through letters that have become very well known. Abelard, a
contemporary of Anselm, rejected the idea that Jesus had to die
to satisfy the father"s offended honor.

"How cruel and wicked is seems that anyone should demand
the blood of an innocent person as the price for anything, or
that it should in any way please him that an innocent man should
be slain-still less that God should consider the death of his Son
so agreeable that by it he should be reconciled to the
world!"

Abelard is representative of the Moral Influence or
Exemplary model of the Atonement. He appeals to the effect Jesus"
death has in awakening our compassion and provoking our grief.
Through the remorse that we feel in contemplating the cross, we
share in the sufferings of Christ. In one of his
many letters to Heloise, Abelard writes:

"Have compassion on him who suffered willingly for your
redemption, and look with remorse on him who was crucified for
you…He himself is the way whereby the faithful pass from
exile to their own country. He too has set up the Cross, from
which he summons us as a ladder for us to use. On this, for you,
the only begotten Son of God was killed; he was made an offering
because he wished it. Grieve with compassion over him alone and
share his suffering in grief."

Because of the spectacular and unmerited act of love
that Christ has shown to sinners their hearts rightfully belong
to him. He has given us himself and in return he deserves our
whole selves. The Lord of all the universe desires us! This
should melt our hearts and inspire us to amendment of
life.

He bought you not with his wealth, but with himself. He
bought and redeemed you with his own blood. See what right he has
over you, and know how precious you are…You are greater
than heaven, greater than the world, for the Creator of the world
himself became the price for you. What has he seen in you, I ask
you, when he lacks nothing, to make him seek even the agonies of
a fearful and inglorious death in order to purchase
you?

Abelard believes that the revelation of God"s love in
Christ has the power to transform our hearts. The power of God"s
love is so great that it dethrones any contrary affection within
us. When we understand how much God loves us, we stop clinging to
sin and instead cling to Christ. In loving us God has made us his
children.

"Redemption is that greatest love kindled in us by
Christ"s passion, a love which not only delivers us from the
bondage of sin, but also acquires for us the true freedom of
children, where love instead of fear becomes the ruling
affection."

Christ justified us by taking our human nature. The
passion of Christ transforms our character. Our heart, changed by
the love of God, has a new willingness to serve him and endure
suffering. It creates boldness in us that we didn"t have
before.

"It seems to us that we are justified in the blood of
Christ and reconciled to God in this, that through the singular
grace manifested to us in that his son took our nature and that
teaching us by both word and example he persevered even unto
death, Jesus bound us closer to himself by love, so that, fired
by so great a benefit of divine grace, true charity would no
longer be afraid to endure anything for his sake."

Abelard emphasizes the subjective element of the
atonement. For Abelard, our crucial need is not that we satisfy
God"s wrath against us, but that we come to be repentance and
that our hearts be changed. For Abelard, the only thing God ask
is that we admit of failure, accept his love, and love him in
return.

References

*http://thepropertyofjesus.blogspot.com/2011/04/peter-abelard-moral-influence.html

*http://www.hymnary.org/person/Abelard_P

*http://stpeter.im/writings/rand/abelard.html

*http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Abelard_on_Metaphysics.CC.pdf

About the author:

Post-Doctor Omar Gómez
Castañeda, Senior, Ph.D

Filósofo, Economista e Historiador
Latinoamericano

*Doctor
en Filosofía,Distinción en Filosofía
Antigüa egresado de Belford University,Humble,Texas,Estados
Unidos en el año
2006.(www.belforduniversity.net/verification/).Graduate:
ID:RV414771-PASSWORD:44198958). *Miembro Asociado de
la Sociedad Venezolana de Filosofía,
Caracas,Distrito Capital(2006-Actualidad)
(cyoris[arroba]ucab.edu.ve).(Google:Sociedad Venezolana de
Filosofía). *Ex - Profesor Titular de la
Cátedra:"Historía de la Filosofía" en el
Diplomado en Filosofía dictado por el Departamento
de Capacitación Docente de
la Universidad Fermín Toro,Cabudare
Barquisimeto,Estado Lara(2007-08). *Investigador,escritor y
asesor de temas filosóficos(2006-Actualidad). *Creador
del Grupo de Filósofos en
Facebook(2008) (www.facebook.com). *Miembro y amigo a
través de Facebook (www.facebook.com) de
los grupos de: Filósofos y Filósofas de
Facebook;Colegio "Hermano Nectario María",Valencia,Estado
Carabobo,Venezuela y Humanidades y Educación de
la Universidad Central de Venezuela.

*Grupo de Filósofos y
Filósofas

*Filosofía y Más

*Filosofía Chile

*Filosofía Costa Rica

*Los Filósofos
Antigüos

Publicaciones,Obras y Trabajos:

*"Ensayo de
la interpretación filosófica
del hombre universal actual en
la economía globalizada de finales del Siglo
XX".Esta obra está registrada como documento
público,ante el Ministerio
de Justicia,Registro Subalterno del Primer
Circuito,Municipio Iribarren,Nº 20,Protocolo 3,del 24
de Octubre de 1997.Dirección:Calle 20,entre Carreras 15 y
16,Torre David,Piso 12,Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela.Esta
Obra también concursó ante el V Premio
de Investigación Filosófica Federico
Riu,auspiciado por la Embajada de España,la
Fundación Federico Riu y la Universidad Central de
Venezuela,Año 1998.

*Economía y
Filosofía:dos disciplinas sociales que se ocupan de
los problemas hombre y sus
posibles soluciones.Artículo alojado en
Contribuciones a la Economía(www.eumed.net).

*Filosofía Antigüa,Material
Compilado Universidad Fermín Toro,Cabudare,Estado
Lara(2006-2007).

*¿Qué es la Filosofía
del Siglo XXI? alojado en Contribuciones a la Economía
Agosto,2007.Texto completo en
http://www.edumed.netce/207b/orgc-0708.htm y en
www.pensardenuevo.com.

*¿Qué
es Lógica Filosófica? alojado en
Contribuciones a la Economía,Septiembre 2007.Texto
completo en
http://www.edumed.net/ce/207c/orgc-0710b.htm.¿Por
qué es necesario conocer de filosofía en nuestros
días? alojado en la Red Pensar de Nuevo,Buenos
Aires,Argentina(www.pensardenuevo.org).

*La Filosofía de la Economía
alojado en:
www.economicasunp.edu.ar/…/Gomez_Castañeda_Omar_Ricardo-La_filosofia_de_la_economia.pdf-Similares

*La meditación trascendental:Un
instrumento ó técnica para comprender
los principios de la Filosofía Antigüa
Hindú en nuestros días, alojado en el muro del
Grupo de Filósofos creado por el Post-Doctor Omar
Gómez C,Senior,Ph.D en Facebook(www.facebook.com),14 de
Julio del 2008.Alojado también en Zona
Económica(www.zonaeconómica.com), el 5 de Abril del
2009,a las 22:50.

*La razón y la fé,alojado en
los muros de:Grupo de Filósofos, Filósofos y
Filósofas de Facebook,Colegio Hermano Nectario
María,Valencia,Estado Carabobo,Venezuela y Humanidades y
Educación de la Universidad Central de Venezuela en
Facebook(www.facebook.com),14 de Agosto del 2008.Alojado
también en la Organización Pensar de
Nuevo(www.pensardenuevo.org).

*La Filosofía China,alojado el
23 de Abril del 2009 en
www.zonaeconomica.com/omar-gomez-castañeda/filosofia-china,Buenos
Aires,Argentina.

*Filosofía japonesa,alojado en
pensardenuevo.org/filosofia-japonesa/-

*La Filosofía y
Características de la Sociedad Venezolana actual y sus
Perspectivas a principios de éste siglo XXI,alojado el
14/7/2010 en
pensardenuevo.org/la-filosofia-y-caracteristicas-de-la-sociedad-

venezolana-actual-y-sus-perspectivas-a-principios-de-este-siglo..-

En caché-Similares.

*Ensayo sobre los Evangelios
Gnósticos en www.monografias.com.(2011)

*Influencia
del pensamiento aristotélico en la actualidad en
www.monografias.com(2011) .

*El Cosmos(Nuestro Universo),alojado en
www.monografias.com(2011) .

* La ética y la
moral,de elaboración propia.Trabajo donado a
la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Carrera
24,entre Calles 24 y 25,Barquisimeto,Estado
Lara,Venezuela,Año 2011.

*¿Qué es lo eterno y
qué es Dios? en
/trabajos85/que-es-lo-eterno-y-que-es-dios/que-es-lo-eterno-y-que-es-dios
y donado a la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Estado
Lara,Venezuela,Año 2011

*The Philosophy of the American dream en
/trabajos87/the-philosophy-of-the-american-dream/the-philosophy-of-the-american-dream

.*La energía geotérmica en:
/trabajos86/energia-geotermica/energia-geotermica.*El
Ente y el Ser en:
/trabajos87/ente-y-ser/ente-y-ser.

*Análisis de la sociedad
venezolana actual y sus perspectivas alojado en:
/trabajos87/analisis-sociedad-venezolana-actual-y-sus-perspectivas/analisis-sociedad-venezolana-actual-y-sus-perspectivas2

*Tales de Mileto,de elaboración
propia y donado a la Biblioteca del IUTIRLA,Sede
Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela.
iutirlalara[arroba]hotmail.com .Anaximandrode Mileto,de
elaboración propia y donado a la Biblioteca del
IUTIRLA,Sede Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela.
iutirlalara[arroba]hotmail.com .

*The Philosophy today in the World alojado
en:/trabajos89/the-philosophy-today-in-the-world/the-philosophy-today-in-the-world.

*El pueblo colombiano:Su
filosofía,cultura e historia en
/trabajos89/pueblo-colombiano-su-filosofia-cultura-e-historia/pueblo-colombiano-su-filosofia-cultura-e-historia

*El Bosón de Higgs en
/trabajos94/boson-higgs/boson-higgs

*Los nuevos agujeros en el centro del sol
en
/trabajos94/nuevos-agujeros-centro-del-sol/nuevos-agujeros-centro-del-sol

*La filosofía de René
Descates en
/trabajos97/filosofia-rene-descartes/filosofia-rene-descartes

*Vida,obra y pensamiento del filósofo Fernando
Savater,de elaboración propia y donado a la Biblioteca del
Instituto Universitario de Tecnología
Industrial(IUTIRLA),Sede Barquisimeto,Estado Lara,Venezuela.
iutirlalara@hotmail.com. Dicha donación fué
realizada el 30 de Agosto del 2013.

Autor:

Post-Doctor Omar Gómez Castañeda,
Senior, Ph.D